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Over	  the	  past	  few	  decades,	  a	  number	  of	  prominent	  scholars	  have	  attempted	  to	  apply	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  the	  study	  of	  International	  Relations	  (IR).	  These	  
applications	  have	  taken	  diverse	  forms	  and	  directions;	  nevertheless,	  many	  involve	  
using	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  criticise	  certain	  purportedly	  ‘scientific’	  approaches	  
to	  studying	  IR	  that	  have	  conventionally	  been	  labelled	  as	  ‘positivist’	  within	  the	  
discipline.	  One	  popular	  line	  of	  objection	  that	  is	  pursued	  in	  this	  context	  argues	  that	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  are	  committed	  to	  a	  problematic	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  –	  called	  the	  ‘mirror’	  or	  ‘picture’	  view	  –	  which	  Wittgenstein	  decisively	  
criticised	  in	  his	  later	  work.	  While	  many	  IR	  scholars	  and	  interpreters	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
later	  philosophy	  would	  be	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  overall	  aim	  and	  direction	  of	  this	  line	  of	  
argument,	  I	  contend	  that	  there	  are	  some	  problems	  with	  it	  which	  have	  the	  result	  that	  
it	  does	  not	  support	  the	  conclusions	  that	  it	  is	  meant	  to.	  I	  therefore	  use	  the	  
identification	  of	  these	  problems	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  developing	  an	  alternative	  
application	  of	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  IR,	  which	  can	  
replace	  the	  anti-­‐representationalist	  objection	  and	  provide	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  way	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In	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  critically	  evaluate,	  and	  attempt	  to	  replace,	  a	  particular	  line	  of	  
argument	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  has	  been	  used	  to	  make	  against	  so-­‐called	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  International	  Relations	  (IR).1	  The	  rough	  shape	  
of	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  that	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  are	  committed	  to	  a	  
problematic	  ‘representational’	  view	  of	  language	  that	  was	  discredited	  by	  Wittgenstein	  
in	  his	  later	  philosophy,	  and	  that	  such	  approaches	  should	  therefore	  accordingly	  be	  
abandoned.	  I	  will	  call	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  the	  ‘anti-­‐representationalist	  objection’	  (or	  
‘ARO’	  for	  short).	  The	  relevant	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  found	  principally	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
Friedrich	  Kratochwil	  (Kratochwil,	  1989;	  2001;	  2009),	  Veronique	  Pin-­‐Fat	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997;	  
2010)	  and	  Karin	  Fierke	  (Fierke,	  2002;	  2003;	  2010a),	  who	  are	  arguably	  the	  most	  
prolific	  and	  sustained	  appliers	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  IR.	  
	  
The	  ARO	  is	  an	  apparently	  promising	  line	  of	  argument	  towards	  which	  many	  scholars	  
and	  interpreters	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  would	  be	  sympathetic.	  However,	  as	  I	  
will	  explain,	  there	  are	  some	  problems	  and	  gaps	  with	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  as	  it	  
stands,	  which	  have	  the	  consequence	  that	  it	  does	  not	  fully	  support	  the	  conclusions	  
that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  seek	  to	  draw	  from	  it.	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  
therefore	  to	  come	  to	  these	  scholars’	  aid	  as	  a	  critical	  fellow	  traveller,	  to	  spell	  out	  
clearly	  what	  the	  difficulties	  with	  the	  ARO	  are,	  and	  to	  provide	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  
applying	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  IR	  that	  overcomes	  
these	  difficulties.	  I	  will	  base	  my	  modifications	  on	  a	  novel	  interpretation	  of	  relevant	  
remarks	  from	  Wittgenstein’s	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  which	  I	  will	  develop	  
through	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  the	  text	  informed	  by	  previous	  scholarship.	  By	  taking	  this	  
approach	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  re-­‐interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  
philosophy	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  ARO;	  nor	  that	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  successful,	  applications	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  must	  employ	  
faithful	  interpretations	  of	  his	  work.	  My	  rationale	  is	  simply	  that	  in	  my	  informed	  
opinion	  as	  an	  interpreter	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  a	  more	  textually	  sensitive	  reading	  of	  
                                                
1	  The	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘positivist’	  and	  ‘representational’	  in	  this	  context	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  
Chapter	  1.	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his	  work	  can	  yield	  applications	  that	  not	  only	  avoid	  the	  problems	  discussed,	  but	  also	  
provide	  more	  subtle	  and	  sophisticated	  ways	  to	  criticise	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  	  
	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  will	  be	  as	  follows:	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  introduction	  I	  
will	  provide	  a	  survey	  of	  existing	  applications	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  the	  
study	  of	  International	  Relations,	  and	  offer	  a	  justification	  for	  my	  focus	  on	  the	  ARO	  as	  it	  
appears	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke.	  In	  Chapter	  1,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  
detailed	  summary	  of	  the	  ARO	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke.	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  will	  undertake	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  
which	  I	  will	  identify	  and	  explain	  which	  aspects	  of	  the	  ARO	  are	  problematic.	  In	  Chapter	  
3,	  I	  will	  engage	  in	  a	  close	  textual	  reading	  of	  passages	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  PI	  from	  which	  
the	  ARO	  takes	  its	  lead,	  and	  highlight	  relevant	  points	  of	  contrast	  with	  the	  
interpretation	  employed	  by	  the	  ARO.	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  I	  will	  explain	  how	  these	  passages	  
of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  can	  be	  used	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  application	  
that	  overcomes	  the	  problems	  I	  identified	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  and	  demonstrate	  the	  
relevance	  of	  this	  application	  for	  past	  and	  current	  work	  in	  IR.	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  I	  will	  sum	  
up	  what	  has	  been	  achieved,	  draw	  some	  final	  conclusions	  concerning	  the	  usefulness	  
of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  for	  IR	  scholars,	  and	  suggest	  some	  future	  directions	  for	  
research.	  	  
	  
The	  thesis	  is	  original	  on	  a	  number	  of	  fronts.	  First	  of	  all,	  in	  evaluating	  the	  anti-­‐
representationalist	  objection	  I	  will	  be	  making	  novel	  observations	  and	  suggestions	  
about	  a	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  has	  popularly	  been	  employed	  in	  IR,	  which	  will	  hopefully	  
be	  of	  interest	  and	  use	  to	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  IR	  scholars.	  Secondly,	  by	  developing	  an	  
alternative	  way	  of	  applying	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  
criticise	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  I	  will	  be	  making	  an	  original	  contribution	  to	  the	  
methodological	  debates	  in	  the	  context	  of	  which	  the	  ARO	  has	  previously	  been	  
advanced.	  Thirdly,	  by	  using	  a	  re-­‐interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  
accomplish	  this,	  I	  will	  also	  be	  making	  an	  original	  contribution	  to	  Wittgenstein	  
scholarship	  –	  most	  notably	  concerning	  the	  exegesis	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  aims	  and	  
methods	  in	  the	  opening	  passages	  of	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations.	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Survey	  of	  Existing	  Applications	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  Philosophy	  to	  IR	  
	  
Types of Application 
 
So	  far,	  IR	  scholars	  have	  appealed	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  
These	  appeals	  can	  be	  divided	  roughly	  into	  three	  categories	  based	  on	  their	  level	  of	  
engagement	  with	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy:	  
	  
• Passing	  mentions	  
• Limited	  applications	  




Many	  appeals	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  in	  IR	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  what	  I	  call	  
‘passing	  mentions’.	  These	  are	  where	  IR	  scholars	  have	  alluded	  in	  passing	  to	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy,	  but	  have	  not	  engaged	  in	  in-­‐depth	  discussions	  of	  his	  work	  
in	  terms	  of	  its	  implications	  for	  IR.	  In	  such	  cases	  there	  is	  a	  reliance	  on	  secondary	  
literature	  with	  little	  or	  no	  explicit	  consideration	  of	  specific	  passages	  from	  
Wittgenstein’s	  texts.	  Passing	  mentions	  in	  this	  sense	  are	  found	  in	  Kratochwil	  (1978;	  
1981;	  1989:	  p.28;	  1993:	  p.65	  &	  75;	  2001:	  p.19-­‐20;	  2008:	  p.85;	  2009:	  p.144;	  2013;	  
2014:	  pp.	  11,	  20,	  53	  &	  58;	  2016:	  p.288),	  Frost	  (1986:	  p.18;	  1996:	  p.24),	  George	  
(1989),	  Neufeld	  (1993),	  Ruggie	  (1993:	  p.145),	  Edkins	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  (1995:	  p.49-­‐50;	  
1997:	  p.295-­‐6),	  Wind	  (1997:	  p.283,	  fn.	  32),	  Duffy,	  Frederking	  and	  Tucker	  (1998),	  Byers	  
(1999:	  p.148),	  Fierke	  and	  Wiener	  (1999),	  Pin-­‐Fat	  (2000:	  p.664;	  2005:	  p.219),	  Wight	  
(2002:	  p.42,	  2006:	  p.236),	  Debrix	  (2002),	  Zehfuss	  (2002:	  p.96),	  Welch	  (2003),	  
Inayatullah	  and	  Blaney	  (2004:	  p.128),	  Fierke	  (2007),	  Edkins	  and	  Zehfuss	  (2008:	  p.16),	  
Lebow	  (2008:	  p.35-­‐6),	  Wiener	  (2007:	  p.55;	  2009:	  p.189),	  Aalberts	  and	  van	  Munster	  
(2008),	  Kratochwil	  and	  Friedrichs	  (2009:	  p.703,	  fn.	  704	  &	  p.717),	  Ish-­‐Shalom	  (2011),	  
Kessler	  (2012),	  Kessler	  and	  Guillaume	  (2012),	  and	  Torsten	  (2012).	  Some	  of	  these	  
passing	  mentions	  are	  short	  paraphrases	  of	  claims	  or	  arguments	  that	  are	  allegedly	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found	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  work,2	  while	  others	  are	  potted	  intellectual	  histories	  situating	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  broader	  cultural	  movement	  or	  network	  of	  academic	  
influences	  linking	  philosophy	  to	  the	  social	  and	  political	  ‘sciences’.3	  Some	  are	  primarily	  
references	  to	  the	  work	  of	  other	  scholars	  who	  have	  applied	  Wittgenstein	  to	  the	  study	  
of	  IR,4	  and	  some	  are	  so	  brief	  that	  they	  can	  practically	  be	  regarded	  as	  name-­‐dropping.5	  
	  
Although	  many	  passing	  mentions	  are	  superficial	  references	  rather	  than	  fully	  worked	  
out	  interpretative	  arguments,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  the	  level	  of	  explicit	  
engagement	  with	  primary	  texts	  does	  not	  necessarily	  indicate	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
role	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  plays	  in	  the	  relevant	  IR	  scholar’s	  work.	  So,	  for	  
example,	  although	  most	  of	  Kratochwil’s	  appeals	  to	  Wittgenstein	  take	  the	  form	  of	  
brief	  paraphrases	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy,	  Kratochwil	  relies	  upon	  these	  passing	  
mentions	  of	  Wittgenstein	  and	  other	  related	  philosophers	  to	  support	  some	  of	  the	  




In	  contrast	  to	  passing	  mentions,	  some	  IR	  scholars	  have	  dedicated	  an	  extended	  
section	  of	  a	  paper	  or	  book	  to	  discussing	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  and	  its	  application	  
to	  the	  study	  of	  IR.	  Aside	  from	  the	  increased	  amount	  of	  space	  dedicated	  to	  discussing	  
                                                
2	  For	  example	  Kratochwil	  1993:	  p.65	  fn.10,	  2001:	  p.20,	  2009:	  p.205;	  Wind,	  2001:	  p.65;	  and	  Fierke,	  
2007:	  p.207.	  
3	  Such	  as	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.6,	  2001:	  p.19;	  Gould,	  2003:	  p.51;	  and	  Wight,	  2002:	  p.42.	  Such	  potted	  
histories	  are	  also	  found	  in	  textbooks	  on	  International	  Relations	  –	  for	  example,	  Anthony	  Burke	  writes	  in	  
The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  International	  Relations	  that	  “Postmodern	  writing	  in	  international	  relations	  
has	  arguably	  developed	  an	  epistemology	  (and	  a	  sociological	  analysis	  of	  power)	  that	  synthesises	  key	  
insights	  from	  the	  literature	  that	  developed	  and	  critiqued	  the	  semiology	  of	  Charles	  Pierce	  and	  
Ferdinand	  de	  Saussure,	  the	  language	  games	  of	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  and	  the	  structuralism	  of	  Claude	  
Levi-­‐Strauss,	  Jacques	  Lacan,	  Louis	  Althusser,	  and	  the	  early	  Michel	  Foucault”	  (Reus-­‐Smit	  and	  Snidal,	  
2008:	  p.362).	  
4	  For	  example,	  Wind,	  1997,	  2001:	  p.67,	  98;	  Zehfuss,	  2002;	  Debrix,	  2002:	  p.206-­‐7;	  Wiener,	  2007:	  p.55,	  
2009:	  p.189;	  Aalberts	  and	  van	  Munster,	  2008:	  p.729;	  and	  Neufeld,	  1993:	  p.56.	  Debrix	  (2002:	  p.206-­‐7),	  
Wiener	  (2007:	  p.55,	  2009:	  p.189),	  and	  Aalberts	  and	  van	  Munster	  (2008:	  p.729)	  base	  their	  comments	  
on	  Fierke’s	  applications	  of	  Wittgenstein	  to	  IR	  –	  in	  particular	  Fierke’s	  articles	  from	  1996,	  1998	  and	  2002	  
respectively;	  while	  Neufeld	  (1993:	  p.56)	  concentrates	  on	  the	  reading	  of	  Wittgenstein	  presented	  by	  
Hollis	  and	  Smith	  (1990).	  Meanwhile	  Wind	  (1997)	  discusses	  Onuf’s	  application	  of	  Wittgenstein	  (1989),	  
and	  Zehfuss	  (2002)	  refers	  to	  Kratochwil	  (Wind,	  1997:	  p.96).	  
5	  Frost,	  1986:	  p.17-­‐18;	  George,	  1989:	  p.273;	  Ruggie,	  1993:	  p.145;	  Frost,	  1996:	  p.24;	  Shaw,	  1999:	  p.79;	  
Fierke,	  1999:	  p.405;	  Welch,	  2003:	  p.312;	  Inayatullah	  and	  Blaney,	  2004:	  p.128;	  Ish-­‐Shalom,	  2011:	  p.480;	  
and	  Torsten,	  2012:	  p.219.	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Wittgenstein,	  the	  main	  difference	  from	  passing	  mentions	  is	  that	  there	  tends	  to	  be	  
more	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  ground	  summaries	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  with	  
references	  to	  primary	  texts	  as	  well	  as	  secondary	  literature.6	  Limited	  applications	  in	  
this	  sense	  are	  present	  in	  Spegele	  (1982),	  Onuf	  (1989,	  Chapter	  1),	  Hollis	  and	  Smith	  
(1990,	  Chapter	  8),7	  Wendt	  (1999,	  Chapter	  4),8	  Farrands	  (2001),	  Fierke	  and	  Nicholson	  
(2001),	  Wight	  (2006),9	  Kessler	  (2007),	  Fierke	  (2001,	  2004,	  2010b),10	  Navari	  (2011),	  
Aalberts	  (2012,	  Chapter	  5)	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  (2013:	  p.242-­‐250).	  
	  
There	  are	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  limited	  applications	  employ	  Wittgenstein’s	  
philosophy.	  Some	  summarise	  a	  specific	  part	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	  and	  use	  it	  to	  
challenge	  other	  scholars’	  approaches	  to	  studying	  IR.	  For	  example,	  Spegele	  uses	  the	  
so-­‐called	  ‘anti-­‐private-­‐language	  argument’	  from	  Wittgenstein’s	  Philosophical	  
Investigations	  (PI)	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  empiricist	  conceptions	  of	  ‘meaning’	  and	  
‘mind’	  espoused	  by	  systems	  theorists	  like	  Kaplan	  and	  Laszlo	  (Spegele,	  1982:	  pp.	  569-­‐
571).11	  Other	  limited	  applications	  use	  one	  or	  more	  aspects	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
philosophy	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  developing	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  thinking	  about	  
International	  Relations.	  The	  most	  famous	  example	  is	  Onuf’s	  employment	  of	  later	  
Wittgenstein’s	  emphasis	  on	  language-­‐use	  and	  remarks	  on	  rules	  and	  rule-­‐following	  as	  
the	  starting	  point	  for	  recommending	  a	  ‘constructivist’	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  IR	  
(Onuf,	  1989:	  p.35,	  p.46).12	  Meanwhile,	  some	  limited	  applications	  try	  to	  reconcile	  
other	  scholars’	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  IR	  with	  more	  
conventional	  approaches	  such	  as	  systems	  analysis	  and	  rational	  choice	  theory	  (For	  
                                                
6	  Although	  not	  in	  all	  cases,	  see	  e.g.	  Navari,	  2011:	  p.615-­‐6	  for	  an	  exception.	  
7	  Hollis	  and	  Smith,	  1990:	  pp.8,	  82-­‐4,	  170,	  176-­‐81,	  184	  f.,	  193	  f.,	  200,	  204	  ff.,	  220	  
8	  Wendt,	  1999:	  pp.172,	  176,	  179,	  183	  
9	  Wight,	  2006:	  pp.137,	  142,	  148,	  177,	  208,	  236,	  263,	  276,	  278	  
10	  Fierke,	  2010b:	  	  p.187	  
11	  For	  the	  relevant	  passages	  in	  Kaplan	  and	  Laszlo	  see	  Kaplan,	  1969:	  p.20-­‐1,	  and	  Laszlo,	  1970:	  p.72.	  
Other	  examples	  are	  found	  in	  Fierke	  (2001,	  2005	  and	  2010b).	  
12	  Other	  examples	  are	  Hollis	  and	  Smith,	  1990;	  Kessler,	  2007;	  Farrands,	  2000;	  Navari,	  2011;	  Aalberts,	  
2012	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2013.	  Kessler	  appeals	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  remarks	  on	  rules	  and	  rule-­‐following	  to	  
support	  a	  ‘radical	  constructivist’	  attempt	  to	  rethink	  intersubjectivity	  and	  get	  around	  the	  so-­‐called	  
‘agent-­‐structure	  problem’	  in	  IR	  (Kessler,	  2007:	  p.264-­‐5),	  while	  Navari	  argues	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  
work	  contains	  a	  “meta-­‐theory	  of	  knowledge”	  and	  a	  “social	  theory	  of	  concept	  formation”	  that	  can	  
ground	  an	  approach	  to	  IR	  focused	  on	  practices	  as	  the	  basic	  constituents	  of	  social	  life	  (Navari,	  2011).	  In	  
her	  2013	  article	  Pin-­‐Fat	  uses	  Cavell’s	  interpretation	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein	  to	  underpin	  a	  so-­‐called	  
‘grammatical’	  approach	  to	  developing	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  ‘cosmopolitanism’,	  which	  she	  also	  
defends	  in	  her	  later	  article	  on	  ‘Cosmopolitanism	  Without	  Foundations’	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2015).	  
 12  
example,	  Wendt,	  1999:	  p.179	  and	  182;	  Fierke	  and	  Nicholson,	  2001).13	  In	  some	  cases,	  
a	  combination	  of	  these	  strategies	  is	  employed	  (Fierke	  and	  Nicholson,	  2001).	  
	  
Substantial	  applications	  	  
	  
Finally,	  some	  IR	  scholars	  have	  dedicated	  whole	  articles	  or	  books	  to	  applying	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  the	  study	  of	  IR.	  Substantial	  applications	  in	  this	  sense	  
include	  Pin-­‐Fat	  (1997;	  2010;	  2015),	  Fierke	  (2002,	  2003,	  2010a),	  Farrands	  (2000)	  and	  
Gunnell	  (2011).	  In	  terms	  of	  strategy	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  distinction	  between	  limited	  
applications	  and	  substantial	  applications,	  and	  the	  different	  ways	  of	  applying	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  identified	  in	  the	  last	  subsection	  also	  apply	  here.	  For	  
example,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  (1997,	  2010),	  Fierke	  (2002,	  2003,	  2010a)	  and	  Gunnell	  (2011)14	  use	  
elements	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  criticise	  the	  work	  of	  other	  IR	  scholars;	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  (1997,	  2010,	  2013,	  2015),	  Fierke	  (2002,	  2003,	  2010a)	  and	  Farrands	  (2000)	  use	  
Wittgenstein	  to	  ground	  new	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  IR;	  and	  Fierke	  (2002,	  2003,	  
2010a)	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  (2010)	  try	  to	  reconcile	  Wittgensteinian	  approaches	  to	  studying	  IR	  
with	  elements	  of	  other	  approaches	  derived	  from	  Structuralism,	  Speech-­‐Act	  Theory	  
and	  Postmodernism.	  There	  is	  also	  some	  overlap	  between	  limited	  and	  substantial	  
applications	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  same	  scholar	  has	  produced	  works	  that	  fall	  into	  both	  
categories	  (e.g.	  Fierke	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat).	  In	  these	  cases,	  limited	  applications	  can	  with	  
caution	  be	  treated	  as	  extrapolations	  of	  substantial	  applications	  by	  the	  same	  author,	  
and	  vice	  versa.	  	  	  
	  
                                                
13	  Wendt	  tries	  to	  synthesize	  the	  ‘public’	  conception	  of	  meaning	  arrived	  at	  by	  “post-­‐Wttgensteinian	  
philosophers	  of	  action”	  with	  some	  form	  of	  individualism	  to	  allow	  for	  agentive	  explanations	  (Wendt,	  
1999:	  p.179),	  and	  suggests	  a	  compatibility	  between	  Hollis	  and	  Smith’s	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  approach	  
to	  understanding	  IR	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘games,’	  and	  alternative	  approaches	  based	  on	  von	  Neumann-­‐
Morgenstern	  “game	  theory”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.182).	  In	  their	  2001	  article	  Fierke	  and	  Nicholson	  take	  up	  
Wendt’s	  suggestion	  and	  explore	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  two	  approaches	  to	  thinking	  about	  IR	  in	  terms	  of	  
games	  compliment	  one	  another	  (Fierke	  and	  Nicholson,	  2001).	  
14	  Gunnell	  is	  distinct	  from	  other	  scholars	  who	  use	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  criticise	  certain	  
approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  IR,	  in	  that	  Gunnell	  criticises	  IR	  scholars	  for	  appealing	  to	  philosophy	  to	  
ground	  their	  methodologies	  –	  and	  therefore	  his	  criticisms	  also	  apply	  to	  scholars	  such	  as	  Onuf,	  
Kratochwil,	  Fierke	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  who	  try	  to	  use	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  new	  
approach	  to	  IR.	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Wittgenstein and the Anti-Representationalist Objection  
	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  last	  sub-­‐section,	  applications	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  
IR	  have	  taken	  various	  forms	  and	  directions.	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  this	  diversity,	  there	  
are	  some	  common	  themes	  and	  lines	  of	  argument	  that	  emerge	  from	  surveying	  these	  
applications.	  One	  such	  theme	  is	  that	  IR	  scholars	  who	  appeal	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  
philosophy	  often	  do	  so	  in	  order	  to	  support	  their	  objection	  to	  certain	  purportedly	  
scientific	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  IR	  that	  have	  conventionally	  been	  labelled	  as	  
‘positivist’	  within	  the	  discipline.15	  This	  anti-­‐positivist	  implementation	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  is	  used	  or	  mentioned	  by	  a	  range	  of	  IR	  scholars,	  but	  is	  most	  
fully	  developed	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  who	  are	  arguably	  the	  
three	  most	  prolific	  appliers	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  IR	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
comparative	  frequency	  and	  longevity	  of	  their	  applications.16	  	  	  
	  
Thus	  in	  Rules,	  Norms	  and	  Decisions,	  we	  find	  Kratochwil	  appealing	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  
later	  philosophy	  to	  support	  his	  campaign	  against	  a	  “positivist	  epistemology”	  in	  IR	  that	  
“treats	  norms	  as	  ‘causes’”	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  	  p.5-­‐6).	  This	  strategy	  is	  maintained	  by	  
Kratochwil	  throughout	  subsequent	  work,	  where	  he	  cites	  Wittgenstein	  in	  opposing	  
                                                
15	  A	  full	  discussion	  and	  outline	  of	  what	  ‘positivism’	  means	  in	  this	  context	  will	  be	  provided	  in	  Section	  1.2	  
of	  the	  next	  Chapter.	  
16	  Kratochwil	  appeals	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  in	  at	  least	  seven	  different	  works	  spanning	  the	  
course	  of	  his	  career,	  while	  Fierke	  appeals	  to	  Wittgenstein	  in	  eight	  of	  hers	  (see	  works	  referenced	  in	  the	  
preceding	  subsection).	  Meanwhile,	  as	  Pin-­‐Fat	  writes,	  “Wittgenstein’s	  contribution	  appears	  in	  all	  my	  
previous	  work”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2013:	  p.242,	  fn.	  4).	  This	  is	  contrasted	  with	  other	  appliers	  of	  Wittgenstein	  to	  
IR,	  who	  cite	  Wittgenstein	  in	  at	  most	  four	  works	  and	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  such	  a	  sustained	  engagement	  
with	  his	  thought.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  peer	  references	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  
are	  regarded	  within	  IR	  as	  pre-­‐eminent	  appliers	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy,	  since	  they	  are	  cited	  in	  
various	  introductory	  texts	  and	  surveys	  as	  representatives	  of	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  approaches	  to	  the	  
subject.	  For	  example,	  in	  Global	  Politics:	  A	  New	  Introduction,	  Fierke’s	  2002	  article	  is	  picked	  out	  as	  “an	  
introduction	  to	  the	  relevance	  of	  Wittgenstein	  for	  global	  politics”	  (Edlkins	  and	  Zehfuss,	  2008:	  p.37);	  
while	  Kratochwil’s	  1989	  book	  is	  cited	  in	  the	  Handbook	  of	  International	  Relations	  as	  the	  primary	  work	  
instantiating	  the	  “modernist	  linguistic	  or	  rule-­‐oriented”	  branch	  of	  ‘constructivism’	  based	  on	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  (Carlsnaes,	  Risse	  &	  Simmons,	  2002:	  p.116).	  Both	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  are	  
also	  cited	  by	  Kessler	  as	  the	  main	  Constructivist	  IR	  scholars	  who	  have	  used	  “the	  linguistic	  turn”	  in	  IR	  
(Kessler,	  2007:	  p.261).	  Moreover,	  Kratochwil	  is	  also	  among	  the	  most	  influential	  IR	  scholars	  to	  have	  
applied	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  IR,	  since	  his	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  book	  Rules,	  Norms	  and	  
Decisions	  (1989)	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  seminal	  work	  which	  was	  instrumental	  in	  the	  
establishment	  of	  ‘constructivism’	  as	  an	  alternative	  framework	  or	  tradition	  for	  studying	  IR.	  For	  
example,	  Jan	  Klabbers	  writes	  that	  “When	  Rules,	  Norms,	  and	  Decisions	  appeared,	  it	  almost	  single-­‐
handedly	  changed	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations,	  drawing	  inspiration	  from	  Wittgenstein,	  speech	  
act	  theory	  and	  both	  the	  communicative	  theorizing	  of	  Habermas	  and	  the	  legal	  theory	  of	  Hart”	  (2015:	  
p.1196).	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the	  idea	  “of	  a	  science	  of	  international	  relations	  …	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  hypothetical-­‐
deductive	  model”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [1981]:	  p.28),	  and	  contrasts	  the	  traditional	  
“epistemological	  project”	  of	  IR	  with	  the	  approaches	  of	  IR	  scholars	  who	  have	  been	  
“influenced	  by	  Wittgenstein	  and	  language	  philosophy”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2009]:	  
p.203	  &	  205).	  Similarly,	  in	  her	  1997	  article	  and	  2010	  book,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  uses	  her	  
interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  challenge	  the	  assumptions	  of	  
Kenneth	  Waltz	  whose	  “neo-­‐Realist”	  methodology	  she	  identifies	  as	  epitomising	  
“positivist	  approaches	  to	  IR”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997;	  2010:	  p.34),	  and	  pits	  later	  Wittgenstein	  
against	  an	  “empiricist-­‐positivist	  approach”	  which	  seeks	  to	  apply	  “scientific	  method”	  
to	  international	  politics	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.12-­‐13).	  Although	  this	  anti-­‐positivist	  focus	  
does	  not	  feature	  so	  heavily	  in	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  more	  recent	  work,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  clearly	  still	  sets	  
store	  in	  the	  anti-­‐positivist	  focus	  of	  her	  previous	  application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
philosophy	  to	  IR.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  her	  continued	  recommendation	  of	  her	  2010	  
book	  as	  “the	  full	  account	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  grammatical	  reading,	  its	  elaboration	  
of	  key	  themes	  in	  the	  later	  philosophy	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  and	  its	  significance	  for	  global	  
politics”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2013:	  p.243,	  fn.7),	  and	  also	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  continues	  to	  
repeat	  some	  of	  the	  main	  interpretive	  and	  philosophical	  claims	  she	  used	  previously	  to	  
argue	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  (e.g.	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2013:	  p.250;	  2015:	  p.87-­‐88).	  
Finally,	  Fierke	  –	  like	  Pin-­‐Fat	  –	  identifies	  Waltz’s	  Theory	  of	  international	  Politics	  as	  “the	  
most	  prominent	  expression	  of	  ‘positivist’	  international	  relations”	  (Fierke,	  2003:	  
p.336),	  and	  uses	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  criticise	  this	  and	  other	  
“explanatory	  theories”	  in	  IR	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84).	  This	  anti-­‐positivist	  presentation	  of	  
the	  relevance	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  for	  IR	  runs	  through	  the	  majority	  of	  
Fierke’s	  books	  and	  articles	  (e.g.	  Fierke,	  1998:	  p.12	  &	  17;	  2002:	  p.332;	  2003;	  2010a;	  
2010b:	  p.173-­‐4;	  2013:	  p.24-­‐26;	  2016a:	  p.72-­‐3	  and	  2016b:	  p.220).	  
	  
While	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  are	  the	  most	  consistent	  and	  prolific	  appliers	  of	  
later	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  argue	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  there	  
are	  also	  other	  IR	  scholars	  and	  commentators	  who	  associate	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  
philosophy	  with	  an	  ‘anti-­‐positivist’	  stance.	  Some	  base	  their	  comments	  on	  the	  
influence	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  on	  Peter	  Winch,	  who	  in	  The	  Idea	  of	  a	  
Social	  Science	  famously	  argued	  against	  the	  application	  of	  methods	  from	  the	  so-­‐called	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‘natural	  sciences’	  to	  social	  affairs	  (Winch,	  1958:	  p.1).	  Thus	  Mervyn	  Frost,	  having	  
attributed	  the	  ‘backwardness’	  of	  IR	  to	  a	  “positivist	  bias”,	  notes	  that	  Winch	  “combined	  
the	  insights”	  of	  “Max	  Weber	  and	  Wilhelm	  Dilthey	  …	  with	  some	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  
the	  philosophical	  work	  done	  by	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  in	  his	  later	  period”,	  resulting	  in	  
“a	  rejection	  of	  the	  positivist	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  reality”	  (Frost,	  
1986:	  p.18).	  Meanwhile	  others	  simply	  note	  the	  popularity	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein	  
among	  IR	  scholars	  who	  are	  opposed	  to	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  within	  the	  discipline.	  
So,	  for	  example,	  Jim	  George	  refers	  to	  IR	  scholars’	  “renewed	  interest	  in	  Wittgenstein	  
and	  elements	  of	  the	  analytical	  philosophy	  school	  and	  their	  dissent	  against	  the	  
hegemony	  of	  logical	  positivism”	  (George,	  1989:	  p.273,	  fn.	  4).	  Finally,	  Aalberts	  and	  van	  
Munster	  cite	  Wittgenstein’s	  PI	  in	  objecting	  to	  some	  IR	  scholars’	  endorsement	  of	  a	  
“positivist	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth’”	  (2008:	  p.729).	  This	  
demonstrates	  how	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  has	  become	  widely	  associated	  with	  
anti-­‐positivism	  within	  IR,	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke.	  	  
	  
Again,	  there	  are	  various	  lines	  of	  objection	  that	  are	  pursued	  by	  scholars	  who	  use	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  argue	  against	  what	  they	  regard	  as	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  to	  IR.	  However,	  one	  line	  of	  objection	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  particularly	  
popular	  in	  this	  context	  is	  one	  that	  I	  am	  calling	  the	  ‘anti-­‐representationalist	  objection’	  
(ARO).	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  fully	  fleshed-­‐out	  summary	  of	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  the	  next	  
chapter,	  but	  for	  introductory	  purposes	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  runs	  as	  follows:	  
	  
(1) ‘Positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  are	  committed	  to	  a	  ‘representational’	  view	  of	  
language	  (commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘picture’	  or	  ‘mirror’	  view	  of	  
language);	  
(2) This	  view	  of	  language	  has	  been	  decisively	  criticised	  by	  later	  Wittgenstein;	  
(3) ‘Positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  should	  therefore	  be	  avoided.	  
	  
The	  above	  line	  of	  argument	  features	  prominently	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke,	  who	  I	  have	  argued	  are	  three	  of	  the	  most	  prolific	  and	  sustained	  appliers	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  IR.	  This	  specific	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  found,	  among	  other	  
places,	  in	  Kratochwil	  (1989:	  p.5-­‐6),	  Fierke	  (2010a:	  p.93-­‐4),	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  (2010:	  p.8-­‐9	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and	  12-­‐13),	  and	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  details	  of	  these	  scholars’	  renditions	  of	  the	  ARO	  at	  
length	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  This	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  also	  presented	  and	  referred	  to	  by	  
other	  IR	  scholars	  who	  cite	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  as	  its	  proponents,	  such	  as	  
when	  Aalberts	  and	  van	  Munster	  articulate	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  with	  reference	  to	  
Fierke	  in	  discussing	  the	  problem	  that	  so-­‐called	  ‘conventional	  constructivists’	  such	  as	  
Wendt	  have	  in	  taking	  inter-­‐subjectivity	  and	  the	  interpretive	  aspects	  of	  social	  life	  
seriously.17	  	  
	  
Justification	  for	  Focusing	  on	  the	  ARO	  
	  
As	  I	  indicated	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  introduction,	  it	  is	  this	  ‘anti-­‐representationalist’	  
line	  of	  objection	  (ARO)	  to	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  that	  I	  will	  be	  focusing	  on	  in	  the	  
thesis.	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  my	  choice	  of	  topic:	  
	  
• Firstly,	  the	  ARO	  is	  obviously	  an	  attractive	  prospect	  for	  IR	  scholars	  who	  want	  
to	  apply	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy,	  as	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  
employed	  in	  the	  main	  works	  of	  the	  three	  most	  prolific	  and	  sustained	  appliers	  
of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  IR.	  
	  
• Secondly,	  the	  ARO	  has	  clearly	  been	  quite	  influential	  within	  IR,	  having	  been	  
identified	  by	  commentators	  as	  a	  strong	  suit	  of	  those	  who	  have	  used	  
Wittgenstein	  to	  argue	  against	  so-­‐called	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  the	  
discipline	  (e.g.	  Debrix,	  2002:	  p.202	  &	  p.206;	  Aalberts	  and	  van	  Munster,	  2008:	  
p.728).	  In	  addition,	  the	  two	  main	  ideas	  that	  motivate	  the	  ARO	  (i.e.	  that	  
Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  is	  ‘anti-­‐positivist’,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  directed	  
fundamentally	  against	  a	  ‘representational’	  view	  of	  language)	  are	  common	  
                                                
17	  “The	  fact	  that	  conventional	  constructivists	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  dealing	  with	  this	  is	  a	  direct	  consequence	  
of	  a	  positivist	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth.’	  That	  is,	  they	  assume	  truth	  to	  be	  out	  there	  
in	  the	  world,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  job	  of	  scholars	  to	  discover	  theories	  that	  correspond	  with	  that	  world.	  As	  such	  
these	  statements	  are	  to	  be	  tested	  against	  reality.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  problematic	  when	  that	  reality	  is	  
socially	  constructed	  and	  reconstructed	  by	  our	  very	  practices	  and	  language.	  Facts	  do	  not	  speak	  for	  
themselves,	  but	  are	  construed	  within	  our	  theoretical	  and	  discursive	  frameworks,	  as	  reflectivists	  and	  
critical	  constructivists	  have	  convincingly	  claimed,	  and	  language	  is	  not	  a	  neutral	  medium	  to	  mirror	  the	  
independent	  reality	  (cf.	  Fierke,	  2002,	  see	  Wittgenstein,	  1952;	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe,	  1985).”	  (Aalberts	  and	  
van	  Munster,	  2008:	  p.728,	  my	  emphasis).	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assumptions	  that	  crop	  up	  when	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  is	  mentioned	  or	  
utilised	  by	  IR	  scholars	  more	  generally.18	  	  
	  
• Thirdly,	  out	  of	  the	  various	  ‘anti-­‐positivist’	  arguments	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  
philosophy	  has	  been	  used	  to	  make	  in	  IR,	  the	  ARO	  is	  in	  my	  eyes	  the	  most	  
problematic	  (at	  least	  in	  its	  current	  formulations	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke).	  Hence	  it	  would	  benefit	  from	  a	  critical	  intervention.	  
	  
• Fourthly,	  although	  I	  can	  see	  some	  problems	  with	  the	  ARO	  as	  a	  line	  of	  
argument,	  I	  am	  (as	  I	  have	  mentioned	  previously)	  sympathetic	  to	  its	  overall	  
aims	  in	  challenging	  the	  sorts	  of	  approaches	  to	  IR	  that	  are	  identified	  as	  
‘positivist’	  within	  the	  discipline.	  Therefore,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  help	  to	  strengthen	  
the	  case	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  in	  IR	  by	  critically	  examining	  and	  
replacing	  the	  ARO.	  
	  
To	  summarise:	  the	  ARO	  is	  a	  distinctive	  and	  influential	  line	  of	  argument	  which	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  has	  been	  used	  to	  make	  in	  IR.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  in	  
which	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  has	  been	  employed	  in	  IR,	  nor	  the	  only	  way	  in	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  has	  been	  used	  to	  argue	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  
IR,	  it	  is	  notable	  because	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  three	  IR	  scholars	  who	  are	  most	  
prolific	  and	  sustained	  in	  their	  application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  IR:	  namely,	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke.	  Other	  scholars	  commentating	  on	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke’s	  applications	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  have	  identified	  the	  ARO	  as	  a	  
strong	  suit	  and,	  in	  addition,	  there	  are	  key	  elements	  of	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  are	  
commonly	  assumed	  by	  IR	  scholars	  who	  write	  about	  Wittgenstein’s	  relevance	  for	  IR	  
more	  generally.	  Given	  the	  above	  considerations,	  the	  ARO	  stands	  out	  as	  a	  specific	  
aspect	  of	  applying	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  in	  IR	  that	  would	  particularly	  benefit	  
from	  critical	  examination.	  	  
                                                
18	  For	  example,	  Farrands	  writes	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  “takes	  the	  rejection”	  of	  a	  
‘correspondence’	  view	  of	  linguistic	  truth	  and	  meaning	  “as	  its	  starting	  point”,	  and	  “requires	  a	  non-­‐
positivist	  account	  of	  language”	  (Farrands,	  2000:	  p.	  83	  &	  93);	  meanwhile,	  Ruggie	  presents	  Wittgenstein	  
as	  one	  of	  a	  host	  of	  intellectuals	  who	  were	  responsible	  for	  ‘shattering’	  the	  aspiration	  of	  modernity	  “to	  
develop	  objective	  science,	  universal	  morality	  and	  law,	  and	  autonomous	  art,	  according	  to	  their	  inner	  
logic”	  (Ruggie,	  1993:	  p.145;	  Habermas,	  1981:	  p.9).	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That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  it	  would	  not	  also	  be	  useful	  to	  critically	  examine	  the	  various	  
other	  arguments	  and	  approaches	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  has	  been	  used	  to	  
support	  in	  IR.	  Rather:	  given	  the	  necessity	  of	  selecting	  a	  more	  specific	  focus	  within	  the	  
broad	  and	  varied	  topic	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  application	  to	  IR,	  the	  ARO	  is	  a	  deserving	  case	  
on	  which	  to	  home	  in.	  As	  such,	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  strive	  to	  offer	  a	  general	  verdict	  on	  
existing	  applications	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  IR,	  but	  to	  offer	  a	  judgement	  on	  a	  
particularly	  influential	  and	  popular	  strand	  thereof,	  and	  thereby	  accomplish	  one	  part	  
of	  a	  larger	  body	  of	  work	  that	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  thorough	  general	  
assessment	  of	  existing	  applications	  of	  Wittgenstein	  to	  IR.	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  
introduction,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  contribution	  that	  the	  thesis	  will	  make,	  since	  the	  
critical	  assessment	  of	  the	  ARO	  will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  thesis	  as	  a	  basis	  
for	  developing	  an	  alternative	  and	  more	  fruitful	  application	  of	  the	  relevant	  remarks	  
from	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  IR.	  	  
	  
The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  thesis	  will	  thus	  be	  on	  the	  ARO	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  
the	  works	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke.	  As	  such,	  my	  summary	  and	  critical	  
evaluation	  of	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  the	  first	  two	  chapters	  will	  be	  based	  on	  selected	  
passages	  by	  these	  three	  scholars,	  in	  which	  the	  ARO	  is	  most	  clearly	  expressed	  and	  
elaborated.	  This	  selective	  approach	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  some	  suspicions	  of	  ‘cherry-­‐
picking’,	  which	  I	  should	  like	  to	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  allay	  at	  this	  point.	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  
of	  course	  true	  that	  the	  ARO	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  every	  piece	  of	  writing	  by	  Kratochwil,	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke.	  These	  scholars	  do	  not	  mention	  or	  employ	  the	  ARO	  every	  time	  they	  
apply	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy,	  and	  they	  also	  draw	  on	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  in	  
other	  ways	  that	  are	  unconnected	  with	  the	  ARO.	  However,	  the	  ARO	  nevertheless	  
forms	  an	  important	  and	  influential	  part	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  scholars	  have	  
employed	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  argue	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  
and	  is	  a	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  they	  all	  continue	  to	  stand	  by	  as	  an	  authoritative	  
component	  of	  their	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  contribution	  to	  their	  discipline.19	  Therefore	  
                                                
19	  For	  example,	  Kratochwil	  puts	  forward	  or	  alludes	  to	  the	  ARO	  in	  books	  and	  articles	  spanning	  his	  whole	  
career,	  including	  1989	  (p.28),	  1993	  (p.76),	  2001	  (p.19-­‐20),	  2009,	  2013	  (p.2),	  2014	  (pp.11,	  20,	  53	  &	  58)	  
and	  2016	  (p.288).	  In	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  case,	  although	  the	  ARO	  does	  not	  appear	  explicitly	  or	  in	  its	  entirety	  in	  her	  
more	  recent	  work,	  it	  does	  appear	  in	  the	  2010	  book	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  continues	  to	  cite	  as	  her	  definitive	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it	  is	  not	  unjustified	  to	  extract	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  from	  these	  scholars’	  wider	  efforts	  
in	  order	  to	  subject	  it	  to	  a	  thorough	  critical	  examination.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  although	  my	  critical	  summary	  and	  evaluation	  of	  the	  ARO	  will	  involve	  
concentrating	  on	  certain	  aspects	  and	  passages	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  
writings	  at	  the	  exclusion	  of	  others,	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  this	  strategy	  is	  not	  to	  dwell	  
unfairly	  on	  the	  ‘weaker’	  parts	  of	  these	  scholars’	  work,	  but	  to	  bring	  out	  the	  most	  
representative	  expressions	  of	  the	  ARO	  in	  order	  to	  undertake	  the	  fullest	  and	  fairest	  
examination	  of	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  as	  these	  scholars	  understand	  it.	  This	  may	  involve	  
leaving	  substantial	  tracts	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  work	  out	  of	  the	  
discussion.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  that	  this	  material	  has	  been	  ignored	  or	  overlooked,	  but	  
that,	  having	  been	  read	  and	  taken	  into	  account,	  it	  has	  been	  found	  either	  not	  to	  
contain	  references	  to	  the	  particular	  line	  of	  argument	  being	  examined,	  or	  to	  contain	  
references	  to	  the	  ARO	  that	  are	  inferior	  in	  length	  or	  detail	  to	  the	  paraphrases	  of	  this	  
line	  of	  argument	  that	  these	  scholars	  offer	  elsewhere.	  	  
	  
Having	  provided	  a	  broad-­‐brush	  survey	  of	  applications	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  
IR,	  and	  explained	  the	  rationale	  for	  my	  focus	  on	  the	  ARO,	  I	  will	  proceed	  to	  the	  next	  
chapter	  where	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  detailed	  outline	  of	  the	  ARO	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke.	  The	  purpose	  of	  providing	  this	  outline	  is	  to	  facilitate	  
the	  subsequent	  identification	  and	  explanation	  of	  certain	  problems	  with	  the	  ARO	  that	  
I	  will	  undertake	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  which	  in	  turn	  will	  enable	  these	  problems	  to	  be	  
addressed	  and	  repaired	  with	  the	  appropriate	  clarity	  and	  precision	  in	  Chapters	  3-­‐4.	  
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
statement	  of	  “what	  constitutes	  a	  grammatical	  reading,	  its	  elaboration	  of	  key	  themes	  in	  the	  later	  
philosophy	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  and	  its	  significance	  for	  global	  politics”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2013:	  p.243,	  fn.7);	  in	  
addition	  to	  which	  she	  continues	  to	  repeat	  some	  of	  the	  main	  claims	  she	  used	  previously	  to	  argue	  
against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ARO	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2013:	  p.250;	  2015:	  p.87-­‐88).	  
Similarly,	  the	  ARO	  is	  repeatedly	  put	  forward	  by	  Fierke	  in	  various	  books	  and	  articles	  up	  to	  2010,	  and	  
although	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  so	  often	  after	  that,	  Fierke	  does	  not	  publicly	  disavow	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  
and	  refers	  to	  it	  again	  in	  a	  2016	  article	  (2016:	  p.72),	  as	  well	  as	  continuing	  to	  affirm	  elements	  of	  it	  in	  
other	  recent	  work	  (e.g.	  Fierke,	  2013:	  p.24-­‐5,	  46).	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Chapter	  1	   Summarising	  the	  Anti-­‐Representationalist	  Objection	  to	  ‘Positivist’	  
Approaches	  to	  IR	  
	  
In	  this	  Chapter	  I	  will	  summarise	  the	  anti-­‐representationalist	  objection	  (ARO),	  which	  is	  
a	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  use	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  
to	  make	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  I	  will	  start	  in	  Section	  1.1	  by	  quoting	  and	  
briefly	  analysing	  some	  key	  passages	  from	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  work	  where	  
this	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  best	  expressed.	  In	  Section	  1.2	  I	  will	  give	  a	  fuller	  explanation	  of	  
what	  the	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  are	  that	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  meant	  to	  
target,	  drawing	  on	  textual	  evidence	  from	  throughout	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  
writings.	  In	  Section	  1.3	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  summary	  of	  the	  
‘representational’	  view	  of	  language	  that	  these	  scholars	  associate	  with	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  to	  IR,	  which	  they	  take	  to	  have	  been	  rejected	  by	  later	  Wittgenstein.	  In	  
Section	  1.4	  I	  will	  explain	  how	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  link	  this	  
‘representational’	  view	  of	  language	  with	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  Finally	  in	  
Section	  1.5	  I	  will	  spell	  out	  the	  particular	  criticisms	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  
use	  Wittgenstein	  to	  make	  on	  this	  basis.	  
	  
1.1	   Concise	  Statements	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Representationalist	  Objection	  	  
	  
An	  explicit	  statement	  of	  the	  ARO	  is	  found	  early	  on	  in	  Kratochwil’s	  1989	  book	  entitled	  
Rules,	  Norms	  and	  Decisions.	  There,	  in	  the	  introduction,	  Kratochwil	  writes:	  
	  
“I	  shall	  argue	  that	  our	  conventional	  understanding	  of	  social	  action	  and	  of	  the	  
norms	  governing	  them	  is	  defective	  because	  of	  a	  fundamental	  
misunderstanding	  of	  the	  function	  of	  language	  in	  social	  interaction,	  and	  
because	  of	  a	  positivist	  epistemology	  that	  treats	  norms	  as	  ‘causes.’	  
Communication	  is	  therefore	  reduced	  to	  issues	  of	  describing	  ‘facts’,	  properly,	  
i.e.	  to	  the	  ‘match’	  of	  concepts	  and	  objects,	  and	  to	  the	  ascertainment	  of	  
nomological	  regularities.	  Important	  aspects	  of	  social	  action	  such	  as	  advising,	  
demanding,	  apologizing,	  asserting,	  promising,	  etc.,	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  
understood	  thereby.	  Although	  the	  philosophy	  of	  ordinary	  language	  has	  
abandoned	  the	  ‘mirror’	  image	  of	  language	  since	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  the	  
research	  programs	  developed	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  logical	  positivism	  are,	  
nevertheless,	  still	  indebted	  to	  the	  old	  conception.	  I	  shall	  argue	  in	  this	  book	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that	  only	  a	  fundamental	  reorientation	  of	  the	  research	  program	  is	  likely	  to	  
overcome	  these	  difficulties.”	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.5-­‐6)	  
	  
In	  this	  passage	  Kratochwil	  identifies	  his	  target	  as	  ‘conventional’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  
which	  were	  “developed	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  logical	  positivism”,	  and	  allegedly	  
employ	  “a	  positivist	  epistemology	  that	  treats	  norms	  as	  ‘causes’”	  and	  reduce	  
communication	  to	  the	  ‘description	  of	  facts’	  and	  “the	  ascertainment	  of	  nomological	  
regularities”.	  Kratochwil	  argues	  that	  the	  relevant	  approaches	  to	  IR	  are	  indebted	  to	  an	  
old	  conception	  or	  ‘image’	  of	  language	  as	  a	  ‘mirror’,	  which	  he	  claims	  was	  long	  ago	  
abandoned	  by	  ordinary	  language	  philosophers	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein.	  The	  
suggested	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  historical	  abandonment	  of	  the	  mirror	  image	  of	  
language	  within	  philosophy,	  and	  the	  criticisms	  that	  led	  to	  this	  abandonment,	  should	  
lead	  IR	  scholars	  to	  fundamentally	  reorient	  their	  research	  programmes	  away	  from	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  although	  the	  above	  passage	  was	  
written	  in	  1989,	  Kratochwil	  has	  asserted	  as	  recently	  as	  2001	  that	  ‘positivism’	  is	  “the	  
orthodox	  understanding	  of	  science	  among	  IR	  specialists”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.14),	  
and	  has	  continued	  in	  his	  contemporary	  work	  to	  warn	  against	  ‘theories’	  of	  IR	  “in	  the	  
fashion	  of	  ‘science’”	  (Kratochwil,	  2016:	  p.291).	  Less	  detailed	  expressions	  of	  the	  above	  
line	  of	  argument	  are	  also	  found	  in	  Kratochwil’s	  2001	  and	  2013	  essays	  respectively	  
(2001:	  p.29	  &	  34;	  2013:	  p.2).	  
	  
A	  similar	  statement	  of	  the	  ARO	  is	  found	  in	  the	  following	  passages	  taken	  from	  Fierke’s	  
2010	  article	  entitled	  ‘Wittgenstein	  and	  International	  Relations	  Theory’:	  
	  
“Wittgenstein’s	  early	  work,	  in	  the	  Tractatus,	  informed	  the	  logical	  positivism	  of	  
the	  Vienna	  Circle.	  While	  logical	  positivism	  per	  se	  is	  no	  longer	  in	  fashion,	  the	  
picture	  theory	  of	  language	  continues	  to	  underpin	  assumptions	  about	  
hypothesis	  testing	  within	  the	  social	  sciences.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  
spectrum,	  Wittgenstein’s	  U-­‐turn	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  (1958)	  
gave	  impetus	  to	  the	  postmodern	  critique	  of	  the	  autonomous	  rational	  agent	  
(Honneth	  1995).	  In	  the	  middle	  of	  this	  spectrum,	  his	  argument	  that	  language	  
use	  is	  action	  has	  influenced	  social	  theory	  more	  broadly	  (e.g.	  Austin	  1963;	  
Searle	  1969;	  Berger	  and	  Luckman	  1967).	  …	  The	  transition	  in	  [Wittgenstein’s]	  
thought	  from	  a	  picture	  theory	  to	  a	  more	  constitutive	  notion	  of	  language	  is	  
precisely	  the	  transition	  that	  has	  been	  underway	  within	  IR	  debates	  for	  the	  last	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twenty	  years,	  from	  the	  unquestioned	  assumption,	  best	  articulated	  by	  Waltz	  
(1979),	  that	  theory	  mirrors	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  international	  system	  across	  time,	  
to	  the	  ‘constructivist	  turn’,	  and	  the	  greater	  attention	  to	  cultural	  difference,	  
meaning,	  context	  and	  processes	  of	  constitution	  and	  change	  (Fierke	  2002).”	  
(Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.83-­‐4)	  
	  
“Wittgenstein	  cannot	  be	  ‘applied’	  in	  the	  way	  you	  would,	  for	  instance,	  apply	  
realist	  or	  institutionalist	  theory.	  The	  latter	  are	  explanatory	  models.	  
Wittgenstein,	  in	  his	  later	  work,	  provided	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  picture	  theory	  of	  
language,	  which	  is	  often	  assumed	  in	  explanatory	  theories.	  Hypothesis	  testing	  
rests	  on	  a	  picture	  theory	  of	  language	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  compare	  
scientific	  categories	  with	  the	  world	  to	  see	  whether	  they	  correspond.”	  (Fierke,	  
2010a:	  p.84)	  
	  
In	  these	  passages,	  Fierke	  echoes	  Kratochwil’s	  argument	  that	  approaches	  to	  IR	  that	  
were	  developed	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  ‘logical	  positivism’	  are	  beholden	  to	  an	  
outdated	  philosophical	  conception	  –	  or,	  in	  Fierke’s	  stronger	  terminology,	  a	  ‘theory’	  –	  
of	  language	  that	  was	  criticised	  by	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  according	  to	  which	  language	  
supposedly	  “pictures”	  or	  “mirrors”	  reality.20	  While	  Kratochwil	  characterised	  such	  
approaches	  to	  IR	  as	  focusing	  on	  the	  identification	  of	  “causes”,	  the	  description	  of	  
“facts”	  and	  the	  ascertainment	  of	  “nomological	  regularities”	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.5-­‐6),	  
Fierke	  characterises	  them	  as	  “explanatory	  theories”	  or	  “models”	  which	  employ	  
“hypothesis	  testing”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84).	  Like	  Kratochwil,	  Fierke	  suggests	  that	  these	  
sorts	  of	  approaches	  involve	  making	  the	  assumption	  that	  one	  can	  ‘match	  up’	  
theoretical	  concepts	  with	  objective	  entities	  or	  features	  of	  reality.	  Fierke	  
acknowledges	  that	  contemporary	  social	  and	  political	  scholars	  have	  largely	  moved	  on	  
from	  endorsing	  ‘logical	  positivism’	  per	  se,	  although	  she	  argues	  that	  explanatory	  
theoretical	  approaches	  to	  IR	  nevertheless	  continue	  largely	  to	  be	  underpinned	  by	  the	  
‘picture	  theory’	  of	  language.	  
	  
Before	  moving	  on	  to	  look	  at	  the	  ARO	  as	  it	  is	  expressed	  by	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  I	  should	  note	  the	  
distinctiveness	  of	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  overall	  impetus	  and	  aim	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  Kratochwil	  
and	  Fierke.	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  are	  both	  IR	  scholars	  who	  seek	  to	  develop	  and	  
                                                
20	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  later,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  use	  words	  like	  ‘picturing’	  and	  ‘mirroring’	  
interchangeably	  in	  this	  context.	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popularise	  ‘constructivist’	  approaches	  to	  studying	  IR	  and,	  as	  such,	  the	  ARO	  appears	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  their	  wider	  attempts	  to	  discredit	  rival	  approaches	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  
the	  superiority	  of	  ‘constructivism’	  as	  a	  methodological	  framework.	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  
meanwhile,	  is	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  developing	  what	  she	  calls	  a	  ‘grammatical’	  
approach	  for	  analysing	  the	  assumptions	  of	  IR	  theories,	  and	  with	  challenging	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  ethical	  issues	  and	  questions	  from	  mainstream	  IR	  theory.	  Despite	  this	  
difference	  in	  focus,	  however,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  still	  argues	  against	  the	  employment	  of	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  along	  the	  same	  lines	  as	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke.	  This	  can	  
be	  seen	  most	  clearly	  in	  the	  following	  passages	  from	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  2010	  book	  on	  
Universality,	  Ethics	  and	  International	  Relations:	  
	  
“What	  captivates	  us	  into	  reading	  accounts	  of	  ethics	  in	  world	  politics	  as	  
representations	  of	  international	  political	  reality?	  Primarily,	  it	  is	  that	  we	  think	  
that	  theorists	  are	  outlining	  the	  ‘thing’s	  nature’:	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
international,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ethical,	  the	  nature	  of	  anarchy,	  the	  nature	  of	  
states,	  the	  nature	  of	  theory,	  and	  so	  on.	  According	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  this	  kind	  of	  
captivity	  arises	  because	  traditional	  philosophers	  (and,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  
subsequent	  chapters,	  some	  IR	  theorists)	  are	  seduced	  by	  a	  metaphysical	  
notion	  of	  what	  makes	  a	  philosophical	  or	  theoretical	  inquiry	  profound	  (deep),	  
namely,	  the	  search	  for	  essences	  …	  	  
	   For	  Wittgenstein,	  we	  think	  we	  are	  outlining	  a	  ‘thing’s	  nature’	  and	  are	  
captivated	  by	  it,	  because	  of	  the	  view	  that	  language	  and	  thought	  represent	  
reality.	  In	  other	  words,	  that	  the	  role	  of	  language	  and	  thought	  is	  
representational	  or	  a	  ‘mirror	  of	  nature’	  (Rorty	  1980).	  …	  
	   Wittgenstein’s	  philosophical	  ‘sketches’	  [in	  the	  Philosophical	  
Investigations]	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  assumptions	  (the	  
pictures	  that	  hold	  us	  captive)	  which	  inform	  the	  notion	  of	  language	  and	  
thought	  as	  representation.”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.8-­‐9)	  
	  
“The	  ideal	  of	  pointing	  to	  an	  object	  and	  naming	  it	  (an	  ostensive	  definition),	  is	  
the	  equivalent	  of	  ‘looking’	  at	  history	  and	  saying	  ‘this	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  
international	  politics’	  and	  therefore,	  directly	  relevant	  to	  methods	  of	  
explanation	  employed	  in	  IR.	  Indeed,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  an	  ostensive	  definition	  
is	  the	  ‘unimpeachable	  model	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  language	  and	  ‘reality’	  
(Staten	  1985:	  69).	  In	  the	  social	  sciences	  (in	  which	  one	  can	  include	  IR)	  it	  is,	  
broadly	  speaking,	  an	  empiricist-­‐positivist	  approach	  that	  ‘applies	  scientific	  
method	  to	  human	  affairs	  conceived	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  natural	  order	  open	  to	  
objective	  enquiry’	  (Hollis	  1994:	  41).	  But	  [later]	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  us	  think	  
about	  this	  otherwise	  …	  .”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.12-­‐13)	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In	  the	  first	  passage,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  enquires	  critically	  into	  an	  assumption	  that	  she	  alleges	  is	  
made	  by	  various	  IR	  scholars	  (not	  just	  ‘positivist’	  ones)	  that	  theoretical	  accounts	  of	  IR	  
represent	  the	  ‘nature’	  or	  ‘reality’	  of	  world	  politics.	  Pin-­‐Fat	  suggests	  that	  the	  reason	  
why	  people	  make	  this	  assumption	  is	  because	  they	  have	  bought	  into	  a	  “view	  that	  
language	  and	  thought	  represent	  reality,”	  which	  Pin-­‐Fat	  identifies	  as	  a	  view	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  criticised	  in	  his	  later	  philosophy.	  In	  the	  second	  passage,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  adapts	  
this	  argument	  to	  work	  more	  specifically	  against	  what	  she	  calls	  “an	  empiricist-­‐
positivist	  approach”	  to	  IR.	  There	  Pin-­‐Fat	  refers	  to	  a	  ‘model’	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  language	  and	  reality	  as	  essentially	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘naming’	  –	  which,	  incidentally,	  
she	  equates	  earlier	  with	  the	  view	  that	  language	  and	  thought	  represent	  reality	  (Pin-­‐
Fat,	  2010:	  p.9)	  –	  and	  suggests	  that	  this	  model	  is	  manifest	  in	  IR	  by	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  which	  seek	  to	  apply	  ‘scientific’	  methods	  to	  international	  politics	  (see	  
above).	  Like	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  suggests	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  
philosophy	  provides	  strong	  motivations	  for	  not	  only	  giving	  up	  a	  representational	  view	  
or	  ‘model’	  of	  language,	  but	  also	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  which	  allegedly	  involve	  a	  
commitment	  to	  this	  view.	  This	  opinion	  is	  expressed	  particularly	  clearly	  by	  Pin-­‐Fat	  in	  















Outline of the Anti-Representationalist Objection 
	  
On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  passages	  quoted	  above,	  we	  can	  provide	  the	  following	  general	  















1.2	   What	  are	  the	  ‘Positivist’	  Approaches	  to	  IR	  targeted	  by	  the	  ARO?	  
	  
	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  last	  section,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  all	  use	  the	  term	  
‘positivism’	  to	  characterise	  approaches	  to	  IR	  that	  they	  are	  using	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  
philosophy	  to	  argue	  against.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  explain	  in	  a	  bit	  more	  detail	  
what	  these	  scholars	  mean	  by	  the	  term	  ‘positivism’	  in	  this	  context,	  and	  what	  they	  
understand	  a	  ‘positivist’	  approach	  to	  IR	  to	  be.	  	  
	  
In	  Rules,	  Norms	  and	  Decisions,	  Kratochwil	  associates	  ‘positivism’	  with	  a	  general	  
“world-­‐image”	  according	  to	  which	  the	  world	  consists	  of	  observable	  “brute	  facts”	  or	  
“givens”,	  and	  scientific	  ‘progress’	  “depends	  upon	  an	  exhaustive	  description	  of	  these	  
facts	  and	  upon	  the	  establishment	  of	  certain	  regularities	  among	  them”	  (Kratochwil,	  
1989:	  p.21).	  This	  is	  a	  view	  which	  Kratochwil	  takes	  to	  be	  common	  to	  both	  Comte’s	  
Figure  1:      Outline  of  the  Anti-­‐Representat ionalist  Object ion  
  
‘Positivist’  approaches  to  IR  are  committed  to  a  ‘representational’  view  of  
language,  according  to  which  language  functions  by  mirroring,  depicting,  
describing  or  otherwise  representing  an  ‘objective’  reality.  
  
  
This  ‘representational’  view  of  language  was  decisively  criticised  by  later  
Wittgenstein  and  other  philosophers  from  the  mid  1940s  onwards.  
  
  
‘Positivist’  approaches  to  IR  should  therefore  be  abandoned  along  with  the  
already  discredited  ‘representational’  view  of  language  to  which  they  are  
beholden.  
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‘positivist’	  sociology	  and	  Bentham’s	  ‘empiricist’	  approach	  to	  morals	  and	  legislation,	  
and	  it	  is	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  Kratochwil	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘positivism’	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  
which	  encompasses	  both	  “logical	  positivism”	  and	  “empiricism”	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  
p.267,	  n.1).21	  In	  a	  later	  essay,	  Kratochwil	  identifies	  ‘logical	  positivism’	  with	  the	  
“scientific	  explanation	  scheme	  proposed	  by	  Popper,	  or	  Hempel”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  
p.32),	  and	  refers	  critically	  to	  sociologists	  and	  IR	  scholars	  who	  “opt	  for	  a	  scientific	  
explanation	  in	  the	  fashion	  of	  logical	  positivism”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.14).	  Here	  
Kratochwil	  asserts	  that	  the	  “methodology	  of	  logical	  positivism”	  involves	  a	  “search	  for	  
transhistorical	  laws”	  which	  can	  be	  arrived	  at	  via	  “data	  analysis”,	  and	  a	  restriction	  of	  
the	  term	  ‘explanation’	  to	  refer	  only	  to	  “nomological	  deductive	  explanations	  and	  their	  
variations”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001,	  p.32).	  
	  
Like	  Kratochwil,	  Fierke	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘positivism’	  fairly	  loosely	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  range	  of	  
positions	  or	  academic	  approaches,	  while	  acknowledging	  that	  there	  is	  a	  more	  specific	  
historical	  meaning	  of	  the	  term.	  In	  an	  article	  from	  2001,	  Fierke	  clarifies	  that	  although	  
in	  her	  opinion	  the	  term	  ‘positivism’	  strictly	  “refers	  to	  the	  logical	  positivism	  of	  the	  
Vienna	  Circle	  in	  the	  1930s”,	  she	  is	  using	  the	  term	  in	  reference	  to	  more	  recent	  debates	  
where	  it	  has	  been	  used	  to	  imply	  “a	  broader	  category	  of	  positions”	  which	  share	  
certain	  priorities	  and	  assumptions	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  p.133-­‐4,	  n.1).	  According	  to	  Fierke	  
these	  priorities	  and	  assumptions	  include	  “the	  search	  for	  causal	  laws	  and	  
generalization,	  a	  correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth	  and	  language,	  and	  the	  division	  
between	  an	  objective	  external	  world	  and	  subjective	  mental	  acts”	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  
p.133-­‐4).	  In	  ‘Links	  Across	  the	  Abyss’,	  Fierke	  cites	  Nicholson	  in	  characterising	  
‘positivism’	  as	  an	  approach	  which	  involves	  a	  “search	  for	  lawlike	  patterns	  and	  
generalizations”	  in	  which	  there	  is	  an	  emphasis	  on	  “causality	  and	  hypothesis	  testing”	  
(Fierke,	  2002,	  p.332.).22	  
                                                
21	  ‘Logical	  positivism’	  according	  to	  Kratochwil	  is	  “[t]he	  idea	  that	  science	  concerned	  with	  the	  objective	  
world	  had	  to	  forgo	  metaphysical	  stances	  and	  be	  concerned	  solely	  with	  ‘positive’	  facts”,	  while	  
‘empiricism’	  involves	  a	  focus	  on	  “facts”	  and	  an	  “inductivist	  bias”	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.21;	  p.267,	  n.1)	  
22	  In	  a	  later	  essay	  from	  2003,	  Fierke	  criticises	  the	  simplistic	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘positivism’	  by	  IR	  scholars	  
to	  distinguish	  approaches	  to	  IR	  which	  focus	  on	  ‘empirical’	  research	  from	  those	  which	  involve	  the	  
analysis	  of	  language	  (Fierke,	  2003:	  p.69-­‐70)	  –	  however	  she	  herself	  uses	  the	  term	  in	  a	  similarly	  
simplistic	  way	  in	  the	  same	  essay	  when	  she	  claims	  that	  “positivist”	  and	  “constructivist”	  traditions	  in	  IR	  
“rely	  on	  opposing	  concepualizations	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  the	  world”	  (Fierke,	  
2003:	  p.73).	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Figure  2:    Features  of   ‘Posi tiv ist ’  Approaches  in   IR,   According  to  
Kratochwil,   P in-­‐Fat  and  F ierke  
  
According  to  Kratochwil,  Pin-­‐Fat  and  Fierke,  a  ‘Positivist’  approach  is  one  that:  
• Makes  a  strict  distinction  between  ‘objective’  vs.  ‘subjective’  (or  ‘facts’  vs.  
‘values’),  with  the  latter  being  excluded  from  the  realm  of  legitimate  
academic  enquiry.  
• Does  not  acknowledge  an  epistemologically  relevant  distinction  between  
the  so-­‐called  ‘natural  sciences’  and  the  study  of  human  affairs.  
• Focuses  on:  
o Quantitative  data  and  data  analysis.  
o Searching  for  general  ‘laws’  or  regularities  that  can  be  used  to  
explain  specific  events  or  cases.  
o Formulating  and  testing  hypotheses.  
o Establishing  causality.  
	  
Finally,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  last	  section,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  takes	  up	  Martin	  Hollis’s	  definition	  of	  
‘positivism’	  as	  “any	  approach	  which	  applies	  scientific	  method	  to	  human	  affairs	  
conceived	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  natural	  order	  open	  to	  objective	  enquiry”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  
p.12-­‐13;	  Hollis,	  1994:	  p.42).	  Pin-­‐Fat	  clarifies	  in	  a	  footnote	  that	  she	  “follow[s]	  Hollis	  in	  
using	  positivism	  in	  the	  wider	  sense	  to	  cover	  positive	  science	  and	  logical	  positivism”	  
(Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.134,	  n.6).	  Like	  Fierke,	  a	  feature	  of	  ‘positivism’	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
particularly	  highlights	  is	  the	  separation	  of	  facts	  from	  values,	  and	  the	  exclusion	  of	  
ethics	  and	  normative	  questions	  from	  the	  remit	  of	  ‘objective’	  social	  and	  political	  study	  
(Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.34,	  p.39).	  
	  
Outline of ‘Positivist’ Approaches to IR 
	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  above,	  we	  can	  provide	  the	  following	  outline	  of	  the	  main	  features	  that	  

















The	  main	  historical	  example	  of	  a	  ‘positivist’	  approach	  to	  IR	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke	  all	  agree	  on	  is	  Kenneth	  Waltz’s	  1979	  work	  A	  Theory	  of	  International	  
Politics.	  Kratochwil	  refers	  to	  Waltz	  as	  a	  scholar	  who	  attempts	  to	  apply	  the	  
‘hypothetical-­‐deductive’	  model	  of	  scientific	  explanation	  to	  international	  politics	  and	  
believes	  in	  “the	  promise	  of	  a	  purely	  positivistic	  science	  of	  politics”	  (Kratochwil,	  1982:	  
p.57),23	  while	  Fierke	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  both	  cite	  Waltz	  as	  epitomising	  the	  ‘positivist	  
hegemony’	  in	  IR	  during	  the	  1970s-­‐80s.24	  The	  reason	  why	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke	  pick	  Waltz	  as	  their	  main	  example	  of	  a	  positivist	  IR	  scholar	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  
extent	  of	  his	  purported	  influence	  within	  the	  discipline.	  As	  Pin-­‐Fat	  puts	  it:	  Waltz	  is	  
“widely	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  international	  theorists	  of	  the	  post-­‐
war	  period”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.82).	  
	  
A	  more	  recently	  active	  IR	  scholar	  whom	  Fierke	  and	  Kratochwil	  associate	  with	  a	  
positivist	  approach	  is	  Alexander	  Wendt,	  in	  particular	  his	  1999	  Social	  Theory	  of	  
International	  Politics.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  since	  Wendt	  explicitly	  identifies	  himself	  as	  
a	  positivist	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  he	  is	  “a	  strong	  believer	  in	  science”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.39-­‐
40),25	  commits	  to	  a	  form	  of	  “scientific	  realism”	  which	  “assumes	  that	  reality	  exists	  
independent	  of	  human	  beings	  …	  and	  can	  be	  discovered	  through	  science”	  (Wendt,	  
1999:	  p.49),	  and	  seeks	  to	  defend	  “the	  view	  that	  constructivist	  social	  theory	  is	  
compatible	  with	  a	  scientific	  approach	  to	  social	  inquiry”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.31).	  For	  her	  
part,	  Fierke	  describes	  Wendt	  as	  a	  scholar	  who	  tries	  to	  combine	  ‘positivism’	  with	  
‘constructivism’	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.332;	  2003:	  p.73),	  and	  groups	  him	  together	  with	  
Dessler	  and	  Katzenstein,	  Keohane	  and	  Krasner,	  as	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  IR	  scholars	  
“who	  claim	  to	  be	  ‘positivist’”	  and	  “agree	  on	  questions	  of	  methodology”	  (Fierke,	  2003:	  
p.69).	  Meanwhile,	  Kratochwil	  acknowledges	  Wendt’s	  distinctiveness	  from	  
“unreconstituted	  Waltzian	  realists”	  and	  “political	  scientists	  of	  the	  mainstream”	  (2011	  
[2002]:	  p.154),	  but	  argues	  that	  Wendt	  nevertheless	  retains	  some	  versions	  of	  their	  
‘positivist’	  assumptions	  regarding	  scientific	  realism,	  “representationalism”	  and	  the	  
unity	  of	  science	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2002]:	  p.154).	  Aside	  from	  those	  mentioned	  above,	  
                                                
23	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [1978]:	  p.28.	  He	  implies	  that	  Waltz’s	  ‘systemic’	  approach	  to	  IR	  is	  ‘positivist’	  by	  
summarising	  Waltz’s	  position	  as	  being	  that	  “only	  a	  physicalist	  account	  –	  cast	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
observational	  facts	  –	  can	  explain”	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.28).	  
24	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.34	  and	  p.135,	  n.3;	  Fierke,	  2001:	  p.336;	  2003:	  p.75;	  2010:	  p.83.	  
25	  Albeit	  of	  a	  “pluralistic”	  kind	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.39-­‐40)	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Fierke	  names	  Inis	  L.	  Claude	  Jr.	  (1962)	  as	  another	  classic	  ‘positivist’	  scholar	  of	  IR	  
(Fierke,	  2003:	  p.75);	  while	  Kratochwil	  identifies	  Kelsen	  and	  Hart	  as	  having	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  to	  international	  law.26	  	  
	  
1.3	   What	  is	  the	  ‘Representational’	  View	  of	  Language	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  and	  Fierke	  associate	  with	  ‘Positivist’	  Approaches	  to	  IR?	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  all	  associate	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  
to	  IR	  with	  a	  problematic	  ‘representational’	  view	  of	  language	  which	  they	  suggest	  has	  
been	  convincingly	  discredited	  by	  later	  Wittgenstein	  and	  other	  subsequent	  
philosophers.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  shall	  undertake	  to	  explain	  in	  more	  detail	  what	  the	  
relevant	  view	  of	  language	  is	  according	  to	  these	  scholars,	  and	  how	  they	  take	  it	  to	  be	  
connected	  with	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  	  
	  
First	  of	  all,	  I	  should	  mention	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  each	  use	  a	  variety	  of	  
expressions	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  view	  of	  language	  in	  question.	  These	  include:	  
	  
	   The	  mirror	  ‘image’	  of	  language	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.5-­‐6;	  2001:	  p.29)	  
An	  understanding	  of	  language	  as	  a	  ‘mirror’	  of	  reality	  (Kratochwil,	  1993:	  p.76)	  
	   The	  mirror	  theory	  of	  language	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.29)	  
A	  conception	  of	  language	  as	  a	  mirror	  of	  reality	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.7)	   	  
A	  conception	  of	  language	  as	  a	  ‘mirror	  of	  nature’	  (Kratochwil	  2011	  [2009]:	  
p.205)	  
A	  picture	  view	  of	  language	  (Fierke	  2002:	  p.332,	  p.333)	  
The	  picture	  theory	  of	  language	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.83)	  
A	  mirror	  view	  of	  language	  (Fierke	  and	  Jørgensen,	  2001:	  p.9)	  
A	  correspondence	  theory	  of	  language	  and	  truth	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  p.126)	  	  
A	  ‘picture	  theory’	  of	  meaning	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.79)	  
A	  representational	  view	  of	  thought	  and	  language	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2011:	  p.7)	  	  
	  
                                                
26	  Although	  whether	  Kelsen	  and	  Hart	  are	  appropriately	  thought	  of	  as	  scholars	  of	  IR	  rather	  than,	  for	  
example,	  legal	  or	  political	  philosophers,	  is	  an	  open	  question.	  
 30  
A	  view	  that	  the	  role	  of	  language	  and	  thought	  is	  representational	  or	  a	  ‘mirror	  	  
	   of	  nature’	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2011:	  p.9)	  
A	  notion	  of	  language	  and	  thought	  as	  representation	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2011:	  p.9)	  
A	  representational	  picture	  of	  language	  (Pin-­‐Fat	  2011:	  p.10)	  
An	  understanding	  of	  language	  according	  to	  which	  language	  represents	  reality	  
(Pin-­‐Fat,	  2013:	  p.250)	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  this	  diversity,	  one	  might	  question	  why	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  use	  the	  phrase	  
‘representational	  view	  of	  language’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  item	  in	  question.	  The	  reasons	  for	  
my	  choice	  are	  that	  (a)	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  are	  not	  particularly	  careful	  
about	  observing	  distinctions	  between	  terms	  like	  ‘theory’,	  ‘view’,	  ‘picture’,	  
‘conception’	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  hence	  the	  term	  ‘view’	  can	  be	  understood	  here	  as	  a	  
neutral	  placeholder	  for	  whichever	  word	  these	  scholars	  happen	  to	  choose	  on	  a	  given	  
occasion;	  and	  (b)	  all	  three	  of	  these	  scholars	  use	  words	  like	  ‘represent’,	  ‘depict’,	  
‘correspond’,	  ‘reflect’	  and	  ‘mirror’	  interchangeably	  when	  summarising	  this	  ‘view’	  and	  
its	  assumptions	  (in	  this	  they	  follow	  Rorty,	  from	  whom	  they	  borrow	  the	  expression	  
‘mirror	  of	  nature’),	  and	  the	  word	  ‘representational’	  is	  a	  convenient	  multi-­‐purpose	  
concept	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  sum	  up	  the	  connotations	  of	  these	  various	  terms.	  
Having	  issued	  this	  terminological	  clarification,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  a	  more	  detailed	  
exposition	  of	  what	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  understand	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  to	  be.	  	  
	  
Unlike	  Fierke	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  Kratochwil	  does	  not	  dedicate	  whole	  passages	  to	  
summarising	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  detail;	  however,	  we	  can	  piece	  
together	  an	  idea	  of	  what	  he	  takes	  this	  view	  to	  be	  by	  compiling	  the	  fragmentary	  
paraphrases	  and	  critical	  references	  to	  it	  that	  are	  dispersed	  throughout	  Kratochwil’s	  
corpus.	  Recall	  that	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  his	  1989	  book	  Kratochwil	  characterises	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  one	  which	  reduces	  communication	  to	  “issues	  of	  
describing	  ‘facts’,	  properly,	  i.e.	  to	  the	  ‘match’	  of	  concepts	  and	  objects”	  (Kratochwil,	  
1989:	  p.5-­‐6).	  It	  is	  not	  immediately	  clear	  from	  that	  passage	  what	  ‘reducing’	  
communication	  to	  factual	  description	  (or	  the	  match	  of	  concepts	  and	  objects)	  
amounts	  to;	  however	  in	  his	  2001	  article,	  Kratochwil	  unpacks	  this	  as	  the	  view	  that	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language	  only	  has	  meaning	  “in	  virtue	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  depict	  accurately	  the	  things,	  
actions,	  and	  properties	  of	  the	  ‘outer	  world.’	  Thus,	  nouns	  stood	  for	  things,	  verbs	  for	  
actions,	  and	  adjectives	  for	  properties”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.19).	  Later	  in	  the	  same	  
essay	  Kratochwil	  equates	  this	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  “concepts	  meant	  something	  …	  
because	  they	  captured	  the	  ontological	  essences	  of	  ‘things’”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.20).	  
Kratochwil	  subsequently	  criticises	  this	  view	  for	  suggesting	  that	  “‘meaning’	  can	  be	  
reduced	  to	  reference”,	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  a	  sentence	  is	  …	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  
correspondences	  of	  various	  words	  utilized	  in	  it”	  and	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  a	  sentence	  
is	  …	  contained	  in	  the	  reference,	  [or]	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  sentence”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  
p.29).	  Meanwhile	  in	  his	  more	  recent	  essays	  Kratochwil	  continues	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  
assumption	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  a	  concept	  …	  is	  …	  its	  reference”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  
[2009]:	  p.144-­‐5;	  2013:	  p.2)	  and	  “the	  notion	  that	  …	  objectively	  given	  things	  are	  
mirrored	  by	  our	  concepts”	  (Kratochwil,	  2006:	  p.187).	  
	  
On	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  passages	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  according	  to	  Kratochwil,	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  is	  one	  according	  to	  which	  spoken	  or	  written	  
linguistic	  expressions	  are	  descriptions	  of	  ‘empirical	  facts’,	  individual	  words	  refer	  to	  
‘objects’	  (in	  the	  broad	  sense	  of	  ‘objectively	  given’	  things,	  actions	  or	  properties),	  and	  
the	  meaning	  of	  words	  and	  sentences	  is	  constituted	  by	  what	  they	  purportedly	  
describe	  or	  refer	  to	  in	  reality.	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  Kratochwil	  paraphrases	  these	  
assumptions	  also	  implies	  that	  according	  to	  him	  this	  view	  is	  committed	  to	  two	  
corollaries:	  firstly,	  that	  the	  facts	  and	  objects	  represented	  by	  language	  are	  ‘objective’	  
in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  exist	  and	  are	  a	  certain	  way	  independently	  of	  subjective	  
preferences,	  interpretations	  or	  values	  (a	  form	  of	  objective	  realism);	  and	  secondly,	  
that	  objects	  which	  fall	  under	  the	  referential	  scope	  of	  the	  same	  concept-­‐word	  all	  
share	  some	  ‘essential’	  feature	  in	  common	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  they	  are	  members	  of	  the	  
same	  category	  (a	  form	  of	  essentialism).	  	  
	  
Let	  us	  turn	  now	  to	  Fierke.	  While	  Kratochwil	  does	  not	  explicitly	  associate	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  with	  the	  work	  of	  a	  particular	  philosopher,	  Fierke	  
explicitly	  identifies	  it	  with	  a	  philosophical	  account	  of	  language	  that	  she	  takes	  to	  be	  
endorsed	  by	  early	  Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  Tractatus,	  and	  accordingly	  uses	  her	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interpretative	  paraphrases	  of	  this	  text	  to	  summarise	  the	  relevant	  view.	  Despite	  this	  
difference	  in	  presentation,	  however,	  Fierke’s	  summaries	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  
of	  language	  are	  largely	  in	  accord	  with	  Kratochwil’s.	  For	  example,	  in	  her	  2001	  essay,	  
Fierke	  refers	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  one	  according	  to	  which	  
language	  is	  “a	  set	  of	  labels	  that	  either	  correspond	  or	  don’t	  with	  a	  real	  world”	  such	  
that	  “we	  can	  compare	  our	  statements	  about	  the	  world	  with	  the	  world	  to	  see	  whether	  
they	  correspond”	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  126),	  and	  in	  her	  2004	  essay	  Fierke	  writes	  that	  
according	  to	  the	  Tractatus	  “words	  are	  applied	  as	  labels,	  strung	  together	  in	  
propositions	  which	  picture	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  world”	  (Fierke,	  2004:	  p.478).	  Meanwhile	  in	  
her	  2003	  essay,	  Fierke	  provides	  the	  following	  more	  extended	  summary:	  
	  
“Propositions	  are	  connections	  between	  words,	  each	  with	  a	  separate	  meaning,	  
which	  describe	  the	  internal	  properties	  of	  facts	  or	  simples.	  The	  world	  is	  divided	  
into	  atomistic	  and	  independent	  units	  that	  are	  mirrored	  in	  language.	  Language	  
is	  the	  totality	  of	  propositions,	  and	  therefore,	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  world.	  
Propositions	  provide	  a	  logical	  scaffolding	  for	  how	  things	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  
one	  another	  if	  true.	  There	  are	  two	  alternatives	  for	  each	  proposition:	  true	  and	  
false.	  The	  logical	  scaffolding	  provides	  a	  picture	  of	  reality.”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  
p.336)27	  
	  
So,	  as	  with	  Kratochwil,	  it	  appears	  that	  according	  to	  Fierke	  the	  representational	  view	  
of	  language	  is	  one	  which	  takes	  language	  and	  linguistic	  communication	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  
be	  reducible	  to	  factual	  propositions	  (an	  assumption	  which	  is	  expressed	  as	  the	  
stipulation	  that	  ‘language	  is	  the	  totality	  of	  propositions’);	  according	  to	  which	  the	  
individual	  words	  that	  make	  up	  these	  propositions	  each	  refer	  to	  objectively	  real	  
‘things’	  or	  ‘elements’	  of	  reality,	  the	  meaning	  of	  each	  word	  is	  derived	  from	  what	  it	  
refers	  to	  in	  reality,	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  proposition	  is	  the	  possible	  configuration	  of	  
‘things’	  that	  it	  depicts.	  That	  Fierke	  also	  takes	  this	  view	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  the	  two	  
corollaries	  of	  ‘objective	  realism’	  and	  ‘essentialism’	  is	  implied	  by	  her	  assertion	  
elsewhere	  that	  “the	  Tractatus	  presents	  logic	  as	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  objective	  of	  facts,	  
                                                
27	  The	  paragraph	  before	  this	  one	  in	  Fierke’s	  2002	  article	  suggests	  a	  more	  complex	  version	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language,	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  made	  between	  ‘elementary	  
propositions’	  in	  which	  every	  word	  corresponds	  with	  an	  ‘object’,	  and	  other	  types	  of	  proposition	  which	  
can	  be	  ‘analysed’	  into	  elementary	  ones	  (see,	  e.g.,	  2002:	  p.336).	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  distinction	  that	  
Fierke	  acknowledges	  when	  she	  comes	  to	  criticise	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  and	  its	  
assumptions.	  Therefore	  I	  am	  taking	  the	  simpler	  version	  as	  definitive	  of	  what	  Fierke	  understands	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  to	  amount	  to.	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which	  have	  essences”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.343).	  Fierke	  goes	  one	  step	  further	  than	  
Kratochwil	  in	  explicitly	  attributing	  to	  this	  view	  the	  additional	  assumption	  that	  the	  
truth	  of	  a	  sentence	  (or	  proposition)	  is	  determined	  by	  whether	  it	  ‘corresponds’	  or	  
‘agrees’	  with	  reality,	  although	  this	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  Kratochwil	  sometimes	  
implicitly	  associates	  with	  the	  ‘mirror	  view’	  (e.g.	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2000]:	  p.155).	  
	  
Like	  Fierke,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  bases	  her	  summaries	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  on	  
her	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  although	  again	  it	  broadly	  accords	  with	  what	  
Kratochwil	  summarises	  as	  the	  ‘mirror’	  view.	  In	  her	  1997	  article	  Pin-­‐Fat	  provides	  the	  
following	  outline:	  
	  
“On	  this	  view	  names	  name	  objects	  and	  configurations	  of	  names	  depict	  
possible	  configurations	  of	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  In	  this	  way,	  language	  can	  
represent	  possible	  states	  of	  affairs	  because	  it	  shares	  the	  same	  structure.	  Thus,	  
the	  truth	  or	  falsity	  of	  a	  proposition	  depends	  on	  whether	  it	  agrees	  or	  disagrees	  
with	  reality	  (Wittgenstein,	  1922,	  2.223,	  4.05).”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.79-­‐80)	  
	  
In	  her	  2010	  book	  Pin-­‐Fat	  repeats	  the	  above	  summary	  together	  with	  a	  quote	  of	  the	  
second	  paragraph	  of	  the	  first	  remark	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  (PI	  
§1b)	  which	  she	  takes	  to	  be	  a	  critical	  reference	  to	  this	  view,	  and	  attributes	  to	  it	  the	  
additional	  assumption	  that	  “the	  objects	  to	  which	  words	  refer	  confer	  meaning	  and	  
sentences	  are	  combinations	  of	  such	  names”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.10).	  There	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
modifies	  her	  interpretation	  to	  one	  according	  to	  which	  early	  Wittgenstein	  did	  not	  
himself	  endorse	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  but	  presented	  it	  within	  the	  
Tractatus	  for	  ‘therapeutic’	  reasons	  as	  something	  for	  the	  reader	  to	  overcome	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  
2010:	  p.27).	  	  
	  
While	  Pin-­‐Fat	  differs	  from	  Kratochwil	  in	  taking	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  
to	  be	  presented	  with	  the	  Tractatus,	  and	  departs	  slightly	  from	  Fierke	  in	  terms	  of	  her	  
revised	  interpretation	  of	  early	  Wittgenstein’s	  motives	  in	  presenting	  this	  view	  in	  the	  
Tractatus,	  she	  nevertheless	  attributes	  the	  same	  assumptions	  to	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  as	  these	  other	  two	  scholars.	  Thus	  –	  as	  we	  can	  see	  from	  the	  above	  
passages	  –	  Pin-­‐Fat	  takes	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  to	  assume	  that	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language	  consists	  of	  propositions	  that	  represent	  possible	  ‘states	  of	  affairs’;	  that	  these	  
propositions	  are	  composed	  of	  individual	  words	  that	  refer	  (or	  correspond)	  to	  ‘objects’;	  
and	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  and	  sentences	  is	  conferred	  on	  them	  by	  the	  facts	  and	  
objects	  which	  they	  describe	  or	  refer	  to.	  Elsewhere	  in	  her	  1997	  essay,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
associates	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  with	  a	  “picture	  of	  the	  subject,	  
reality	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  one	  another”	  according	  to	  which	  reality	  “is	  the	  
external	  world	  …	  outside	  the	  mind”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.81),	  which	  suggests	  that	  like	  
Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  she	  takes	  this	  view	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  an	  assumption	  of	  
‘objective	  realism’;	  while	  her	  equation	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  words	  name	  objects	  
with	  the	  assumption	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  [a]	  word	  …	  is	  …	  dependent	  on	  naming	  an	  
element	  which	  is	  common	  to	  all	  instances	  of	  its	  use”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80)	  implies	  that	  
she	  takes	  it	  to	  also	  involve	  the	  assumption	  of	  ‘essentialism’.	  As	  with	  Fierke’s	  
summary,	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  explicitly	  includes	  the	  additional	  assumption	  that	  propositional	  


















Outline of the Representational View of Language 
	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  last	  section,	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  according	  to	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  can	  be	  outlined	  as	  consisting	  of	  the	  following	  
assumptions:	  
	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  sometimes	  group	  a	  number	  of	  the	  above	  assumptions	  together	  
and	  summarise	  them	  collectively	  as	  the	  assumption	  that	  there	  is	  a	  ‘logical’	  structure	  
or	  order	  to	  reality	  which	  language	  ‘mirrors’	  or	  ‘reflects’.	  Thus	  Pin-­‐Fat	  refers	  to	  the	  
assumption	  of	  “a	  super-­‐order	  between	  super-­‐concepts	  –	  a	  ‘hard’	  connection	  between	  
the	  order	  of	  possibilities	  common	  to	  both	  thought	  and	  world”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80);	  
while	  Fierke	  follows	  Hacker	  in	  attributing	  to	  the	  Tractatus	  the	  claim	  that	  “a	  sentence	  
with	  ‘sense’	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  logical	  syntax	  of	  language	  is	  perfectly	  isomorphic	  with	  
the	  logical	  structure	  of	  reality”	  (Fierke,	  2003:	  p.335-­‐6;	  Hacker,	  1996:	  p.37).	  
Figure  3:    The  Representational  View  of  Language  According  to   
Kratochwil,   P in-­‐Fat  and  F ierke  
  
Assumption  1:   Language  is  composed  of  sentences  that  describe  possible  
‘facts’.    
Assumption  2:   Individual  words  in  these  sentences  name/  refer  to/  
correspond  with  ‘objects’.  
Assumption  3:   The  meaning  of  words  and  sentences  comes  from,  or  is  
constituted  by,  the  ‘objects’  and  ‘facts’  to  which  they  refer.  
Corollary  i:   The  relevant  objects  and  facts  belong  to  a  reality  that  is  
‘objective’  in  the  sense  that  it  exists  and  is  a  certain  way  
independently  of  subjective  factors  (objective  realism);    
Corollary  ii:   Items  falling  under  the  referential  scope  of  a  particular  word  
all  share  one  common  feature  by  virtue  of  which  they  belong  
to  the  same  category  (class  essentialism);  
Corollary  iii:   Sentences  are  ‘true’  when  they  correspond  or  agree  with  
reality  (correspondence  theory  of  truth).  
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1.4	   How	  do	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  link	  the	  ‘Representational	  View	  
of	  Language’	  with	  ‘Positivist’	  Approaches	  to	  IR?	  
	  
Having	  summarised	  what	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  take	  the	  ‘representational	  
view	  of	  language’	  to	  be,	  I	  will	  now	  explore	  in	  more	  detail	  how	  these	  scholars	  suggest	  
that	  this	  view	  is	  connected	  with	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  	  
	  
Connection 1: Historical Influence 
	  
All	  three	  scholars	  frame	  the	  connections	  that	  they	  draw	  between	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  and	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  with	  a	  historical	  
narrative	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  within	  philosophy,	  
and	  the	  purported	  influence	  of	  philosophy	  on	  the	  methods	  employed	  in	  social	  and	  
political	  study.	  The	  gist	  of	  this	  narrative	  is	  as	  follows:	  that	  the	  representational	  view	  
of	  language	  was	  the	  dominant	  view	  of	  language	  within	  philosophy	  until	  the	  mid	  20th	  
Century,	  and	  was	  endorsed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  prominent	  philosophers	  and	  
philosophical	  movements	  including	  the	  ‘logical	  positivists’	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle;	  that	  
scholars	  of	  social	  and	  political	  affairs	  were	  later	  influenced	  by	  these	  philosophies	  
when	  developing	  their	  methodologies,	  especially	  by	  ‘logical	  positivism’	  which	  they	  
used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  adapting	  and	  justifying	  the	  application	  of	  purportedly	  ‘scientific’	  
methods	  to	  their	  subject	  matter	  (such	  as	  hypothesis	  testing);	  and	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
this	  historical	  influence,	  approaches	  to	  IR	  which	  recommend	  or	  employ	  such	  methods	  
are	  wholly	  or	  partially	  committed	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  that	  
underpinned	  the	  philosophies	  according	  to	  which	  they	  were	  developed.	  	  	  
	  
So,	  for	  example,	  while	  Kratochwil	  does	  not	  explicitly	  identify	  the	  ‘mirror	  view’	  of	  
language	  with	  the	  work	  of	  a	  particular	  philosopher,	  he	  implicitly	  attributes	  this	  view	  
to	  a	  range	  of	  influential	  past	  philosophical	  movements	  including	  “classical	  as	  well	  as	  
‘modern’	  (Cartesian)	  epistemology”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.34),	  “classical	  logic”	  
(Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.225),	  “classical	  linguistic	  analysis”	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.268,	  n.26)	  
and	  the	  “logical	  positivism”	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.5-­‐6).	  Kratochwil	  
suggests	  that	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  “conventional	  understanding	  of	  social	  action”	  among	  IR	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scholars	  is	  one	  which	  incorporates	  the	  ‘mirror	  view’	  of	  language	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  
p.5);	  and	  that	  “much	  of	  [IR	  scholars’]	  standard	  understanding	  about	  the	  function	  of	  
language	  was	  based,	  until	  recently,	  on	  a	  conception	  of	  language	  as	  a	  mirror	  of	  
reality”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.19).	  As	  we	  saw	  previously,	  Kratochwil	  claims	  that	  in	  
particular,	  “research	  programs	  developed	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  logical	  positivism	  are	  
…	  indebted	  to”	  the	  ‘mirror	  conception’	  of	  language	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.6),	  since	  they	  
adopt	  a	  “positivist	  epistemology”	  that	  is	  committed	  to	  this	  view	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  
p.5).	  	  
	  
Like	  Kratochwil,	  Fierke	  associates	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  with	  
“philosophical	  presuppositions	  underlying	  Western	  philosophy	  since	  Descartes”	  
(Fierke	  and	  Jørgensen,	  2001:	  p.4).	  However,	  while	  Kratochwil	  implies	  that	  Descartes	  
himself	  was	  committed	  to	  the	  ‘mirror	  view’,	  Fierke	  suggests	  instead	  that	  Descartes	  
was	  part	  of	  a	  tradition	  of	  metaphysics	  out	  of	  which	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  developed,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  early	  Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  who	  “added	  
a	  mirror	  or	  picture	  view	  of	  language,	  to	  ideas,	  building	  on	  the	  tradition	  of	  
metaphysics,	  that	  logical	  structures	  are	  properties	  of	  an	  objective	  world”	  (Fierke	  and	  
Jørgensen,	  2001:	  p.9-­‐10,	  n.2).	  From	  this	  point	  onward,	  Fierke’s	  historical	  narrative	  is	  
more	  or	  less	  in	  agreement	  with	  Kratochwil’s,	  as	  she	  claims	  that	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  was	  then	  “adopted	  by	  the	  logical	  positivists	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle”	  
(Fierke	  and	  Jørgensen,	  2001:	  p.9-­‐10;	  Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.83),	  and	  through	  their	  influence	  
has	  shaped	  positivist	  practice	  in	  the	  social	  sciences”	  (Fierke,	  2003:	  p.333).	  	  
	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  gives	  expression	  to	  a	  similar	  narrative	  in	  her	  1997	  article.	  There	  she	  argues	  
that	  both	  the	  Tractatus’	  alleged	  “‘picture	  theory’	  of	  meaning”,	  and	  Waltz’s	  ‘positivist’	  
account	  of	  how	  theory	  functions,28	  are	  committed	  to	  a	  “picture”	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  subject	  and	  reality	  which	  they	  get	  from	  “the	  Cartesian	  legacy	  of	  the	  
exaltation	  of	  epistemology”	  (1997:	  p.79,	  p.81).	  Pin-­‐Fat	  identifies	  the	  central	  
assumption	  of	  this	  ‘picture’	  as	  being	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  thinking	  ‘subject’	  
and	  an	  ‘objective’	  external	  reality,	  in	  addition	  to	  which	  Pin-­‐Fat	  attributes	  to	  the	  
                                                
28	  Pin-­‐Fat	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  Waltz	  as	  a	  ‘positivist’	  in	  this	  essay,	  however	  in	  her	  2010	  book	  she	  explicitly	  
identifies	  Waltz	  as	  epitomising	  a	  ‘positivist’	  approach	  to	  IR	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.34).	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Cartesian	  tradition	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  subject	  and	  
reality	  is	  essentially	  one	  of	  representation,	  whereby	  the	  subject’s	  thoughts,	  
perceptions,	  utterances,	  knowledge	  etc.	  are	  all	  understood	  as	  ‘representations’	  of	  
reality	  in	  some	  sense	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.81).	  	  
	  
These	  historical	  sketches	  offered	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
introduction	  to	  the	  more	  specific	  parallels	  and	  connections	  that	  they	  identify	  
between	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  and	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  and	  
as	  offering	  a	  potential	  explanation	  for	  why	  such	  connections	  might	  exist.	  Now	  I	  am	  
going	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  some	  of	  the	  specific	  ways	  in	  which	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke	  take	  the	  two	  to	  be	  connected	  (some	  of	  which	  have	  already	  been	  mentioned),	  
which	  can	  be	  summarised	  under	  headings	  of	  implicit	  commitment,	  common	  
association	  and	  similarity.	  
	  
Connection 2: Implicit Commitment 
	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  ways	  in	  which	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  allege	  a	  connection	  
between	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  and	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  is	  by	  
suggesting	  that	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  automatically	  imply	  or	  entail	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language,	  and	  that	  they	  stand	  or	  fall	  together.	  Thus,	  for	  
example,	  in	  his	  1989	  book	  Kratochwil	  suggests	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  communication	  
to	  the	  description	  of	  ‘facts’	  and	  to	  “the	  ‘match’	  of	  concepts	  and	  objects”	  is	  part	  and	  
parcel	  of	  a	  “positivist	  epistemology”,	  which	  is	  why	  he	  concludes	  that	  the	  problems	  
associated	  with	  the	  ‘mirror	  view’	  can	  only	  be	  averted	  by	  a	  complete	  reorientation	  of	  
the	  research	  programme	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.5-­‐6).	  This	  is	  a	  suggestion	  that	  is	  
reinforced	  by	  Kratochwil’s	  argument	  in	  his	  2001	  essay,	  that	  the	  rejection	  of	  
conceptual	  ‘fuzziness’	  and	  ‘normative’	  concerns	  in	  IR	  follows	  from	  the	  adoption	  of	  an	  
“epistemology	  that	  is	  based	  on	  a	  ‘mirror’	  image	  of	  language”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  
p.29).29	  Similarly,	  Fierke	  claims	  in	  her	  2010	  essay	  that	  “the	  picture	  theory	  of	  language	  
continues	  to	  underpin	  assumptions	  about	  hypothesis	  testing	  within	  the	  social	  
sciences”	  (Fierke,	  2010:	  p.83),	  and	  that	  “hypothesis	  testing	  rests	  on	  a	  picture	  theory	  
                                                
29	  Underlining	  denotes	  my	  emphasis.	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of	  language	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  compare	  scientific	  categories	  with	  the	  world	  to	  
see	  whether	  they	  correspond”	  (Fierke,	  2010:	  p.84);	  both	  of	  which	  suggest	  that	  the	  
recommendation	  and	  attempted	  employment	  of	  ‘hypothesis	  testing’	  within	  IR	  
betrays	  an	  implicit	  acceptance	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language.	  
At	  times,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  go	  as	  far	  as	  to	  imply	  that	  ‘positivism’	  in	  IR,	  and	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language,	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing.	  For	  example,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
refers	  to	  the	  account	  of	  language	  she	  finds	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  as	  “logical	  positivism”	  
(Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.6),	  and	  then	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘positivism’	  to	  cover	  both	  “positive	  
science	  and	  logical	  positivism”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.134,	  n.6),	  going	  on	  to	  identify	  the	  
‘naming’	  model	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  reality	  as	  taking	  the	  form	  
in	  IR	  and	  other	  social	  sciences	  of	  “an	  empiricist-­‐positivist	  approach”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  
p.12).	  Fierke	  is	  more	  overt	  in	  this	  regard,	  writing	  in	  a	  joint	  introduction	  with	  
Jørgensen	  that:	  
	  
“The	  linguistic	  turn	  signalled	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  positivist	  view	  of	  language	  
as	  mirroring	  an	  objective	  reality,	  to	  language	  as	  constitutive	  of	  the	  social	  
world.	  The	  former	  is	  a	  necessary	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  notions	  of	  hypothesis	  
testing	  or	  the	  idea	  that	  theoretical	  statements	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  
world	  to	  see	  whether	  they	  correspond.”	  (Fierke	  and	  Jørgensen,	  2001:	  p.7)	  
	  
In	  the	  above	  passage,	  Fierke	  and	  Jørgensen	  not	  only	  identify	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  as	  a	  specifically	  ‘positivist’	  view,	  but	  also	  propose	  that	  assuming	  this	  
view	  is	  “necessary”	  for	  ‘notions	  of	  hypothesis	  testing’,	  which	  suggests	  that	  one	  
cannot	  endorse	  or	  develop	  a	  conception	  of	  hypothesis	  testing	  without	  assuming	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language.	  In	  her	  2010	  essay	  Fierke	  again	  equates	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  with	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  when	  she	  argues:	  
	  
“the	  transition	  in	  [Wittgenstein’s]	  thought	  from	  a	  picture	  theory	  to	  a	  more	  
constitutive	  notion	  of	  language	  is	  precisely	  the	  transition	  that	  has	  been	  
underway	  within	  IR	  debates	  for	  the	  last	  twenty	  years,	  from	  the	  unquestioned	  
assumption,	  best	  articulated	  by	  Waltz	  (1979),	  that	  theory	  mirrors	  the	  logic	  of	  
the	  international	  system	  across	  time,	  to	  the	  ‘constructivist	  turn’,	  and	  the	  
greater	  attention	  to	  cultural	  difference,	  meaning,	  context	  and	  processes	  of	  
constitution	  and	  change.”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84)	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This	  identification	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  with	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  in	  IR	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  stronger	  version	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  are	  implicitly	  committed	  to	  this	  view.	  
	  
Connection 3: Common Association 
	  
A	  slightly	  weaker	  way	  in	  which	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  try	  to	  forge	  a	  
connection	  between	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  and	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  in	  IR	  is	  by	  suggesting	  that	  IR	  scholars	  who	  adopt	  a	  ‘positivist’	  approach	  
frequently	  or	  typically	  happen	  to	  also	  assume	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language.	  
Thus	  Fierke	  writes	  that	  “Wittgenstein,	  in	  his	  later	  work,	  provided	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  
picture	  theory	  of	  language,	  which	  is	  often	  assumed	  in	  explanatory	  theories”	  such	  as	  
“realist	  or	  institutionalist”	  theories	  of	  IR	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84,	  my	  emphasis),	  while	  
Kratochwil	  argues	  that	  “most	  ‘realists’	  …	  believe	  in	  natural	  kinds	  and	  some	  essence	  
that	  ‘correctly’	  names	  the	  things	  in	  the	  world”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011:	  p.144,	  my	  
emphasis).30	  
	  
Connection 4: Similarities 
	  
Another	  sort	  of	  way	  in	  which	  Fierke	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  try	  to	  connect	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  with	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  is	  by	  pinpointing	  specific	  
similarities	  between	  the	  two	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  claims	  or	  assumptions	  to	  which	  they	  are	  
committed.	  For	  example,	  in	  her	  1997	  essay	  Pin-­‐Fat	  compares	  Kenneth	  Waltz’s	  claim	  
that	  “a	  theory	  is	  a	  picture	  …	  of	  a	  bounded	  realm	  or	  domain	  of	  activity”	  with	  the	  
Tractatus’	  proposition	  that	  language	  is	  a	  ‘picture’	  of	  reality,	  and	  suggests	  that	  they	  
are	  similar	  in	  that	  they	  both	  assume	  (a)	  that	  there	  is	  an	  irrevocable	  “separation”	  
between	  the	  subject	  “and	  a	  passive,	  external	  reality”,	  and	  (b)	  that	  the	  relationship	  of	  
the	  subject	  to	  reality	  is	  one	  of	  ‘representation’	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.81-­‐2;	  Waltz,	  1979:	  
p.8).	  Pin-­‐Fat	  also	  draws	  a	  parallel	  between	  Waltz’s	  claim	  that	  a	  theory	  “indicates	  that	  
                                                
30	  Since	  Kratochwil	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘realist’	  to	  characterise	  approaches	  to	  IR	  that	  he	  elsewhere	  calls	  
‘positivist’,	  the	  latter	  argument	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  intended	  to	  apply	  to	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  
as	  well.	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some	  factors	  are	  more	  important	  than	  others	  and	  specifies	  the	  relations	  among	  
them”,	  and	  the	  Tractatus’	  alleged	  assumption	  that	  there	  is	  “a	  super-­‐order”	  between	  
concepts	  and	  essential	  elements	  of	  reality	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.81;	  Waltz,	  1979:	  p.8),	  
arguing	  that	  Waltz’s	  stipulation	  that	  theory	  must	  abstract	  from	  reality	  in	  order	  to	  
“mirror	  the	  most	  important	  elements	  under	  consideration”	  is	  tantamount	  to	  
assuming	  that	  there	  is	  a	  logical	  “order	  of	  possibilities	  common	  to	  both	  thought	  and	  
world”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.82).	  
	  
Meanwhile	  Fierke,	  in	  her	  2002	  essay,	  also	  picks	  out	  Waltz’s	  claim	  that	  theory	  ‘depicts’	  
reality	  as	  resembling	  the	  Tractarian	  proposition	  that	  language	  is	  a	  ‘picture’	  of	  reality,	  
and	  suggests	  that	  Waltz’s	  approach	  to	  IR	  theory	  “relies	  on	  similar	  assumptions	  about	  
the	  nature	  of	  language”	  to	  the	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.336).	  Fierke	  highlights	  Waltz’s	  
recommendation	  to	  IR	  theorists	  “to	  give	  a	  clear	  and	  fixed	  meaning	  to	  otherwise	  
vague	  and	  varying	  terms,”	  his	  account	  of	  theory	  as	  being	  “derived	  from	  invariant	  laws	  
based	  on	  factual	  correlations,”	  and	  his	  attempt	  to	  “lay	  bare	  the	  essential	  elements”	  
of	  international	  politics	  as	  aspects	  of	  his	  work	  that	  particularly	  resemble	  the	  
assumptions	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  presented	  in	  the	  Tractatus.	  
Fierke	  spells	  out	  the	  similarities	  as	  follows:	  
	  
“Like	  the	  Tractatus,	  Waltz	  provides	  a	  positional	  picture	  of	  reality	  composed	  of	  
atomistic	  units.	  The	  relations	  between	  these	  parts	  and	  the	  whole	  are	  
expressed	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  logical	  scaffolding.	  Both	  provide	  a	  crystalline	  
logic	  that	  relates	  to	  a	  world	  of	  simples.	  …	  The	  resemblance	  rests	  on	  the	  
following	  common	  assumptions.	  Logic	  exists	  in	  the	  world.	  To	  capture	  this	  logic	  
requires	  an	  exercise	  in	  clarifying	  and	  fixing	  the	  meaning	  of	  terms.	  These	  terms	  
correspond	  to	  a	  world	  of	  simples.”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.336)	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  words	  correspond	  to	  simples,	  Fierke	  
acknowledges	  that	  Waltz	  “does	  not	  claim	  the	  isomorphic	  [i.e.	  one-­‐to-­‐one]	  qualities	  of	  
perfect	  correspondence	  between	  theory	  and	  world”;	  but	  like	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  she	  suggests	  
that	  Waltz	  makes	  the	  related	  assumption	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ‘essential’	  underlying	  order	  




Outline of the Connections 
	  
The	  ways	  in	  which	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  suggest	  that	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  
to	  IR	  are	  connected	  with	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  are	  summarised	  in	  
the	  box	  below,	  for	  convenience.	  
	  
	  
A Note on Consistency 
	  
The	  reader	  may	  observe	  at	  this	  point	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke	  try	  to	  link	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  with	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  appear	  to	  be	  compatible.	  So,	  for	  example,	  it	  might	  seem	  self-­‐contradictory	  
Figure  4:    Ways  in  which  Kratochwil,  Pin-­‐Fat  and  F ierke  Suggest  
that   ‘Posit ivist ’  Approaches  to   IR  are   l inked  with  the  
Representat ional  View  of   Language    
  
1) ‘Positivist’  approaches  to  IR  were  historically  influenced  by  popular  
philosophies  that  endorsed  the  representational  view  of  language  (this  
connection  being  used  to  frame  the  other  more  specific  connections  
below).  
  
2) ‘Positivist’  approaches  to  IR  are  implicitly  committed  to  the  representational  
view  of  language.  
  
3) ‘Positivist’  approaches  to  IR  often  go  along  with  a  commitment  to  the  
representational  view  of  language.  
  
4) ‘Positivist’  approaches  to  IR  are  similar  to  the  representational  view  of  
language  in  that  they  are  committed  to  some  of  the  same  assumptions,  
and/or  to  assumptions  which  resemble  those  of  the  representational  view  
of  language  in  certain  respects.  
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to	  suggest	  –	  as	  Fierke	  does	  –	  that	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  are	  implicitly	  
committed	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  and	  then	  to	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  
committed	  to	  assumptions	  which	  are	  merely	  similar	  to	  those	  endorsed	  by	  this	  view	  
(see,	  e.g.,	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.336).	  Such	  apparent	  inconsistencies	  are	  indeed	  a	  cause	  for	  
concern.	  However,	  since	  my	  aim	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  summarise	  rather	  than	  evaluate,	  
having	  briefly	  acknowledged	  this	  difficulty,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  explain	  the	  
objections	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  use	  Wittgenstein	  to	  make	  against	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  above	  connections.	  
	  
1.5	   What	  are	  the	  Criticisms	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  Use	  Later	  
Wittgenstein	  to	  make	  on	  this	  Basis?	  
	  
To	  recapitulate,	  so	  far	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  accomplished	  the	  following:	  In	  1.1	  I	  
provided	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  anti-­‐representationalist	  line	  of	  objection	  against	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  that	  is	  employed	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  using	  
passages	  from	  their	  work	  in	  which	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  most	  concisely	  and	  
cohesively	  expressed.	  In	  1.2	  I	  explained	  which	  sorts	  of	  approaches	  are	  included	  in	  
what	  these	  scholars	  consider	  to	  be	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  against	  which	  their	  
anti-­‐representationalist	  line	  of	  objection	  is	  directed.	  In	  1.3	  I	  provided	  an	  account	  of	  
what	  these	  scholars	  understand	  by	  the	  problematic	  ‘representational’	  view	  of	  
language	  that	  they	  associate	  with	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  which	  they	  refer	  to	  
using	  terms	  like	  the	  ‘mirror	  view’	  or	  ‘picture	  view’	  of	  language.	  In	  1.4	  I	  explained	  the	  
different	  sorts	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  connect	  this	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  with	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  	  
	  
Having	  come	  this	  far,	  my	  task	  in	  the	  current	  section	  will	  be	  to	  explain	  the	  criticisms	  
that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  make	  of	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  the	  alleged	  association	  with	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  for	  which	  they	  
appeal	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  for	  support.	  As	  I	  have	  previously	  stated,	  my	  
aim	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  summarise	  rather	  than	  to	  critically	  evaluate;	  and	  so	  aside	  
from	  the	  occasional	  acknowledgement,	  I	  will	  largely	  refrain	  from	  pointing	  out	  any	  
flaws	  or	  problematic	  features	  in	  Kratochwi,	  Fierke	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  arguments.	  
 44  
	  
Something	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  acknowledge	  at	  this	  juncture	  is	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke	  do	  not	  always	  make	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  criticisms	  that	  are	  meant	  
to	  apply	  solely	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  and	  those	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  
also	  apply	  to	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  assumption	  of	  this	  
view.	  This	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  point	  that	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  criticisms	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  to	  IR	  would	  depend	  upon	  the	  precise	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  are	  thought	  to	  
be	  connected.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  
automatically	  imply	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  then	  
criticisms	  of	  the	  latter	  view	  would	  presumably	  be	  thought	  likewise	  to	  automatically	  
work	  as	  refutations	  of	  such	  approaches.	  If,	  however,	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  to	  IR	  are	  committed	  to	  assumptions	  which	  resemble	  those	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language,	  then	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  some	  explicit	  
argument	  made	  for	  how	  criticisms	  of	  the	  latter	  are	  still	  applicable	  to	  the	  former.	  
Again,	  this	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  I	  will	  address	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  when	  I	  come	  to	  
evaluate	  the	  anti-­‐representationalist	  line	  of	  objection.	  However,	  for	  now	  I	  will	  simply	  
summarise	  the	  criticisms	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  make	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  (in	  the	  context	  of	  which	  they	  appeal	  to	  later	  
Wittgenstein),	  and	  follow	  this	  with	  some	  brief	  remarks	  on	  what	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke	  envisage	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  criticisms	  being	  for	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  to	  IR.	  
	  
Criticism 1: The ‘Propositional’ Model is Inadequate 
	  
In	  his	  work	  Kratochwil	  often	  airs	  the	  criticism	  that	  thinking	  of	  language	  purely	  in	  
terms	  of	  factual	  propositions	  is	  not	  a	  good	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  meaning	  of	  
sentences	  and	  other	  so-­‐called	  ‘speech	  acts’.	  This	  is	  clearly	  a	  criticism	  aimed	  at	  what	  I	  
previously	  called	  ‘Assumption	  1’	  and	  ‘Assumption	  3’	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language,	  according	  to	  which	  language	  is	  composed	  of	  sentences	  which	  describe	  
possible	  ‘facts’,	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  sentence	  is	  the	  possible	  ‘fact’	  that	  it	  represents.	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Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  also	  allude	  to	  this	  criticism	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  in	  their	  work	  (e.g.	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80;	  Fierke,	  2003:	  p.75-­‐6)	  –	  however,	  
since	  they	  conflate	  it	  with	  the	  separate	  criticism	  that	  not	  all	  words	  refer	  to	  objects,	  I	  
will	  focus	  here	  on	  Kratochwil’s	  version,	  as	  it	  is	  by	  him	  that	  this	  criticism	  is	  most	  clearly	  
expressed.	  	  	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  main	  reasons	  that	  Kratochwil	  offers	  to	  support	  his	  criticism	  of	  the	  
propositional	  model	  of	  linguistic	  meaning:	  firstly,	  he	  argues	  that	  not	  all	  uses	  of	  
language	  are	  statements	  of	  possible	  fact,	  and	  secondly,	  that	  are	  other	  important	  
factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  particular	  use	  of	  language	  aside	  from	  its	  
supposed	  ‘propositional	  content’.	  The	  following	  passage	  from	  Kratochwil’s	  1989	  book	  
shows	  how	  these	  two	  reasons	  are	  combined	  by	  Kratochwil	  in	  his	  objection	  to	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language:	  
	  
“While	  classical	  logic	  assumed	  that	  communication	  among	  actors	  is	  possible	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  propositional	  content,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  is	  safeguarded	  by	  certain	  
truth	  functions,	  the	  discussion	  of	  speech	  acts	  showed	  that	  such	  a	  conception	  
of	  language	  is	  inadequate.	  Truth	  and	  falsity	  are	  appropriate	  criteria	  only	  when	  
applied	  to	  propositions.	  Neither	  the	  illocutionary	  nor	  the	  perlocutionary	  effect	  
of	  speech	  acts	  can	  thereby	  be	  analyzed.	  However,	  since	  promising,	  
contracting,	  asserting,	  etc.,	  are	  important	  parts	  of	  our	  social	  world,	  we	  cannot	  
simply	  exclude	  these	  aspects	  from	  our	  theorizing	  about	  social	  reality.”	  
(Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.29)	  
	  
In	  this	  passage	  Kratochwil	  initially	  points	  out	  that	  aside	  from	  factual	  assertions,	  there	  
are	  other	  ways	  of	  using	  language	  (such	  as	  “promising”	  and	  “contracting”)	  which	  are	  
not	  well-­‐characterised	  as	  descriptions	  that	  could	  be	  true	  or	  false.	  Kratochwil	  credits	  
Searle’s	  “discussion	  of	  speech	  acts”	  with	  this	  observation,	  however	  Kratochwil’s	  
references	  elsewhere	  to	  Wittgenstein	  as	  the	  decisive	  figure	  in	  instigating	  the	  demise	  
of	  the	  ‘mirror	  view’	  of	  language	  suggests	  that	  he	  is	  using	  this	  phrase	  to	  gesture	  
towards	  the	  sorts	  of	  considerations	  that	  originally	  surfaced	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  
philosophy.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  passage	  Kratochwil	  makes	  the	  complementary	  
suggestion	  that	  there	  are	  not	  only	  ways	  of	  using	  language	  that	  are	  non-­‐propositional,	  
but	  also	  that	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  ‘speech	  act’	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than	  its	  supposed	  ‘propositional	  content’	  (i.e.	  the	  possible	  factual	  scenario	  that	  it	  
allegedly	  describes).	  Kratochwil	  uses	  J.L.	  Austin’s	  terms	  ‘illocutionary’	  and	  
‘perlocutionary’	  to	  refer	  to	  these	  factors	  which	  are	  excluded	  by	  ‘propositional’	  
analyses	  of	  linguistic	  meaning	  (Austin,	  1955).	  	  
	  
Elsewhere	  in	  his	  work	  Kratochwil	  explores	  in	  more	  depth	  some	  examples	  of	  using	  
language	  whose	  (main)	  purpose	  or	  function	  is	  not	  to	  provide	  factual	  descriptions,	  and	  
also	  explains	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  language-­‐use	  that	  he	  takes	  to	  
contribute	  to	  linguistic	  meaning,	  including	  those	  he	  characterises	  as	  ‘illocutionary’	  
and	  ‘perlocutionary’.	  An	  example	  of	  a	  non-­‐propositional	  use	  of	  language	  that	  
Kratochwil	  frequently	  refers	  to	  is	  Austin’s	  example	  of	  saying	  “I	  do”	  in	  a	  marriage	  
ceremony	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.7;	  2001:	  p.31).	  Kratochwil	  states	  in	  his	  2001	  article	  
that	  “when	  I	  say,	  for	  example,	  in	  a	  marriage	  ceremony	  ‘I	  do,’	  I	  [do	  not]	  describe	  
something	  ….	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  here	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  description	  breaks	  down	  
entirely	  since	  I	  am	  ‘doing’	  something”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.31).	  Meanwhile,	  in	  his	  
1989	  book,	  Kratochwil	  suggests	  that	  what	  one	  does	  by	  uttering	  ‘I	  do’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
a	  marriage	  ceremony,	  is	  to	  “commit”	  oneself	  to	  a	  marriage	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.7).	  In	  
this	  light,	  Kratochwil	  suggests	  that	  “asserting”	  a	  proposition	  is	  only	  one	  of	  a	  whole	  
range	  of	  different	  ‘speech	  acts’	  which	  include	  “demanding”,	  “appointing”,	  
“apologizing”,	  “threatening”	  etc.	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.31).31	  An	  important	  point	  with	  
regard	  to	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  there	  are	  some	  ‘propositional’	  
uses	  of	  language,	  or	  that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  ‘descriptive’	  aspect	  to	  many	  speech	  acts;	  
rather,	  what	  it	  denies	  –	  with	  reference	  to	  counter-­‐examples	  –	  is	  that	  all	  meaningful	  
uses	  of	  language	  are	  ‘propositional’,	  and	  that	  language	  necessarily	  depends	  for	  its	  
meaning	  upon	  its	  descriptive	  function.	  	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  ‘illocutionary’	  or	  ‘perlocutionary’	  dimensions	  of	  language-­‐use,	  
Kratochwil	  clarifies	  in	  his	  1989	  book	  that	  these	  terms	  are	  part	  of	  the	  three-­‐part	  
distinction	  made	  by	  Austin	  and	  Searle	  between	  the	  ‘locution’,	  ‘illocution’	  and	  
                                                
31	  Fierke	  also	  potentially	  implies	  a	  form	  of	  this	  criticism	  in	  her	  2002	  essay	  when	  she	  writes	  that	  “[t]he	  
picture	  view	  couldn’t	  account	  for	  the	  multiple	  ways	  in	  which	  language	  is	  used”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.337).
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‘perlocution’	  of	  a	  speech	  act.32	  According	  to	  Kratochwil,	  the	  locution	  of	  a	  speech	  act	  
refers	  to	  what	  it	  is	  that	  is	  said	  (such	  as	  ‘I	  do’,	  or	  ‘I	  promise’),	  while	  the	  illocution	  or	  
illocutionary	  force	  refers	  to	  what	  kind	  of	  act	  an	  utterance	  ostensibly	  amounts	  to,	  for	  
example,	  ‘promising’,	  ‘requesting’,	  ‘demanding’	  etc.	  Finally,	  the	  perlocution	  or	  
perlocutionary	  effect	  refers	  to	  the	  consequence(s)	  of	  the	  utterance,	  in	  terms	  of	  “the	  
impact	  it	  has	  on	  the	  hearers”.33	  An	  example	  of	  a	  perlocutionary	  effect	  cited	  by	  
Kratochwil	  is	  “threatening”	  (1989:	  p.30,	  p.147).	  Thinking	  back	  to	  the	  passage	  quoted	  
at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  subsection,	  Kratochwil’s	  argument	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  that	  
passage	  can	  be	  put	  like	  this:	  if	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘speech	  act’	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  what	  
is	  said	  (its	  ‘locution’),	  but	  also	  on	  what	  sort	  of	  action	  it	  amounts	  to	  (its	  ‘illocution’)	  
and	  on	  the	  consequences	  or	  effects	  that	  it	  has	  (the	  ‘perlocution’),	  then	  an	  analysis	  
which	  focuses	  only	  on	  ‘propositional	  content’	  will	  at	  best	  only	  succeed	  in	  providing	  a	  
partial	  account	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  an	  utterance.	  
	  
Expanding	  on	  the	  last	  point,	  Kratochwil	  argues	  in	  his	  1989	  book	  that	  the	  illocution	  
and	  perlocution	  of	  a	  speech	  act	  often	  depends	  upon	  a	  wider	  social	  or	  linguistic	  
context	  in	  which	  it	  takes	  place,	  such	  as	  a	  relationship	  between	  two	  people,	  or	  an	  
extended	  dialogue	  or	  written	  text.	  Taking	  the	  example	  of	  an	  ‘indirect’	  or	  ‘implied’	  
statement,	  Kratochwil	  writes:	  
	  
“‘Indirect’	  speech	  acts	  are	  very	  common	  occurrences	  that	  simply	  cannot	  be	  
neglected.	  The	  utterance	  ‘You	  look	  pale’	  in	  most	  cases	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  factual	  
statement	  but	  is	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  context,	  such	  as	  ‘I	  worry	  about	  you,’	  ‘Can	  I	  do	  
anything	  for	  you?’,	  etc.	  Sentence	  grammars	  and	  [formal]	  semantic	  
investigations	  ignore,	  however,	  precisely	  this	  pragmatic	  dimension	  of	  
language	  exchanges,	  as	  well	  as	  syntagmatic	  chaining	  of	  sentences	  and	  clauses	  
to	  larger	  units	  or	  sequences.”	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.30)	  
	  
In	  his	  2001	  article	  Kratochwil	  puts	  this	  objection	  in	  stronger	  terms,	  claiming	  that	  “it	  is	  
the	  context	  that	  determines	  the	  meaning	  entirely”	  (2001:	  p.29).34	  This	  claim	  will	  be	  
                                                
32	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.8	  
33	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.8	  
34	  I	  should	  like	  to	  note	  at	  this	  point	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  retain	  a	  ‘semantic’	  conception	  
of	  linguistic	  function	  in	  criticising	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  and	  its	  assumptions;	  in	  that	  
they	  treat	  their	  observations	  concerning	  how	  language	  functions	  in	  various	  situations	  as	  equivalent	  to	  
observations	  about	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  language	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  meaning,	  and	  therefore	  as	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considered	  further	  under	  ‘Criticism	  3’,	  below,	  when	  I	  will	  look	  at	  the	  more	  general	  
argument	  made	  by	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  that	  linguistic	  meaning	  is	  ‘socially	  
constructed’.	  
	  
Criticism 2: Words do not refer to ‘Objects’ 
	  
A	  second	  criticism,	  made	  by	  all	  three	  scholars,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  –	  as	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  holds	  –	  that	  each	  word	  in	  language	  refers	  to	  an	  
‘object’.	  This	  criticism	  is	  worked	  out	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	  it	  actually	  targets	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  assumptions	  that	  these	  scholars	  assign	  to	  
the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  including	  Assumption	  2	  (that	  words	  refer	  to	  
objects),	  Assumption	  3	  (that	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  comes	  from	  the	  object	  to	  
which	  it	  refers),	  Corollary	  1	  (according	  to	  which	  the	  ‘objects’	  to	  which	  words	  refer	  are	  
‘objective’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  their	  existence	  and	  characteristics	  do	  not	  depend	  upon	  
‘subjective’	  factors	  such	  as	  how	  they	  are	  perceived	  or	  interpreted	  by	  individuals),	  and	  
Corollary	  2	  (according	  to	  which	  the	  ‘objects’	  to	  which	  words	  refer	  fall	  naturally	  into	  
categories	  defined	  by	  some	  ‘essential’	  property	  which	  is	  possessed	  by	  all	  members	  of	  
the	  class).	  As	  with	  the	  previous	  criticism,	  there	  are	  some	  different	  reasons	  that	  are	  
offered	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  to	  support	  their	  objection	  to	  these	  
assumptions.	  These	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  follows.	  
	  
• Reason	  A):	  Not	  all	  words	  refer	  to	  something.	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  reasons	  offered	  in	  support	  of	  this	  criticism	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke	  is	  that	  not	  all	  words	  refer	  to,	  or	  name,	  something	  (whether	  an	  ‘object’	  or	  not),	  
and	  that	  there	  are	  many	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  words	  can	  be	  used	  meaningfully	  aside	  
from	  reference	  or	  naming.	  Pin-­‐Fat	  argues	  in	  her	  1997	  article	  that	  later	  Wittgenstein	  
criticises	  the	  assumption	  that	  words	  name	  objects	  in	  PI	  §23,	  by	  “show[ing]	  that	  there	  
are	  many	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  words	  are	  meaningful	  which	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  word-­‐
object	  naming	  relation.	  For	  example,	  giving	  orders	  and	  obeying	  them,	  making	  a	  joke,	  
                                                                                                                                        
capable	  of	  contradicting	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language’s	  assumptions	  concerning	  the	  semantic	  
functioning	  of	  words	  and	  sentences.	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forming	  and	  testing	  a	  hypothesis,	  praying	  etc.”35	  Fierke	  makes	  a	  similar	  claim	  in	  her	  
2003	  article,	  where	  she	  writes	  that	  “the	  absence	  of	  an	  isomorphic	  relationship	  
between	  the	  word	  and	  the	  world	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  work,	  
particularly	  his	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  in	  which	  he	  sought	  to	  explore	  the	  many	  
different	  ways	  humans	  use	  language”.36	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  implication	  is	  that	  there	  are	  
various	  ways	  of	  using	  language	  –	  including	  giving	  and	  obeying	  orders,	  telling	  jokes,	  
forming	  and	  testing	  hypotheses,	  and	  praying	  –	  in	  which	  words	  are	  used	  in	  ways	  other	  
than	  reference	  or	  naming,	  and	  that	  one	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  main	  aims	  in	  listing	  such	  
examples	  in	  the	  PI	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  this	  point.	  
	  
Meanwhile,	  in	  his	  2001	  article,	  Kratochwil	  points	  out	  that	  there	  are	  words	  such	  as	  
“connectives	  and	  conditionals”37	  which	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  anything	  in	  reality,	  but	  
nevertheless	  modify	  the	  meaning	  of	  sentences	  in	  which	  they	  occur.38	  An	  example	  of	  a	  
conditional	  that	  Kratochwil	  cites	  is	  ‘although’.	  Elsewhere,	  Kratochwil	  suggests	  that	  
‘normative’	  terms	  such	  as	  “public	  interest”	  and	  “national	  interest”	  are	  also	  non-­‐
referential,39	  since	  rather	  than	  functioning	  as	  “descriptive	  labels,”	  they	  are	  used	  “for	  
evaluating,	  criticising,	  or	  justifying	  action”.40	  Like	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  Kratochwil	  
elsewhere	  credits	  this	  criticism	  to	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  for	  example	  when	  he	  writes	  in	  
his	  2009	  article	  that	  his	  analysis	  of	  ‘rule	  of	  law’	  “began	  from	  a	  Wittgensteinian	  notion	  
that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  concept	  …	  is	  not	  its	  reference	  but	  its	  ‘use’”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  
[2009]:	  p.145),	  and	  that	  “if	  meaning	  is	  not	  simple	  reference	  …	  then	  meaning	  is	  
conveyed	  by	  how	  we	  use	  our	  concepts,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  suggested”	  (Kratochwil,	  
2013:	  p.2).	  Both	  of	  these	  attributions	  allude	  to	  PI	  §43,	  where	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  
                                                
35	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80.	  From	  this	  quote	  of	  Pin-­‐Fat’s,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  she	  conflates	  Assumption	  3	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  with	  Assumption	  2	  (according	  to	  which	  sentences	  are	  
propositional),	  and	  so	  offers	  Wittgenstein’s	  observation	  of	  the	  variety	  of	  different	  ways	  of	  using	  
language	  as	  an	  objection	  to	  Assumption	  2	  and	  3	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  together.	  
This	  is	  apparently	  also	  the	  case	  with	  Fierke.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  both	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke	  would,	  on	  reflection,	  commit	  to	  something	  like	  the	  first	  criticism	  of	  Assumption	  2	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  offered	  by	  Kratochwil	  under	  Objection	  1	  above,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
criticism	  that	  not	  all	  words	  work	  by	  referring	  to	  objective	  phenomena.	  
36	  Fierke,	  2003:	  p.75-­‐6	  
37	  Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.29	  
38	  “there	  are	  also	  certain	  important	  modifiers	  such	  as	  connectives	  and	  conditionals—what	  does	  
‘although’	  correspond	  to?—that	  play	  a	  role	  in	  what	  a	  sentence	  means”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.29).	  
39	  Kratochwil,	  2011:	  p.56	  
40	  Kratochwil,	  2011:	  p.39	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“For	  a	  large	  class	  of	  cases	  –	  though	  not	  for	  all	  –	  in	  which	  we	  employ	  the	  word	  
‘meaning’	  it	  can	  be	  defined	  thus:	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  its	  use	  in	  the	  language”.	  	  
	  
• Reason	  B):	   The	  cases	  to	  which	  a	  given	  word	  refers	  need	  not	  all	  share	  one	  
‘core’	  property	  in	  common.	  
	  
Another	  reason	  offered	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  in	  support	  of	  their	  criticism	  
that	  words	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  ‘objects’	  in	  the	  sense	  assumed	  by	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language,	  is	  that	  there	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  single	  ‘core’	  property,	  or	  set	  of	  
properties,	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  all	  cases	  to	  which	  a	  referential	  word	  applies.	  In	  making	  
this	  argument,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  all	  cite	  a	  famous	  passage	  from	  
Wittgenstein’s	  PI	  where	  he	  introduces	  his	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘family	  resemblance’	  concept.41	  In	  
the	  relevant	  passage	  Wittgenstein	  invites	  the	  reader	  to	  consider	  the	  example	  of	  the	  
word	  ‘game’,	  and	  to	  think	  of	  various	  cases	  of	  what	  are	  called	  ‘games’.	  Wittgenstein	  
suggests	  that	  if	  we	  put	  aside	  the	  preconception	  that	  all	  of	  these	  cases	  “must	  have	  
something	  common”	  then	  we	  will	  notice	  that	  there	  is	  no	  one	  common	  property	  
shared	  by	  all	  things	  we	  call	  ‘games’,	  but	  rather	  a	  number	  of	  characteristic	  features	  
which	  relate	  certain	  games	  to	  certain	  others:	  
	  
“Look,	  for	  example,	  at	  board-­‐games,	  with	  their	  various	  affinities.	  Now	  pass	  to	  
card-­‐games;	  here	  you	  find	  many	  correspondences	  with	  the	  first	  group,	  but	  
many	  common	  features	  drop	  out,	  and	  others	  appear.	  When	  we	  pass	  next	  to	  
ball-­‐games,	  much	  that	  is	  common	  is	  retained,	  but	  much	  is	  lost.	  –	  Are	  they	  all	  
‘entertaining’?	  Compare	  chess	  with	  noughts	  and	  crosses.	  Or	  is	  there	  always	  
winning	  and	  losing,	  or	  competition	  between	  players?	  Think	  of	  patience.	  In	  
ball-­‐games,	  there	  is	  winning	  and	  losing;	  but	  when	  a	  child	  throws	  his	  ball	  at	  the	  
wall	  and	  catches	  it	  again,	  this	  feature	  has	  disappeared.	  Look	  at	  the	  parts	  
played	  by	  skill	  and	  luck,	  and	  at	  the	  difference	  between	  skill	  in	  chess	  and	  skill	  in	  
tennis.	  Think	  now	  of	  singing	  and	  dancing	  games;	  here	  we	  have	  the	  element	  of	  
entertainment,	  but	  how	  many	  other	  characteristic	  features	  have	  disappeared!	  
And	  we	  can	  go	  through	  the	  many,	  many	  other	  groups	  of	  games	  in	  the	  same	  
way,	  can	  see	  how	  similarities	  crop	  up	  and	  disappear.”	  (PI	  §66)	  
	  
                                                
41	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80;	  Fierke,	  2001:	  p.119;	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2001]:	  p.251	  and	  2010	  [2002]:	  p.76	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Wittgenstein	  goes	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  form	  of	  relatedness	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  
“family	  resemblance”,	  by	  analogy	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  one	  can	  observe	  such	  
discontinuous	  patterns	  of	  similarities	  between	  individual	  members	  of	  the	  same	  
family	  (PI	  §67).	  Wittgenstein	  also	  identifies	  the	  words	  ‘language’	  and	  ‘number’	  as	  
examples	  of	  other	  words	  whose	  applications	  “form	  a	  family”	  (PI	  §65-­‐66).	  	  	  
	  
Apparently	  referring	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  remarks	  in	  PI	  §65-­‐7,	  Kratochwil	  identifies	  
various	  concepts	  that	  are	  used	  in	  IR	  as	  ‘family	  resemblance’	  terms;	  or,	  as	  he	  
sometimes	  puts	  it,	  “cluster	  concepts”.42	  In	  a	  2001	  article,	  after	  having	  considered	  
various	  cases	  where	  someone	  or	  something	  is	  said	  to	  ‘represent’	  the	  people	  in	  a	  
political	  sense,	  Kratochwil	  writes:	  
	  
“[T]here	  is	  no	  clear	  concept	  of	  [political]	  representation.	  Instead,	  a	  variety	  of	  
closely	  related,	  though	  quite	  distinctive,	  practices	  and	  conceptions	  of	  making	  
public	  choices	  are	  covered	  by	  this	  term.	  …	  Each	  of	  the	  different	  models	  seems	  
to	  be	  derived	  from	  one	  example	  which	  quickly	  loses	  its	  plausibility	  when	  it	  is	  
applied	  to	  other	  contexts	  that	  are	  illuminated	  by	  a	  different	  example.	  
Representation	  is	  more	  like	  a	  cluster-­‐term	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  understandings	  that	  
might	  share	  a	  certain	  family	  resemblance	  but	  that	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  firm	  
core	  aside	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  serve	  as	  a	  cipher	  pointing	  to	  the	  importance	  
of	  ‘the	  people’.”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011:	  p.251)	  
	  
Another	  example	  identified	  by	  Kratochwil	  is	  the	  concept	  ‘power’:	  
	  
“[P]ower	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  cluster-­‐concept,	  linking	  
various	  ‘forms’	  …	  .	  Sometimes	  it	  can	  be	  ‘possessed’,	  at	  other	  times	  it	  is	  more	  
diffuse	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  intellectual	  hegemonies	  or	  structural	  power),	  
sometimes	  it	  has	  certain	  observable	  effects	  (as	  in	  Weber’s	  or	  Dahl’s	  
definition),	  and	  in	  other	  cases	  it	  can	  be	  ‘seen’	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  
counterfactual	  thought	  experiment	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  power	  of	  anticipated	  
reaction).	  None	  of	  these	  variations,	  however,	  disqualifies	  any	  of	  these	  
manifestations	  from	  being	  properly	  called	  an	  instance	  of	  power,	  and	  
eliminating	  any	  of	  them	  might	  entail	  significant	  heuristic	  	  
costs.”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011:	  p.209)	  
	  
	  
                                                
42	  Kratochwil,	  2011:	  p.209	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• Reason	  C):	   Identifying	  the	  referents	  of	  a	  word	  may	  involve	  interpretation	  
and	  evaluation.	  
	  
Another	  reason	  that	  Kratochwil	  offers	  in	  support	  of	  this	  criticism	  is	  that	  there	  are	  
cases	  in	  which	  identifying	  something	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  conceptual	  kind	  involves	  
subjective	  interpretation	  and/or	  making	  evaluative	  judgements.	  This	  is	  clearly	  
targeted	  at	  the	  ‘objective	  realist’	  corollary	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  words	  correspond	  
with	  ‘objects’.	  In	  his	  1989	  book	  and	  2001	  article,	  Kratochwil	  argues	  that	  “what	  counts	  
as	  a	  case	  of	  self-­‐defence”,	  “aggression”,	  “self-­‐determination”	  or	  “interference”	  is	  not	  
something	  that	  can	  be	  simply	  observed	  or	  deduced	  ‘objectively’	  from	  some	  relevant	  
facts,	  but	  rather	  depends	  on	  how	  one	  evaluates	  and	  interprets	  these	  facts	  as	  “part	  of	  
a	  complex	  appraisal”.43	  In	  other	  words:	  if	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  given	  action	  
constitutes	  an	  instance	  of	  ‘self-­‐defence’,	  ‘aggression’	  etc.,	  is	  not	  a	  wholly	  objective	  
matter,44	  that	  means	  that	  there	  is	  room	  for	  genuine	  disagreement	  about	  what	  the	  
referents	  of	  these	  words	  are.	  
	  
Kratochwil	  suggests	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  a	  word	  may	  even	  be	  what	  he	  calls	  an	  
“essentially	  contested	  concept”,	  which	  is	  a	  term	  he	  borrows	  from	  Connelly	  (1983)45	  
to	  characterise	  concept-­‐words	  whose	  application	  is	  typically	  contested,	  and	  where	  
such	  contestation	  appears	  to	  be	  central	  to	  the	  word’s	  function.	  Kraochwil	  suggests	  
that	  the	  application	  of	  words	  like	  ‘deterrence’,	  ‘self-­‐defence’,	  ‘aggression’	  and	  
‘legitimate’	  are	  inherently	  contestable	  in	  this	  manner	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.28),	  and	  
that	  the	  essential	  contestability	  of	  these	  words’	  applications	  is	  what	  allows	  them	  to	  
be	  used	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  persuasion	  in	  the	  context	  of	  political	  discourses	  (2001:	  
p.29).	  Kratochwil	  sometimes	  uses	  the	  adjective	  “fuzzy”	  to	  characterise	  concept-­‐words	  





                                                
43	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.33;	  and	  2001:	  p.29	  
44	  E.g.	  such	  as	  could	  be	  settled	  by	  “pure	  observation”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.29).	  
45	  Although	  the	  term	  was	  originally	  coined	  by	  W.B.	  Gallie	  (1955).	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• Reason	  D):	   The	  referents	  of	  a	  word	  may	  change	  over	  time.	  
	  
A	  fourth	  reason	  put	  forward	  by	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  is	  that	  the	  application	  of	  a	  
word	  and/or	  the	  cases	  to	  which	  it	  refers	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  change	  over	  time.	  For	  
example,	  in	  a	  2002	  article	  on	  sovereignty	  Kratochwil	  carries	  out	  an	  historical	  
investigation	  into	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘sovereignty’	  and	  ‘property’	  
“emerged	  and	  changed	  over	  time	  as	  the	  key	  notions	  for	  understanding	  …	  the	  
territorial	  state	  and	  its	  concomitant	  ‘system’	  …	  [and]	  how	  the	  ‘invention’	  of	  the	  state	  
and	  the	  modern	  ‘individual’	  are	  connected”.46	  In	  this	  context,	  Kratochwil	  observes	  
how	  the	  word	  ‘sovereignty’	  initially	  emerged	  during	  the	  medieval	  period	  as	  a	  way	  of	  
denoting	  any	  hierarchical	  relationship	  between	  two	  or	  more	  parties,	  before	  being	  
defined	  by	  Bodin	  as	  a	  supreme	  and	  absolute	  authority	  (or	  ‘majesty’)	  over	  all	  citizens	  
and	  things	  common	  to	  them;47	  and	  was	  then	  subsequently	  redefined	  by	  Hobbes	  to	  
refer	  to	  the	  limited	  public	  authority	  of	  a	  figurehead	  (a	  Sovereign)	  to	  whom	  a	  group	  of	  
individuals	  lend	  power	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  keeping	  order.48	  	  
	  
Meanwhile	  Fierke,	  in	  her	  2001	  article,	  points	  out	  the	  difference	  between	  two	  
scenarios	  of	  international	  politics	  that	  have	  historically	  been	  cited	  as	  examples	  of	  
“balance	  of	  power”	  politics;	  observing	  that	  “in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  
was	  given	  meaning	  as	  a	  conflict	  between	  two	  stable	  and	  permanent	  nuclear	  ‘families’	  
(alliances)	  within	  which	  it	  was	  largely	  unthinkable	  that	  a	  member	  would	  leave	  to	  join	  
the	  other	  family”,	  while	  in	  contrast	  “the	  classic	  European	  balance	  of	  power”	  during	  
the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  Century	  positively	  encouraged	  new	  alliances,	  with	  states	  
“trying	  to	  remain	  attractive	  to	  new	  suitors	  in	  a	  context	  of	  ever	  changing	  affairs”	  
(Fierke,	  2001:	  p.130).	  Thus	  while	  the	  term	  “balance	  of	  power”	  has	  been	  used	  to	  
characterise	  both	  the	  politics	  of	  19th	  Century	  Europe	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  
                                                
46	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2002]:	  p.64	  
47	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2002]:	  p.65	  
48	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2002]:	  p.72.	  In	  a	  different	  article,	  Kratochwil	  examines	  the	  historical	  ‘shifts’	  that	  
have	  taken	  place	  in	  political	  discourse	  regarding	  what	  is	  identified	  as	  the	  justification	  for	  following	  the	  
“rule	  of	  law”;	  observing	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  move	  away	  from	  an	  emphasis	  on	  “the	  importance	  of	  the	  
state,	  sovereignty	  and	  most	  of	  the	  traditional	  ‘sources’	  of	  law,”	  towards	  an	  emphasis	  on	  “‘humanity’,	  
or	  even	  more	  abstractly,	  ‘human	  dignity’”	  as	  “the	  exclusive	  legitimising	  source”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  
[2009]:	  p.145).	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“the	  practices	  by	  which	  balance	  is	  maintained	  [in	  each	  of	  these	  scenarios]	  are	  
diametrically	  opposed”	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  p.130).49	  	  
	  
Kratochwil’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  different	  historical	  senses	  in	  which	  the	  word	  
‘sovereignty’	  has	  been	  used,	  and	  Fierke’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  
historical	  scenarios	  to	  which	  the	  term	  ‘balance	  of	  power’	  has	  been	  applied,	  highlight	  
the	  potential	  for	  the	  application	  of	  words	  to	  change	  over	  time	  such	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  
a	  word’s	  reference	  may	  shift,	  expanding	  to	  incorporate	  new	  scenarios	  that	  either	  did	  
not	  previously	  exist	  or	  were	  not	  considered	  appropriate	  referents,	  and/or	  potentially	  
diminishing	  to	  exclude	  certain	  cases	  that	  were	  once	  considered	  appropriate	  referents	  
but	  are	  now	  obsolete.	  This	  point	  is	  integrated	  by	  Fierke	  with	  Reason	  (B),	  as	  she	  
suggests	  that	  in	  cases	  like	  ‘balance	  of	  power’	  where	  the	  previous	  referent	  is	  retained	  
along	  with	  the	  new	  scenario	  as	  a	  possible	  meaning	  of	  the	  term,	  it	  is	  more	  appropriate	  
to	  think	  of	  the	  term	  as	  referring	  to	  a	  “family”	  of	  related	  cases,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
members	  of	  an	  ‘essential’	  type	  of	  phenomenon	  “transcending	  time	  and	  space”	  
(Fierke,	  2001:	  p.130).	  
	  
Criticism 3: Linguistic Meaning is ‘Socially Constructed’ 
	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  more	  specific	  criticisms	  that	  I	  have	  outlined	  so	  far,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  and	  Fierke	  also	  make	  some	  broader	  objections	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  in	  the	  context	  of	  which	  they	  advance	  their	  own	  general	  claims	  about	  
language	  and	  linguistic	  meaning.	  One	  such	  objection	  involves	  endorsing	  the	  claim	  
that	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  and	  sentences	  is	  ‘constructed’	  or	  ‘constituted’	  by	  their	  use	  
in	  particular	  social	  contexts,	  which	  is	  meant	  to	  contradict	  the	  representational	  view’s	  
assumption	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  and	  sentences	  is	  determined	  by	  some	  
‘objective’	  phenomena	  or	  factual	  situations	  that	  they	  supposedly	  refer	  to	  or	  describe	  
in	  reality.50	  This	  is	  a	  claim	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  take	  to	  have	  a	  basis	  in	  
                                                
49	  “In	  the	  one	  case	  [the	  Cold	  War],	  it	  is	  irrational	  to	  change	  alliances;	  in	  the	  other	  [19th	  Century	  Europe]	  
changing	  alliances	  is	  part	  of	  the	  game”	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  p.130).	  
50	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  sometimes	  use	  the	  term	  ‘constructed’	  rather	  than	  ‘constituted’;	  however	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section	  I	  shall	  use	  the	  latter	  term	  more	  often,	  since	  this	  is	  the	  term	  which	  is	  used	  
by	  all	  three	  scholars.	  
 55  
Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy,	  especially	  in	  remarks	  such	  as	  PI	  §23	  and	  §67,	  and	  
which	  they	  typically	  introduce	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  two-­‐part	  contention,	  where	  it	  is	  
prefaced	  by	  a	  negative	  general	  claim	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  and/or	  
sentences	  is	  not	  ‘representational’.	  Below	  are	  some	  examples	  of	  passages	  in	  which	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  present	  this	  objection:	  
	  
“The	  decisive	  impulse	  for	  constructivism	  came	  from	  Wittgenstein’s	  ‘linguistic	  
turn’	  in	  his	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  (1953),	  where	  the	  problem	  of	  meaning	  
found	  a	  new	  solution.	  The	  meaning	  of	  a	  term	  consisted	  no	  longer	  in	  its	  exact	  
correspondence	  to	  an	  object	  in	  the	  ‘outer	  world’	  but	  in	  its	  use	  in	  speech.	  In	  
other	  words,	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein	  directed	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  conventional	  
and	  pragmatic	  character	  of	  language.	  Concepts	  meant	  something,	  not	  
because	  they	  captured	  the	  ontological	  essences	  of	  ‘things’	  …	  but	  because	  they	  
were	  used	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  among	  speakers	  who	  thereby	  communicated	  with	  
one	  another.”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.20,	  my	  emphasis.	  See	  also	  Kratochwil,	  
2013:	  p.2)	  
	  
“So	  if	  the	  naming	  of	  objects	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  then	  
what	  might?	  ‘For	  a	  large	  class	  of	  cases	  –	  though	  not	  for	  all	  –	  in	  which	  we	  
employ	  the	  word	  ‘meaning’	  it	  can	  be	  defined	  thus:	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  
its	  use	  in	  the	  language’	  (Wittgenstein,	  1953,	  §43).	  Meaning,	  then,	  comes	  from	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  word	  is	  used	  in	  particular	  contexts,	  or	  as	  Wittgenstein	  
sometimes	  put	  [sic.]	  it,	  ‘our	  talk	  gets	  its	  meaning	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  our	  
proceedings’	  (Wittgenstein,	  1969,	  §229).	  The	  ‘rest	  of	  our	  proceedings’	  are	  our	  
practices.	  He	  says,	  ‘The	  word	  “language-­‐game”	  is	  here	  meant	  to	  emphasise	  
that	  the	  speaking	  of	  language	  is	  part	  of	  an	  activity	  or	  a	  form	  of	  life’	  
(Wittgenstein,	  1953,	  23).”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80,	  my	  emphasis.	  See	  also	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
2010:	  p.10	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2013:	  p.250)	  	  
	  
“The	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  draws	  on	  the	  metaphor	  of	  a	  game	  to	  
elaborate	  the	  nature	  of	  language.	  Language	  use	  is	  like	  making	  moves	  in	  a	  
game.	  The	  structure	  of	  meaning	  and	  interaction	  are	  dependent	  on	  rules	  
shared	  with	  others.	  Language	  use	  is	  a	  form	  of	  action	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  rather	  
than	  merely	  a	  set	  of	  labels	  for	  a	  world	  independent	  of	  us	  (Wittgenstein,	  1958:	  
paras.	  1,	  3,	  7,	  65,	  66).”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.37,	  my	  emphasis.	  See	  also	  Fierke,	  
2010a:	  p.86)	  
	  
In	  the	  above	  quotes,	  the	  relevant	  claim	  is	  expressed	  variously	  as	  being	  that	  the	  
meaning	  of	  a	  term	  consists	  in	  its	  use	  in	  speech,	  that	  concepts	  mean	  something	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because	  they	  are	  used	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  among	  speakers,	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  
comes	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  used	  in	  particular	  contexts,	  and	  that	  the	  structure	  
of	  linguistic	  meaning	  is	  dependent	  on	  shared	  rules	  of	  language-­‐use.	  It	  clear	  from	  the	  
fuller	  explications	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  provide	  of	  these	  claims	  
elsewhere,	  that	  they	  are	  committed	  to	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  understanding	  of	  the	  
sense	  in	  which	  linguistic	  meaning	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  ‘constituted’	  or	  ‘constructed’	  by	  
language-­‐use	  (see	  below).	  Therefore,	  the	  above	  variations	  in	  their	  manner	  of	  
expression	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  indicate	  any	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  
version	  of	  this	  claim	  that	  these	  scholars	  endorse;	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  they	  do	  not	  
acknowledge	  any	  relevant	  distinction	  between	  claims	  such	  as	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  
linguistic	  item	  is	  its	  use,	  that	  a	  linguistic	  item	  has	  meaning	  because	  of	  its	  use,	  that	  the	  
meaning	  of	  a	  linguistic	  item	  originates	  from	  its	  use,	  and	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  
linguistic	  item	  depends	  on	  its	  use.	  	  
	  
In	  explaining	  what	  it	  means	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  linguistic	  items	  such	  as	  
words	  and	  sentences	  is	  constituted	  by	  their	  use,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  both	  appeal	  to	  
later	  Wittgenstein’s	  example	  of	  a	  game	  of	  chess,	  which	  Wittgenstein	  discusses	  and	  
refers	  to	  in	  remarks	  such	  as	  PI	  §31	  and	  §199	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.15;	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.337-­‐
8	  and	  2010:	  p.88).	  In	  contrast,	  Kratochwil	  draws	  mainly	  on	  Searle’s	  discussion	  of	  a	  
football	  game	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.27),	  although	  he	  acknowledges	  Wittgenstein	  as	  
the	  originator	  of	  this	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  linguistic	  meaning	  –	  for	  example,	  when	  he	  
writes	  that	  “the	  decisive	  impulse	  for	  constructivism	  came	  from	  Wittgenstein’s	  
‘linguistic	  turn’	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  where	  the	  problem	  of	  meaning	  
found	  a	  new	  solution.	  The	  meaning	  of	  a	  term	  consisted	  no	  longer	  in	  its	  exact	  
correspondence	  to	  an	  object	  in	  the	  ‘outer	  world’	  but	  in	  its	  use	  in	  speech”	  (Kratochwil,	  
2001:	  p.8).51	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  initial	  point	  with	  which	  all	  three	  scholars	  begin	  is	  the	  
observation	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  certain	  nouns	  and	  descriptive	  expressions	  that	  are	  
used	  in	  playing	  or	  talking	  about	  a	  game	  such	  as	  chess	  or	  American	  football,	  cannot	  be	  
explained	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  physical	  properties	  and	  movements	  of	  the	  objects	  
involved.	  	  
	  
                                                
51	  Searle’s	  discussion	  is	  itself	  partially	  based	  on	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  example	  (Searle,	  1969:	  p.52).	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Thus,	  for	  example,	  one	  cannot	  explain	  what	  the	  “knight”	  or	  “king”	  is	  in	  chess	  by	  
referring	  solely	  to	  the	  shape	  and	  material	  composition	  of	  the	  piece	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  
p.88;	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.15);	  nor	  can	  one	  explain	  what	  “touchdown”	  or	  “time	  out”	  is	  in	  
American	  football	  by	  referring	  solely	  to	  the	  physical	  movements	  of	  the	  ball	  and	  the	  
player’s	  bodies	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.27).	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  bolster	  this	  claim	  with	  
the	  argument	  that	  if	  one	  were	  to	  attempt	  to	  describe	  a	  game	  or	  other	  social	  scenario	  
in	  purely	  physical	  and/or	  material	  terms,	  one	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  certain	  
distinctions	  that	  are	  ordinarily	  acknowledged	  between	  different	  sorts	  of	  objects	  and	  
movements.	  So,	  for	  example,	  Fierke	  argues	  that	  appealing	  to	  the	  knight’s	  
composition	  out	  of	  wood	  or	  metal	  “would	  not	  then	  distinguish	  this	  object,	  or	  its	  use,	  
from	  a	  thousand	  other	  products	  made	  with	  wood	  or	  metal”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.88);	  
while	  Kratochwil	  argues	  that	  “describing	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  door	  by	  way	  of	  physical	  
movements	  and	  physiological	  processes	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  whether	  what	  happened	  was	  
a	  random	  action,	  was	  done	  in	  order	  to	  let	  fresh	  air	  into	  the	  room,	  was	  a	  gesture	  of	  
politeness,	  or	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  signal	  for	  another	  person	  to	  leave	  the	  room”	  
(Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.24).	  	  
	  
Having	  made	  this	  point,	  Fierke	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  argue	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  piece	  in	  chess	  
comes	  from,	  and	  must	  therefore	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of,	  its	  use	  in	  accordance	  with	  
a	  set	  of	  established	  rules	  and	  conventions	  that	  together	  constitute	  the	  game	  of	  
‘chess’	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.15;	  Fierke,	  2001:	  p.131,	  2010:	  p.88),	  with	  Fierke	  claiming	  that	  
the	  objects	  and	  practices	  involved	  in	  chess	  are	  “constituted	  and	  made	  meaningful”	  by	  
the	  “rules	  of	  that	  particular	  game”	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  p.131).	  Similarly,	  Kratochwil	  quotes	  
Searle’s	  claim	  that	  actions	  such	  as	  ‘scoring	  a	  touchdown’	  or	  ‘going	  offside’	  are	  
“institutional	  facts”	  which	  “can	  only	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  constitutive	  rules	  
that	  underlie	  them”;	  arguing	  that	  “terms	  such	  as	  ‘offside,’	  ‘checkmate,’	  ‘home	  run,’	  
etc.	  …	  attain	  their	  meaning	  by	  pointing	  to	  further	  consequences	  within	  the	  game-­‐
structure,	  such	  as	  choosing	  a	  move,	  making	  a	  point,	  having	  to	  pay	  a	  penalty,	  etc.”	  
(Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.27;	  Searle,	  1969:	  p.52).	  	  
	  
In	  discussing	  their	  examples	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  both	  appeal	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  
‘constitutive	  rule’,	  or	  ‘rule-­‐like	  action’,	  which	  they	  purportedly	  get	  from	  later	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Wittgenstein	  and	  Searle	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.338;	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.27).	  A	  constitutive	  
rule,	  according	  to	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke,	  is	  a	  way	  of	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  rule	  
which	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  practical	  instantiation	  of	  it,	  from	  which	  other	  people	  can	  
deduce	  the	  rule	  that	  is	  being	  followed	  and/or	  learn	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  it	  
themselves.	  So,	  for	  example,	  if	  a	  chess	  player	  is	  playing	  correctly	  in	  accordance	  with	  
the	  rules	  of	  chess,	  then	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  move	  the	  various	  pieces	  around	  
the	  board	  while	  playing	  the	  game	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  practical	  demonstration	  of	  the	  
rules	  they	  are	  following,	  and	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  those	  watching	  or	  participating	  
in	  the	  game	  for	  how	  to	  play.	  In	  his	  work,	  Kratochwil	  sometimes	  refers	  to	  rules	  and	  
rule-­‐like	  actions	  together	  as	  ‘norms’.	  
	  
It	  is	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  observations	  and	  arguments	  concerning	  the	  playing	  and	  
description	  of	  games	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  endorse	  the	  more	  general	  
claim	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  word	  (or	  other	  linguistic	  item)	  is	  constituted	  by	  its	  use;	  
which,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘constitutive	  rule’	  above,	  is	  in	  their	  eyes	  equivalent	  
to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  and	  other	  linguistic	  expressions	  is	  constituted	  
by	  the	  rules	  and	  normative	  practices	  that	  guide	  their	  use	  in	  particular	  social	  contexts.	  
In	  his	  2001	  article	  Kratochwil	  commits	  to	  the	  “positive	  heuristic”	  that	  “man	  is	  not	  
only	  a	  language-­‐endowed	  animal,	  but	  …	  that	  meaning	  is	  use	  and	  that	  communication	  
among	  a	  set	  of	  people	  is	  governed	  by	  conventions	  and	  criteria”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  
p.15),	  asserting	  that	  “speech	  acts	  are	  constituted	  by	  norms”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  “only	  
within	  a	  practice	  governed	  by	  institutional	  rules	  will	  a	  certain	  utterance	  have	  a	  
meaning”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.31).	  In	  her	  2002	  article	  Fierke	  concludes	  in	  light	  of	  the	  
chess	  example	  that	  “material	  objects,	  our	  actions	  or	  observations	  acquire	  meaning	  
within	  a	  social	  context	  of	  rules”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.338).	  Meanwhile	  Pin-­‐Fat	  claims	  that	  
“the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  …	  require[s]	  …	  its	  use	  within	  a	  particular	  context”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  
2010:	  p.10),	  and	  that	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  a	  word	  one	  must	  be	  able	  to	  use	  it	  and	  
“to	  follow	  a	  rule”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.16).	  These	  general	  claims	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
linguistic	  meaning	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  endorse	  are	  effectively	  a	  
generalisation	  of	  the	  points	  they	  make	  regarding	  the	  meaning	  of	  words,	  objects	  and	  
actions	  involved	  in	  playing	  or	  describing	  games,	  such	  that	  these	  points	  are	  taken	  to	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hold	  not	  just	  for	  words	  and	  expressions	  used	  to	  describe	  or	  participate	  in	  games	  and	  
game-­‐like	  scenarios,	  but	  for	  all	  words	  and	  sentences	  in	  general.	  	  
	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  both	  use	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  terms	  ‘language-­‐game’,	  ‘grammar’,	  
and	  ‘form	  of	  life’	  to	  express,	  and	  expand	  upon,	  their	  claim	  regarding	  the	  normative	  
constitution	  of	  linguistic	  meaning,	  citing	  the	  passage	  from	  PI	  §23	  where	  Wittgenstein	  
writes:	  “Here	  the	  term	  ‘language-­‐game’	  is	  meant	  to	  bring	  into	  prominence	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  speaking	  of	  language	  is	  part	  of	  an	  activity,	  or	  of	  a	  form	  of	  life.”	  According	  to	  
Fierke,	  ‘forms	  of	  life’	  are	  “patterns	  of	  activity	  visible	  across	  cultures”,	  while	  ‘language-­‐
games’	  are	  “culturally	  specific”	  contexts	  of	  activity	  which,	  “like	  a	  game,	  …	  represent	  a	  
set	  of	  interrelated	  practices	  that	  rest	  on	  socially	  accepted	  rules,	  which	  are	  often	  
assumed	  rather	  than	  consciously	  applied”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.88-­‐9).	  ‘Grammar’	  
according	  to	  Fierke,	  refers	  to	  the	  “range	  of	  possible	  expressions	  relating	  to	  a	  
practice”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.345),	  and	  she	  quotes	  Hacker’s	  interpretation	  of	  ‘grammar’	  
as	  “the	  rules	  for	  the	  use	  of	  expressions	  in	  question,	  which	  lay	  down	  what	  it	  makes	  
sense	  to	  say”	  (Hacker,	  1996:	  p.81;	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.344).	  Examples	  of	  ‘forms	  of	  life’	  
cited	  by	  Fierke	  include	  religion,	  war,	  violence,	  diplomacy,	  moral	  discourse,	  marriage	  
and	  sports	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.345;	  2010:	  p.88);	  while	  examples	  of	  ‘language-­‐games’	  she	  
provides	  are	  “a	  Christian	  wedding	  ceremony”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.344),	  “praying	  while	  
facing	  Meccah”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.89),	  “threaten[ing]	  retaliation	  with	  nuclear	  
weapons”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.345),	  justifying	  war	  “based	  on	  the	  threat	  of	  WMD”	  (Fierke,	  
2010a:	  p.92),	  and	  justifying	  war	  by	  appealing	  to	  “humanitarian	  reasons”	  (Fierke,	  
2010a:	  p.92).	  As	  examples	  of	  ‘grammar’,	  Fierke	  cites	  the	  norms	  of	  “saying	  ‘I	  do’	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  Christian	  wedding	  ceremony	  or	  stamping	  on	  a	  piece	  of	  glass	  in	  a	  Jewish	  
one”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.344).	  
	  
Pin-­‐Fat’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘language-­‐game’,	  ‘form	  of	  life’	  and	  ‘grammar’	  is	  
similar	  to	  Fierke’s,	  though	  it	  differs	  in	  some	  respects.	  According	  to	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  ‘language-­‐
games’	  are	  “practices”	  involving	  language	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.13),	  which	  is	  a	  somewhat	  
flexible	  designation	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  takes	  to	  include	  various	  things.	  She	  cites	  examples	  of	  
language-­‐games	  that	  are	  identified	  by	  Wittgenstein	  as	  “swearing,	  giving	  orders,	  
confessing	  a	  motive,	  talking	  about	  sense	  impressions”	  etc.,	  but	  notes	  that	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Wittgenstein	  also	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘language-­‐game’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  practice(s)	  of	  using	  a	  
particular	  word,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘language-­‐games’	  played	  with	  the	  words	  ‘game’,	  
‘proposition’	  and	  ‘thought’,	  and	  even	  “to	  signify	  the	  overall	  system	  of	  linguistic	  
practices”	  as	  a	  whole	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.16).	  Pin-­‐Fat	  adds	  to	  the	  list	  of	  examples	  
“language	  games	  of	  International	  Relations	  played	  with	  the	  use	  of	  words	  such	  as	  
‘ethics’,	  ‘universality’,	  ‘politics’,	  ‘international’,	  ‘anarchy’,	  and	  so	  on”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  
p.16),	  and	  claims	  that	  “theories	  are	  language	  games”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.13).	  	  
	  
Wary	  of	  becoming	  embroiled	  in	  an	  interpretive	  debate,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  is	  vaguer	  than	  Fierke	  
on	  the	  question	  of	  what	  a	  ‘form	  of	  life’	  is,	  stating	  simply	  that	  it	  “provides	  a	  wider	  
context	  of	  activities	  in	  which	  the	  activities	  of	  a	  language	  game	  make	  sense”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  
2010:	  p.131,	  n.5).	  With	  regard	  to	  ‘grammar’,	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  explanations	  of	  this	  term	  are	  
elusive;	  however	  she	  apparently	  uses	  it	  similarly	  to	  Fierke,	  to	  refer	  both	  to	  the	  kinds	  
of	  statement	  that	  are	  deemed	  appropriate	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  language-­‐game,	  and	  to	  
“the	  rules	  of	  a	  language-­‐game”	  that	  “determine”	  which	  expressions	  and	  ways	  of	  
using	  language	  are	  appropriate	  in	  that	  context	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.81).	  In	  her	  book,	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  quotes	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  Pitkin’s	  application	  of	  Wittgenstein	  to	  political	  
theory:	  	  
	  
“Grammar	  …	  establishes	  the	  place	  of	  a	  concept	  in	  our	  system	  of	  concepts,	  and	  
thereby	  in	  our	  world.	  It	  controls	  what	  other	  concepts,	  what	  questions	  and	  
observations,	  are	  relevant	  to	  a	  particular	  concept.	  [Thus]	  knowing	  what	  ‘a	  
mistake’	  is	  depends	  not	  on	  mastering	  its	  distinguishing	  features	  or	  
characteristics,	  but	  on	  having	  mastered	  what	  sorts	  of	  circumstances	  count	  as	  
‘making	  a	  mistake’,	  ‘preventing	  a	  mistake’,	  ‘excusing	  a	  mistake’,	  and	  so	  on.”	  
(Pitkin,	  1985:	  p.119)	  
	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  although	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  claim	  that	  the	  
meaning	  of	  particular	  uses	  of	  language	  are	  ‘determined’	  by	  the	  normative	  rules	  and	  
practices	  of	  the	  context	  within	  which	  they	  take	  place,	  they	  acknowledge	  that	  
individual	  language-­‐users	  have	  some	  freedom	  to	  influence	  the	  meaning	  of	  what	  they	  
say	  and	  write,	  and	  also	  to	  change	  the	  normative	  practices	  of	  existing	  language-­‐games	  
in	  which	  they	  participate.	  For	  example,	  Fierke	  writes:	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“The	  language	  user	  is	  embedded	  in	  a	  context	  and	  constrained	  by	  its	  rules,	  yet	  
may,	  through	  her	  choices	  and	  actions,	  shape	  that	  context,	  much	  as	  the	  chess	  
player,	  while	  embedded	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game,	  exercises	  choice	  in	  moving	  
from	  any	  particular	  space.”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.338)	  
	  
Elsewhere,	  Fierke	  suggests	  that	  the	  “socially	  accepted	  rules”	  or	  “grammar”	  of	  
language-­‐games	  “regulate	  action	  insofar	  as	  deviations	  from	  the	  rules	  may	  be	  
sanctioned”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.89).	  
	  
Criticism 4: Our Perception is Shaped by Language 
	  
Another	  criticism	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Fierke,	  
and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  make	  involves	  endorsing	  the	  general	  claim	  that	  our	  perception	  of	  
phenomena,	  including	  our	  identification	  and	  classification	  of	  items,	  is	  inextricably	  
bound	  up	  with	  the	  particular	  practices	  of	  language-­‐use	  in	  which	  we	  participate,	  and	  is	  
thereby	  determined	  by	  the	  same	  sorts	  of	  context-­‐relative	  rules	  and	  conventions	  that	  
determine	  the	  meaning	  of	  linguistic	  expressions.	  This	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  version	  of	  
‘linguistic	  relativism’	  or	  ‘linguistic	  determinism’,	  as	  famously	  summarised	  by	  Sapir:	  
	   	  
“The	  real	  world	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  built	  up	  on	  the	  language	  habits	  of	  the	  
group.	  We	  see	  and	  hear	  and	  otherwise	  experience	  very	  largely	  as	  we	  do	  
because	  the	  language	  habits	  of	  our	  community	  predispose	  certain	  choices	  of	  
interpretation.	  The	  worlds	  in	  which	  different	  societies	  live	  are	  distinct	  worlds,	  
not	  merely	  the	  same	  world	  with	  different	  labels	  attached.”	  (Sapir,	  1956:	  p.69)	  
	  
On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  claim,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  
for	  us	  to	  consider	  phenomena	  ‘objectively’	  apart	  from	  language	  so	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
evaluate	  whether	  and	  how	  well	  language	  or	  theory	  represents	  them,	  as	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  and	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  would	  require.	  
	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  last	  objection,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  start	  from	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  
identity	  of	  the	  material	  objects	  and	  movements	  used	  in	  games	  depends	  on,	  and	  is	  
thereby	  relative	  to,	  the	  rules	  and	  normative	  practices	  of	  the	  game.	  Pin-­‐Fat	  quotes	  
Wittgenstein’s	  remark	  PI	  §49	  in	  which	  he	  compares	  naming	  an	  object	  to	  putting	  a	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piece	  in	  its	  place	  on	  the	  chessboard,	  which	  Pin-­‐Fat	  interprets	  as	  contending	  that	  
objects	  are	  named	  and	  identified	  in	  preparation	  for	  a	  particular	  context	  in	  which	  they	  
are	  used.	  From	  this	  Pin-­‐Fat	  draws	  the	  general	  conclusion	  that	  “Wittgenstein	  is	  
pointing	  out	  that	  objects	  are	  indeterminate	  in	  themselves,”	  and	  that	  whether	  
something	  is	  an	  object,	  and	  what	  sort	  of	  object	  it	  is,	  depends	  on	  the	  grammar	  of	  the	  
particular	  context	  in	  question	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.13).	  As	  support	  for	  this	  claim	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
cites	  PI	  §370	  where	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  that	  “grammar	  tells	  us	  what	  kind	  of	  object	  
anything	  is”.	  Pin-­‐Fat	  presents	  this	  as	  a	  counterclaim	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  “ostensive	  
definitions”	  work	  “because	  they	  are	  grounded	  in	  a	  basic	  experience	  such	  as	  Humean	  
apprehension	  of	  a	  particular”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.13).	  	  
	  
Fierke	  makes	  the	  roughly	  the	  same	  argument	  as	  Pin-­‐Fat	  in	  her	  2010	  article.	  There	  she	  
claims	  that	  the	  “ontology”	  of	  the	  objects	  and	  movements	  used	  in	  chess	  “cannot	  be	  
separated	  from	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.88);	  since	  
it	  is	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  that	  stipulate	  the	  identity	  and	  meaning	  of	  the	  objects	  and	  
movements	  involved.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  recognising	  a	  piece	  of	  wood	  or	  metal	  as	  a	  
‘knight’	  requires	  familiarity	  with	  the	  normative	  practices	  and	  rules	  of	  chess,	  and	  the	  
same	  goes	  for	  recognising	  a	  certain	  pattern	  of	  movements	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  
‘cheating’	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.89).	  Fierke	  then	  generalises	  this	  claim	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  
perception	  and	  identification	  of	  phenomena	  in	  general,	  writing:	  	  
	  
“The	  ability	  to	  consistently	  identify,	  for	  instance,	  a	  table,	  and	  distinguish	  it	  
from	  a	  chair,	  precedes	  any	  individual	  and	  is	  reproduced	  by	  individuals	  within	  a	  
social	  world.	  The	  expression	  of	  emotion,	  no	  less	  than	  the	  identification	  of	  
chairs	  and	  tables,	  relies	  on	  customs,	  rules	  and	  institutions	  that	  precede	  the	  
individual.	  Neither	  the	  mental	  processes	  of	  individuals	  nor	  objects	  in	  the	  
world	  exist	  independent	  of	  this	  a	  priori	  language,	  which	  we	  are	  socialized	  into	  
as	  we	  learn	  to	  use	  language	  and	  thus	  become	  social	  beings.”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  
p.85)	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  arguments,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  conclude	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  
perceive	  phenomena	  ‘objectively’	  in	  a	  way	  which	  would	  allow	  one	  to	  compare	  their	  
pure	  manifestation	  with	  a	  linguistic	  artefact	  such	  as	  a	  theory,	  a	  meta-­‐theoretical	  
claim,	  a	  hypothesis,	  or	  a	  conceptual	  definition,	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  whether,	  and	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how	  well,	  the	  latter	  represents	  the	  former.	  In	  her	  2001	  essay,	  Fierke	  sums	  up	  the	  
conclusion	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  
	  
“Questions	  of	  meaning	  and	  interpretation	  are	  fundamentally	  questions	  about	  
language.	  One	  can	  accept	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  material	  reality	  independent	  of	  
language,	  but	  one	  cannot	  say	  anything	  meaningful	  about	  it,	  one	  cannot	  SAY	  
anything	  about	  it,	  without	  language	  …	  A	  consistent	  constructivist	  position,	  I	  
would	  argue,	  has	  to	  begin	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  we	  cannot	  get	  behind	  our	  
language	  to	  compare	  it	  with	  that	  which	  it	  describes.”	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  p.118)	  
	  
In	  her	  2002	  essay,	  Fierke	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  “discovery”	  that	  “We	  
cannot	  stand	  outside	  our	  language	  to	  compare	  it	  with	  that	  which	  it	  describes”	  (2002:	  
p.337).	  Meanwhile,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  concludes	  similarly	  in	  her	  2010	  book:	  
	  
“If	  we	  open	  our	  ears	  to	  the	  echo	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  spirit,	  we	  no	  longer	  inhabit	  
a	  world	  where	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  apprehend	  a	  reality	  which	  is	  ‘out	  there’	  (i.e.	  
outside	  language)	  and	  is	  the	  object	  that	  is	  represented	  so	  that	  the	  
assessments	  of	  claims	  about	  it	  can	  be	  measured	  as	  accurate	  (true)	  or	  
inaccurate	  (false).	  Without	  the	  possibility	  of	  knowledge	  of	  this	  kind,	  certainty	  
becomes	  impossible	  because	  it	  rests	  upon	  it.”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.7)	  
	  
From	  the	  above	  quotations,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  deny	  that	  
there	  may	  be	  an	  objective	  reality	  that	  exists	  and	  has	  certain	  properties	  independently	  
of	  human	  cognition	  and	  language.	  Rather	  what	  they	  are	  challenging	  is	  the	  possibility	  
of	  our	  perceiving	  such	  a	  reality	  in	  its	  ‘objective’	  form,	  such	  that	  we	  could	  compare	  it	  
with	  what	  we	  say	  or	  write	  about	  phenomena;	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  able	  to	  use	  
language	  to	  articulate	  reality	  in	  its	  ‘objective’	  form	  independently	  from	  the	  grammar	  
of	  a	  particular	  context	  of	  language-­‐use.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  conclusion	  with	  which	  Kratochwil	  concurs	  in	  his	  2000	  and	  2002	  articles.	  
There	  he	  claims	  that	  “we	  cannot	  get	  in	  between	  the	  ‘things’	  and	  our	  description	  of	  
them”	  since	  “their	  ‘ontology’	  depends	  on	  the	  purposes	  and	  practices	  embedded	  in	  
our	  concepts”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2000]:	  p.176);	  that	  “no	  ultimate	  foundation	  can	  be	  
appealed	  to	  in	  order	  to	  show	  what	  the	  world	  is	  ‘really	  like’”;	  and	  that	  ‘things’	  cannot	  
“speak	  to	  us	  in	  an	  unadulterated	  form”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2002]:	  p.78)	  but	  will	  need	  
to	  be	  expressed	  through	  “language”	  (Ibid.).	  Like	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  Kratochwil	  does	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not	  deny	  the	  possibility	  that	  reality	  exists	  ‘objectively’,	  but	  rather	  he	  rejects	  the	  
possibility	  that	  we	  could	  perceive	  its	  ‘objective’	  form	  and	  represent	  it	  using	  language.	  
He	  writes:	  
	  
“Hardly	  anyone	  –	  even	  among	  the	  most	  ardent	  constructivists	  or	  pragmatists	  
–	  doubts	  that	  the	  ‘world’	  exists	  ‘independent’	  from	  our	  minds.	  The	  question	  is	  
rather	  whether	  we	  can	  recognise	  it	  in	  a	  pure	  and	  direct	  fashion,	  i.e.,	  without	  
any	  ‘description’,	  or	  whether	  what	  we	  recognise	  is	  always	  already	  organised	  
and	  formed	  by	  certain	  categorical	  and	  theoretical	  elements.	  Thus,	  Kant’s	  
‘thing	  in	  itself’	  is	  ‘there’,	  but	  it	  is	  unrecognisable	  and	  as	  such	  uninteresting	  
until	  and	  unless	  it	  is	  brought	  under	  some	  description.”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  
[2000]:	  p.168	  
	  
Outline of the Criticisms 
	  
To	  aid	  the	  reader,	  here	  is	  a	  skeleton	  outline	  of	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  and	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  made	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke,	  as	  summarised	  in	  the	  last	  subsection:	  
	   	  
Criticism	  1:	   The	  ‘propositional’	  model	  of	  linguistic	  meaning	  is	  inadequate,	  because:	  
A) Not	  all	  ‘speech	  acts’	  are	  propositions	  of	  fact,	  and	  
B) There	  are	  other	  factors	  that	  influence	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  speech	  
act,	  such	  as	  the	  perlocution,	  illocution	  and	  context.	  
	  
Criticism	  2:	   Words	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  ‘objects’	  in	  the	  sense	  assumed	  by	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language,	  since:	  
A) Not	  all	  words	  refer	  to	  something	  (e.g.	  connectives/	  
conditionals);	  
B) The	  cases	  to	  which	  a	  word	  refers	  need	  not	  share	  an	  ‘essential’	  
property	  in	  common;	  
C) Identifying	  the	  referents	  of	  a	  word	  may	  involve	  interpretation	  
and	  evaluation;	  
D) The	  referents	  of	  a	  word	  may	  change	  over	  time.	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Criticism	  3:	   Linguistic	  meaning	  is	  ‘socially	  constructed’,	  in	  the	  sense	  that:	  
(A) The	  meaning	  of	  words	  and	  sentences	  comes	  from	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  they	  are	  used	  in	  particular	  contexts	  of	  language-­‐use	  
(‘language-­‐games’);	  
(B) These	  contexts	  are	  governed	  by	  normative	  rules	  and	  practices	  
(‘grammar’)	  by	  which	  the	  significance	  of	  particular	  actions	  
(including	  ‘speech	  acts’)	  is	  established	  and	  maintained;	  
(C) These	  normative	  rules	  and	  practices	  determine	  the	  range	  of	  
possible	  ways	  in	  which	  particular	  concepts	  or	  sentences	  may	  be	  
used.	  	  
	  
Criticism	  4:	   Our	  perception	  of	  phenomena	  is	  shaped	  by	  language	  in	  the	  sense	  that:	  
• The	  individuation	  and	  properties	  of	  what	  we	  perceive	  through	  the	  
senses	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  linguistic	  practices	  of	  the	  community	  
in	  which	  we	  have	  been	  raised	  –	  i.e.	  our	  language	  is	  inherently	  
involved	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  ‘objects’	  of	  our	  perception;	  
• We	  are	  therefore	  unable	  to	  perceive	  how	  objects	  and	  situations	  
are	  independently	  of	  a	  particular	  language,	  so	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  see	  
how	  ‘accurately’	  our	  words	  and	  sentences	  represent	  them;	  and	  
• Even	  if	  we	  were	  able	  to	  perceive	  reality	  in	  its	  ‘objective’	  form,	  we	  
would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  articulate	  this	  in	  language,	  since	  our	  concepts	  
and	  sentences	  are	  tied	  up	  with	  certain	  (subjective)	  ways	  of	  
perceiving	  and	  interpreting	  phenomena.	  
	  
The Applicability of the Criticisms 
	  
The	  above	  criticisms	  as	  they	  are	  expressed	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  clearly	  
target	  the	  following	  assumptions	  attributed	  by	  these	  scholars	  to	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language:	  (1)	  that	  language	  is	  composed	  of	  propositional	  sentences	  which	  
describe	  possible	  ‘facts’,	  (2)	  that	  words	  refer	  to	  ‘objects’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘objective’	  
phenomena	  whose	  individuation	  and	  properties	  obtain	  independently	  of	  subjective	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interpretations,	  values	  and	  preferences,	  and	  (3)	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  and	  
sentences	  comes	  from	  the	  ‘objects’	  and	  ‘facts’	  which	  they	  allegedly	  name	  or	  
describe;	  as	  well	  as	  against	  the	  corollaries	  of	  objective	  realism,	  essentialism	  and	  a	  
correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth.	  Furthermore,	  these	  scholars	  suggest	  that	  the	  above	  
criticisms	  to	  also	  provide	  a	  sound	  motivation	  for	  rejecting	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  
approaches	  to	  IR	  which	  they	  take	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  in	  the	  ways	  outlined	  in	  Section	  1.4,	  which	  involve	  testing	  hypotheses	  (Pin-­‐
Fat,	  1997:	  p.82;	  Fierke,	  2003:	  p.336,	  2010:	  p.84),	  formulating	  explanatory	  theories	  
(Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.18;	  Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84),	  providing	  abstract	  definitions	  of	  concepts	  
based	  on	  the	  identification	  of	  supposedly	  ‘essential’	  characteristics	  (Fierke,	  2003:	  
p.336;	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [1982]	  p.39;	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.9	  and	  11),	  and	  treating	  the	  
subject	  matter	  of	  IR	  as	  part	  of	  an	  ‘objective’	  reality	  whose	  existence	  and	  nature	  is	  
assumed	  to	  be	  independent	  of	  the	  values,	  interpretations	  etc.	  of	  human	  ‘subjects’	  
(Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.84;	  2010:	  p.35;	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2000]:	  p.168).	  
	  
As	  I	  alluded	  to	  previously	  in	  Section	  1.4,	  precisely	  how	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  to	  IR	  depends	  upon	  which	  of	  the	  alleged	  connections	  between	  these	  
approaches	  and	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  one	  takes	  to	  be	  decisive	  
according	  to	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  go	  with	  these	  
scholars’	  suggestion	  that	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  automatically	  imply	  or	  entail	  
the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  any	  successful	  criticisms	  
of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  should	  automatically	  render	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  to	  IR	  untenable	  by	  extension.	  Alternatively,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  take	  as	  
authoritative	  these	  scholars’	  suggestion	  that	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  are	  similar	  
to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  that	  they	  are	  committed	  to	  some	  of	  the	  
same,	  or	  similar,	  assumptions,	  then	  this	  would	  rather	  imply	  that	  criticisms	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  are	  applicable	  to	  some	  of	  the	  assumptions	  made	  
by	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  similarity.	  As	  I	  have	  already	  
noted,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  are	  not	  entirely	  clear	  or	  consistent	  with	  regard	  
to	  this	  question,	  and	  so	  I	  too	  will	  have	  to	  leave	  it	  somewhat	  vague	  in	  my	  summary	  of	  
their	  arguments.	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Chapter	  2	   Evaluating	  the	  Anti-­‐Representationalist	  Objection	  
	  
	  
In	  the	  last	  chapter	  I	  sought	  to	  summarise	  a	  particular	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  use	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  make	  against	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  which	  I	  called	  the	  ‘anti-­‐representationalist	  objection’	  
(ARO).	  In	  my	  summary	  I	  refrained	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  from	  criticising	  or	  endorsing	  
the	  various	  claims	  and	  arguments	  that	  these	  scholars	  make,	  and	  tried	  simply	  to	  set	  
out	  the	  relevant	  line	  of	  objection	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  their	  work.	  Having	  summarised	  the	  
anti-­‐representationalist	  objection	  as	  clearly	  as	  possible,	  my	  next	  move	  will	  be	  to	  
subject	  it	  to	  a	  critical	  evaluation.	  This	  evaluation	  has	  three	  aims:	  firstly,	  to	  help	  IR	  
scholars	  in	  general	  to	  assess	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  and	  its	  contribution	  to	  
methodological	  debates	  in	  IR;	  secondly,	  to	  help	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  to	  see	  
why	  they	  might	  need	  to	  change	  the	  ARO	  to	  improve	  the	  validity	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  
their	  objection	  to	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR;	  and	  thirdly,	  to	  determine	  for	  my	  own	  
purposes	  where	  there	  are	  gaps	  or	  difficulties	  with	  the	  ARO	  which	  a	  new	  application	  
of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  could	  be	  helpful	  in	  overcoming.	  	  
	  
To	  reiterate:	  any	  criticisms	  of	  the	  ARO	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  not	  made	  with	  the	  purpose	  
of	  undermining	  the	  work	  carried	  out	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  but	  are	  rather	  
offered	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  a	  critical	  ‘fellow	  traveller’	  –	  i.e.	  someone	  who	  is	  sympathetic	  
with	  these	  scholars’	  objection	  to	  certain	  purportedly	  ‘scientific’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  but	  
who	  can	  see	  some	  particular	  problems	  with	  the	  ARO	  that	  necessitate	  its	  
replacement.	  Prior	  to	  starting	  the	  critical	  part	  of	  my	  evaluation,	  I	  will	  therefore	  begin	  
in	  2.1	  by	  summarising	  some	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  the	  ARO	  as	  I	  see	  it.	  I	  will	  not	  dwell	  in	  
great	  detail	  on	  these	  positive	  aspects	  of	  the	  ARO,	  and	  will	  offer	  supporting	  remarks	  
as	  opposed	  to	  a	  comprehensive	  defence.	  Once	  I	  have	  summarised	  the	  strengths	  of	  
the	  ARO,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  will	  be	  organised	  into	  two	  main	  parts.	  In	  2.2	  I	  will	  
identify	  and	  explain	  four	  problematic	  features	  of	  the	  ARO	  as	  it	  is	  put	  forward	  by	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke.	  Then	  in	  2.3	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  detail	  what	  the	  implications	  
of	  these	  problematic	  features	  are	  for	  these	  scholars’	  more	  specific	  criticisms	  of	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  focusing	  on	  the	  examples	  of	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt.	  This	  will	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prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  where	  I	  will	  work	  towards	  developing	  my	  
own	  alternative	  Wittgensteinian	  approach	  to	  criticising	  scholars	  such	  as	  Waltz	  and	  
Wendt,	  which	  can	  overcome	  the	  problems	  identified	  with	  the	  ARO.	  
	  
2.1	   Strengths	  and	  Promising	  Features	  of	  the	  ARO	  in	  its	  Current	  Form	  
 
(i) It Highlights the Importance of Language for IR 
	  
One	  strength	  of	  the	  ARO,	  as	  currently	  expressed	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  is	  
that	  it	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  important	  role	  that	  language	  plays	  in	  international	  
politics,	  and	  in	  scholarly	  accounts	  or	  theories	  thereof.	  The	  relevance	  of	  linguistic	  
considerations	  for	  IR	  was	  called	  into	  question	  in	  2000	  by	  Kai	  Alderson,	  who	  argued	  
that	  scholars	  such	  as	  Kratochwil	  have	  bought	  into	  a	  misleading	  “analogy”	  between	  
“normative	  phenomena	  in	  international	  politics	  and	  the	  social	  phenomenon	  of	  
language”	  (Alderson,	  2000:	  p.1).	  However	  this	  criticism	  assumes	  that	  the	  sorts	  of	  
normative	  practices	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  international	  politics	  are	  essentially	  distinct	  
from	  the	  sorts	  of	  practices	  that	  we	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘language’,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  falls	  foul	  of	  
the	  valid	  observation	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  ARO	  that	  uses	  of	  language	  sometimes	  
constitute	  normative	  actions	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘speech	  acts’,	  and	  that	  as	  such	  language	  is	  
often	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  normative	  interactions	  that	  make	  up	  international	  
politics.	  So,	  for	  example,	  when	  the	  British	  Defence	  Secretary	  Michael	  Fallon	  recently	  
referred	  to	  Russia’s	  annexation	  of	  Crimea	  as	  an	  act	  of	  “aggression”	  (Associated	  Press:	  
19	  February	  2015)	  this	  was	  not	  a	  purely	  linguistic	  event	  that	  occurred	  in	  isolation	  
from	  the	  active	  business	  of	  international	  politics,	  but	  was	  part	  of	  an	  explicitly	  political	  
act	  of	  ‘warning’	  or	  ‘cautioning’	  which	  had	  significant	  implications	  for	  the	  diplomatic	  
relations	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  UK.	  Consideration	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  examples	  can	  
remind	  us	  of	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  uses	  of	  language	  which	  either	  are,	  or	  form	  a	  part	  of,	  
actions	  that	  are	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  course	  of	  international	  relations.	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  there	  is	  the	  consideration	  that	  many	  of	  the	  terms	  used	  by	  IR	  scholars	  to	  
conceptualise	  their	  subject	  matter,	  such	  as	  ‘war’,	  ‘state’	  and	  so	  on,	  are	  words	  whose	  
employments	  and	  meanings	  originate	  in	  ordinary	  (i.e.	  non-­‐academic)	  contexts	  of	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language	  use,	  including	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  international	  politics.	  These	  
contexts	  might	  include	  diplomatic	  peace	  talks	  between	  representatives	  of	  different	  
countries,	  meetings	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	  political	  speeches	  made	  by	  world	  
leaders,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  technical	  sense	  that	  such	  words	  are	  given	  by	  
IR	  scholars	  is	  predicated	  upon	  the	  currency	  these	  words	  have	  in	  existing	  linguistic	  
practices,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  normative	  activities	  of	  international	  
politics.	  This	  is	  a	  point	  which	  is	  well-­‐made	  by	  the	  ARO,	  and	  is	  another	  reason	  why	  
linguistic	  considerations	  are	  relevant	  for	  IR.52	  
	  
By	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  language	  for	  IR	  the	  ARO	  not	  only	  
encourages	  IR	  scholars	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  linguistic	  aspects	  of	  their	  subject	  
matter,	  but	  also	  to	  reflect	  critically	  upon	  their	  own	  uses	  of	  language	  in	  theorising	  
about	  international	  politics,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  assumptions	  they	  may	  have	  regarding	  the	  
functioning	  or	  meaning	  of	  linguistic	  expressions.	  This	  is	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  
the	  discipline	  which	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  sophistication	  and	  methodological	  self-­‐
awareness	  of	  research.	  
	  
(ii) It Foregrounds Linguistic Features that are Relevant for IR 
	  
Building	  on	  the	  previous	  point,	  another	  strength	  of	  the	  ARO	  is	  that	  the	  examples	  of	  
language-­‐use	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  cite	  as	  contradicting	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  are	  ones	  which	  foreground	  features	  of	  word-­‐
application	  which	  are	  especially	  prominent	  in	  the	  case	  of	  concepts	  that	  are	  relevant	  
for	  IR.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  when	  Pin-­‐Fat	  cites	  ‘giving	  orders’	  and	  ‘praying’	  as	  examples	  of	  
non-­‐referential	  uses	  of	  language	  that	  contradict	  the	  assumption	  that	  words	  refer	  to	  
objects,	  this	  highlights	  a	  ‘performative’	  dimension	  of	  language-­‐use	  which	  is	  key	  to	  the	  
functioning	  of	  language	  in	  international	  politics.	  The	  relevance	  of	  this	  dimension	  for	  
IR	  is	  made	  explicit	  by	  Kratochwil	  when	  he	  observes	  that	  terms	  like	  ‘national	  interest’	  
                                                
52	  This	  relates	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  ‘reflexivity’	  in	  studying	  human	  affairs:	  specifically,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  
consideration	  that	  new	  academic	  definitions	  and	  applications	  of	  relevant	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘war’,	  
‘state’,	  ‘genocide’	  etc.,	  can	  influence	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  concepts	  are	  used	  in	  the	  original	  
contexts	  from	  which	  they	  were	  taken,	  and	  hence	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  subject	  matter	  which	  they	  are	  
being	  used	  to	  study.	  Reflexivity	  is	  an	  issue	  which	  has	  already	  been	  exhaustively	  discussed	  in	  sociology	  
–	  see	  May	  (1999)	  for	  an	  overview.	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are	  not	  purely	  descriptive	  labels,	  but	  are	  used	  for	  “evaluating,	  criticising,	  or	  justifying	  
action”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011:	  p.39,	  p.56).	  A	  topical	  real-­‐life	  example	  which	  illustrates	  this	  
point	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  March	  2014	  press	  interview	  with	  the	  Russian	  President	  
Vladimir	  Putin,	  where	  Putin	  gave	  the	  following	  response	  to	  a	  question	  regarding	  the	  
possible	  deployment	  of	  Russian	  troops	  in	  Ukraine:	  	  
	  
“If	  we	  see	  this	  lawlessness	  starting	  in	  eastern	  regions,	  if	  the	  people	  ask	  us	  for	  
help	  –	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  plea	  from	  a	  legitimate	  president,	  which	  we	  already	  
have	  –	  then	  we	  reserve	  the	  right	  to	  use	  all	  the	  means	  we	  possess	  to	  protect	  
those	  citizens.	  And	  we	  consider	  it	  quite	  legitimate.”	  (Putin:	  04	  March	  2014)	  
	  
In	  this	  quote	  we	  can	  see	  how	  Putin	  uses	  concepts	  like	  ‘lawlessness’,	  ‘legitimacy’,	  
‘right’	  and	  ‘protection’	  to	  justify	  his	  deployment	  of	  Russian	  troops	  across	  the	  borders	  
of	  a	  neighbouring	  country.	  Putin’s	  choice	  of	  the	  word	  ‘protect’	  is	  especially	  significant	  
given	  the	  UN’s	  recent	  recasting	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘humanitarian	  intervention’	  in	  
terms	  of	  an	  international	  ‘responsibility	  to	  protect’	  (R2P).53	  This	  provides	  an	  explicit	  
example	  of	  how	  ‘performative’	  (as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  descriptive	  or	  referential)	  uses	  
of	  language	  are	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  diplomacy	  involved	  in	  international	  
relations;	  and	  therefore	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  considering	  the	  ‘perlocutionary’	  and	  
‘illocutionary’	  dimensions	  of	  the	  language	  used	  by	  politicians	  and	  other	  international	  
political	  actors.54	  
	  
Similarly,	  when	  Kratochwil	  challenges	  the	  assumption	  of	  essentialism	  by	  charting	  the	  
variety	  of	  different	  sorts	  of	  case	  to	  which	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘political	  representation’	  
and	  ‘power’	  have	  been	  applied,	  this	  highlights	  a	  genuine	  feature	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
such	  concepts	  are	  used	  in	  contexts	  relating	  to	  IR.	  For	  example,	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘war’,	  
‘torture’,	  ‘invasion’	  and	  ‘state’	  can	  all	  be	  regarded	  as	  family-­‐resemblance	  concepts	  
(or	  ‘cluster	  concepts’	  as	  Kratochwil	  sometimes	  calls	  them),	  insofar	  as	  these	  terms	  are	  
applied	  in	  political	  discourses	  to	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  particular	  cases	  which	  do	  not	  all	  
share	  one	  specific	  property	  or	  a	  set	  of	  properties	  in	  common.	  To	  take	  the	  example	  of	  
                                                
53	  See	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations:	  2005	  World	  Summit	  Outcome	  Document;	  and	  Moon:	  
2009	  
54	  The	  reader	  may	  refer	  back	  to	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  1.5,	  Criticism	  1,	  for	  a	  reminder	  of	  what	  Kratochwil	  
understands	  Austin’s	  terms	  ‘perlocutionary’	  and	  ‘illocutionary’	  to	  mean	  with	  regard	  to	  ‘speech	  acts’.	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the	  concept	  ‘state’:	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  of	  Great	  Britain,	  Vatican	  City,	  Andorra	  and	  
the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  are	  all	  recognised	  as	  ‘states’	  under	  international	  law;	  
however,	  these	  entities	  are	  quite	  different	  from	  one	  another	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
political,	  geographical	  and	  bureaucratic	  organisation.	  Namely:	  the	  UK	  consists	  of	  four	  
countries	  with	  partially	  devolved	  powers	  united	  under	  a	  central	  democratic	  
government;	  Vatican	  City	  is	  an	  enclave	  which	  is	  ruled	  by	  the	  Pope	  as	  an	  independent	  
ecclesiastical	  state;	  Andorra	  is	  a	  co-­‐principality	  ruled	  jointly	  by	  the	  President	  of	  
France	  and	  the	  Bishop	  of	  Urgel;	  and	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  is	  a	  federal	  republic	  
made	  up	  of	  fifty	  states	  and	  a	  federal	  district.	  Due	  to	  this	  variety	  among	  the	  accepted	  
referents	  of	  the	  word	  ‘state’	  it	  is	  quite	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  might	  be	  more	  
suitable	  to	  think	  of	  the	  referential	  scope	  of	  this	  concept	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  family	  of	  
interrelated	  cases,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  group	  of	  cases	  that	  all	  share	  some	  particular	  
defining	  characteristic	  or	  set	  of	  characteristics	  that	  distinguishes	  them	  from	  non-­‐
states.	  
	  
Two	  other	  linguistic	  features	  highlighted	  by	  the	  ARO	  which	  are	  of	  particular	  relevance	  
for	  concepts	  used	  in	  IR	  are	  evaluative	  application	  and	  essential	  contestability;	  in	  
other	  words,	  the	  observations	  that	  (a)	  deciding	  whether	  a	  concept	  is	  applicable	  to	  
particular	  cases	  may	  sometimes	  necessitate	  having	  to	  make	  a	  moral	  and/or	  
interpretive	  judgement	  based	  on	  subjective	  beliefs	  and	  values	  that	  others	  may	  not	  
share;	  and	  (b)	  in	  some	  cases	  –	  as	  per	  Gallie’s	  idea	  of	  ‘essentially	  contested	  concepts’	  
(Gallie:	  1955)	  –	  there	  may	  be	  radical	  disagreement	  concerning	  the	  application	  of	  a	  
concept	  which	  cannot	  be	  settled	  by	  appealing	  to	  objective	  considerations,	  and	  this	  
disagreement	  may	  furthermore	  be	  crucial	  to	  the	  function(s)	  that	  the	  concept	  
performs.	  	  
	  
A	  clear	  example	  of	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  relevant	  for	  IR	  whose	  application	  is	  both	  
evaluative	  and	  essentially	  contested	  in	  the	  senses	  just	  explained,	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  
‘terrorism’	  (including	  the	  term	  ‘terrorist’).	  As	  many	  scholars	  have	  noted,	  despite	  
comprehensive	  legal	  reviews,	  vast	  academic	  surveys	  and	  intense	  political	  debate,	  
there	  is	  still	  as	  yet	  no	  internationally	  accepted	  definition	  of	  ‘terrorism’	  (see	  Record,	  
2003;	  Schnelle,	  2012;	  Hodgson	  and	  Tadros,	  2013;	  Edwards,	  2014:	  p.184-­‐5).	  While	  this	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is	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  diversity	  among	  the	  number	  of	  recognised	  cases	  of	  ‘terrorism’	  
that	  an	  adequate	  definition	  has	  to	  capture	  (Hodgson	  and	  Tadros:	  2013:	  p.495),	  it	  is	  
also	  due	  to	  fundamental	  ethical	  and	  ideological	  disagreements	  among	  people	  
concerning	  which	  are	  the	  overriding	  criteria	  that	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  
particular	  action	  counts	  as	  ‘terrorism’	  (e.g.	  violence	  by	  non-­‐state	  combatants,	  the	  
harming	  of	  civilians,	  the	  deliberate	  creation	  of	  a	  frightening	  spectacle,	  religious	  or	  
political	  motives,	  etc.),	  whether	  there	  are	  any	  exceptional	  circumstances	  under	  which	  
an	  action	  that	  would	  normally	  count	  as	  ‘terrorism’	  should	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  different	  
kind	  of	  act	  (such	  as	  ‘guerrilla	  warfare’,	  ‘freedom	  fighting’,	  ‘resistance’	  etc.)	  and	  if	  so,	  
what	  the	  absolving	  conditions	  are	  (see	  especially	  Edwards,	  2014,	  p.184-­‐5).55	  What	  
‘terrorism’	  is,	  is	  therefore	  not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  settled	  once	  and	  for	  all	  by	  one	  
academic	  or	  a	  handful	  of	  academics,	  since	  the	  criteria	  of	  their	  interpretation	  will	  be	  
just	  as	  ‘contestable’	  as	  the	  inherently	  controversial	  uses	  to	  which	  this	  word	  is	  put	  by	  
any	  other	  individual	  language-­‐user.	  
	  
A	  final	  valid	  consideration	  highlighted	  by	  the	  ARO	  is	  what	  one	  might	  call	  the	  
‘historicity’	  of	  concepts	  and	  their	  associated	  social	  practices,	  which	  is	  raised	  by	  both	  
Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  words	  refer	  to	  essentially	  
definable	  objects	  or	  classes	  of	  object.	  This	  feature	  relates	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  (a)	  our	  
current	  political	  concepts	  and/or	  the	  institutions	  and	  actions	  associated	  with	  them	  
have	  not	  always	  existed,	  and	  (b)	  that	  the	  significance	  and	  application	  of	  relevant	  
                                                
55	  A	  specific	  demonstration	  of	  the	  essential	  contestability	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘terrorism’	  is	  found	  in	  the	  
fundamental	  disagreement	  exhibited	  among	  commentators	  regarding	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  rockets	  fired	  
by	  Hamas	  into	  Israeli	  settlements	  constitute	  acts	  of	  ‘terrorism’,	  with	  some	  people	  citing	  Hamas’	  
indiscriminate	  targeting	  and	  the	  resultant	  civilian	  casualties	  as	  support	  for	  applying	  the	  concept	  in	  this	  
case,	  and	  others	  citing	  the	  dire	  living	  conditions,	  death	  and	  destruction	  experienced	  by	  the	  population	  
of	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  strip	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Israeli	  army	  as	  justification	  for	  conceiving	  of	  these	  
rocket	  attacks	  in	  an	  alternative	  way,	  such	  as	  a	  form	  of	  resistance	  against	  an	  unjust	  oppression	  
(Edwards,	  2014:	  p.185).	  Whether	  or	  not	  one	  considers	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘terrorism’	  to	  be	  applicable	  in	  
this	  case	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  facts,	  such	  as	  how	  many	  civilians	  are	  killed	  (although	  such	  facts	  are	  of	  
course	  relevant),	  but	  rather	  on	  subjective	  factors	  such	  as	  one’s	  moral	  beliefs	  about	  whether	  and	  under	  
what	  conditions	  it	  is	  acceptable	  to	  kill	  civilians.	  Since	  people’s	  moral	  beliefs	  about	  such	  matters	  vary	  
widely,	  so	  too	  people’s	  opinions,	  and	  therefore	  people’s	  practices,	  will	  diverge	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  concept.	  The	  essential	  contestability	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘terrorism’	  is	  a	  topic	  that	  has	  
already	  been	  discussed	  at	  length	  by	  political	  and	  moral	  philosophers	  (e.g.	  Almond,	  1984:	  p.115),	  
political	  theorists	  (e.g.	  Reitan,	  2010),	  jurisprudents	  (e.g.	  Hodgson	  and	  Tadros,	  2013)	  and	  some	  IR	  
scholars	  (e.g.	  Booth	  and	  Dunne,	  2012:	  p.22).	  Other	  relevant	  concepts	  that	  are	  essentially	  contestable	  
in	  this	  sense	  are	  ‘civil	  war’,	  ‘state’	  (e.g.	  is	  ISIS	  a	  ‘state’?),	  and	  ‘invasion’	  (e.g.	  does	  the	  U.S.A.’s	  use	  of	  
armed	  drones	  in	  Afghanistan	  constitute	  a	  military	  ‘invasion’?).	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concepts	  and	  their	  associated	  practices	  may	  have	  changed	  over	  time	  and	  may	  
continue	  to	  change	  into	  the	  future.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  there	  was	  a	  point	  in	  human	  
history	  when	  there	  was	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  ‘state’,	  or	  even	  a	  ‘city’,	  and	  so	  the	  form	  of	  
these	  institutions	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  concepts	  relating	  to	  them	  is	  something	  that	  
has	  developed	  over	  time	  along	  with	  human	  society	  and	  ways	  of	  life.	  This	  is	  a	  point	  
that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  when	  theorising	  about	  IR	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘state’	  
interactions	  and	  so	  on.	  
	  
(iii) It is Similar to Successful ‘Anti-Positivist’ Arguments Made in 
Other Disciplines 
	  
A	  third	  promising	  feature	  of	  the	  ARO	  is	  that	  it	  resembles	  some	  successful	  arguments	  
that	  have	  been	  made	  by	  scholars	  in	  other	  disciplines	  against	  methodologies	  that	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  would	  regard	  as	  ‘positivist’.56	  So,	  for	  example,	  in	  
sociology	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  who	  identify	  themselves	  as	  ‘ethnomethodologists’	  
have	  drawn	  on	  similar	  aspects	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  support	  valid	  criticisms	  
of	  ‘scientism’	  in	  the	  study	  of	  human	  affairs;	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  an	  ‘anti-­‐positivist’	  
movement	  in	  sociology	  that	  began	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  Century	  and	  was	  subsequently	  
developed	  through	  the	  work	  of	  key	  intellectuals	  such	  as	  Weber	  (1948),	  Winch	  (1958),	  
Garfinkel	  (1967),	  Schütz	  (1967)	  and	  Habermas	  (1968,	  1973).	  Specific	  examples	  of	  such	  
arguments	  are	  found	  in	  Anderson,	  Hughes	  and	  Sharrock	  (1986:	  p.178	  and	  p.188),	  
Sharrock	  and	  Button	  (1991:	  p.139-­‐142),	  Lynch	  (1994:	  p.137),	  and	  –	  more	  recently	  –	  in	  
Hutchinson,	  Read	  and	  Sharrock	  (2008:	  p.24).57	  While	  the	  ARO’s	  resemblance	  to	  these	  
arguments	  does	  not	  necessarily	  constitute	  a	  definite	  strength,	  it	  does	  provide	  reason	  
to	  be	  optimistic	  about	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  ARO	  to	  provide	  valid	  criticisms	  of	  




                                                
56	  By	  ‘successful’,	  I	  mean	  argumentatively	  sound.	  
57	  I	  will	  not	  attempt	  here	  to	  summarise	  these	  other	  arguments	  and	  to	  defend	  their	  validity,	  which	  is	  a	  
task	  that	  would	  fill	  a	  whole	  thesis	  in	  itself.	  Instead,	  I	  am	  simply	  mentioning	  these	  points	  and	  supplying	  
the	  relevant	  references	  in	  order	  to	  give	  an	  indication	  of	  my	  motivations	  for	  trying	  to	  improve	  the	  ARO.	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2.2	   Problematic	  Aspects	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Representationalist	  Objection	  
	  
Having	  identified	  some	  of	  the	  main	  strengths	  of	  the	  ARO	  I	  will	  now	  explain	  some	  of	  
the	  gaps	  and	  weaknesses	  that	  I	  have	  identified	  with	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  its	  
current	  form,	  which	  I	  will	  argue	  necessitate	  its	  replacement.	  
	  
Problem 1: Ambivalence Concerning the Nature of the 
Representational View of Language 
	  
The	  first	  weakness	  that	  I	  want	  to	  discuss	  is	  the	  ambivalence	  in	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke’s	  arguments	  concerning	  what	  sort	  of	  thing	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  is.	  This	  ambivalence	  is	  created	  by	  these	  scholars’	  apparent	  equivocation	  
between	  different	  possible	  ways	  of	  conceiving	  of	  this	  view,	  and	  their	  vagueness	  when	  
it	  comes	  to	  reconciling	  these.	  While	  Kratochwil	  equivocates	  between	  roughly	  two	  
conceptions,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  equivocate	  between	  at	  least	  three.	  These	  different	  
conceptions	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  can	  be	  outlined	  as	  follows:	  
	  
a. The	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  conceived	  as	  a	  specific	  account	  
of	  how	  language	  functions	  (Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke);	  
b. The	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  conceived	  as	  something	  more	  
general,	  such	  as:	  
i. A	  ‘type’	  of	  account	  (Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  only);	  
ii. An	  underlying	  ‘picture’	  or	  ‘notion’	  (Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke).	  
	  
While	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  tend	  to	  move	  sequentially	  in	  their	  arguments	  from	  one	  
conception	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  to	  another,	  Kratochwil	  
consistently	  treats	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  a	  hybrid	  of	  a)	  and	  b)ii.	  In	  
order	  to	  further	  explain	  this	  ambiguity	  I	  will	  first	  outline	  the	  three	  different	  
conceptions	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  that	  appear	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  and	  then	  detail	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Kratochwil	  merges	  the	  first	  and	  third	  
of	  these	  conceptions.	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• Conception	  a:	   the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  a	  specific	  account	  of	  
how	  language	  functions.	  
	  
Sometimes	  when	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  refer	  to	  ‘the	  picture	  theory’	  or	  ‘picture	  view’	  of	  
language,58	  they	  apparently	  take	  themselves	  to	  be	  referring	  to	  a	  particular	  account	  
comprised	  of	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  claims	  or	  assumptions	  about	  how	  language	  functions.	  
This	  is	  apparent	  at	  the	  start	  of	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  1997	  essay	  where	  she	  equates	  the	  “view	  that	  
language	  and	  thought	  represent	  reality”	  with	  the	  Tractatus’	  alleged	  “‘picture	  theory’	  
of	  meaning”,59	  and	  in	  Fierke’s	  essays	  where	  she	  refers	  to	  the	  Tractatus’	  alleged	  
account	  as	  “the	  picture	  theory	  of	  language”60	  and	  “the	  picture	  view	  of	  language”61	  
(my	  emphasis).	  The	  identification	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  a	  
specific	  philosophical	  account	  is	  also	  implied	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  
use	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  to	  summarise	  this	  ‘view’	  of	  language	  that	  they	  object	  to,	  
presenting	  direct	  quotes	  and	  paraphrases	  of	  the	  Tractatus’	  propositions	  as	  
statements	  of	  the	  targeted	  view’s	  commitments.62	  	  
	  
If	  we	  were	  to	  go	  along	  with	  this	  conception,	  then	  we	  should	  interpret	  all	  of	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke’s	  references	  to	  the	  ‘picture	  view’	  or	  ‘picture	  theory’	  of	  language	  as	  
referring	  exclusively	  to	  the	  particular	  set	  of	  claims	  that	  they	  extract	  from	  the	  text	  of	  
the	  Tractatus.	  To	  give	  an	  example	  of	  what	  this	  would	  entail,	  in	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  case	  this	  
would	  mean	  interpreting	  such	  references	  as	  being	  to	  an	  account	  according	  to	  which,	  
specifically:	  “to	  give	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  proposition	  means	  to	  give	  the	  essence	  of	  all	  
description,”	  “names	  name	  objects	  and	  configurations	  of	  names	  depict	  possible	  
configurations	  of	  objects	  in	  the	  world,”	  “language	  can	  represent	  possible	  states	  of	  
affairs	  because	  it	  shares	  the	  same	  structure,”	  and	  “the	  truth	  or	  falsity	  of	  a	  proposition	  
                                                
58	  Pin-­‐Fat	  also	  uses	  expressions	  such	  as	  ‘the	  view	  that	  language	  and	  thought	  represent	  reality’	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  
1997:	  p.79).	  
59	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.79	  
60	  Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84	  
61	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.333	  –	  my	  emphasis.	  
62	  E.g.	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.9;	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.335.	  It	  is	  also	  implied	  the	  fact	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  present	  
criticisms	  of	  the	  account	  of	  language	  they	  find	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  as	  criticisms	  of	  the	  view	  of	  language	  as	  
representational	  (or	  a	  ‘picture’)	  of	  reality	  (E.g.	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.82;	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.337,	  my	  emphasis).	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depends	  on	  whether	  it	  agrees	  or	  disagrees	  with	  reality.”63	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  we	  
would	  be	  bound,	  according	  to	  this	  conception,	  to	  regard	  the	  Tractatus	  as	  the	  only	  
text	  that	  contains	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  according	  to	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke;	  however,	  it	  would	  mean	  that	  we	  would	  have	  to	  assume	  that	  any	  accounts	  of	  
language	  which	  do	  not	  endorse	  the	  specific	  claims	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  extract	  
from	  the	  Tractatus	  would	  not	  count,	  according	  to	  them,	  as	  instances	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language.	  
	  
• Conception	  b(i):	   the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  a	  ‘type’	  of	  
account.	  
	  
At	  other	  times	  in	  their	  work,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  treat	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  more	  as	  a	  ‘type’	  of	  account	  which	  includes	  not	  only	  those	  accounts	  that	  
adhere	  to	  the	  specific	  set	  of	  claims	  they	  each	  extract	  from	  the	  Tractatus,	  but	  also	  
encompasses	  other	  accounts	  that	  are	  similar	  or	  linked	  to	  these	  claims	  in	  some	  way.	  In	  
Fierke’s	  case,	  having	  identified	  ‘the	  picture	  view’	  or	  ‘picture	  theory’	  of	  language	  as	  an	  
account	  presented	  in	  the	  Tractatus,	  she	  then	  extends	  her	  application	  of	  these	  terms	  
to	  refer	  to	  aspects	  of	  the	  philosophies	  of	  science	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  ‘logical	  
positivists’	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  and	  Karl	  Popper.	  The	  prima	  facie	  reasoning	  behind	  
this	  extension	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘picture	  view’/	  ‘picture	  theory’	  appears	  to	  be	  two-­‐fold:	  
firstly,	  the	  historical	  relationship	  between	  the	  Tractatus	  and	  the	  philosophies	  of	  
science	  developed	  by	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  and	  Karl	  Popper;	  and	  secondly,	  the	  suggestion	  
made	  by	  Fierke	  that	  these	  latter	  philosophies	  involve	  making	  and/or	  accepting	  some	  
of	  the	  same	  claims	  about	  language	  and	  reality	  that	  she	  identifies	  as	  being	  present	  in	  
the	  Tractatus	  (namely	  that	  all	  propositions	  can	  be	  analysed	  into	  elementary	  
propositions	  which	  represent	  states	  of	  affairs,	  and	  that	  testing	  the	  truth	  or	  falsity	  of	  a	  
proposition	  involves	  seeing	  whether	  the	  primitive	  names	  in	  the	  relevant	  elementary	  
propositions	  correspond	  with	  real	  entities).64	  	  
	  
                                                
63	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.79-­‐80	  
64	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.336	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Fierke	  subsequently	  extends	  the	  scope	  of	  her	  application	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘picture	  view’/	  
‘picture	  theory’	  even	  further	  when	  she	  starts	  to	  use	  these	  terms	  to	  refer	  to	  any	  
account	  or	  statement	  of	  methodology	  that	  has	  either	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  Vienna	  
Circle	  and	  Karl	  Popper,	  or	  which	  she	  takes	  to	  have	  certain	  similarities	  to	  the	  claims	  
that	  she	  has	  identified	  as	  being	  in	  common	  between	  these	  philosophers’	  accounts	  
and	  the	  Tractatus.	  Thus	  Fierke	  refers	  to	  IR	  scholars	  such	  as	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt	  as	  being	  
committed	  to	  a	  “picture	  view”	  or	  “picture	  theory”	  of	  language	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  there	  
are	  historical	  links	  and	  “family	  resemblance[s]”	  between	  the	  account	  of	  language	  
presented	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  and	  the	  claims	  or	  assumptions	  about	  language	  that	  are	  
made	  in	  the	  course	  of	  these	  IR	  scholars’	  work.65	  	  
	  
In	  her	  2010	  book	  Pin-­‐Fat	  similarly	  identifies	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  
a	  class	  of	  accounts	  when	  she	  characterises	  “the	  view	  that	  language	  and	  thought	  
represent	  reality”66	  as	  one	  which	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  “in	  the	  widest	  sense	  to	  include	  any	  
view”	  according	  to	  which	  each	  word	  names	  an	  object,	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  
the	  object	  for	  which	  it	  stands	  (my	  emphasis).67	  	  
	  
• Conception	  b(ii):	   the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  an	  underlying	  
‘notion’	  or	  ‘picture’.	  
	  
Occasionally	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  extend	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  they	  mean	  by	  terms	  like	  
‘the	  picture	  view’	  or	  ‘picture	  theory’	  of	  language	  even	  further,	  suggesting	  that	  these	  
terms	  refer	  to	  something	  so	  general	  that	  it	  permeates	  practically	  the	  entire	  history	  of	  
Western	  philosophy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  approaches	  of	  multifarious	  scholars	  of	  social	  and	  
political	  affairs.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  jointly-­‐written	  introduction	  to	  a	  2001	  collection	  of	  
essays,	  Fierke	  refers	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  language	  “is	  a	  mirror	  of	  an	  objective	  
reality”	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “presuppositions	  underlying	  Western	  philosophy	  since	  
Descartes”,	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  “implicit	  acceptance	  of	  a	  mirror	  view	  of	  language”	  by	  
“conventional	  constructivists”	  in	  IR.68	  She	  later	  claims	  in	  her	  2010	  essay	  that	  “the	  
                                                
65	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.336-­‐7	  
66	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.9	  
67	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.9	  
68	  Fierke,	  2001:	  p.4	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picture	  theory	  of	  language	  …	  is	  often	  assumed	  in	  explanatory	  theories”,	  and	  that	  
“hypothesis	  testing	  rests	  on	  a	  picture	  theory	  of	  language”.69	  Meanwhile,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
sometimes	  refers	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  a	  “picture”	  of	  how	  
language	  works,	  which	  “captivates”	  numerous	  philosophers	  and	  IR	  scholars.70	  	  
	  
Quotes	  such	  as	  these	  suggest	  –	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  first	  two	  conceptions	  –	  that	  in	  order	  
for	  someone	  to	  be	  said	  to	  ‘assume’	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  not	  only	  
do	  they	  not	  have	  to	  articulate	  any	  of	  the	  specific	  claims	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  
extract	  from	  texts	  such	  as	  the	  Tractatus,	  but	  indeed,	  they	  need	  not	  articulate	  any	  
definite	  claims	  about	  language	  at	  all.	  In	  particular,	  Fierke’s	  references	  to	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  her	  2010	  article	  suggest	  that	  even	  choosing	  to	  
use	  a	  particular	  technique	  of	  study	  –	  such	  as	  formulating	  a	  theoretical	  explanation,	  or	  
testing	  a	  hypothesis	  –	  discloses	  a	  tacit	  commitment	  to	  the	  “picture	  theory”	  or	  
“picture	  view	  of	  language”	  (see	  above).	  This,	  along	  with	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  use	  of	  
terms	  such	  as	  “notion”	  and	  “picture”	  to	  characterise	  the	  relevant	  ‘view’,	  suggests	  
that	  they	  are	  arguing	  against	  something	  much	  vaguer,	  more	  general	  and	  less	  
definitively	  articulated	  than	  either	  a	  particular	  account	  of	  language,	  or	  a	  family	  of	  
related	  accounts	  that	  share	  certain	  claims	  or	  assumptions.71	  	  
	  
Having	  outlined	  the	  three	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  that	  are	  present	  in	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  arguments,	  I	  will	  now	  explain	  how	  
the	  first	  and	  third	  of	  these	  conceptions	  are	  combined	  in	  Kratochwil’s	  work.	  Unlike	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  Kratochwil	  does	  not	  at	  any	  point	  explicitly	  identify	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  with	  the	  work	  of	  a	  particular	  philosopher,	  
preferring	  to	  characterise	  it	  in	  vague	  terms	  as	  an	  “image”,72	  “notion”,73	  or	  “idea”74	  of	  
                                                
69	  Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84	  
70	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80;	  2010:	  p.9	  &	  p.14	  
71	  For	  example,	  it	  would	  be	  highly	  implausible	  to	  claim	  that	  someone	  who	  employs	  a	  specific	  sort	  of	  
method,	  such	  as	  testing	  a	  hypothesis,	  thereby	  tacitly	  ‘assumes’	  all	  of	  the	  specific	  propositions	  about	  
language	  that	  are	  presented	  in	  the	  Tractatus.	  Therefore	  when	  Fierke	  claims	  that	  hypothesis	  testing	  
“rests	  on	  a	  picture	  theory	  of	  language”,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  by	  “picture	  theory	  of	  
language”	  she	  is	  referring	  to	  something	  more	  cerebral	  and	  less	  definite	  than	  a	  specific	  account	  or	  set	  
of	  claims	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  p.7).	  
72	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.5-­‐6;	  2001:	  p.29	  
73	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2006]:	  p.187	  
74	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2009]:	  p.210	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language	  which	  is	  associated	  with	  various	  philosophical	  schools	  and	  movements	  
including	  “classical	  logic”,75	  “classical	  and	  modern	  (Cartesian)	  epistemology”76	  and	  
“logical	  positivism”.77	  Despite	  this,	  Kratochwil	  is	  implicitly	  ambivalent	  between	  this	  
more	  general	  conception	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  and	  a	  conception	  
of	  this	  view	  as	  something	  quite	  specific	  that	  can	  be	  refuted	  by	  objecting	  to	  particular	  
set	  of	  claims.	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  Kratochwil’s	  2001	  
essay:	  
	  
“Much	  of	  our	  standard	  understanding	  about	  the	  function	  of	  language	  was	  
based,	  until	  recently,	  on	  a	  conception	  of	  language	  as	  a	  mirror	  of	  reality.	  If	  
language	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  meaningful,	  it	  was	  so	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  
depict,	  accurately,	  the	  things,	  actions	  and	  properties	  of	  the	  ‘outer	  world.’	  
Thus,	  nouns	  stood	  for	  things,	  verbs	  for	  actions,	  and	  adjectives	  for	  properties.”	  
(Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.19)	  
	  
In	  this	  passage,	  Kratochwil	  starts	  off	  by	  talking	  about	  the	  ‘mirror’	  conception	  of	  
language	  as	  something	  so	  general	  that	  it	  underlies	  “much	  of	  our	  standard	  
understanding”	  of	  language.	  However,	  he	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  attribute	  to	  it	  the	  relatively	  
specific	  assumptions	  that	  ‘nouns	  stand	  for	  things’,	  ‘verbs	  stand	  for	  actions’	  and	  
‘adjectives	  stand	  for	  properties’.	  Unlike	  a	  shared	  ‘notion’	  that	  could	  underlie	  a	  range	  
of	  accounts	  and	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  general	  understanding,	  the	  latter	  are	  the	  sorts	  of	  
specific	  claims	  that	  could	  differentiate	  one	  particular	  representational	  account	  of	  
language	  from	  others.	  A	  few	  lines	  later,	  Kratochwil	  articulates	  the	  central	  assumption	  
of	  this	  view	  in	  an	  even	  more	  specialist	  manner,	  using	  terminology	  taken	  from	  
Descartes.78	  	  
	  
From	  the	  above	  discussion	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  ARO	  in	  its	  current	  form	  is	  
ambivalent	  between	  two	  or	  three	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language,	  which	  are	  not	  obviously	  compatible	  with	  one	  
another.	  The	  most	  significant	  problem	  with	  this	  ambivalence	  is	  that	  which	  criticisms	  
turn	  out	  to	  be	  appropriate	  and	  effective	  objections	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
                                                
75	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.29-­‐30	  
76	  Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.34	  
77	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.5	  
78	  Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.20	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language	  will	  partly	  depend	  upon	  what	  sort	  of	  item	  it	  is.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  is	  an	  account	  consisting	  of	  some	  specific	  written	  
claims	  and	  their	  implied	  assumptions	  (as	  per	  Conception	  a),	  then	  a	  plausible	  way	  to	  
criticise	  it	  would	  be	  to	  contradict	  one	  of	  more	  of	  the	  individual	  claims	  or	  assumptions	  
to	  which	  it	  is	  committed	  –	  which	  is	  indeed	  the	  main	  tactic	  adopted	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  and	  Fierke	  (see	  Section	  1.5).	  However,	  if	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  is	  
rather	  a	  kind	  of	  account	  that	  encompasses	  various	  similar	  but	  not	  necessarily	  
identical	  sets	  of	  claims	  about	  how	  language	  functions	  (as	  per	  Conception	  b(i)),	  then	  
criticising	  the	  specific	  claims	  made	  by	  one	  particular	  account	  that	  falls	  within	  this	  
category	  will	  not	  necessarily	  undermine	  the	  whole	  class.	  In	  this	  case	  it	  would	  be	  
necessary	  to	  supply	  additional	  explanations	  of	  how	  each	  counterargument	  can	  be	  
made	  to	  work	  against	  similar	  versions	  of	  the	  targeted	  claim	  or	  assumption	  which	  are	  
not	  directly	  challenged	  by	  it79	  –	  however,	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  sort	  of	  explanation	  that	  
is	  often	  missing	  from	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  arguments.80	  Finally,	  if	  we	  are	  
to	  understand	  that	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  is	  instead	  a	  vague	  ‘image’	  
or	  ‘notion’	  of	  language	  that	  underpins	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  accounts	  and	  approaches	  
(as	  per	  Conception	  b(ii)),	  then	  it	  becomes	  even	  more	  doubtful	  that	  contradicting	  
specific	  clams	  about	  words,	  sentences,	  and	  so	  on	  is	  an	  appropriate	  or	  effective	  way	  
to	  contradict	  it.	  
	  
The	  above	  outline	  might	  seem	  abstract;	  however,	  by	  analysing	  some	  passages	  from	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  work	  in	  this	  light,	  we	  can	  start	  to	  see	  how	  their	  
ambivalence	  concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  
constitutes	  a	  genuine	  argumentative	  difficulty.	  In	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  case,	  a	  prime	  example	  is	  
found	  on	  page	  9-­‐11	  of	  her	  2010	  book.	  Early	  on	  page	  9,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  initially	  establishes	  a	  
distinction	  between	  “the	  view	  that	  language	  and	  thought	  represent	  reality”	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  and	  certain	  “pictures”	  or	  “assumptions”	  that	  inform	  this	  view	  on	  the	  other.	  
However,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  then	  immediately	  conflates	  the	  distinction	  she	  has	  just	  established	  
                                                
79	  This	  is	  a	  recommendation	  that	  will	  be	  repeated	  in	  the	  coming	  sections.	  
80	  For	  example,	  when	  Kratochwil	  states	  that	  the	  exclusion	  of	  ‘fuzzy’	  or	  ‘normative’	  concepts	  from	  
‘scientific’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  are	  “beholden	  to	  an	  epistemology	  that	  is	  based	  on	  a	  ‘mirror’	  image	  of	  
language”,	  and	  then	  presents	  as	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  fuzzy	  and	  normative	  concepts	  from	  IR	  
the	  modal	  counter-­‐arguments	  that	  reference	  is	  not	  the	  only	  factor	  that	  determines	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  
sentence,	  and	  that	  not	  every	  word	  corresponds	  to	  something	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.29).	  
 81  
by	  introducing	  a	  passage	  from	  Wittgenstein’s	  PI	  §1	  as	  a	  summary	  of	  a	  “picture	  of	  
language	  [which]	  is	  constructed	  in	  the	  widest	  sense	  to	  include	  any	  view”	  according	  to	  
which	  words	  name	  objects,	  sentences	  are	  combinations	  of	  such	  names,	  and	  every	  
word	  has	  a	  correlating	  meaning	  which	  is	  the	  object	  for	  which	  it	  stands	  (my	  emphasis).	  
From	  there	  on,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  treats	  the	  “view	  that	  language	  and	  thought	  represent	  reality”	  
and	  the	  “picture	  of	  language”	  that	  allegedly	  informs	  this	  view	  as	  though	  they	  were	  
one	  and	  the	  same	  thing.	  Referring	  to	  both,	  she	  writes:	  
	  
“In	  this	  view,	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  reality	  comes	  through	  
naming.	  Language	  can	  represent	  reality	  because	  names	  name	  objects	  and	  
configurations	  of	  names	  depict	  possible	  configurations	  of	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  
In	  this	  way,	  language	  can	  represent	  possible	  states	  of	  affairs	  because	  it	  shares	  
the	  same	  structure.	  Thus,	  the	  truth	  or	  falsity	  of	  a	  proposition	  depends	  on	  
whether	  it	  agrees	  or	  disagrees	  with	  reality	  (Wittgenstein	  1922:	  2.223,	  4.05).”	  
(Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.9)	  
	  
An	  initial	  effect	  of	  this	  conflation	  is	  that	  although	  Pin-­‐Fat	  claims	  that	  the	  relevant	  
‘view’/‘picture’	  is	  constructed	  “in	  the	  widest	  sense”	  to	  include	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  
accounts,	  her	  summary	  (like	  Kratochwil’s)	  actually	  ends	  up	  being	  quite	  specific,	  
pinning	  this	  supposedly	  wide-­‐ranging	  item	  down	  to	  a	  limited	  selection	  of	  what	  are,	  at	  
times,	  quite	  specialised	  propositions.	  Hence	  when	  Pin-­‐Fat	  later	  criticises	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  using	  her	  interpretation	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  
despite	  the	  alleged	  generality	  of	  this	  view,	  the	  criticisms	  she	  provides	  are	  quite	  
narrowly-­‐targeted	  objections	  to	  specific	  claims	  regarding	  words	  and	  sentences	  that	  
she	  has	  extracted	  from	  passages	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  and	  PI.81	  What	  makes	  this	  doubly	  
problematic	  is	  that	  when	  Pin-­‐Fat	  comes	  to	  sum	  up	  her	  criticisms,	  she	  does	  not	  
acknowledge	  their	  specificity,	  but	  on	  the	  contrary,	  refers	  to	  them	  as	  though	  they	  
pose	  a	  challenge	  to	  any	  account	  or	  approach	  which	  assumes	  that	  language	  is	  in	  some	  
sense	  ‘representational’.82	  	  
                                                
81	  For	  example,	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  observation	  that	  “naming	  is	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  language	  use”	  counters	  the	  
specific	  claim	  that	  ‘every	  word	  names	  an	  object’,	  while	  her	  argument	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  
does	  not	  require	  a	  naming	  relationship”	  counters	  the	  claim	  that	  ‘the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  dependent	  
upon	  its	  naming	  an	  object’	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.10).	  
82	  For	  example,	  on	  page	  11,	  after	  having	  presented	  her	  criticisms	  of	  the	  claims	  that	  ‘every	  word	  names	  
an	  object’	  and	  ‘the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  the	  object	  for	  which	  it	  stands’,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  concludes:	  “Language	  
games	  are	  not	  …	  representational”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.10,	  original	  emphasis).	  
 82  
	  
Similarly,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  although	  Fierke	  initially	  clarifies	  her	  extended	  application	  
of	  the	  term	  ‘picture	  view’	  or	  ‘picture	  theory’	  of	  language	  as	  being	  based	  on	  certain	  
similarities	  (including	  some	  common	  claims)	  shared	  between	  the	  relevant	  accounts	  
and	  approaches,83	  at	  times	  she	  characterises	  this	  connection	  in	  much	  stronger	  terms;	  
such	  as	  when	  she	  claims	  that	  “it	  is	  the	  same	  view”	  that	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
Tractatus,	  the	  ‘logical	  positivism’	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle,	  and	  Karl	  Popper’s	  philosophy	  
of	  science.84	  Consequently,	  when	  Fierke	  comes	  to	  sum	  up	  her	  criticisms	  of	  specific	  
claims	  that	  she	  attributes	  to	  the	  Tractatus	  –	  such	  as	  that	  language	  consists	  of	  factual	  
propositions,	  or	  that	  there	  is	  an	  isomorphic	  correspondence	  between	  words	  and	  
elements	  of	  reality	  –	  she	  presents	  her	  criticisms	  as	  though	  they	  were	  general	  
refutations	  of	  a	  traditional	  philosophical	  view	  of	  language	  based	  on	  the	  “metaphor”	  
of	  a	  picture.85	  We	  can	  characterise	  the	  problem	  identified	  above	  as	  an	  ‘over-­‐inflation’	  
of	  the	  actual	  scope	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  FIerke’s	  more	  specific	  criticisms,	  owing	  
to	  these	  scholars’	  ambivalence	  in	  shifting	  between,	  and	  conflating,	  different	  
conceptions	  of	  a	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  with	  disparate	  levels	  of	  
generality.	  
	  
A	  partial	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  that	  might	  be	  entertained	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke,	  is	  to	  pin	  the	  ARO	  down	  to	  one	  conception	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language.	  However,	  this	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  further	  difficulties,	  since	  there	  are	  some	  
aspects	  of	  their	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  rely	  upon	  one	  conception,	  and	  some	  aspects	  
that	  rely	  upon	  another.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  ARO	  is	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  the	  whole	  range	  
of	  philosophical	  accounts	  and	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke	  suggest,	  then	  this	  would	  require	  conceiving	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  
of	  language	  as	  something	  quite	  general,	  such	  as	  an	  underlying	  ‘notion’	  or	  ‘picture’	  of	  
how	  language	  functions	  (Conception	  b(ii)).	  However,	  since	  most	  of	  the	  actual	  
criticisms	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  
make	  are	  specific	  counterarguments	  targeted	  towards	  particular	  versions	  of	  claims	  or	  
                                                
83	  i.e.	  the	  Tractatus,	  the	  ‘logical	  positivism’	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle,	  and	  Karl	  Popper’s	  philosophy	  of	  
science.	  
84	  Fierke,	  2003:	  p.75	  
85	  Fierke,	  2003:	  p.76	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assumptions,	  their	  effectiveness	  would	  appear	  to	  depend	  upon	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  being	  something	  more	  specific,	  such	  as	  a	  particular	  theory	  or	  
account	  (Conception	  a).	  
	  
Problem 2: Ambiguity Surrounding the Most General Conception of the 
Representational View of Language 
	  
A	  related	  weakness	  is	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  do	  not	  provide	  an	  adequate	  
explanation	  of	  what	  a	  ‘notion’	  or	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  is	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  their	  most	  
general	  conception	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  employed	  by	  the	  ARO	  
(Conception	  b(ii)).	  Pin-­‐Fat	  is	  superior	  in	  this	  regard	  to	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke,	  in	  that	  
she	  does	  at	  least	  attempt	  to	  provide	  such	  an	  explanation;	  however,	  as	  I	  will	  argue,	  
Pin-­‐Fat’s	  account	  still	  leaves	  important	  questions	  unresolved,	  and	  therefore	  is	  
unsuccessful	  at	  dispelling	  the	  ambiguity	  surrounding	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  in	  its	  most	  general	  form.	  
	  
Looking	  back	  over	  the	  extracts	  already	  quoted	  in	  this	  chapter,	  we	  can	  deduce	  the	  
following	  criteria	  that	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  conceived	  in	  its	  most	  
general	  form	  –	  as	  an	  underlying	  ‘notion’	  or	  ‘picture’	  –	  should	  satisfy	  if	  it	  is	  to	  perform	  
the	  role	  in	  the	  ARO	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  assign	  to	  it:	  
	  
• It	  should	  be	  extremely	  general.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  according	  to	  these	  scholars,	  
the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  its	  general	  form	  underlies	  a	  whole	  
range	  of	  accounts	  and	  movements	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  
philosophy,	  including	  (but	  not	  limited	  to)	  Cartesian	  epistemology,	  the	  ‘logical	  
positivism’	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle,	  and	  contemporary	  ‘realist’	  philosophies	  of	  
science.	  If	  it	  is	  to	  live	  up	  to	  this	  claim,	  then	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  in	  its	  general	  form	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  encompassing	  this	  diversity	  
of	  philosophical	  accounts	  and	  movements,	  while	  transcending	  their	  specific	  
differences.	  In	  Kratochwil’s	  words,	  it	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  viewed	  as	  part	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of	  philosophy’s	  traditional	  “epistemological	  project”,	  “irrespective	  of	  its	  
various	  forms”.86	  	  
	  
• It	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  meaningfully	  attributed	  to	  written	  accounts	  of	  a	  
greater	  specificity	  than	  itself.	  From	  the	  first	  condition	  (above)	  it	  follows	  that	  
the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  according	  to	  this	  conception	  should	  be	  
more	  general	  than	  the	  specific	  claims	  of	  some	  particular	  account,	  or	  group	  of	  
accounts,	  of	  language.	  However,	  despite	  its	  greater	  generality,	  it	  should	  be	  
capable	  of	  being	  ‘attributed’	  to	  those	  more	  specific	  accounts	  which	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  identify	  as	  containing	  or	  assuming	  it.	  So,	  for	  
example,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  Tractatus	  to	  justifiably	  be	  said	  to	  epitomise	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  its	  general	  form,	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  needs	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  attributed	  to	  the	  text	  in	  some	  
way	  that	  is	  more	  meaningful	  than	  just	  being	  acceptable	  as	  a	  vague	  summary	  
of	  some	  of	  its	  propositions.87	  	  
	  
• It	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  tacitly	  (perhaps	  even	  unconsciously)	  assumed.	  As	  
we	  saw	  earlier,	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  according	  to	  this	  
conception	  is	  something	  that	  can	  be	  automatically	  assumed	  simply	  by	  
adopting	  a	  certain	  method	  or	  approach.	  As	  such	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  
being	  endorsed	  by	  someone	  without	  being	  articulated	  by	  them	  in	  spoken	  or	  
written	  form,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  without	  the	  person	  necessarily	  being	  aware	  
that	  they	  have	  endorsed	  it	  (for	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  someone	  who	  tries	  to	  
formulate	  and	  test	  a	  hypothesis	  without	  consciously	  entertaining	  any	  definite	  
claims	  about	  language).	  	  
	  
These	  are	  the	  conditions	  that	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  under	  the	  most	  
general	  conception	  needs	  to	  satisfy	  if	  it	  is	  to	  perform	  the	  role	  in	  the	  ARO	  that	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  assign	  to	  it.	  From	  this	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  
                                                
86	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2009]:	  p.203	  
87	  This	  is	  based	  on	  the	  consideration	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  several	  specific	  accounts	  of	  language	  can	  be	  
summed	  up	  by	  the	  same	  general	  paraphrase	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  these	  accounts	  
are	  all	  committed	  to	  some	  common	  underlying	  ‘view’.	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representational	  view	  of	  language	  according	  to	  this	  conception	  will	  be	  something	  
quite	  novel	  which	  differs	  substantially	  from	  other	  more	  conventional	  targets	  of	  
academic	  criticism	  such	  as	  particular	  theories	  and	  claims	  about	  language.	  Given	  that	  
this	  is	  so,	  it	  behoves	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  to	  give	  an	  in-­‐depth	  explanation	  of	  
what	  sort	  of	  thing	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  this	  general	  incarnation	  
could	  be,	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  ‘assumed’	  or	  ‘committed	  to’	  by	  those	  accounts	  
and	  academic	  endeavours	  to	  which	  they	  attribute	  it.	  At	  present,	  however,	  a	  sufficient	  
explanation	  of	  this	  kind	  is	  not	  found	  in	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  or	  Fierke’s	  work.	  	  
	  
For	  example,	  Kratochwil	  frequently	  uses	  terms	  like	  ‘image’,88	  ‘understanding’89	  and	  
‘notion’90	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  in	  an	  apparent	  effort	  to	  
differentiate	  it	  from	  more	  specific	  philosophical	  accounts	  and	  claims.	  However,	  at	  no	  
point	  does	  Kratochwil	  explain	  what	  an	  ‘image’	  of	  language	  is,	  how	  it	  differs	  from	  a	  
particular	  account	  of	  language,	  or	  what	  it	  means	  for	  someone’s	  work	  or	  the	  methods	  
they	  employ	  to	  be	  ‘indebted’	  to	  such	  an	  image.	  Similarly,	  when	  Fierke	  makes	  claims	  
such	  as	  that	  “hypothesis	  testing	  rests	  on	  a	  picture	  theory	  of	  language”,91	  she	  is	  clearly	  
using	  the	  term	  ‘picture	  theory	  of	  language’	  to	  refer	  to	  something	  more	  general	  than	  
the	  specific	  set	  of	  claims	  she	  extracts	  from	  the	  Tractatus	  –	  however	  Fierke	  never	  
explains	  what	  this	  is,	  or	  what	  ‘resting’	  on	  such	  a	  theory	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  advancing	  
any	  explicit	  claims	  about	  language	  amounts	  to.	  
	  
Out	  of	  all	  three	  scholars,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  is	  the	  only	  one	  who	  seriously	  attempts	  to	  give	  a	  
more	  in-­‐depth	  explanation	  of	  what	  a	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  is,	  which	  she	  does	  by	  
drawing	  on	  her	  interpretation	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘grammatical	  
picture’.	  In	  her	  1997	  article	  Pin-­‐Fat	  suggests	  that	  such	  ‘pictures’	  are	  generated	  by	  
statements	  which	  appear	  to	  represent	  “deep	  metaphysical	  facts	  about	  the	  world”,92	  
but	  are	  in	  fact	  merely	  “full-­‐blown	  representation[s]	  of	  our	  grammar.	  Not	  facts;	  but	  as	  
it	  were	  illustrated	  turns	  of	  speech”.93	  Pin-­‐Fat	  explains	  that	  by	  ‘grammar’,	  later	  
                                                
88	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.5-­‐6;	  2001:	  p.29	  
89	  Kratochwil,	  1993:	  p.76;	  2001:	  p.19	  
90	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2006]:	  p.187	  
91	  Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84	  
92	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.81	  
93	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.82;	  Wittgenstein	  PI	  295	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Wittgenstein	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  conventional	  rules	  and	  practices	  which	  determine	  the	  
possibilities	  of	  meaning	  for	  particular	  words	  and	  sentences	  within	  a	  given	  social	  
context.94	  While	  Pin-­‐Fat’s	  explanation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  concept	  of	  a	  grammatical	  
picture	  goes	  some	  way	  towards	  explaining	  how	  such	  pictures	  arise,	  it	  does	  not	  
squarely	  address	  the	  central	  question	  of	  what	  a	  grammatical	  picture	  is,	  leaving	  
metaphors	  such	  as	  ‘illustrated	  turns	  of	  speech’	  unexplained.	  
	  
The	  main	  reason	  why	  this	  ambiguity	  is	  problematic	  for	  the	  ARO	  is	  that	  it	  means	  that	  
the	  criticisms	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  aim	  at	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  in	  its	  most	  general	  form	  are	  made	  without	  proper	  justification,	  and	  are	  not	  
capable	  of	  being	  properly	  held	  to	  account	  by	  other	  scholars	  who	  might	  object	  to	  
them.	  That	  is	  to	  say:	  without	  a	  coherent	  explanation	  of	  what	  an	  underlying	  ‘notion’	  
or	  ‘picture’	  is	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense,	  and	  what	  the	  methodological	  criteria	  are	  for	  
determining	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  particular	  scholar	  is	  committed	  to	  such	  a	  ‘picture’,	  the	  
door	  is	  left	  wide	  open	  for	  anybody	  to	  arbitrarily	  identify	  an	  academic	  account	  or	  
approach	  as	  being	  committed	  to	  a	  problematic	  ‘picture’	  of	  language,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
vague	  connections	  with	  previously	  criticised	  claims	  or	  accounts	  to	  which	  it	  bears	  
some	  manner	  of	  resemblance.	  In	  addition,	  without	  further	  methodological	  
clarification,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  critics	  of	  the	  ARO	  to	  be	  able	  to	  refute	  the	  
identification	  of	  a	  particular	  account	  or	  approach	  in	  IR	  as	  being	  committed	  to	  a	  
problematic	  ‘picture’	  of	  language,	  as	  in	  order	  to	  argue	  that	  an	  account	  or	  approach	  is	  
not	  committed	  to	  such	  a	  ‘picture’,	  one	  would	  need	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  idea	  of	  what	  such	  
a	  commitment	  would	  amount	  to.	  Since	  the	  generality	  of	  the	  ARO’s	  application	  
depends	  upon	  the	  validity	  of	  such	  identifications,	  then	  a	  more	  substantial	  
explanation	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  its	  most	  general	  
form	  is	  required,	  if	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  FIerke	  wish	  the	  reach	  of	  their	  objection	  to	  
be	  as	  general	  as	  they	  make	  it	  out	  to	  be.	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  this,	  there	  is	  the	  risk	  that	  by	  being	  vague	  in	  this	  connection,	  Kratochwil,	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  leave	  the	  ARO	  open	  to	  a	  challenge	  of	  hypocrisy	  with	  respect	  to	  
their	  criticism	  of	  ‘essentialism’.	  Recall	  that	  all	  three	  scholars	  criticise	  ‘essentialism’	  in	  
                                                
94	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.83;	  2010:	  p.21	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the	  form	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  all	  the	  referents	  or	  applications	  of	  a	  particular	  word	  
must	  share	  some	  ‘essential’	  feature	  or	  set	  of	  features	  in	  common;	  and	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
characterises	  the	  search	  for	  essences	  as	  an	  illegitimate	  attempt	  to	  ‘dig	  beneath’	  the	  
surface	  of	  phenomena	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.8	  and	  p.14).	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  some	  critics	  of	  
the	  ARO	  might	  ask:	  doesn’t	  the	  positing	  of	  a	  representational	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  as	  
‘underlying’	  a	  variety	  of	  similar	  accounts	  and	  approaches	  betray	  a	  commitment	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  the	  ARO	  to	  just	  such	  a	  form	  of	  essentialism?	  Doesn’t	  it	  precisely	  assume	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  common	  ‘element’	  shared	  by	  these	  different	  accounts	  and	  theories	  
which	  makes	  them	  all	  vulnerable	  to	  broadly	  the	  same	  objections,	  which	  lies	  
concealed	  beneath	  their	  various	  claims?	  After	  all,	  how	  else	  are	  we	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  argument	  that	  even	  though	  Waltz	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  an	  
isomorphic	  correspondence	  between	  theoretical	  concepts	  and	  elements	  of	  reality,	  he	  
is	  nevertheless	  committed	  to	  the	  same	  ‘picture’	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  
and	  reality	  as	  that	  presented	  by	  the	  Tractatus	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.81;	  Fierke,	  2002:	  
p.336)?	  	  
	  
In	  view	  of	  the	  above,	  the	  most	  important	  questions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  
regarding	  the	  more	  general	  conception	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  are	  
as	  follows:	  
	  
Question	  1:	   What	  is	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  its	  general	  
form?	  
	  
If,	  as	  Kratochil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  suggest,	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  specific	  claims	  of	  any	  particular	  account	  of	  
language,	  and	  can	  be	  tacitly	  or	  even	  unconsciously	  assumed	  by	  scholars	  
adopting	  a	  certain	  academic	  approach,	  a	  crucial	  question	  is:	  what	  is	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  its	  general	  form?	  For	  example,	  in	  
Kratochwil’s	  case,	  we	  might	  ask	  what	  an	  ‘image’	  of	  language	  is;	  and	  in	  Pin-­‐
Fat’s	  case,	  what	  an	  ‘illustration’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  expression	  ‘illustrated	  
turns	  of	  phrase’	  amounts	  to.	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Question	  2:	   What	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  identifying	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language?	  
	  
Since	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  attribute	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  so	  broadly	  to	  so	  many	  different	  accounts	  and	  kinds	  of	  scholarly	  
endeavours,	  another	  important	  question	  which	  arises	  is:	  how	  do	  Kratochwil,	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  something	  or	  someone	  is	  committed	  
to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language?	  One	  could	  put	  this	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
negative	  question:	  what	  would	  it	  take	  in	  order	  for	  someone	  or	  something	  not	  
to	  be	  identified	  as	  being	  committed	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language?	  
	  
Question	  3:	   What	  is	  the	  methodological	  status	  of	  claims	  that	  attribute	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  to	  particular	  scholars,	  accounts	  etc.?	  
	  
A	  third	  issue	  in	  need	  of	  clarification	  is	  what	  sort	  of	  statements	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  and	  Fierke	  take	  themselves	  to	  be	  making	  when	  –	  for	  example	  –	  they	  claim	  
that	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  a	  scholar	  ‘assumes’	  or	  is	  ‘indebted’	  to	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  in	  its	  general	  form.	  Given	  that	  according	  to	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  its	  general	  form	  
transcends	  particularities	  and	  can	  be	  assumed	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  explicit	  
endorsement,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  some	  kind	  of	  explanation	  as	  to	  what	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  are	  doing	  when	  they	  identify	  its	  presence	  in	  the	  
work	  of	  others.	  	  
	  
Problem 3: Ambiguities Concerning the Specific Claims Attributed to 
the Representational View of Language 
	  
A	  third	  problem	  is	  that	  when	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  paraphrase	  what	  they	  
take	  to	  be	  the	  specific	  commitments	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  they	  
fluctuate	  between	  different	  wordings	  that	  imply	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  relevant	  
claims	  and	  assumptions.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  1989	  book	  Kratochwil	  conflates	  
Assumption	  1	  and	  2	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  (see	  outline	  in	  Chapter	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1)	  when	  he	  sums	  up	  the	  ‘positivist’	  assumption	  that	  communication	  consists	  solely	  in	  
“describing	  ‘facts’”	  as	  the	  reduction	  of	  communication	  “to	  the	  ‘match’	  of	  concepts	  
and	  objects”	  (Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.5-­‐6).	  Subsequently	  Kratochwil	  paraphrases	  this	  
assumption	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  ways,	  referring	  to	  it	  as	  the	  assumption	  that	  “if	  
language	  was	  meaningful,	  it	  was	  so	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  depict	  accurately	  the	  
things,	  actions,	  and	  properties	  of	  the	  ‘outer	  world’”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.19);	  that	  
“nouns	  [stand]	  for	  things,	  verbs	  for	  actions,	  and	  adjectives	  for	  properties”	  
(Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.19);	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  a	  term	  consist[s]	  …	  in	  its	  exact	  
correspondence	  to	  an	  object	  in	  the	  ‘outer	  world’”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.20);	  that	  
“concepts	  [mean]	  something	  …	  because	  they	  [capture]	  the	  ontological	  essences	  of	  
‘things’”	  (Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.20);	  that	  “objectively	  given	  things	  are	  mirrored	  by	  our	  
concepts”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2006]:	  p.187);	  and	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  a	  concept	  …	  is	  
…	  its	  reference”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2009]:	  p.144-­‐5).	  	  
	  
Similarly,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  equates	  the	  assumptions	  that	  “names	  name	  objects”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  
p.80);	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  the	  object	  for	  which	  it	  stands”	  (Ibid.);	  that	  
words	  “rely”	  on	  “the	  word-­‐object	  naming	  relation”	  for	  their	  meaning	  (Ibid.);	  that	  “the	  
meaning	  of	  [a]	  word	  …	  is	  …	  dependent	  on	  naming	  an	  element	  which	  is	  common	  to	  all	  
instances	  of	  its	  use”	  (ibid.);	  that	  “language	  …	  shares	  the	  same	  structure”	  with	  
“possible	  states	  of	  affairs”	  (Pin-­‐Fat	  2011:	  p.9);	  and	  that	  “words	  refer	  to	  objects”	  
(ibid.).	  Meanwhile,	  Fierke	  treats	  as	  equivalent	  the	  assumptions	  that	  “language	  
provides	  labels	  for	  an	  objective	  reality”	  (Fierke	  and	  Jørgensen,	  2001:	  p.9,	  fn.2);	  that	  
“language	  is	  the	  totality	  of	  propositions”	  which	  are	  “composed	  of	  simple	  names”	  of	  
“simple	  entities	  in	  the	  world”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.335);	  that	  “all	  propositions	  can	  be	  
analysed”	  into	  “elementary	  propositions”	  composed	  of	  “primitive	  names”	  (Fierke,	  
2002:	  p.336);	  that	  “a	  sentence	  with	  a	  ‘sense’	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  logical	  syntax	  of	  
language	  is	  perfectly	  isomorphic	  with	  the	  logical	  structure	  of	  reality”	  (ibid.);	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  “possibility	  of	  correlating	  primitive	  names	  with	  entities	  in	  the	  world”	  (ibid.);	  
that	  there	  is	  an	  “isomorphic	  …	  correspondence”	  between	  language	  and	  the	  world”	  
(ibid.);	  that	  language	  is	  “a	  set	  of	  labels,	  linked	  in	  propositions”	  which	  “picture	  the	  
logic	  of	  the	  world”	  (Fierke,	  2004:	  p.478-­‐9);	  and	  that	  “we	  can	  compare	  scientific	  
categories	  with	  the	  world	  to	  see	  whether	  they	  correspond”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84).	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From	  the	  examples	  quoted	  above	  one	  can	  clearly	  see	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  
terminological	  equivocations	  and	  conflations	  in	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  
writing	  generate	  ambiguities	  concerning	  precisely	  which	  assumptions	  are	  being	  
identified	  and	  criticised	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  and	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  More	  specifically,	  these	  equivocations	  include:	  	  
	  
• Treating	  conceptually	  distinct	  expressions	  like	  ‘name’,	  ‘label’,	  ‘correspond’,	  
‘refer’,	  ‘stand	  for’	  etc.	  as	  synonymous;	  	  
• Shifting	  seamlessly	  between	  versions	  of	  assumptions	  that	  involve	  different	  
quantifiers,	  such	  as	  between	  the	  universal	  assumption	  that	  all	  words	  
correspond	  with	  objects	  and	  less	  extensive	  assumptions	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  
some	  words	  correspond	  with	  objects	  (such	  as	  the	  ‘simple	  names’	  in	  analysed	  
propositions,	  or	  certain	  theoretical	  concepts);	  	  
• Conflating	  connectives	  with	  different	  implications,	  such	  as	  ‘if’,	  ‘because’,	  ‘is	  
constituted	  by’,	  ‘is	  identical	  with’,	  ‘depends	  on’	  etc.,	  	  
• Wavering	  between	  expressions	  of	  actuality	  and	  possibility,	  e.g.	  words	  can	  be	  
made	  to	  correspond	  with	  objects	  vs.	  there	  is	  a	  correspondence	  between	  
words	  and	  objects.	  
	  
The	  distinctions	  that	  are	  erased	  by	  these	  equivocations	  might	  seem	  subtle.	  However,	  
they	  are	  actually	  highly	  significant	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  criticisms	  that	  Kratochwil,	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  make	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  and	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  to	  IR.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  distinctions	  in	  question	  relate	  to	  differences	  in	  
the	  scope	  and	  meaning	  of	  the	  paraphrased	  assumptions	  that	  would	  affect	  whether	  or	  
not	  certain	  criticisms	  would	  apply	  to	  them.	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  modal	  criticism	  made	  
by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  that	  ‘not	  all	  words	  refer	  to	  objects’	  would	  work	  as	  a	  
counterargument	  against	  the	  universal	  claim	  that	  ‘all	  words	  refer	  to	  objects’;	  
however,	  it	  would	  not	  directly	  contradict	  the	  similar	  assumptions	  that	  ‘words	  in	  
elementary	  propositions	  refer	  to	  objects’	  or	  that	  ‘some	  theoretical	  concepts	  refer	  to	  
objects’	  as	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  suggest,	  since	  these	  latter	  assumptions	  do	  
not	  involve	  a	  blanket	  denial	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  non-­‐referential	  words	  or	  non-­‐
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referential	  factors	  affecting	  linguistic	  meaning.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  counter-­‐
arguments	  and	  examples	  used	  to	  challenge	  the	  universal	  claim	  that	  ‘all	  words	  refer	  to	  
objects’	  could	  not	  conceivably	  be	  adapted	  to	  refute	  non-­‐universal	  versions	  of	  this	  
claim;	  however	  the	  point	  is	  rather	  that	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  explanation	  included	  
in	  the	  ARO	  of	  how	  such	  arguments	  can	  be	  extended	  so	  that	  they	  work	  against	  these	  
other	  versions	  to	  which	  they	  are	  not	  directly	  applicable.	  Otherwise	  the	  connection	  is	  
left	  obscure,	  which	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  sound	  basis	  for	  making	  methodological	  
recommendations	  that	  will	  be	  taken	  seriously	  by	  other	  IR	  scholars	  –	  especially	  by	  
those	  for	  whom	  this	  would	  involve	  making	  radical	  changes	  to	  their	  way	  of	  working.	  
	  
A	  salutary	  example	  of	  why	  such	  distinctions	  matter	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  language	  is	  
found	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Robert	  Brandom’s	  2008	  book,	  Between	  Saying	  and	  Doing:	  
Towards	  an	  Analytic	  Pragmatism.	  There	  Brandom	  sets	  forth	  a	  sophisticated	  
programme	  for	  the	  philosophical	  analysis	  of	  linguistic	  meaning,	  in	  which	  he	  attempts	  
to	  reconcile	  “the	  classical	  project	  of	  philosophical	  analysis”	  as	  developed	  by	  “Russell	  
and	  Moore,	  the	  Tractatus,	  the	  Cambridge	  analysts	  of	  the	  1920s,	  the	  Vienna	  Circle,	  
Ayer,	  Goodman	  and	  Quine”	  (2008:	  p.xvii-­‐xviii),	  with	  what	  he	  terms	  the	  “pragmatist	  
critique	  of	  semantics”	  developed	  by	  philosophers	  such	  as	  James,	  Dewey,	  Austin,	  later	  
Wittgenstein,	  Searle	  and	  Rorty	  (Brandom,	  2008:	  p.4-­‐5).	  In	  this	  context,	  Brandom	  
accepts	  the	  ‘pragmatist’	  rejection	  of	  the	  unqualified	  assumptions	  that	  “uses	  of	  
singular	  terms	  have	  the	  job	  of	  picking	  out	  objects”	  and	  “declarative	  sentences	  are	  in	  
the	  business	  of	  stating	  facts”	  (Brandom,	  2008:	  p.4-­‐5),	  which	  are	  assumptions	  that	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  also	  criticise	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ARO.	  However,	  in	  
place	  of	  these	  assumptions	  Brandom	  adopts	  the	  more	  nuanced	  premise	  that	  the	  
identification	  of	  objects	  and	  factual	  statements	  are	  uses	  of	  language	  which	  “form	  a	  
privileged	  centre”	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  “more	  peripheral”	  uses	  can	  be	  understood	  
(Brandom,	  2008:	  p.4-­‐5).	  Now,	  this	  premise	  of	  Brandom’s	  is	  somewhat	  similar	  to	  the	  
universal	  assumptions	  that	  all	  words	  refer	  to	  objects	  and	  all	  sentences	  state	  facts;	  
nevertheless,	  Brandom	  is	  correct	  in	  thinking	  that	  his	  premise	  is	  not	  directly	  
challenged	  by	  the	  ‘pragmatist	  critique’	  of	  the	  latter	  assumptions,	  as	  his	  claim	  is	  one	  
of	  the	  primacy	  rather	  than	  the	  universality	  of	  referential	  and	  propositional	  uses	  of	  
language.	  While	  one	  may	  still	  reasonably	  disagree	  with	  Brandom,	  the	  point	  remains	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that	  in	  order	  to	  criticise	  Brandom’s	  premise	  it	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  point	  out	  the	  
similarities	  between	  this	  premise	  and	  historical	  universal	  assumptions	  regarding	  the	  
functioning	  of	  words	  and	  sentences	  that	  have	  been	  successfully	  refuted	  by	  the	  
‘pragmatist	  critique’.	  Rather,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  provide	  a	  thorough	  explanation	  of	  
how	  the	  ‘pragmatist	  critique’	  can	  be	  adapted	  so	  that	  it	  continues	  to	  pose	  a	  challenge	  
to	  Brandom’s	  modified	  premise,	  despite	  relevant	  differences	  between	  this	  premise	  
and	  the	  universal	  assumptions	  that	  formed	  the	  original	  target	  of	  these	  objections.	  
	  
This	  example	  helps	  to	  illuminate	  why	  it	  is	  important	  for	  IR	  scholars	  like	  Kratochwil,	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  who	  seek	  to	  apply	  something	  like	  the	  ‘pragmatist	  critique’	  to	  the	  
assumptions	  of	  scholars	  within	  their	  discipline,	  to	  be	  careful	  to	  paraphrase	  their	  
targets	  in	  a	  precise	  manner,	  and	  not	  to	  conflate	  assumptions	  involving	  different	  
quantifiers,	  connectives,	  etc.,	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  mistakenly	  giving	  the	  impression	  that	  
criticisms	  of	  a	  particular	  assumption	  will	  automatically	  refute	  similar	  versions	  to	  
which	  it	  may	  not	  be	  directly	  applicable.	  It	  also	  illustrates	  the	  need	  for	  such	  scholars	  to	  
provide	  ‘bridging’	  explanations	  to	  explicitly	  set	  forth	  how	  existing	  criticisms	  of	  certain	  
historical	  claims	  and	  assumptions	  within	  philosophy	  are	  applicable	  to	  similar,	  yet	  
relevantly	  distinct,	  versions	  of	  these	  claims	  that	  may	  be	  found	  in	  the	  more	  recent	  
work	  of	  IR	  scholars.	  	  
	  
Problem 4: Insufficient Methodological Justification for Appealing to 
‘Ordinary Language’  
	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  1.5,	  many	  of	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language	  made	  by	  the	  ARO	  are	  counter-­‐claims	  based	  on	  observations	  about	  
how	  language	  is	  ordinarily	  used.	  In	  employing	  this	  strategy,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke	  appear	  to	  be	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  philosophers	  like	  J.L.	  Austin,	  later	  
Wittgenstein	  and	  Searle,	  whom	  they	  cite	  in	  support	  of	  their	  objections.	  The	  
observations	  employed	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  in	  this	  manner	  include	  both	  
illustrative	  examples	  of	  how	  specific	  words	  and	  sentences	  are	  typically	  used,	  and	  
modal	  generalisations	  about	  how	  language	  can	  function	  that	  are	  derived	  from	  these	  
examples.	  Now,	  many	  people	  may	  be	  content	  to	  accept	  such	  observations	  as	  truisms	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about	  how	  language	  is	  used	  –	  and	  indeed,	  they	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  perfectly	  valid.	  
However,	  at	  present,	  these	  observations	  pose	  a	  potential	  problem	  for	  the	  ARO	  in	  the	  
following	  way.	  	  
	  
First	  of	  all,	  despite	  its	  intuitiveness,	  this	  sort	  of	  appeal	  to	  ‘ordinary	  language’	  is	  a	  far	  
from	  straightforward	  strategy,	  and	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  considerable	  debate	  over	  the	  
past	  60-­‐odd	  years	  (for	  example,	  Heath:	  1952;	  Mates,	  1958;	  Cavell:	  1958;	  Fodor	  and	  
Katz:	  1963;	  Kindi,	  1998;	  Hanfling,	  2000;	  Jackman,	  2001).	  Some	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  that	  
have	  been	  raised	  and	  discussed	  in	  this	  context	  include:	  
	  
-­‐ Whether	  appealing	  to	  observations	  about	  language-­‐use	  constitutes	  an	  
appeal	  to	  empirical	  facts;	  
-­‐ Whether	  these	  are	  sociological	  facts	  about	  how	  the	  majority	  of	  speakers	  
use	  their	  native	  language,	  or	  facts	  of	  some	  other	  kind;	  
-­‐ What	  sort	  of	  evidence	  or	  investigation	  (if	  any)	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  
correctly	  observe	  that	  language	  is	  used	  in	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  a	  way;	  
-­‐ How	  disagreements	  over	  facts	  of	  this	  kind	  are	  to	  be	  resolved.	  
	  
In	  view	  of	  the	  above,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  tenable	  for	  scholars	  wishing	  to	  base	  their	  
arguments	  on	  observations	  of	  ordinary	  language-­‐use	  to	  simply	  present	  their	  
observations	  and	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  self-­‐evident,	  as	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  FIerke	  apparently	  do.	  Even	  if	  one	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  observations	  that	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  make,	  in	  order	  for	  these	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  sound	  basis	  for	  
contradicting	  other	  people’s	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  the	  ARO	  needs	  to	  include	  a	  plausible	  
account	  of	  the	  methodological	  status	  of	  such	  observations,	  which	  addresses	  the	  main	  
uncertainties	  that	  have	  previously	  been	  identified	  (above).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  could	  not	  rise	  to	  this	  challenge	  and	  show	  their	  
observations	  to	  be	  sound;	  but	  simply	  to	  point	  out	  that	  at	  present,	  this	  amounts	  to	  a	  
significant	  weakness	  in	  their	  arguments	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  
	  
Secondly,	  there	  is	  the	  more	  serious	  potential	  problem	  facing	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  that	  if	  
they	  follow	  Searle	  in	  acknowledging	  the	  status	  of	  their	  linguistic	  observations	  as	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factual	  claims	  of	  some	  kind,95	  they	  could	  end	  up	  contradicting	  some	  of	  their	  own	  
arguments	  against	  making	  and	  testing	  true/false	  statements.96	  These	  include	  Pin-­‐
Fat’s	  suggestion	  that	  knowledge-­‐claims	  and	  questions	  of	  truth	  or	  falsity	  should	  be	  
avoided	  because	  they	  are	  based	  on	  unjustified	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
proof,	  evidence	  etc.,97	  and	  Fierke’s	  argument	  that	  ‘hypothesis	  testing’	  is	  based	  on	  
mistaken	  assumptions	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  language	  to	  ‘mirror’	  an	  objective	  reality.98	  
The	  potential	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  contradiction	  is	  foreseen	  by	  Fierke	  in	  her	  2001	  article,	  
when	  she	  notes	  that	  her	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘empirical’	  to	  characterise	  the	  approach	  she	  
thinks	  IR	  scholars	  should	  adopt	  “is	  not	  without	  problems”	  –	  given	  her	  position	  that	  
“the	  word	  ‘empirical,’	  and	  the	  data/theory	  dichotomy,	  presuppose	  a	  correspondence	  
theory	  of	  truth”	  and	  a	  “way	  of	  knowing”	  that	  “Wittgenstein	  criticised”	  in	  his	  later	  
philosophy.99	  Fierke	  hints	  at	  a	  possible	  solution	  to	  this	  apparent	  contradiction	  when	  
she	  suggests	  that	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  “alternative	  approach”	  to	  linguistic	  analysis	  is	  
“not	  properly	  empirical	  as	  this	  word	  has	  traditionally	  been	  used.”100	  However,	  Fierke	  
does	  not	  elaborate	  further	  in	  explaining	  in	  what	  sense	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  approach	  
is	  ‘not	  properly	  empirical’,	  or	  how	  such	  ‘non-­‐traditional’	  empirical	  observations	  
manage	  to	  avoid	  the	  criticisms	  that	  she	  takes	  herself	  and	  later	  Wittgenstein	  to	  have	  
levelled	  against	  more	  traditional	  empirical	  approaches.	  	  
	  
Problem 5: Endorsement of Universal Claims 
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  many	  of	  the	  ARO’s	  objections	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  
language	  and	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  involve	  citing	  particular	  counter-­‐examples	  
and	  making	  modal	  generalisations	  to	  contradict	  universal	  claims	  about	  language.	  At	  
times,	  however,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  go	  further	  than	  this	  in	  expressing	  their	  
objections,	  and	  end	  up	  endorsing	  some	  universal	  claims	  of	  their	  own.	  Thus,	  for	  
example,	  after	  contradicting	  the	  universal	  claim	  that	  ‘words	  only	  have	  meaning	  when	  
they	  name	  objects’,	  by	  observing	  that	  not	  all	  words	  name	  objects	  and	  that	  there	  are	  
                                                
95	  E.g.	  Searle,	  1969:	  p.13	  
96	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.82;	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.351	  
97	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.82;	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.351	  
98	  Fierke,	  2002:	  p.351	  
99	  Fierke,	  2001:	  p.122	  
100	  Fierke,	  2001	  p.123	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various	  contexts	  in	  which	  words	  are	  meaningful	  without	  naming	  objects,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  asks:	  
“so,	  if	  the	  naming	  of	  objects	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  then	  what	  
might?”	  Here	  Pin-­‐Fat	  shifts	  from	  a	  modal	  denial	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  ‘the	  meaning	  of	  
words	  does	  not	  always	  come	  from	  naming	  objects’,	  to	  endorsing	  a	  negative	  universal	  
claim	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  ‘The	  meaning	  of	  words	  is	  not	  provided	  by	  the	  naming	  of	  
objects’	  (my	  emphasis).101	  A	  similar	  shift	  is	  performed	  a	  few	  lines	  later	  when,	  after	  
quoting	  Wittgenstein’s	  remark	  in	  PI	  §43	  that	  “for	  a	  large	  class	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  we	  
use	  the	  word	  ‘meaning’	  …	  [it]	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  this	  way:	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  
its	  use	  in	  the	  language”	  (original	  emphasis),	  Pin-­‐Fat	  concludes:	  “meaning	  then,	  comes	  
from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  word	  is	  used	  in	  particular	  contexts”.102	  Here	  Pin-­‐Fat	  converts	  
the	  modal	  tone	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  remark,	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  explicitly	  specifies	  
that	  he	  is	  speaking	  of	  a	  “large	  class	  of	  cases”	  and	  “not	  for	  all”,	  into	  an	  unqualified	  
categorical	  assertion	  about	  what	  constitutes	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  in	  general.103	  
Another	  example	  of	  a	  universal	  claim	  endorsed	  by	  all	  three	  scholars	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  
we	  cannot	  step	  outside	  language	  so	  as	  to	  see	  whether,	  and	  how	  well,	  it	  represents	  an	  
objective	  reality	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2000]:	  p.176;	  Fierke,	  2001:	  p.118;	  2002:	  p.337;	  
Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.7).	  
	  
These	  sorts	  of	  universal	  claims	  made	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  FIerke	  are	  
problematic	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  many	  of	  these	  universal	  claims	  look	  a	  lot	  
like	  metaphysical	  theses,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  attempts	  to	  assert	  
necessary	  a	  priori	  truths	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  language	  and/or	  reality.	  This	  is	  
especially	  problematic	  for	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  since	  they	  criticise	  other	  philosophers	  
and	  scholars	  for	  buying	  into	  metaphysical	  theses,	  and	  so	  if	  they	  were	  to	  endorse	  
metaphysical	  theses	  themselves	  this	  would	  amount	  to	  a	  contradiction	  in	  their	  
arguments.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  in	  her	  book	  Pin-­‐Fat	  strongly	  criticises	  IR	  scholars	  who	  
have	  given	  in	  to	  “the	  urge	  to	  make	  universal	  claims”	  about	  “what	  anarchy	  is,	  what	  a	  
                                                
101	  The	  transition	  Pin-­‐Fat	  undertakes	  here	  is	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  someone	  who	  goes	  from	  denying	  that	  all	  
fruit	  grows	  on	  trees,	  to	  asserting	  that	  ‘fruit	  does	  not	  grow	  on	  trees’.	  
102	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80	  
103	  Kratochwil	  commits	  to	  the	  same	  (or	  similar)	  universal	  claims	  about	  where	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  
does	  and	  does	  not	  come	  from,	  when	  he	  endorses	  “the	  Wittgensteinian	  notion	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  
concept	  …	  is	  not	  its	  reference	  but	  its	  ‘use’”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011:	  p.144-­‐5);	  while	  Fierke	  asserts	  that	  
“language	  use	  …	  constitutes	  human	  action	  and	  meaning”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84).	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state	  is,	  what	  war	  is,	  what	  power	  is,	  what	  security	  is,	  and	  so	  on”	  which	  purport	  to	  
“apply	  universally	  to	  all	  instances	  of	  that	  ‘thing’	  …	  without	  exception”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  
p.2).	  However,	  she	  herself	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  assess	  claims	  of	  truth	  or	  
falsity	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.7),	  that	  “certainty	  [is]	  impossible”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.7),	  that	  
“meaning	  cannot	  be	  fixed”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.13)	  and	  so	  on.	  These	  claims	  are	  
apparently	  just	  as	  universal	  as	  those	  which	  Pin-­‐Fat	  uses	  the	  ARO	  to	  rebut,	  and	  so	  
unless	  Pin-­‐Fat	  can	  provide	  some	  sort	  of	  explanation	  for	  why	  her	  own	  universal	  claims	  
are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  criticisms,	  then	  this	  indeed	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  fundamental	  
contradiction	  in	  her	  argument.	  
	  
Secondly,	  some	  of	  the	  universal	  claims	  about	  language	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke	  make	  directly	  contradict	  modal	  claims	  and	  examples	  of	  language-­‐use	  that	  
these	  same	  scholars	  present	  elsewhere	  in	  their	  arguments.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  in	  
making	  their	  modal	  arguments	  against	  the	  universal	  assumptions	  that	  ‘all	  words	  refer	  
to	  objects’	  and	  ‘all	  sentences	  are	  factual	  propositions’,	  Kratochwil	  and	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
acknowledge	  that	  there	  are	  actually	  some	  words	  and	  sentences	  which	  do	  function	  as	  
referential	  terms	  and	  factual	  propositions;	  although	  they	  argue	  that	  these	  are	  not,	  so	  
to	  speak,	  the	  ‘be	  all	  and	  end	  all’	  of	  language.	  Thus	  Pin-­‐Fat	  includes	  “forming	  and	  
testing	  a	  hypothesis”	  in	  her	  list	  of	  different	  sorts	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  words	  may	  be	  
used,	  and	  argues	  that	  “there	  are	  many	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  words	  are	  meaningful	  
which	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  word-­‐object	  naming	  relation”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80);	  while	  
Kratochwil	  claims	  that	  “normative	  terms	  follow	  a	  logic	  different	  from	  that	  of	  
descriptive	  definitions”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011:	  p.39).104	  However,	  these	  
acknowledgements	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  some	  legitimate	  uses	  of	  language	  which	  
involve	  factual	  claims,	  referring	  to	  objects,	  description	  and	  so	  on,	  are	  contradicted	  
elsewhere	  by	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Katochwil’s	  universal	  claims	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  objects	  
does	  not	  provide	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80),	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  
to	  assess	  claims	  as	  “accurate	  (true)	  or	  inaccurate	  (false)”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.7);	  and	  that	  
                                                
104	  These	  examples	  serve	  to	  highlight	  the	  observation	  that	  ‘reference’	  and	  ‘use’	  are	  not	  two	  
diametrically	  opposed	  ways	  of	  conceiving	  of	  linguistic	  meaning	  as	  Fierke	  suggests	  (2002:	  p.332),	  since	  
‘reference’	  can	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘use’	  –	  or	  group	  of	  uses	  –	  to	  which	  words	  and	  sentences	  may	  be	  put	  (the	  
same	  goes	  for	  ‘description’,	  ‘naming’	  etc.).	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“the	  meaning	  of	  a	  concept	  …	  is	  not	  its	  reference	  but	  its	  ‘use’”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011:	  
p.145).	  
	  
Thirdly,	  there	  is	  the	  problem	  that	  making	  and/or	  assessing	  of	  some	  of	  these	  claims	  
would	  apparently	  require	  adopting	  a	  kind	  of	  objectivity	  that	  all	  three	  scholars	  argue	  is	  
impossible.	  This	  is	  most	  clearly	  exemplified	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  ‘we	  cannot	  step	  outside	  
language’.	  If	  it	  really	  were	  the	  case	  –	  as	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  argue	  –	  that	  in	  
order	  to	  justifiably	  assert	  that	  language	  represents	  reality,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  occupy	  an	  impossible	  position	  ‘outside’	  language,	  then	  this	  would	  also	  apply	  to	  
their	  counterclaim	  that	  language	  and	  reality	  are	  intertwined.	  This	  highlights	  the	  self-­‐
contradictory	  nature	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  claim,	  since	  it	  effectively	  
amounts	  to	  the	  mystical	  paradox	  that	  ‘we	  have	  ascertained	  that	  the	  relationship	  
between	  language	  and	  reality	  is	  such	  that	  one	  cannot	  ascertain	  what	  this	  relationship	  
is’.	  
	  
Problem 6: Inconsistent Stance towards Everyday Linguistic Practices  
	  
As	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  the	  validity	  of	  many	  of	  the	  ARO’s	  criticisms	  depends	  
upon	  the	  methodological	  soundness	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  appeals	  to	  
‘ordinary	  language’	  in	  the	  form	  of	  observations	  about	  features	  of	  everyday	  linguistic	  
practices.	  In	  view	  of	  this	  dependence,	  another	  problematic	  facet	  of	  the	  ARO	  is	  that	  in	  
some	  places	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  actually	  find	  themselves	  contradicting	  or	  
denying	  some	  ordinary	  linguistic	  practices	  in	  their	  eagerness	  to	  argue	  against	  certain	  
universal	  claims	  or	  assumptions	  regarding	  how	  language	  functions.	  	  
	  
For	  instance,	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  under	  the	  last	  heading	  how	  Pin-­‐Fat	  denies	  the	  
possibility	  of	  evaluating	  true/false	  claims	  or	  of	  gaining	  certain	  knowledge;	  and	  yet	  in	  
everyday	  life	  there	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  accepted	  practices	  and	  scenarios	  in	  which	  people	  
are	  said	  to	  evaluate	  the	  truth	  or	  falsity	  of	  claims,	  and	  to	  be	  certain	  or	  to	  gain	  
certainty.	  Thus	  a	  news	  journalist	  may	  challenge	  the	  truth	  or	  accuracy	  of	  a	  claim	  made	  
by	  a	  politician,	  a	  doctor	  may	  carry	  out	  tests	  on	  a	  patient	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  the	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cause	  of	  their	  illness,	  and	  so	  on.	  By	  claiming	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  evaluate	  
true/false	  claims	  or	  to	  gain	  certainty,	  it	  appears	  that	  Pin-­‐Fat	  is	  not	  only	  arguing	  
against	  an	  academic	  view	  of	  language,	  but	  is	  denying	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  being	  able	  
to	  do	  what	  people	  who	  engage	  in	  these	  sorts	  of	  practices	  take	  themselves	  to	  be	  
doing;	  i.e.	  denying	  the	  ability	  of	  doctors	  to	  get	  to	  the	  bottom	  of	  a	  patient’s	  illness	  so	  
as	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  prescribing	  appropriate	  treatment,	  or	  the	  ability	  of	  journalists	  to	  
legitimately	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  a	  politician’s	  claim	  is	  false	  or	  misleading.	  Similarly,	  
there	  are	  times	  when	  Fierke	  goes	  beyond	  challenging	  assumptions	  about	  language	  
and	  appropriate	  methods	  for	  studying	  IR,	  and	  appears	  to	  contradict	  established	  
practices	  of	  scientific	  enquiry,	  such	  as	  when	  she	  makes	  the	  unqualified	  claim	  that	  
“hypothesis	  testing	  rests	  on	  a	  picture	  theory	  of	  language	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  
compare	  scientific	  categories	  with	  the	  world	  to	  see	  whether	  they	  correspond”	  
(Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.84).	  Rather	  than	  criticising	  a	  particular	  assumption	  that	  supports	  the	  
supposition	  that	  one	  can	  apply	  quasi-­‐scientific	  techniques	  of	  ‘hypothesis	  testing’	  to	  
the	  study	  of	  IR,	  this	  claim	  apparently	  contends	  that	  practices	  of	  ‘hypothesis	  testing’	  in	  
general	  –	  no	  matter	  in	  which	  context	  they	  are	  employed	  –	  are	  founded	  on	  a	  
misconception.	  	  
	  
These	  sorts	  of	  denials	  are	  not	  only	  problematic	  due	  to	  the	  radical	  and	  controversial	  
theses	  they	  advance,	  implying,	  as	  they	  do,	  that	  the	  results	  and	  achievements	  of	  all	  
practices	  involving	  hypothesis	  testing	  and	  evaluations	  of	  truth	  or	  falsity	  are	  ill-­‐gotten,	  
but	  also	  because	  they	  betray	  an	  inconsistent	  attitude	  on	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke’s	  part	  concerning	  the	  argumentative	  weight	  that	  observations	  of	  ordinary	  
language-­‐use	  carry.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  observations	  of	  ordinary	  language-­‐use	  that	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  use	  to	  refute	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  representational	  
view	  of	  language,	  they	  treat	  such	  observations	  as	  prima	  facie	  evidence	  that	  is	  
powerful	  enough	  to	  thwart	  academic	  claims	  and	  approaches	  that	  go	  against	  them.	  
However,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  ordinary	  linguistic	  practices	  that	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  disavowals	  of	  hypothesis	  testing,	  true/false	  evaluations,	  and	  
epistemic	  certainty,	  these	  everyday	  practices	  are	  ignored	  in	  favour	  of	  these	  scholars’	  
somewhat	  grand	  claims	  about	  their	  impossibility.	  This	  inconsistent	  attitude	  towards	  
observations	  of	  ordinary	  linguistic	  practices	  risks	  undermining	  the	  authority	  of	  the	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ARO’s	  criticisms,	  and	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  consistent	  methodological	  
justification	  for	  the	  appeal	  to	  ordinary	  language	  observations	  in	  this	  context.	  
	  
Problem 7: Inadequate Treatment of Objective Realism 
	  
A	  final	  problem	  with	  the	  ARO,	  is	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  criticisms	  of	  
‘objective	  realism’	  are	  inadequate	  in	  that:	  (a)	  they	  fail	  to	  address	  alternative	  ways	  of	  
conceiving	  of	  social	  facts	  as	  ‘objectively	  real’	  that	  are	  more	  commonly	  upheld	  in	  
social	  and	  political	  study,	  and	  (b)	  risk	  buying	  into	  radical	  forms	  of	  linguistic	  relativism	  
which	  have	  been	  rendered	  highly	  questionable	  by	  recent	  criticisms	  of	  ‘strong’	  
versions	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘Sapir-­‐Whorf	  hypothesis’.	  	  
	  
The	  form	  of	  objective	  realism	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  target	  is	  the	  
assumption	  that	  there	  is	  an	  objective	  reality	  which	  exists	  and	  has	  a	  natural	  form	  that	  
obtains	  independently	  of	  human	  cognition,	  language	  and	  theory;	  and	  furthermore	  
that	  this	  reality	  and	  its	  form	  can	  be	  perceived	  and	  represented	  in	  a	  neutral	  way.105	  
‘Objectivity’	  in	  this	  context	  is	  apparently	  understood	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  independence	  from	  human	  mentality,	  language	  and	  
meaning;	  but	  is	  also	  associated	  by	  these	  scholars	  with	  externality,106	  neutrality107	  and	  
transcendence/	  universality.108	  While	  Pin-­‐Fat	  argues	  against	  the	  entire	  assumption,	  
Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  are	  careful	  to	  specify	  that	  they	  do	  not	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  
objective	  reality,	  but	  rather	  they	  deny	  that	  this	  reality	  can	  be	  known	  independently	  
of	  human	  thought	  and	  language	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  p.134;	  Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2009]:	  
p.171).	  	  
	  
                                                
105	  Kratochwil,	  1989:	  p.21,	  2011	  [2006]:	  p.187,	  2011	  [2007]:	  p.204;	  Fierke,	  2001:	  p.130,	  2001:	  p.134	  fn.	  
1,	  2002:	  p.338;	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997,	  p.81,	  p.82.	  
106	  “Reality	  is	  the	  external	  world,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  outside	  the	  mind”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.81),	  “patterns	  do	  
not	  exist	  in	  an	  objective	  world	  ‘out	  there’,	  as	  assume	  by	  the	  behaviourists”	  (Fierke,	  2001:	  p.130).	  
107	  Kratochwil	  refers	  to	  the	  attempt	  “to	  eliminate	  the	  value-­‐tinge	  in	  the	  description”	  and	  insistence	  
“that	  everything	  has	  to	  be	  cast	  in	  neutral,	  ‘objective’,	  observational	  language”	  (2011	  [2007]:	  p.204).	  
108	  Pin-­‐Fat	  characterises	  the	  idea	  of	  objective	  truth	  as	  assuming	  that	  something	  is	  “universally	  true	  
regardless	  of	  time	  and	  place”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.46).	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As	  I	  have	  suggested,	  one	  problem	  with	  this	  way	  of	  conceiving	  of	  objective	  realism	  is	  
that	  it	  leaves	  out	  a	  main	  sense	  in	  which	  many	  scholars	  –	  including	  some	  whose	  work	  
would	  count	  as	  ‘positivist’	  according	  to	  the	  ARO	  –	  have	  conceived	  of	  social	  or	  political	  
facts	  as	  being	  ‘objective’.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  Rules	  of	  Sociological	  Method,	  Durkheim	  
famously	  argued	  that	  aspects	  of	  our	  collective	  social	  life	  such	  as	  religious	  practices,	  
the	  language	  we	  speak,	  the	  monetary	  system	  we	  use,	  and	  the	  professions	  into	  which	  
we	  enter,	  are	  ‘objectively	  real’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  exist	  “outside	  the	  consciousness	  
of	  the	  individual”,	  and	  have	  “a	  compelling	  and	  coercive	  power	  by	  virtue	  of	  which,	  
whether	  [the	  individual]	  wishes	  it	  or	  not,	  they	  impose	  themselves	  upon	  him”	  
(Durkheim,	  1989:	  p.50-­‐51).	  By	  this,	  Durkheim	  is	  not	  claiming	  that	  religious	  practices,	  
monetary	  systems,	  professions	  etc.	  are	  independent	  of	  human	  cognition	  and	  
language	  per	  se.	  Rather,	  he	  is	  pointing	  out	  that	  as	  collective	  social	  phenomena,	  they	  
have	  an	  existence	  and	  form	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  thought	  and	  volition	  of	  any	  
particular	  individual	  who	  is	  born	  into	  them;	  and	  that	  they	  are	  encountered	  by	  
individuals	  as	  an	  external	  constraint	  upon	  their	  possibilities	  of	  action.	  	  
	  
Whatever	  its	  flaws	  may	  be,	  Durkheim’s	  conception	  of	  the	  ‘objective	  reality’	  of	  social	  
facts	  is	  not	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  same	  criticisms	  as	  the	  assumption	  that	  reality	  has	  a	  
form	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  human	  thought	  and	  language	  in	  general.	  This	  is	  an	  
important	  point,	  since	  Alexander	  Wendt	  –	  whom	  both	  Kratochwil	  and	  Fierke	  criticise	  
as	  adopting	  a	  ‘positivist’	  approach	  to	  IR	  –	  sometimes	  appeals	  to	  a	  Durkheimian	  form	  
of	  objective	  realism	  in	  developing	  his	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics;	  for	  
example,	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  “shared	  beliefs	  and	  the	  practices	  to	  which	  they	  give	  
rise	  confront	  individual	  actors	  as	  external	  social	  facts,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  not	  
external	  to	  actors	  collectively”	  and	  that	  in	  this	  sense	  “social	  structures	  are	  no	  less	  real	  
than	  material	  ones”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.24;	  see	  also	  p.75).	  This	  observation	  also	  
highlights	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  are	  remiss	  in	  not	  distinguishing	  
between	  individual	  versus	  collective	  subjectivity	  when	  arguing	  against	  assumptions	  of	  
objective	  realism;	  and	  that	  as	  a	  result	  the	  ARO	  at	  present	  has	  no	  way	  of	  discerning	  
between	  somewhat	  absurd	  assumptions	  concerning	  the	  independence	  of	  social	  and	  
political	  phenomena	  from	  human	  mentality	  and	  language	  in	  general,	  versus	  more	  
modest	  (still	  potentially	  mistaken)	  assumptions	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	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individual	  subjects	  and	  the	  collectively	  maintained	  social	  practices	  and	  institutions	  in	  
which	  they	  can	  participate.	  	  
	  
Moving	  on	  now	  to	  the	  next	  problem,	  as	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
and	  Fierke	  paraphrase	  the	  assumption	  of	  objective	  realism	  primarily	  as	  assuming	  that	  
phenomena	  are	  ‘objective’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  having	  an	  existence	  and	  form	  that	  is	  
independent	  from	  human	  cognition	  and	  language.	  When	  these	  scholars	  come	  to	  
criticise	  this	  assumption	  however,	  they	  reduce	  this	  to	  independence	  from	  language	  
alone,	  arguing	  against	  objective	  realism	  by	  denying	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  
apprehend	  phenomena	  ‘outside’	  language,	  and	  endorsing	  the	  general	  counter-­‐
assertion	  that	  the	  form	  of	  what	  we	  perceive	  or	  recognise	  is	  already	  shaped	  by	  the	  
form(s)	  of	  the	  language	  we	  use	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2000]:	  p.168;	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.7;	  
Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.85).	  The	  strongest	  form	  of	  this	  contention	  is	  expressed	  by	  Fierke	  in	  
her	  2010	  essay,	  where	  she	  writes:	  
	  
“The	  expression	  of	  emotion,	  no	  less	  than	  the	  identification	  of	  chairs	  and	  
tables,	  relies	  on	  customs,	  rules	  and	  institutions	  that	  precede	  the	  individual.	  
Neither	  the	  mental	  processes	  of	  individuals	  nor	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  exist	  
independent	  of	  this	  a	  priori	  language,	  which	  we	  are	  socialized	  into	  as	  we	  learn	  
to	  use	  language	  and	  thus	  become	  social	  beings.”	  (Fierke,	  2010a:	  p.85)	  	  
	  
Similarly,	  Kratochwil	  suggests	  that	  “what	  we	  recognise	  is	  always	  already	  organised	  
and	  formed	  by	  certain	  categorical	  and	  theoretical	  elements.	  Thus,	  Kant’s	  ‘thing	  in	  
itself’	  is	  ‘there’,	  but	  it	  is	  unrecognisable	  and	  as	  such	  uninteresting	  until	  and	  unless	  it	  is	  
brought	  under	  some	  description”	  (Kratochwil,	  2011	  [2000]:	  p.168).	  
	  
The	  risk	  with	  these	  arguments	  against	  objective	  realism	  is	  that	  they	  appear	  to	  involve	  
a	  commitment	  to	  a	  quite	  radical	  form	  of	  linguistic	  relativism,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  
language	  we	  use	  completely	  determines	  the	  form	  of	  what	  we	  can	  perceive	  and	  
recognise.	  In	  disciplines	  such	  as	  psychology,	  linguistics	  and	  anthropology,	  this	  idea	  is	  
commonly	  known	  as	  the	  ‘strong’	  version	  of	  the	  Sapir-­‐Whorf	  hypothesis,	  named	  after	  
two	  American	  linguists	  of	  the	  1930s	  –	  1950s	  (see	  e.g.	  Lund,	  2003:	  p.10).	  This	  
contention	  is	  problematic	  first	  and	  foremost	  because	  it	  implies	  that	  those	  without	  
language	  cannot	  perceive	  or	  recognise	  anything,	  which	  is	  manifestly	  false	  when	  we	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consider	  that	  non-­‐language-­‐using	  animals	  routinely	  detect,	  recognise	  and	  
discriminate	  between	  phenomena	  on	  a	  perceptual	  basis	  –	  such	  as	  when	  hawks	  see	  
the	  movement	  of	  mice	  in	  the	  grass,	  when	  squirrels	  revisit	  locations	  where	  they	  have	  
buried	  nuts,	  or	  when	  thrushes	  find	  convenient	  stones	  to	  crack	  a	  snail’s	  shell	  on.	  If	  it	  
were	  the	  case,	  as	  Fierke	  and	  Kratochwil	  allege,	  that	  distinct	  phenomena	  are	  not	  
‘recognisable’	  or	  do	  not	  ‘exist’	  as	  such	  independently	  of	  the	  linguistic	  practices	  into	  
which	  we	  as	  humans	  are	  socialised,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  for	  animals	  to	  
perform	  such	  tasks;	  and	  yet	  we	  only	  have	  to	  look	  out	  of	  the	  window	  to	  see	  animals	  
routinely	  engaging	  in	  activities	  which	  involve	  them.	  In	  addition,	  while	  there	  is	  a	  
certain	  amount	  of	  experimental	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  words	  involved	  in	  the	  
categorisation	  of	  perceptual	  phenomena	  –	  such	  as	  colour	  words	  –	  may	  influence	  the	  
speed	  and	  accuracy	  of	  tasks	  involving	  relevant	  perceptual	  judgements	  (e.g.	  Winawer	  
et	  al,	  2007),	  the	  recorded	  effects	  are,	  as	  McWhorter	  puts	  it,	  “distinctly	  subtle	  and,	  
overall,	  minor”	  (McWhorter,	  2014:	  p.xv),	  and	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  sound	  basis	  for	  the	  
vastly	  more	  general	  and	  vague	  speculation	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  language	  determines	  

















Chapter	  3	   Revisiting	  Wittgenstein’s	  Later	  Philosophy	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  2	  I	  critically	  examined	  a	  particular	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  and	  Fierke	  use	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  make	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  
to	  the	  study	  of	  International	  Relations	  (IR)	  which	  I	  call	  the	  ‘anti-­‐representationalist	  
objection’	  (ARO).	  While	  I	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  general	  direction	  of	  the	  ARO	  and	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  motivations	  for	  pursuing	  it,	  I	  highlighted	  some	  
specific	  problems	  and	  gaps	  in	  these	  scholars’	  reasoning	  which	  have	  the	  result	  that	  
the	  ARO	  does	  not	  fully	  support	  the	  conclusions	  that	  they	  seek	  to	  draw	  from	  it.	  	  
	  
Many	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  ARO	  that	  I	  identified	  in	  the	  last	  Chapter	  can	  be	  seen	  
to	  stem	  from	  inadequacies	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  account	  
for	  what	  they	  take	  to	  be	  the	  main	  target	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy;	  namely,	  
the	  representational	  view	  of	  language.	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  difficulties	  discussed	  
under	  Problem	  1,	  Problem	  2	  and	  Problem	  3	  in	  Section	  2.2	  of	  the	  last	  Chapter	  can	  all	  
be	  seen	  to	  arise	  largely	  because	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  provide	  inconsistent	  
and	  inconclusive	  accounts	  of	  what	  sort	  of	  thing	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  
is,	  what	  its	  commitments	  are,	  what	  the	  methodological	  justification	  is	  for	  claiming	  
that	  a	  given	  scholar	  is	  committed	  to	  this	  ‘view’,	  and	  how	  the	  criticisms	  that	  they	  
provide	  are	  meant	  to	  apply	  to	  accounts	  or	  approaches	  that	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  
committed	  to	  it.	  
	  
This	  being	  the	  case,	  a	  good	  first	  step	  to	  take	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  and	  how	  
later	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  might	  offer	  a	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  
the	  ARO,	  would	  be	  to	  re-­‐examine	  remarks	  of	  the	  PI	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke	  regard	  as	  being	  critical	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language.	  The	  focus	  of	  
this	  examination	  would	  be	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  what	  later	  Wittgenstein	  identifies	  as	  his	  
target(s)	  in	  these	  remarks,	  what	  sorts	  of	  criticisms	  he	  makes,	  what	  the	  
methodological	  basis	  of	  these	  criticisms	  is,	  and	  how	  he	  takes	  them	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  
work	  of	  other	  philosophers.	  This	  would	  then	  allow	  a	  comparison	  to	  be	  made	  between	  
the	  target(s)	  and	  manner	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  criticisms	  in	  the	  PI,	  and	  the	  sorts	  of	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criticisms	  employed	  by	  the	  ARO,	  with	  a	  special	  attention	  paid	  to	  aspects	  of	  the	  ARO	  
that	  I	  have	  previously	  identified	  as	  problematic.	  	  
	  
A	  sequence	  of	  remarks	  from	  the	  PI	  which	  is	  particularly	  appropriate	  for	  the	  purposes	  
of	  this	  Chapter	  is	  PI	  §§1-­‐5,	  where	  Wittgenstein	  critically	  investigates	  a	  ‘picture’	  of	  
language	  and	  a	  philosophical	  idea	  of	  meaning	  that	  he	  extracts	  from	  St	  Augustine’s	  
Confessions.	  I	  will	  proceed	  in	  the	  next	  section	  to	  offer	  a	  close	  re-­‐reading	  of	  the	  
remarks	  in	  question,	  followed	  by	  a	  reflection	  on	  what	  the	  implications	  are	  for	  
Wittgenstein’s	  potential	  to	  overcome	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  ARO.	  This	  
will	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  further	  discussion	  and	  investigation	  of	  some	  questions	  regarding	  
Wittgenstein’s	  approach	  in	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  which	  remain	  unanswered	  by	  my	  initial	  
interpretation,	  and	  which	  need	  to	  be	  settled	  in	  order	  to	  definitively	  see	  whether	  and	  
how	  Wittgenstein	  manages	  to	  overcome	  all	  of	  the	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  the	  ARO.	  
	  
At	  this	  point	  I	  should	  like	  to	  reiterate	  what	  I	  said	  in	  the	  introduction	  about	  my	  
approach:	  i.e.	  that	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  re-­‐interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
later	  philosophy	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  repair	  the	  ARO;	  nor	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  successful,	  
applications	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  must	  employ	  faithful	  interpretations	  of	  his	  
work.	  My	  rationale	  is	  simply	  that	  in	  my	  informed	  opinion	  as	  an	  interpreter	  of	  later	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy,	  a	  more	  textually	  and	  culturally	  sensitive	  reading	  of	  his	  
work	  can	  help	  us	  to	  craft	  an	  alternative	  mode	  of	  objection	  that	  not	  only	  avoids	  the	  
current	  problems	  with	  the	  ARO,	  but	  also	  yields	  more	  subtle	  and	  sophisticated	  ways	  to	  
criticise	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  	  
	  
3.1	   Wittgenstein’s	  Target	  in	  the	  Opening	  Remarks	  of	  the	  PI	  
	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  1	  and	  2,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  explicitly	  quotes	  PI	  §1	  as	  containing	  a	  summary	  
of	  the	  “picture	  of	  language”	  which	  she	  subsequently	  identifies	  with	  the	  
representational	  “view”	  of	  language	  that	  she	  claims	  is	  rejected	  by	  later	  Wittgenstein	  
in	  the	  PI	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  p.9).	  Meanwhile,	  Fierke	  implies	  that	  PI	  §1	  and	  §3	  contain	  a	  
paraphrase	  and	  rejection	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  when	  she	  cites	  
these	  remarks	  in	  support	  of	  her	  interpretation	  that	  according	  to	  later	  Wittgenstein	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“language	  use	  is	  a	  form	  of	  action	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  rather	  than	  merely	  a	  set	  of	  labels	  for	  
a	  world	  independent	  of	  us	  [i.e.	  as	  per	  the	  ‘picture	  view’	  of	  language]”	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  
p.337).	  Kratochwil	  does	  not	  explicitly	  cite	  any	  specific	  remarks	  from	  the	  PI	  in	  support	  
of	  his	  claim	  that	  later	  Wittgenstein	  was	  opposed	  to	  a	  ‘mirror’	  or	  ‘picture’	  view	  of	  
language;	  however,	  the	  fact	  that	  Kratochwil	  summarises	  the	  ‘mirror’	  view	  in	  terms	  
that	  are	  almost	  identical	  to	  the	  wording	  used	  by	  later	  Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §1(b)	  
strongly	  suggests	  that	  Kratochwil	  interprets	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  
Fierke	  (see	  e.g.	  Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.29).	  	  
	  
As	  well	  as	  interpreting	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  PI	  as	  involving	  the	  presentation	  and	  
criticism	  of	  a	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  are	  
also	  apparently	  committed	  to	  an	  interpretation	  according	  to	  which	  the	  alleged	  
paraphrases	  of	  this	  view	  contained	  in	  the	  opening	  remarks	  of	  the	  PI	  are	  also	  intended	  
to	  double	  up	  as	  summaries	  of	  the	  commitments	  of	  some	  actual	  philosophers	  who	  
they	  take	  to	  be	  the	  implied	  targets	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy.	  Thus	  Pin-­‐Fat	  
explicitly	  suggests	  that	  PI	  §1b	  serves	  to	  summarise	  a	  view	  that	  Wittgenstein	  
associates	  with	  Augustine,	  and	  which	  was	  presented	  by	  early	  Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  
Tractatus	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.79;	  2010:	  p.9);	  while	  Katochwil	  and	  Fierke	  imply	  that	  PI	  
§1b	  summarises	  a	  view	  of	  language	  that	  was	  assumed	  by	  early	  ‘analytic’	  philosophers	  
at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  20th	  Century	  –	  including	  Frege,	  Russell,	  G.E.	  Moore	  and	  early	  
Wittgenstein	  –	  and	  was	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  problems	  they	  encountered	  to	  do	  with	  
meaning	  and	  reference	  (see	  Fierke,	  2003:	  p.335,	  and	  Kratochwil,	  2001:	  p.	  20	  and	  
p.34).	  
	  
Thirdly,	  when	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  paraphrase	  what	  they	  take	  to	  be	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  
criticisms	  of	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language,	  they	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  suggests	  
that	  they	  interpret	  these	  criticisms	  as	  taking	  the	  form	  of	  specific	  counter-­‐claims	  or	  
counter-­‐examples	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  refute	  particular	  assumptions	  about	  language	  
to	  which	  adherents	  to	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  are	  allegedly	  
committed.	  So,	  for	  example,	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  2	  how	  Pin-­‐Fat	  interprets	  later	  
Wittgenstein	  as	  contradicting	  the	  “idea	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  the	  object	  …	  for	  
which	  it	  stands	  (names)”	  as	  she	  takes	  it	  to	  be	  summarised	  in	  PI	  §1,	  with	  the	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observation	  “that	  there	  are	  many	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  words	  are	  meaningful	  which	  
do	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  word-­‐object	  naming	  relation”	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  1997:	  p.80).	  	  
	  
The	  above	  features	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  interpretations	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  critical	  approach	  and	  strategy	  in	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  PI	  should	  be	  kept	  
in	  mind	  during	  the	  following	  discussion,	  since	  the	  interpretation	  which	  I	  will	  
recommend	  differs	  from	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  on	  all	  three	  points.	  According	  
to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  that	  I	  will	  present,	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  (a)	  identify	  
in	  these	  remarks	  a	  particular	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  as	  the	  object	  of	  his	  
criticism;	  (b)	  consider	  his	  paraphrases	  of	  the	  items	  he	  criticises	  to	  double	  up	  as	  
accurate	  summaries	  of	  the	  commitments	  of	  rival	  philosophers;	  or	  (c)	  intend	  his	  
criticisms	  to	  work	  as	  direct	  counter-­‐arguments	  against	  the	  published	  accounts	  or	  
claims	  of	  other	  philosophers.	  	  
	  
Prior	  to	  introducing	  my	  interpretation,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  précis	  of	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  to	  
remind	  the	  reader	  of	  what	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  in	  these	  passages,	  and	  also	  to	  provide	  
a	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  some	  of	  the	  more	  detailed	  observations	  that	  I	  am	  going	  to	  
make	  regarding	  specific	  wordings	  and	  other	  textual	  features	  of	  these	  remarks.	  	  
	  
Précis of PI §§1-5 
	  
Wittgenstein	  famously	  begins	  his	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  in	  PI	  §1(a)	  by	  quoting	  a	  
passage	  from	  St	  Augustine’s	  Confessions	  in	  which	  Augustine	  describes	  how	  he	  first	  
learnt	  to	  speak.109	  After	  quoting	  this	  passage,	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  “in	  [Augustine’s]	  
words	  we	  get	  …	  a	  particular	  picture	  [Bild]	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  human	  language”	  
according	  to	  which	  “the	  words	  in	  language	  name	  objects”	  and	  “sentences	  are	  
combinations	  of	  such	  names”	  (PI	  §1b).	  Wittgenstein	  furthermore	  suggests	  that	  “In	  
this	  picture	  of	  language	  we	  find	  [finden	  wir]	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  following	  idea	  [Idee]:	  
Every	  word	  has	  a	  meaning.	  This	  meaning	  is	  correlated	  with	  the	  word.	  It	  is	  the	  object	  
for	  which	  the	  word	  stands”	  (PI	  §1b).	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  some	  critical	  observations	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  rather,	  how	  he	  envisages	  this	  to	  have	  taken	  place.	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regarding	  Augustine’s	  approach	  to	  providing	  his	  description	  (PI	  §1c),	  and	  then	  
instructs	  the	  reader	  to	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  of	  language-­‐use	  between	  a	  shopkeeper	  
and	  a	  customer	  who	  wants	  to	  buy	  some	  apples	  (PI	  §1d).	  
	  
In	  PI	  §2	  Wittgenstein	  states	  “That	  philosophical	  concept	  [Begriff]	  of	  meaning	  is	  at	  
home	  in	  a	  primitive	  conception	  [Vorstellung]	  of	  the	  way	  language	  functions.	  But	  one	  
might	  instead	  say	  that	  it	  is	  the	  imagining	  [Vorstellung]	  of	  a	  language	  more	  primitive	  
than	  ours”	  (PI	  §2a).	  Wittgenstein	  then	  invites	  the	  reader	  to	  “imagine	  a	  language	  for	  
which	  the	  description	  given	  by	  Augustine	  is	  correct”	  (PI	  §2b),	  and	  proceeds	  to	  
describe	  an	  imaginary	  language	  used	  by	  a	  builder	  and	  his	  assistant	  consisting	  of	  just	  
four	  words	  for	  types	  of	  building	  stones.	  Wittgenstein	  instructs	  the	  reader	  to	  
“Conceive	  of	  this	  as	  a	  complete	  primitive	  language”	  (PI	  §2b).	  	  
	  
In	  PI	  §3	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  that	  what	  Augustine	  describes	  is	  a	  “system	  of	  
communication”,	  but	  that	  not	  everything	  we	  call	  language	  is	  included	  in	  this	  system.	  
Thus	  Augustine’s	  description	  is	  appropriate	  for	  a	  “narrowly	  circumscribed	  area”	  of	  
what	  we	  call	  language	  but	  “not	  for	  the	  whole”	  of	  what	  Augustine	  is	  purporting	  to	  
describe	  (PI	  §3a).	  Wittgenstein	  compares	  Augustine	  to	  someone	  who	  tries	  to	  define	  
‘playing	  a	  game’	  with	  a	  definition	  that	  is	  only	  really	  appropriate	  for	  board	  games	  (PI	  
§3b).	  	  
	  
In	  PI	  §4	  Wittgenstein	  instructs	  the	  reader	  to	  imagine	  an	  example	  of	  someone	  
providing	  an	  over-­‐simple	  description	  of	  the	  use	  of	  a	  script,	  which	  is	  designed	  to	  
further	  illustrate	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  “Augustine’s	  conception	  [Auffassung]	  of	  
language”	  is	  “over-­‐simple”	  (PI	  §4).	  
	  
In	  PI	  §5	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  that	  from	  the	  example	  in	  PI	  §1,	  one	  may	  “get	  an	  idea	  
of	  how	  much	  the	  general	  concept	  [Begriff]	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  surrounds	  the	  
working	  of	  language	  with	  a	  haze	  which	  makes	  clear	  vision	  impossible”	  (PI	  §5a).	  
Wittgenstein	  proposes	  that	  “It	  disperses	  the	  fog	  if	  we	  study	  the	  phenomena	  of	  
language	  in	  primitive	  kinds	  of	  use	  in	  which	  one	  can	  clearly	  survey	  the	  purpose	  and	  
functioning	  of	  the	  words”	  (PI	  §5b).	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Interpretation of PI §§1-5 
	  
As	  I	  noted	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  apparently	  interpret	  
Wittgenstein’s	  purpose	  in	  the	  opening	  remarks	  of	  the	  PI	  as	  being	  to	  introduce	  and	  
criticise	  his	  main	  target,	  which	  they	  take	  to	  be	  the	  representational	  view	  of	  language.	  
According	  to	  such	  an	  interpretation,	  the	  extract	  from	  Augustine’s	  Confessions	  quoted	  
by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §1a,	  along	  with	  the	  ‘picture’	  and	  ‘idea’	  that	  Wittgenstein	  
outlines	  in	  PI	  §1b,	  are	  all	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  one	  coextensive	  summary	  of	  a	  
single	  problematic	  ‘view’	  to	  which	  later	  Wittgenstein	  was	  allegedly	  opposed.	  
However,	  as	  several	  previous	  interpreters	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  have	  
pointed	  out,	  there	  are	  actually	  some	  subtle	  but	  important	  distinctions	  registered	  by	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §1	  that	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  such	  an	  interpretation.	  	  
	   	  
So,	  for	  example,	  David	  Stern	  acknowledges	  that	  for	  “many	  philosophers,	  §1b	  
provides	  a	  clear	  outline	  of	  the	  mistaken	  view	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  language	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  finds	  in	  Augustine,	  a	  view	  that	  is	  presupposed	  in	  §1a,	  and	  that	  forms	  
one	  of	  the	  principal	  targets	  in	  what	  follows”	  (Stern,	  2004:	  p.76).	  However,	  Stern	  
challenges	  such	  “black-­‐and-­‐white	  readings”110	  on	  two	  counts:	  firstly,	  by	  pointing	  out	  
that	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  the	  tentative	  qualification	  “it	  seems	  to	  me”	  when	  suggesting	  
that	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  outlined	  in	  PI	  §1b	  is	  present	  in	  Augustine’s	  words;	  and	  
secondly,	  by	  observing	  that	  Wittgenstein	  separates	  the	  ‘picture’	  and	  the	  ‘idea’	  
outlined	  in	  PI	  §1b	  with	  a	  “long	  double-­‐dash”	  which	  is	  typically	  used	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  
PI	  “to	  indicate	  either	  a	  change	  of	  topic,	  or	  a	  new	  voice”	  (Stern,	  2004:	  p.76).	  	  
	   	  
Stern	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  acknowledging	  the	  first	  distinction	  between	  the	  passage	  quoted	  
from	  Augustine	  in	  §1a,	  and	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  outlined	  in	  §1b.	  
Another	  feature	  that	  some	  other	  interpreters	  appeal	  to	  in	  arguing	  for	  this	  distinction	  
is	  that	  what	  Augustine	  writes	  about	  language-­‐learning	  in	  the	  quoted	  passage	  is	  
actually	  more	  sophisticated	  than	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  subsequently	  outlines;	  and	  that	  therefore,	  the	  latter	  cannot	  be	  
regarded	  as	  a	  straight	  summary	  of	  the	  former.	  Thus,	  as	  early	  as	  1976,	  Fogelin	  noted	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that	  the	  ‘picture’	  outlined	  in	  PI	  §1b	  is	  “more	  naïve	  than	  the	  view	  actually	  presented	  
by	  Augustine”	  (Fogelin,	  2001	  [1976]:	  p.109);	  while	  Fischer	  and	  Ammereller	  have	  more	  
recently	  contested	  that	  Augustine	  “says	  nothing	  of	  the	  sort	  in	  the	  passage	  
Wittgenstein	  quoted,	  and	  never	  claimed	  that,	  say,	  prepositions	  name	  objects”	  
(Fischer	  and	  Ammereller,	  2004:	  p.	  XIII).111	  
	  
Regarding	  the	  second	  distinction	  proposed	  by	  Stern,	  between	  the	  ‘picture’	  and	  ‘idea’	  
in	  PI	  §1b,	  Joachim	  Schulte	  also	  registers	  such	  a	  distinction	  when	  he	  observes	  that	  in	  
this	  paragraph	  Wittgenstein	  “is	  talking,	  not	  about	  one	  picture	  but	  about	  two	  things	  –	  
a	  ‘particular	  picture’	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  human	  language,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  an	  idea	  
which	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  that	  picture,	  on	  the	  other”	  (Schulte,	  2004:	  p.23).	  Schulte	  
appeals	  to	  some	  different	  textual	  evidence	  for	  this	  distinction	  from	  Stern,	  noting	  that	  
while	  the	  ‘picture’	  outlined	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  PI	  §1b	  is	  “vague	  and	  sketchy”,	  the	  
“idea”	  whose	  roots	  Wittgenstein	  locates	  in	  this	  ‘picture’	  is	  expressed	  with	  “full	  and	  
explicit	  generality”	  (Schulte,	  2004:	  p.23).	  What	  Schulte	  is	  alluding	  to	  here	  is	  that	  
whereas	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  outlined	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  PI	  §1b	  makes	  
unqualified	  references	  to	  ‘words’	  and	  ‘sentences’	  without	  explicitly	  specifying	  that	  
this	  is	  meant	  to	  include	  all	  words	  or	  all	  sentences,	  the	  ‘idea’	  of	  meaning	  that	  is	  
summarised	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  PI	  §1b	  contains	  the	  phrase	  “every	  word”	  and	  thus	  
explicitly	  indicates	  that	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  apply	  universally	  to	  all	  words.	  It	  is	  on	  this	  basis	  
that	  Schulte	  concludes	  that	  “Wittgenstein’s	  remarks	  in	  §1	  contain	  a	  distinction	  
between	  a	  sketchy	  picture	  conveyed	  by	  the	  quotation	  from	  Augustine	  and	  a	  [more	  
explicit	  and	  polished]	  idea	  rooted	  in	  that	  picture”	  (Schulte,	  2004:	  p.23).	  
	  
To	  the	  above	  we	  can	  add	  the	  observations	  that	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  a	  colon	  to	  
introduce	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  that	  he	  outlines	  in	  PI	  §1b	  (“…a	  
particular	  picture	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  human	  language.	  Namely	  this:”),	  and	  a	  separate	  
colon	  to	  introduce	  the	  subsequent	  ‘idea’	  of	  meaning	  (“…we	  find	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  
                                                
111	  By	  itself,	  this	  observation	  does	  not	  definitively	  establish	  that	  Wittgenstein	  intended	  there	  to	  be	  a	  
distinction	  between	  the	  passage	  he	  quotes	  from	  Augustine	  and	  the	  ‘picture’	  he	  outlines	  in	  PI	  §1b	  –	  
after	  all,	  Wittgenstein	  could	  have	  wrongly	  attributed	  something	  to	  Augustine	  that	  is	  not	  implied	  by	  
what	  Augustine	  writes.	  However,	  it	  does	  give	  a	  reason	  to	  be	  wary	  of	  assuming	  that	  Wittgenstein	  
intends	  the	  ‘picture’	  in	  PI	  §1b	  to	  be	  a	  straight	  summary	  of	  Augustine’s	  commitments,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
an	  explicit	  indication	  by	  Wittgenstein	  that	  this	  is	  his	  intention.	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following	  idea:”);112	  and	  that	  he	  employs	  a	  metaphor	  of	  growth	  to	  characterise	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  ‘picture’	  and	  ‘idea’,	  stating	  that	  the	  latter	  has	  its	  “roots”	  in	  
the	  former.	  These	  observations	  add	  extra	  support	  to	  the	  textual	  argument	  for	  the	  
second	  distinction	  –	  already	  identified	  by	  Stern	  and	  Schulte	  –	  between	  the	  ‘picture’	  
and	  the	  ‘idea’	  that	  Wittgenstein	  outlines	  in	  PI	  §1b.	  
	  
So	  far,	  then,	  we	  have	  the	  following	  evidence	  of	  two	  distinctions	  marked	  by	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §1:	  
	  
• Distinction	  1:	   Augustine’s	  description	  versus	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  finds	  in	  it	  
	  
o Wittgenstein	  uses	  the	  qualification	  “it	  seems	  to	  me”	  when	  suggesting	  
that	  we	  find	  the	  ‘picture’	  in	  Augustine’s	  words	  (Stern,	  2004:	  p.76).	  
o What	  Augustine	  writes	  about	  language	  in	  the	  quoted	  passage	  is	  more	  
sophisticated	  than	  the	  ‘picture’	  outlined	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §1b,	  and	  
does	  not	  state	  or	  imply	  the	  same	  assumptions	  about	  language	  
(Fogelin,	  2001	  [1976]:	  p.109;	  Fischer	  and	  Ammereller,	  2004:	  p.	  XIII).	  
o Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  Augustine’s	  description	  is	  equivalent	  
to	  the	  ‘picture’	  that	  he	  finds	  in	  this	  description.	  
	  
• Distinction	  2:	  The	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  vs.	  the	  ‘idea’	  of	  meaning	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  suggests	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  this	  picture	  
	  
o Wittgenstein	  uses	  a	  long	  double-­‐dash	  [⎯]	  to	  separate	  the	  ‘picture’	  
and	  ‘idea’	  he	  outlines	  in	  PI	  §1b	  (Stern,	  2004:	  p.76).	  
o The	  ‘picture’	  outlined	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  PI	  §1b	  is	  “vague	  and	  sketchy”,	  
while	  the	  “idea”	  whose	  roots	  Wittgenstein	  locates	  in	  this	  ‘picture’	  is	  
expressed	  with	  “full	  and	  explicit	  generality”	  (Schulte,	  2004:	  p.23).	  
o Wittgenstein	  uses	  separate	  colons	  to	  introduce	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  the	  
essence	  of	  language	  and	  the	  subsequent	  ‘idea’	  of	  meaning	  in	  PI	  §1b.	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  PI	  §1,	  my	  emphasis.	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o Wittgenstein	  uses	  a	  metaphor	  of	  growth	  to	  characterise	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  ‘picture’	  and	  ‘idea’	  outlined	  in	  PI	  §1b,	  
thereby	  implying	  that	  although	  they	  are	  related	  they	  are	  not	  the	  same	  
thing.	  
	  
In	  my	  opinion,	  the	  above	  observations	  provide	  ample	  evidence	  that	  Wittgenstein	  
distinguishes	  in	  the	  opening	  remark	  of	  the	  PI	  between	  three	  items:	  (1)	  the	  
description	  of	  language-­‐learning	  that	  he	  quotes	  from	  Augustine’s	  Confessions,	  (2)	  the	  
‘picture’	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  that	  he	  extracts	  from	  this	  description,	  and	  (3)	  the	  
‘idea’	  of	  meaning	  that	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  ‘has	  its	  roots’	  in	  this	  picture.	  Since	  these	  
distinctions	  preclude	  reading	  the	  first	  two	  paragraphs	  of	  PI	  §1	  as	  a	  continuous	  
summary	  of	  one	  item,	  their	  presence	  implies	  that	  later	  Wittgenstein	  is	  doing	  
something	  more	  complex	  in	  PI	  §§1a-­‐b	  than	  introducing	  and	  summarising	  a	  mistaken	  
‘view’	  of	  language	  which	  will	  become	  the	  prime	  target	  of	  his	  subsequent	  criticisms,	  as	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  suggest.	  	  
	  
Moving	  on	  now	  to	  consider	  the	  criticisms	  themselves,	  the	  first	  critical	  comment	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  makes	  in	  the	  PI	  is	  that	  “Augustine	  does	  not	  speak	  of	  any	  differences	  
between	  types	  of	  words”	  (PI	  §1c).	  In	  light	  of	  the	  previous	  discussion,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  
this	  comment	  is	  not	  aimed	  directly	  at	  the	  ‘picture’	  or	  ‘idea’	  that	  Wittgenstein	  outlines	  
in	  PI	  §1b,	  but	  rather	  at	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Augustine	  describes	  language-­‐learning	  in	  the	  
passage	  quoted	  in	  PI	  §1a.	  Furthermore,	  the	  criticism	  that	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  is	  not	  
of	  a	  positive	  claim	  or	  statement	  that	  Augustine	  makes	  in	  this	  passage,	  but	  of	  an	  
omission;	  that	  is,	  Augustine’s	  failure	  to	  explicitly	  mention	  differences	  between	  types	  
of	  words.	  Wittgenstein	  then	  goes	  further	  to	  suggest	  that	  “whoever	  describes	  
language-­‐learning	  in	  this	  way	  is	  thinking,	  so	  I	  want	  to	  believe,	  primarily	  of	  nouns	  like	  
‘table’,	  ‘chair’,	  ‘loaf’,	  and	  of	  people’s	  names,	  and	  only	  secondarily	  of	  the	  names	  of	  
certain	  actions	  and	  properties;	  and	  of	  the	  remaining	  kinds	  of	  word	  as	  something	  that	  
will	  take	  care	  of	  itself”	  (PI	  §1c).	  This	  implies	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  identifying	  
Augustine’s	  failure	  to	  mention	  different	  word-­‐types	  as	  a	  potentially	  problematic	  
feature	  of	  the	  latter’s	  description,	  Wittgenstein	  also	  interprets	  it	  as	  symptomatic	  of	  a	  
further	  problem	  to	  do	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  someone	  who	  offers	  such	  a	  description	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is	  thinking	  about	  their	  subject	  matter.	  Specifically,	  the	  kind	  of	  problem	  which	  
Wittgenstein	  characterises	  is	  one	  of	  bias,	  whereby	  someone	  who	  purportedly	  sets	  
out	  to	  think	  generally	  about	  some	  phenomena	  (in	  this	  case,	  language-­‐learning)	  
concentrates	  their	  attention	  on	  a	  narrow	  range	  of	  examples	  of	  a	  certain	  type,	  e.g.	  
names	  and	  nouns,	  while	  giving	  lesser	  or	  no	  consideration	  to	  other	  equally	  deserving	  
cases.	  We	  should	  note	  that	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  make	  the	  strong	  claim	  that	  
Augustine	  was	  definitely	  thinking	  about	  language	  in	  this	  biased	  way,	  and	  qualifies	  his	  
suggestion	  with	  the	  phrase	  “so	  I	  want	  to	  believe”	  [so	  möchte	  ich	  glauben]	  (PI	  §1c).	  
Another	  point	  to	  note	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  at	  this	  stage	  say	  precisely	  what	  
he	  thinks	  the	  problem	  is	  with	  either	  (a)	  Augustine’s	  failure	  to	  mention	  different	  types	  
of	  words	  in	  his	  description,	  and	  (b)	  the	  biased	  way	  of	  thinking	  that	  Wittgenstein	  
surmises	  that	  someone	  who	  gives	  such	  a	  description	  is	  engaged	  in.	  This	  is	  something	  
that	  unfolds	  in	  subsequent	  remarks.	  
	  
The	  next	  apparently	  critical	  comment	  comes	  at	  the	  start	  of	  PI	  §2,	  where	  Wittgenstein	  
writes:	  “That	  philosophical	  concept	  [Begriff]	  of	  meaning	  is	  at	  home	  in	  a	  primitive	  
conception	  [Vorstellung]	  of	  the	  way	  language	  functions.”	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  
word	  “that”	  [Jener]	  indicates	  to	  the	  reader	  that	  he	  is	  referring	  back	  to	  something	  that	  
has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  in	  PI	  §1.	  Out	  of	  the	  three	  items	  introduced	  by	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §1,	  the	  most	  likely	  candidate	  for	  what	  Wittgenstein	  is	  referring	  
back	  to	  as	  “that	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  meaning”,	  is	  the	  ‘idea’	  [Idee]	  outlined	  in	  the	  
latter	  half	  of	  PI	  §1b	  that	  every	  word	  has	  a	  meaning	  which	  is	  correlated	  with	  the	  word,	  
and	  is	  the	  object	  for	  which	  the	  word	  stands	  (PI	  §1b).	  Meanwhile	  the	  German	  word	  
Vorstellung,	  which	  I	  have	  translated	  as	  ‘conception’,	  can	  also	  mean	  ‘imagination’/	  
‘picture’/	  ‘image’,	  and	  thus	  has	  a	  connotative	  association	  with	  the	  word	  Bild	  which	  
Wittgenstein	  uses	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  PI	  §1b	  when	  outlining	  the	  “picture	  [Bild]	  of	  the	  
essence	  of	  human	  language”	  that	  he	  finds	  in	  Augustine’s	  description.	  This	  provides	  
some	  basis	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  “primitive	  Vorstellung”	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  
suggests	  that	  the	  “philosophical	  concept	  [Begriff]	  of	  meaning	  has	  its	  place”	  is	  either	  
the	  same	  as,	  or	  continuous	  with,	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  human	  language	  in	  
which	  Wittgenstein	  previously	  stated	  that	  this	  concept	  has	  its	  ‘roots’.	  This	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interpretation	  is	  strengthened	  by	  the	  agreement	  of	  the	  metaphors	  of	  ‘having	  its	  roots	  
in’	  and	  ‘having	  its	  place	  in’,	  which	  are	  used	  in	  PI	  §1b	  and	  PI	  §2a	  respectively.113	  
	  
If	  the	  above	  interpretation	  is	  correct	  –	  and,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  it	  appears	  plausible	  –	  
then	  the	  first	  line	  of	  PI	  §2a	  would	  to	  some	  extent	  be	  a	  restatement	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
contention	  in	  PI	  §1b,	  that	  the	  ‘idea’	  of	  meaning	  outlined	  at	  the	  end	  of	  PI	  §1b	  has	  its	  
roots	  in	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  outlined	  in	  the	  first	  half.	  However,	  if	  
we	  read	  the	  first	  line	  of	  PI	  §2a	  in	  this	  way,	  then	  we	  have	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  it	  is	  a	  
somewhat	  modified	  restatement	  of	  PI	  §1b,	  since	  there	  are	  some	  small	  but	  potentially	  
significant	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  passages	  in	  terms	  of	  phrasing.	  For	  example,	  
as	  Joachim	  Schulte	  has	  noted,	  the	  ‘Bild’	  mentioned	  in	  PI	  §1b	  is	  said	  to	  be	  of	  “the	  
essence	  of	  human	  language”,	  whereas	  the	  ‘Vorstellung’	  in	  PI	  §2a	  is	  of	  “the	  way	  
language	  functions”	  (Schulte,	  2004:	  p.25).	  Another	  difference	  is	  that	  the	  ‘concept	  of	  
meaning’	  Wittgenstein	  refers	  to	  at	  the	  start	  of	  PI	  §2a	  as	  being	  at	  home	  in	  a	  primitive	  
Vorstellung	  of	  how	  language	  functions,	  is	  identified	  there	  as	  a	  “philosophical”	  
concept	  –	  an	  epithet	  which	  is	  not	  used	  to	  characterise	  the	  ‘idea’	  that	  is	  said	  in	  PI	  §1b	  
to	  have	  its	  ‘roots’	  in	  the	  Bild	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  human	  language.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  
Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “primitive”	  in	  PI	  §2a	  to	  characterise	  the	  Vorstellung	  in	  
which	  this	  ‘concept’	  has	  its	  place,	  which	  likewise	  is	  not	  used	  previously	  in	  connection	  
with	  the	  Bild	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  introduced	  in	  PI	  §1b.	  	  
	  
These	  differences	  in	  the	  phraseology	  of	  PI	  §2a	  compared	  with	  that	  of	  PI	  §1b	  can	  be	  
seen	  as	  elaborations	  which	  serve	  to	  provide	  the	  reader	  with	  additional	  information	  
concerning	  Wittgenstein’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  Bild	  and	  Idee	  that	  he	  previously	  
introduced,	  and	  of	  their	  interrelation.	  This	  information	  includes	  the	  following	  
judgements:	  (1)	  that	  the	  ‘picture’	  [Bild]	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  human	  language	  outlined	  in	  
PI	  §1b	  either	  amounts	  to	  –	  or	  is	  part	  of	  –	  a	  ‘conception’	  or	  ‘imagination’	  [Vorstellung]	  
of	  the	  way	  that	  language	  functions;	  (2)	  that	  this	  ‘picture’	  and/or	  ‘conception’	  is	  
“primitive”	  in	  character;	  and	  (3)	  that	  the	  ‘idea’	  [Idee]	  that	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  this	  ‘picture’	  
is	  moreover	  a	  “philosophical	  concept	  [philosophische	  Begriff]	  of	  meaning”.	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  It	  is	  further	  supported	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  a	  later	  remark,	  PI	  §59,	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  the	  phrases	  
bestimmtes	  Bild	  and	  bestimmte	  Vorstellung	  interchangeably	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  “particular	  picture”	  that	  
names	  signify	  “only	  what	  is	  an	  element	  of	  reality”.	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So,	  what	  does	  Wittgenstein	  mean	  by	  calling	  the	  conception	  of	  language	  mentioned	  in	  
PI	  §2a	  “primitive”?	  One	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  ‘primitive’	  which	  some	  scholars	  have	  
focused	  on	  when	  interpreting	  the	  first	  line	  of	  PI	  §2a	  is	  ‘simplistic’	  or	  ‘overly	  simple’	  
(e.g.	  Schulte,	  2004:	  p.24).	  That	  Wittgenstein	  intended	  to	  evoke	  this	  meaning	  of	  the	  
word	  ‘primitive’	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  conception	  of	  language	  mentioned	  in	  PI	  §2a	  is	  
supported	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  later	  on	  in	  PI	  §4	  Wittgenstein	  refers	  to	  “Augustine’s	  
conception	  of	  language”	  as	  “over-­‐simplifed”	  [zu	  einfachen].	  As	  Schulte	  and	  others	  
have	  observed,	  this	  sense	  of	  ‘primitive’	  can	  also	  have	  a	  “pejorative	  shade”	  when	  
applied	  to	  someone’s	  approach	  or	  way	  of	  thinking,	  since	  it	  implies	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  
“too	  simple	  in	  a	  way	  which	  might	  warrant	  the	  inference	  that	  [the	  person	  concerned]	  
is	  not	  particularly	  bright”	  (Schulte,	  2004:	  p.24).	  However,	  this	  implication	  is	  not	  
necessarily	  intended	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	  remarks	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  
PI.	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  suggesting	  that	  the	  picture	  or	  conception	  of	  language	  summarised	  in	  PI	  
§1b	  is	  ‘over-­‐simple’,	  some	  scholars	  have	  proposed	  that	  by	  using	  the	  word	  ‘primitive’	  
Wittgenstein	  meant	  to	  imply	  that	  this	  picture	  is	  characteristic	  of	  an	  early	  stage	  in	  the	  
course	  of	  an	  individual’s	  thought	  or	  reflection	  upon	  some	  subject	  matter	  which	  
precedes	  their	  formulation	  of	  overtly	  philosophical	  concepts,	  such	  as	  a	  philosophical	  
concept	  of	  meaning.	  Baker	  and	  Hacker	  express	  this	  interpretation,	  though	  somewhat	  
obliquely,	  when	  they	  refer	  to	  the	  picture	  outlined	  in	  PI	  §1b	  as	  a	  “pre-­‐theoretical	  
picture”	  (Baker	  and	  Hacker,	  2005	  [1980]	  a:	  p.1).	  This	  reading	  is	  supported	  firstly	  by	  
Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  a	  metaphor	  of	  growth	  (‘has	  its	  roots	  in’)	  to	  characterise	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  ‘picture’	  and	  ‘idea’	  in	  PI	  §1b,	  thus	  suggesting	  that	  the	  
former	  precedes	  and	  is	  less	  developed	  than	  the	  latter;	  and	  secondly,	  by	  Schulte’s	  
observation	  that	  the	  ‘picture’	  summarised	  in	  PI	  §1b	  is	  “vague	  and	  sketchy”,	  in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  “full	  and	  explicit	  generality”	  of	  the	  subsequent	  ‘idea’	  which	  
Wittgenstein	  refers	  back	  to	  as	  a	  ‘philosophical	  concept’	  (Schulte,	  2004:	  p.23).	  	  
	  
In	  summary:	  there	  is	  textual	  evidence	  to	  support	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  first	  line	  of	  
PI	  §2a	  as	  proposing	  that	  the	  ‘idea’	  outlined	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  PI	  §1b	  is	  a	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“philosophical	  concept”	  which	  has	  its	  place	  in	  a	  ‘primitive’	  picture	  or	  conception	  of	  
the	  way	  language	  functions;	  and	  that	  this	  picture/	  conception	  is	  ‘primitive’	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  it	  is	  (a)	  simplistic	  compared	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  capture,	  and	  
(b)	  characteristic	  of	  a	  pre-­‐philosophical	  stage	  in	  a	  person’s	  reflection	  upon	  some	  
subject	  matter,	  prior	  to	  their	  formulation	  of	  a	  philosophical	  concept.	  	  
	  
Progressing	  now	  to	  the	  second	  line	  of	  PI	  §2a,	  Wittgenstein	  continues:	  “But	  one	  might	  
instead	  say	  that	  [this	  primitive	  conception	  of	  language]	  is	  the	  conception	  of	  a	  
language	  that	  is	  more	  primitive	  than	  ours”	  (PI	  §2a).	  Here	  Wittgenstein	  is	  suggesting	  
that	  we	  can	  shift	  from	  viewing	  the	  relevant	  conception	  of	  language	  as	  a	  primitive	  
conception	  of	  something	  that	  is	  not	  primitive	  (the	  workings	  of	  our	  language),	  to	  
viewing	  it	  as	  a	  conception	  of	  a	  language	  that	  is	  more	  primitive	  than	  our	  own.	  The	  
German	  words	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  for	  ‘conception’	  and	  ‘primitive’	  in	  this	  line	  are	  
Vorstellung	  and	  primitiven,	  which	  are	  the	  same	  words	  used	  in	  the	  previous	  line	  to	  
refer	  to	  the	  ‘primitive	  conception’	  of	  how	  language	  functions	  in	  which	  the	  
philosophical	  concept	  of	  meaning	  had	  its	  roots.	  The	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  next	  paragraph	  
Wittgenstein	  introduces	  an	  example	  of	  a	  fictional	  primitive	  language	  as	  one	  “for	  
which	  the	  description	  given	  by	  Augustine	  is	  correct”	  implies	  that	  this	  second	  usage	  of	  
the	  word	  Vorstellung	  is	  meant	  to	  carry	  its	  connotation	  of	  ‘imagination’	  in	  addition	  to	  
that	  of	  ‘conception’.114	  Schulte	  has	  also	  rightly	  observed	  that	  “the	  second	  occurrence	  
of	  ‘primitive’	  [in	  PI	  §2a]	  does	  not	  carry	  the	  same	  [negative]	  connotation	  that	  the	  first	  
occurrence	  can”	  (Schulte,	  2004:	  p.24),	  since	  in	  the	  second	  line	  of	  PI	  §2a	  the	  quality	  of	  
‘primitiveness’	  is	  no	  longer	  being	  attributed	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  language	  in	  which	  
the	  philosophical	  concept	  [Begriff]	  of	  meaning	  outlined	  in	  PI	  §1b	  has	  its	  place;	  but	  
rather	  to	  an	  imaginary	  language	  for	  which	  this	  conception	  of	  language	  would	  be	  
fitting.	  	  
	  
The	  imaginary	  language	  that	  Wittgenstein	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  
‘primitive’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  relatively	  simple	  in	  comparison	  to	  actual	  human	  
language,	  in	  the	  following	  ways:	  
                                                
114	  This	  adds	  further	  credibility	  to	  observing	  a	  distinction	  in	  the	  opening	  remarks	  of	  the	  PI	  between	  
that	  which	  is	  characterised	  using	  the	  words	  ‘Idee’	  and	  ‘Begriff’,	  and	  that	  which	  is	  characterised	  using	  
the	  words	  ‘Bild’	  and	  ‘Vorstellung’.	  
 116  
(1) It	  only	  has	  four	  words	  (‘block’,	  ‘pillar’,	  ‘slab’	  and	  ‘beam’);	  in	  contrast	  to	  
existing	  natural	  languages,	  which	  have	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  
words	  apiece.115	  
(2) There	  are	  only	  two	  people	  who	  use	  the	  language:	  a	  speaker	  (builder	  A)	  
and	  a	  responder	  (assistant	  B).	  
(3) There	  is	  only	  one	  social	  context	  in	  which	  language	  is	  used,	  i.e.	  ‘building	  
with	  building	  stones’.	  
(4) There	  is	  apparently	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  word,	  and	  only	  one	  kind	  way	  in	  
which	  the	  words	  function:	  A	  calls	  a	  word	  out,	  and	  B	  brings	  the	  relevant	  
building	  stone.	  	  	  
	  
Altogether,	  the	  implication	  of	  PI	  §2	  is	  this:	  that	  either	  we	  can	  think	  of	  Augustine’s	  
description	  of	  language	  –	  and	  by	  extension,	  the	  conception	  of	  language	  in	  which	  the	  
concept	  of	  meaning	  in	  PI	  §1b	  has	  its	  place	  –	  as	  a	  staggeringly	  over-­‐simplified	  attempt	  
to	  grasp	  the	  hugely	  complex	  phenomenon	  that	  we	  call	  ‘language’;	  or	  we	  can	  think	  of	  
it	  as	  an	  adequate	  portrait	  of	  some	  less	  complicated	  phenomenon	  which	  resembles	  
what	  we	  call	  ‘language’	  to	  some	  extent,	  but	  is	  much	  simpler	  in	  the	  relevant	  ways	  
mentioned	  above.	  This	  interpretation	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  next	  remark,	  when	  
Wittgenstein	  writes	  that	  Augustine	  “does	  describe	  a	  system	  of	  communication;	  only	  
not	  everything	  we	  call	  language	  is	  encompassed	  by	  this	  description”	  (PI	  §3a).	  In	  this	  
remark,	  Wittgenstein	  offers	  us	  a	  third	  possible	  way	  of	  thinking	  of	  Augustine’s	  
description	  and	  the	  associated	  conception	  of	  language:	  namely,	  as	  being	  appropriate	  
for	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  what	  we	  call	  language.	  He	  writes:	  
	  
“And	  one	  must	  say	  in	  so	  many	  cases	  where	  the	  question	  arises	  ‘Is	  this	  
representation	  [Darstellung]	  suitable	  or	  unsuitable?’,	  the	  answer	  is:	  ‘Yes,	  but	  
only	  for	  this	  narrowly	  circumscribed	  area,	  not	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  what	  you	  were	  
purporting	  to	  describe.”	  
	  
So	  far,	  then,	  Wittgenstein	  has	  offered	  his	  reader	  three	  alternative	  ways	  of	  thinking	  of	  
Augustine’s	  description	  quoted	  in	  PI	  §1a:	  	  
                                                




• As	  an	  over-­‐simplistic	  description	  of	  how	  language	  functions;	  
• As	  a	  description	  of	  a	  (fictional)	  ‘primitive’	  language,	  which	  is	  much	  simpler	  
and	  less	  complex	  than	  what	  we	  call	  ‘language’;	  
• As	  a	  description	  that	  purports	  to	  be	  of	  ‘language’	  in	  general,	  but	  is	  only	  really	  
appropriate	  for	  a	  small	  part	  of	  what	  we	  call	  ‘language’.	  	  	  
	  
Likewise,	  Wittgenstein	  has	  also	  offered	  the	  following	  two	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  
‘primitive’	  conception	  or	  image	  of	  how	  language	  functions,	  in	  which	  he	  suggested	  
that	  the	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  meaning	  in	  PI	  §1b	  has	  its	  place:	  
	  
• As	  an	  over-­‐simplistic	  and/or	  pre-­‐philosophical	  conception	  of	  how	  language	  
functions;	  
• As	  the	  imagining	  of	  a	  language	  (or	  language-­‐like	  phenomenon)	  that	  is	  much	  
simpler	  than	  what	  we	  call	  ‘language’.	  
	  
In	  the	  second	  paragraph	  of	  PI	  §3	  Wittgenstein	  compares	  Augustine	  to	  someone	  who	  
purports	  to	  describe	  ‘games’	  in	  general,	  but	  offers	  a	  description	  which	  is	  only	  really	  
appropriate	  for	  board	  games.	  Extrapolating	  from	  this	  example	  and	  the	  previous	  
paragraph,	  we	  can	  draw	  the	  conclusion	  that	  what	  Wittgenstein	  finds	  primarily	  
objectionable	  about	  Augustine’s	  description	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  that	  it	  purports	  to	  apply	  
to	  more	  cases	  than	  it	  is	  actually	  appropriate	  for.	  In	  the	  last	  line	  of	  this	  remark,	  
Wittgenstein	  provides	  what	  he	  apparently	  considers	  to	  be	  a	  remedy	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  
problem	  when	  he	  suggests	  that	  such	  a	  description	  can	  be	  ‘rectified’	  by	  “expressly	  
restricting”	  it	  to	  those	  cases	  for	  which	  it	  is	  suitable.	  	  
	  	  
Skipping	  now	  to	  PI	  §5,	  there	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  “If	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  example	  in	  §1,	  
one	  can	  perhaps	  get	  an	  idea	  of	  how	  much	  the	  general	  concept	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  
word	  surrounds	  the	  working	  of	  language	  with	  a	  haze	  which	  makes	  clear	  vision	  
impossible.”	  One	  might	  assume	  that	  the	  ‘example’	  Wittgenstein	  is	  referring	  to	  in	  this	  
sentence	  is	  the	  imaginary	  scenario	  of	  ‘going	  to	  the	  grocers’	  that	  he	  described	  in	  PI	  
§1d.	  However,	  it	  is	  equally	  possible	  that	  Wittgenstein	  is	  referring	  here	  to	  the	  idea	  of	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meaning	  outlined	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  PI	  §1b	  as	  an	  ‘example’	  of	  a	  general	  
philosophical	  concept	  of	  meaning;	  or	  even	  to	  the	  whole	  sequence	  charted	  in	  PI	  §1a-­‐b	  
as	  an	  ‘example’	  of	  how	  someone	  might	  arrive	  at	  a	  general	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  
meaning,	  which	  illustrates	  how	  such	  a	  concept	  can	  come	  to	  surround	  the	  working	  of	  
language	  with	  a	  haze.	  	  
	  
Likewise,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  by	  ‘the	  general	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  the	  meaning	  
of	  a	  word’	  Wittgenstein	  is	  referring	  specifically	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  meaning	  outlined	  in	  PI	  
§1(b),	  that	  ‘every	  word	  has	  a	  meaning	  with	  which	  it	  is	  correlated,	  which	  is	  the	  object	  
for	  which	  it	  stands’.	  However,	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  is	  strange	  that	  Wittgenstein	  
uses	  the	  pronoun	  ‘the’	  to	  identify	  this	  concept,	  as	  opposed	  to	  referring	  to	  it	  as	  ‘this’	  
or	  ‘that’	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  meaning	  –	  especially	  when	  Wittgenstein	  has	  
previously	  referred	  back	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  meaning	  in	  PI	  §1b	  as	  “that	  [jener]	  
philosophical	  concept	  of	  meaning”	  (PI	  §2a).	  In	  this	  light,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  by	  “the	  
general	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word”	  in	  PI	  §5	  Wittgenstein	  is	  
referring	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  ‘word-­‐meaning’	  is	  a	  cohesive	  phenomenon	  of	  which	  a	  
universal	  account	  or	  definition	  can	  be	  provided.	  	  
	  
Something	  else	  that	  is	  important	  to	  notice	  about	  PI	  §5	  is	  that	  what	  Wittgenstein	  
identifies	  as	  problematic	  about	  the	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  word-­‐meaning	  is	  that	  it	  
prevents	  us	  from	  having	  a	  clear	  vision	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  language.	  As	  with	  
Wittgenstein’s	  previous	  critical	  remarks,	  we	  have	  to	  recognise	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  
the	  tone	  and	  implications	  of	  this	  criticism	  in	  contrast	  with	  other	  more	  familiar	  critical	  
strategies.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  unlike	  a	  direct	  contradiction,	  Wittgenstein’s	  criticism	  is	  by	  
contrast	  a	  much	  gentler	  caution	  concerning	  the	  obstructive	  effect	  that	  a	  concept	  has	  
upon	  one’s	  ability	  to	  observe	  and	  think	  clearly	  about	  the	  phenomena	  at	  hand.	  Also	  
unlike	  a	  direct	  contradiction,	  Wittgenstein’s	  criticism	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  there	  could	  
be	  a	  ‘correct’	  general	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  word	  meaning	  to	  replace	  the	  concept	  
that	  is	  being	  criticised.	  In	  this	  way	  we	  can	  start	  to	  see	  how	  Wittgenstein	  might	  avoid	  
the	  problems	  I	  identified	  with	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  replacement	  of	  a	  
general	  representational	  concept	  of	  word	  meaning	  with	  an	  equally	  general	  concept	  
of	  ‘meaning	  as	  use’.	  In	  other	  words:	  by	  employing	  a	  more	  nuanced	  type	  of	  criticism	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that	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  there	  could	  be	  a	  ‘correct’	  concept	  of	  meaning	  to	  replace	  the	  
criticised	  concept,	  Wittgenstein	  avoids	  committing	  to	  universal	  claims	  about	  
language	  which	  would	  be	  hypocritical	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  would	  fall	  foul	  of	  some	  
of	  the	  same	  criticisms	  of	  over-­‐generalisation	  and	  omission	  which	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  
of	  Augustine’s	  description	  and	  ‘way	  of	  thinking’	  in	  PI	  §§1-­‐5.	  This	  observation	  is	  borne	  
out	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  Wittgenstein	  later	  provides	  his	  own	  take	  on	  word-­‐meaning	  
in	  PI	  §43,	  he	  explicitly	  specifies	  that	  his	  explanation	  does	  not	  apply	  universally	  to	  all	  
cases	  in	  which	  we	  might	  speak	  of	  the	  ‘meaning’	  of	  a	  word,	  writing:	  
	  
“For	  a	  large	  class	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  we	  employ	  the	  word	  ‘meaning’,	  though	  not	  
for	  all,	  one	  can	  explain	  the	  employment	  of	  this	  word	  thus:	  The	  meaning	  of	  a	  
word	  is	  its	  use	  in	  the	  language.”	  (PI	  §43)	  
	  
Preliminary Implications of PI §§1-5 for the ARO  
	  
As	  I	  observed	  previously,	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  approach	  in	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  
which	  contrasts	  with	  the	  ARO,	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  direct	  his	  criticisms	  
towards	  one	  particular	  target	  –	  such	  as	  a	  particular	  view	  or	  account	  of	  language	  –	  but	  
rather	  distinguishes	  between	  at	  least	  three	  interrelated	  items	  in	  the	  opening	  remarks	  
which	  he	  proceeds	  to	  critically	  discuss.	  The	  main	  distinctions	  marked	  by	  Wittgenstein	  
in	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  PI	  are	  (1)	  between	  Augustine’s	  description	  and	  a	  ‘picture’	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  finds	  in	  Augustine’s	  words,	  and	  (2)	  between	  Augustine’s	  description	  and	  
a	  ‘philosophical	  concept	  of	  meaning’	  that	  allegedly	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  
aforementioned	  ‘picture’.	  An	  important	  implication	  of	  these	  distinctions	  is	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  avoids	  misattributing	  universal	  claims	  to	  Augustine’s	  description,	  such	  
as	  that	  all	  words	  refer	  to	  objects.	  	  
	  
A	  related	  feature	  is	  that	  when	  Wittgenstein	  comes	  to	  criticise	  Augustine’s	  description	  
and	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  he	  finds	  in	  Augustine’s	  words,	  he	  does	  not	  rely	  –	  like	  the	  
ARO	  –	  on	  modal	  counterclaims	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  ‘not	  all	  words	  refer	  to	  objects’;	  but	  
rather	  offers	  more	  nuanced	  cautions	  regarding	  the	  suitability	  and	  potential	  
obstructiveness	  of	  Augustine’s	  description,	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  that	  can	  be	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found	  in	  it,	  and	  the	  general	  philosophical	  idea	  of	  word-­‐meaning.116	  This	  is	  just	  as	  well	  
since	  –	  as	  I	  have	  noted	  above	  –	  neither	  Augustine’s	  description	  nor	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  
language	  outlined	  in	  PI	  §1,	  contain	  universal	  claims	  about	  language	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  
would	  be	  directly	  refuted	  by	  modal	  counterclaims	  such	  as	  that	  ‘not	  all	  words	  refer	  to	  
objects’.	  This	  means	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  avoiding	  the	  problem	  of	  misattributing	  
universal	  claims	  to	  philosophers	  and	  other	  scholars,	  Wittgenstein’s	  opening	  criticisms	  
also	  avoid	  the	  problem	  I	  identified	  with	  the	  ARO’s	  use	  of	  modal	  counter-­‐claims	  and	  
counter-­‐examples	  to	  argue	  against	  scholars	  who	  do	  not	  explicitly	  commit	  to	  the	  
relevant	  universal	  claims	  about	  words	  and	  sentences	  that	  would	  be	  challenged	  by	  
these	  arguments.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  when	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  that	  one	  can	  find	  a	  ‘particular	  picture’	  in	  
Augustine’s	  words,	  and	  that	  someone	  who	  offers	  such	  a	  description	  is	  thinking	  about	  
language	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  assert	  these	  as	  definite	  claims,	  but	  
rather	  offers	  them	  as	  tentative	  suggestions	  using	  the	  qualifications	  “it	  seems	  to	  me”	  
and	  “so	  I	  want	  to	  believe”.	  Thus	  Wittgenstein	  is	  not	  committed	  to	  strong	  claims	  of	  
the	  sort	  made	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  regarding	  the	  alleged	  tacit	  
assumptions	  and	  underlying	  commitments	  of	  the	  academics	  whose	  work	  they	  
criticise.	  Therefore,	  Wittgenstein	  also	  avoids	  the	  problems	  encountered	  by	  the	  ARO	  
which	  are	  associated	  with	  making	  obscure	  and	  unjustified	  claims	  regarding	  what	  
certain	  scholars	  are	  ‘really’	  committed	  to,	  even	  when	  they	  do	  not	  explicitly	  assert	  or	  
imply	  it	  in	  their	  texts.	  
	  
Another	  point	  is	  that	  most	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  criticisms	  in	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  PI	  are	  not	  
aimed	  directly	  at	  the	  content	  of	  Augustine’s	  description	  or	  the	  philosophical	  concept	  
of	  meaning	  that	  Wittgenstein	  extracts	  from	  it,	  but	  rather	  at	  flawed	  conceptions	  or	  
ways	  of	  thinking	  by	  which	  Wittgenstein	  surmises	  these	  items	  could	  have	  been	  
                                                
116	  For	  example,	  Wittgenstein	  criticises	  Augustine	  for	  not	  mentioning	  differences	  between	  types	  of	  
word,	  and	  for	  providing	  a	  description	  of	  language	  learning	  which	  is	  really	  only	  appropriate	  for	  a	  limited	  
portion	  of	  what	  we	  call	  ‘language’	  (i.e.	  words	  like	  nouns	  and	  names).	  Similarly,	  Wittgenstein	  criticises	  
the	  ‘picture’	  or	  ‘conception’	  of	  language	  that	  he	  identifies	  in	  PI	  §1b	  for	  being	  over-­‐simple	  compared	  to	  
the	  complexities	  of	  human	  language,	  and	  therefore	  inadequate	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  conceiving	  of	  our	  
language	  as	  a	  whole.	  Even	  when	  Wittgenstein	  criticises	  the	  ‘general	  philosophical	  concept	  of	  
meaning’,	  he	  does	  not	  contradict	  it	  outright,	  but	  contends	  that	  it	  obstructs	  our	  view	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  
language.	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produced.	  So,	  for	  example,	  although	  in	  PI	  §1	  Wittgenstein	  notes	  that	  Augustine’s	  
description	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	  distinctions	  between	  different	  sorts	  of	  word,	  what	  
Wittgenstein	  goes	  on	  to	  criticise	  is	  the	  bias	  involved	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  that	  
“someone	  who	  describes	  the	  learning	  of	  language	  in	  such	  a	  way	  is	  thinking”.	  
Similarly,	  when	  Wittgenstein	  comes	  in	  PI	  §2	  to	  criticise	  the	  ‘philosophical	  concept	  of	  
meaning’	  he	  outlined	  in	  PI	  §1b,	  he	  does	  so	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘primitiveness’	  of	  the	  
conception	  or	  picture	  in	  which	  this	  concept	  supposedly	  “has	  its	  place”.	  Thus	  while	  the	  
ARO	  specifically	  attempts	  to	  target	  ‘representational’	  accounts	  of	  language	  by	  
contradicting	  particular	  idiosyncratic	  claims	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  such	  accounts,	  
what	  Wittgenstein	  criticises	  are	  certain	  problematic	  ways	  of	  thinking,	  such	  as	  biased	  
and	  incomplete	  consideration	  of	  examples.	  
	  
Accordingly,	  unlike	  the	  ARO,	  Wittgenstein’s	  criticisms	  do	  not	  specifically	  target	  the	  
‘representational’	  character	  of	  Augustine’s	  description	  or	  the	  related	  ‘concept	  of	  
meaning’	  in	  PI	  §1b,	  except	  as	  a	  contingent	  result	  of	  a	  more	  general	  problem	  of	  biased	  
thinking	  which	  could	  be	  operative	  regardless	  of	  which	  examples	  of	  language-­‐use	  are	  
preferred.	  In	  short:	  if	  what	  Wittgenstein	  is	  criticising	  about	  Augustine’s	  description	  is	  
Augustine’s	  presumed	  failure	  to	  consider	  a	  sufficiently	  wide	  variety	  of	  examples	  of	  
language-­‐use,	  then	  it	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  success	  of	  this	  criticism	  which	  particular	  
examples	  Augustine	  happens	  to	  have	  concentrated	  on	  or	  ignored;	  since	  the	  criticism	  
of	  bias	  would	  still	  apply	  even	  if	  Augustine	  had	  ignored	  nouns	  and	  names	  while	  
concentrating	  on	  imperative	  verbs	  and	  articles.	  The	  crucial	  factor	  which	  would	  render	  
a	  person	  vulnerable	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  criticism	  in	  PI	  §1c	  is	  not	  concentrating	  on	  
nouns	  and	  names	  per	  se,	  but	  rather	  concentrating	  on	  some	  particular	  kinds	  of	  
example	  over	  others.	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  mean	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  criticisms	  are	  more	  
general	  than	  those	  employed	  by	  the	  ARO,	  but	  also	  that	  as	  a	  result	  Wittgenstein	  
sidesteps	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  ARO’s	  over-­‐inflation	  of	  some	  quite	  
specific	  criticisms	  and	  counterclaims	  as	  though	  they	  were	  more	  general	  refutations	  of	  
whole	  classes	  or	  types	  of	  account.	  
	  
A	  final	  observation	  is	  that	  when	  Wittgenstein	  criticises	  Augustine	  for	  focussing	  on	  the	  
use	  of	  particular	  sorts	  of	  words,	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  lump	  these	  examples	  together	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under	  one	  heading	  such	  as	  ‘representation’,	  ‘reference’,	  or	  ‘depiction’.	  Instead,	  he	  
lists	  them	  separately	  as	  “nouns	  like	  ‘table’,	  ‘chair’,	  ‘bread’”,	  “people’s	  names”,	  and	  
“names	  of	  certain	  actions	  and	  properties”	  (PI	  §1c).	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  with	  Kratochwil,	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  who	  frequently	  conflate	  names	  with	  nouns,	  and	  equate	  reference	  
with	  naming	  and	  standing-­‐for,	  while	  using	  a	  singular	  term	  like	  ‘mirroring’,	  ‘picturing’,	  
or	  ‘representation’	  to	  characterise	  these	  functions	  collectively.	  This	  is	  another	  way	  in	  
which	  Wittgenstein’s	  approach	  is	  more	  nuanced	  than	  the	  ARO,	  which	  itself	  risks	  
falling	  foul	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  criticisms	  in	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  PI	  by	  failing	  to	  
acknowledge	  differences	  between	  various	  words	  that	  we	  call	  ‘nouns’	  and	  ‘names’,	  
and	  between	  different	  sorts	  of	  functions	  that	  may	  be	  characterised	  using	  the	  terms	  
‘representation’,	  ‘reference’,	  ‘naming’,	  ‘standing-­‐for’	  etc.	  (including	  the	  various	  




In	  the	  previous	  sub-­‐section	  I	  identified	  some	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  ARO	  
and	  Wittgenstein’s	  strategy	  in	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  PI,	  and	  gave	  some	  preliminary	  
indications	  of	  how	  these	  could	  allow	  Wittgenstein	  to	  overcome	  or	  avoid	  some	  of	  the	  
problems	  faced	  by	  the	  ARO	  that	  I	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  Now	  I	  will	  
acknowledge	  some	  remaining	  questions	  concerning	  features	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  PI	  
that	  remain	  obscure,	  and	  which	  need	  to	  be	  clarified	  in	  order	  to	  see	  whether	  
Wittgenstein	  avoids	  some	  of	  the	  other	  problems	  encountered	  by	  the	  ARO	  that	  I	  have	  
not	  yet	  addressed.	  These	  questions	  will	  need	  to	  be	  carried	  forwards	  and	  considered	  
in	  the	  next	  subsection,	  where	  I	  will	  go	  into	  more	  detail	  concerning	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  technique	  of	  philosophical	  criticism	  in	  the	  PI.	  
	  
One	  such	  remaining	  question	  is:	  assuming	  that	  Wittgenstein	  intended	  his	  remarks	  in	  
the	  opening	  of	  the	  PI	  to	  be	  of	  relevance	  to	  more	  recent	  philosophers	  than	  Augustine,	  
then	  how	  is	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  that	  Wittgenstein	  finds	  in	  Augustine’s	  words	  
meant	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  work	  of	  contemporary	  philosophers	  and	  academics?	  This	  
is	  related	  to	  a	  second	  question,	  which	  is:	  what	  is	  the	  justification	  for	  claiming	  to	  find	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such	  a	  ‘picture’	  in	  another	  academic’s	  words,	  when	  they	  themselves	  do	  not	  explicitly	  
endorse	  it?	  Addressing	  this	  question	  is	  vitally	  important,	  because	  without	  a	  
satisfactory	  answer,	  Wittgenstein’s	  suggestion	  that	  we	  can	  find	  a	  ‘picture’	  in	  
Augustine’s	  words	  is	  potentially	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  same	  criticisms	  of	  ‘vagueness’,	  
‘essentialism’	  and	  ‘arbitrariness’	  that	  I	  levelled	  at	  the	  ARO’s	  general	  conception	  of	  the	  
representational	  view	  of	  language	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  
	  
A	  third	  question	  is:	  how	  are	  we	  to	  understand	  the	  criticisms	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  of	  
Augustine’s	  description	  and	  the	  ‘picture’	  he	  finds	  in	  it,	  as	  being	  applicable	  to	  the	  work	  
of	  contemporary	  philosophers	  and	  academics?	  I	  have	  already	  partially	  answered	  this	  
question	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  what	  Wittgenstein	  criticises	  about	  Augustine’s	  
description	  is	  a	  biased	  way	  of	  thinking	  that	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  specific	  description	  of	  
language	  that	  Augustine	  provides.	  However,	  there	  is	  more	  going	  on	  in	  the	  opening	  of	  
the	  PI	  than	  just	  the	  identification	  of	  biased	  tendencies	  of	  thought,	  and	  more	  to	  be	  
said	  about	  how	  the	  ‘picture’	  in	  PI	  §1b	  is	  meant	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  criticism.	  	  
	  
All	  of	  the	  questions	  summarised	  above	  require	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  and	  
interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  in	  remarks	  like	  PI	  §1	  than	  I	  
have	  so	  far	  provided.	  
	  
3.2	   Wittgenstein’s	  Use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘Picture’	  in	  Remarks	  like	  PI	  §1	  
 
 
In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  seek	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  interpretation	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  in	  remarks	  like	  PI	  §1	  which	  consolidates	  the	  
useful	  features	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  critical	  approach	  in	  PI	  §1	  that	  I	  have	  already	  
identified,	  and	  answers	  the	  remaining	  queries	  I	  listed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  last	  section.	  In	  
order	  to	  do	  this,	  I	  will	  take	  up	  a	  recent	  interpretation	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  
the	  term	  ‘picture’	  found	  in	  Oskari	  Kuusela’s	  Struggle	  Against	  Dogmatism	  (2008),	  
which	  I	  will	  use	  as	  a	  template	  on	  which	  to	  elaborate	  and	  develop	  into	  an	  
interpretation	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  answer	  the	  remaining	  questions	  identified	  
above.	  This	  will	  result	  in	  a	  coherent	  interpretation	  of	  a	  relevant	  and	  insightful	  aspect	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of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  methodology	  that	  can	  be	  used	  by	  IR	  scholars	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  
criticise	  approaches	  to	  IR	  (including	  so-­‐called	  ‘positivist’	  approaches),	  while	  avoiding	  




In	  his	  book,	  The	  Struggle	  against	  Dogmatism,	  Kuusela	  provides	  an	  interpretation	  of	  
later	  Wittgenstein’s	  conception	  of	  philosophical	  problems,	  which	  includes	  a	  
characterisation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  ‘pictures’	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  genesis	  and	  attempted	  
solution	  of	  such	  problems.	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
‘picture’	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  can	  therefore	  be	  introduced	  by	  summarising	  his	  
account	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  conception	  of	  a	  philosophical	  problem.	  
	  
Kuusela	  introduces	  Wittgenstein’s	  conception	  of	  philosophical	  problems	  in	  the	  PI	  by	  
describing	  a	  number	  of	  examples	  of	  what	  later	  Wittgenstein	  would	  regard	  as	  a	  
‘philosophical	  problem’,	  including	  how	  such	  problems	  might	  arise	  and	  become	  
exacerbated.	  One	  of	  these	  examples	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  Kuusela	  calls	  ‘the	  problem	  of	  
meaning’.	  Kuusela	  sums	  up	  this	  problem	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
“A	  sign	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  many	  ways.	  Hence	  it	  seems	  that	  by	  itself	  it	  can	  
mean	  anything	  or	  nothing.	  But	  how	  then	  does	  a	  sign	  acquire	  its	  meaning?”	  
(Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.33)	  
	  
Kuusela	  writes	  that	  a	  “natural	  way”	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  problem	  might	  be	  to	  say	  that	  
“a	  sign	  has	  meaning	  when	  somebody	  means	  something	  by	  it”.	  However,	  he	  notes	  
that	  this	  raises	  the	  further	  question	  of	  what	  this	  ‘meaning	  something	  by	  a	  sign’	  
consists	  in.	  At	  this	  point,	  Kuusela	  suggests,	  we	  might	  be	  misled	  by	  certain	  analogies	  
and	  similarities	  between	  the	  use	  of	  the	  verbs	  ‘to	  mean’	  and	  ‘to	  say,’	  to	  propose	  that	  
meaning	  is	  a	  “process”	  that	  accompanies	  what	  we	  say.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  the	  sorts	  of	  
analogies	  that	  we	  might	  be	  misled	  by,	  Kuusela	  observes:	  “we	  say	  …	  ‘I	  meant	  this	  and	  
that’	  just	  as	  we	  say	  …	  ‘I	  said	  this	  and	  that’”.	  	  
	  
The	  implication	  here	  is	  this:	  that	  when	  someone	  uses	  the	  expression	  ‘I	  said	  X’,	  they	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are	  usually	  referring	  to	  an	  event	  or	  activity	  of	  speech	  that	  took	  place;	  and	  because	  of	  
the	  similarities	  between	  the	  form	  of	  this	  expression	  and	  the	  expression	  ‘I	  meant	  X’,	  
we	  might	  imagine	  that	  when	  someone	  says	  ‘I	  meant	  X’	  they	  are	  reporting	  an	  
analogous	  event	  or	  activity	  of	  meaning	  that	  took	  place	  while	  they	  spoke.	  Kuusela	  
provides	  a	  vignette	  to	  illustrate	  the	  further	  problematic	  complications	  that	  this	  might	  
create:	  
	  
“If	  I	  said	  ‘Napoleon	  was	  a	  short	  man’	  and	  you	  ask,	  ‘Did	  you	  mean	  the	  man	  
who	  was	  defeated	  at	  waterloo?’	  my	  affirmative	  answer,	  of	  course,	  does	  not	  
mean	  that	  I	  must	  have	  consciously	  thought	  of	  Waterloo	  and	  Napoleon’s	  
defeat	  at	  the	  time	  of	  my	  utterance.	  But	  does	  the	  past	  tense	  then	  indicate	  that	  
an	  unconscious	  act	  or	  process	  of	  meaning	  took	  place	  in	  which	  a	  connection	  
was	  made	  between	  Napoleon	  and	  Waterloo—or	  in	  which	  everything	  that	  I	  
understood	  by	  Napoleon	  was	  somehow	  present?	  After	  all,	  you	  could	  have	  
asked	  something	  else	  about	  him,	  and	  insofar	  as	  this	  belongs	  to	  my	  concept	  of	  
Napoleon,	  apparently	  it	  had	  to	  be	  present	  in	  the	  act	  or	  process	  of	  meaning	  
him.”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.34)	  
	  
	  
Kuusela	  subsequently	  characterises	  the	  problem	  of	  meaning	  using	  later	  Witgenstein’s	  
concept	  of	  a	  ‘picture’,	  writing:	  	  
	  
“Another	  way	  to	  describe	  the	  problem	  of	  meaning	  is	  to	  say	  that	  one	  is	  misled	  
by	  a	  particular	  picture	  of	  what	  meaning	  something	  consists	  of.	  …	  In	  the	  above	  
case,	  the	  picture	  is	  based	  on	  an	  analogy	  between	  the	  use	  of	  ‘meaning’	  and	  
‘saying.’	  …	  Such	  pictures	  may	  then	  come	  to	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  one’s	  attempts	  
to	  understand	  a	  phenomenon	  or	  the	  use	  of	  a	  word.”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.35)	  
	  
	  
So,	  according	  to	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation,	  we	  can	  be	  misled	  by	  the	  apparent	  similarity	  
between	  the	  forms	  of	  the	  expressions	  ‘I	  meant	  X’	  and	  ‘I	  said	  X’	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  
use	  of	  the	  two	  expressions	  is	  strictly	  comparable,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  we	  misinterpret	  
‘I	  meant	  X’	  as	  reporting	  something	  that	  I	  did;	  and	  that	  this	  misinterpretation	  can	  lead	  
us	  to	  imagine	  an	  activity	  or	  ‘process’	  of	  meaning	  which	  is	  the	  semantic	  equivalent	  of	  
speaking.	  This	  imagined	  process	  of	  meaning	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  ‘picture’	  in	  
later	  Wittgenstein’s	  sense.	  Once	  accepted,	  such	  a	  ‘picture’	  can	  seem	  to	  throw	  up	  
more	  complex	  and	  mysterious	  problems	  to	  do	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  imagined	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process,	  such	  as	  those	  enacted	  by	  Kuusela	  above.	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  a	  
‘picture’	  arises,	  and	  how	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  generation	  of	  philosophical	  ‘problems’.	  
Kuusela	  then	  offers	  the	  following	  characterisation	  of	  what	  a	  ‘picture’	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  
according	  to	  later	  Wittgenstein:	  
	  
	  
“A	  picture	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  conception	  or	  a	  
mode	  of	  presenting	  things	  or	  facts,	  including	  facts	  concerning	  language	  use.	  A	  
picture	  need	  not	  be	  detailed	  and	  carefully	  articulated,	  or	  based	  on	  any	  close	  
examination	  of	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  Rather	  it	  may	  be	  just	  a	  rough	  and	  ready	  
conception	  that	  recommends	  itself	  to	  one—perhaps	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  
certain	  forms	  of	  expression	  that	  one	  uses”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.36)	  
	  
This	  characterisation	  raises	  a	  few	  further	  questions	  which	  I	  will	  address	  later,	  but	  for	  
now	  I	  am	  simply	  presenting	  it	  as	  a	  statement	  of	  what	  Kuusela	  understands	  a	  ‘picture’	  
in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  to	  be.	  	  
	  
As	  well	  as	  generating	  philosophical	  problems,	  Kuusela	  suggests	  that	  according	  to	  
Wittgenstein	  such	  ‘pictures’	  can	  be	  instrumental	  in	  the	  development	  of	  misconceived	  
philosophical	  theories	  aimed	  at	  solving	  these	  apparent	  problems.	  Kuusela	  writes	  that	  
“it	  is	  characteristic	  of	  pictures	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  sense	  that	  they	  can	  function	  as	  the	  
basis	  for	  more	  detailed	  accounts	  and	  grow	  into	  more	  sophisticated	  philosophical	  
theories.”	  The	  way	  in	  which	  a	  picture	  has	  this	  effect,	  according	  to	  Kuusela,	  is	  by	  
“putting	  one	  on	  a	  certain	  path	  of	  thinking	  about	  [some]	  phenomena”,	  so	  that	  even	  if	  
the	  picture	  itself	  is	  not	  borne	  out	  upon	  investigation,	  instead	  of	  being	  abandoned,	  it	  
is	  refined	  and	  modified	  in	  ever	  more	  subtle	  ways	  to	  try	  to	  account	  for	  the	  exceptions.	  
Kuusela	  uses	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  that	  Wittgenstein	  finds	  in	  Augustine’s	  words	  in	  
PI	  §1	  (which	  Kuusela	  calls	  ‘the	  Augustinian	  picture’)	  as	  an	  example	  to	  explain	  how	  this	  
might	  happen:	  
	  
“If	  one	  accepts	  the	  Augustinian	  picture	  of	  language,	  it	  may	  function	  as	  a	  root	  
for	  a	  philosophical	  theory	  according	  to	  which	  to	  be	  a	  word	  is	  to	  be	  something	  
that	  has	  a	  meaning.	  To	  have	  a	  meaning,	  in	  turn,	  is	  to	  stand	  for	  an	  object.	  But	  
although	  it	  may	  sometimes	  be	  unproblematic	  to	  say	  that	  a	  word	  stands	  for	  an	  
object,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  what	  such	  an	  object	  would	  be.	  What	  do	  words	  
stand	  for,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  negation	  or	  numerals?	  Some	  kind	  of	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abstract,	  Platonic	  objects,	  perhaps?	  But	  what	  then	  is	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  
such	  objects?	  At	  this	  point	  one	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  drawn	  into	  articulating	  
ever	  more	  sophisticated	  theories	  about	  abstract	  objects,	  instead	  of	  examining	  
more	  closely	  the	  assumed	  picture	  of	  meaning	  that	  creates	  the	  problem	  of	  
referents.”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.37)	  
	  
In	  this	  passage	  Kuusela	  suggests	  that	  someone	  who	  initially	  accepts	  the	  ‘Augustinian	  
picture’	  may	  subsequently	  become	  aware	  that	  this	  picture	  does	  not	  work	  that	  well	  
for	  everything	  that	  we	  call	  a	  word	  –	  for	  example,	  the	  words	  ‘five’,	  or	  ‘not’,	  which	  do	  
not	  appear	  to	  stand	  for	  something	  that	  we	  would	  naturally	  identify	  as	  an	  ‘object’.	  In	  
Kuusela’s	  example,	  rather	  than	  abandoning	  the	  picture	  in	  light	  of	  these	  conflicting	  
cases,	  the	  person	  instead	  tries	  to	  theorise	  away	  the	  conflict	  by	  speculating	  that	  the	  
nature	  or	  existence	  of	  the	  ‘objects’	  for	  which	  these	  words	  stand	  must	  be	  somehow	  
special.	  This	  can	  then	  give	  rise	  to	  further	  problems	  concerning	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  
speculated	  ‘objects’	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  words	  that	  are	  meant	  
to	  stand	  for	  them	  etc.	  
	  
If	  we	  think	  back	  to	  Kuusela’s	  previous	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  ‘problem	  of	  meaning’	  
might	  develop,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  something	  similar	  is	  described	  as	  happening	  there.	  As	  
with	  the	  ‘Augustinian	  picture’,	  Kuusela	  suggested	  how	  if	  we	  have	  taken	  up	  the	  
picture	  of	  meaning	  as	  a	  process,	  then	  we	  might	  subsequently	  become	  aware	  that	  this	  
picture	  conflicts	  with	  our	  observations	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘meaning’	  –	  
such	  as	  the	  observation	  that	  when	  someone	  says	  ‘I	  meant	  X’,	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  
saying	  that	  ‘X’	  ran	  through	  their	  mind	  at	  the	  time	  in	  question.117	  However,	  rather	  
than	  accepting	  this	  as	  a	  contradiction	  of	  the	  picture	  of	  meaning	  as	  a	  process,	  the	  
person	  in	  Kuusela’s	  vignette	  responded	  to	  this	  conflict	  by	  speculating	  that	  the	  
process	  of	  meaning	  must	  be	  of	  such	  a	  kind	  that	  we	  are	  unaware	  of	  its	  going	  on	  –	  e.g.	  
an	  ‘unconscious’	  process.	  Thus	  instead	  of	  abandoning	  the	  picture	  of	  meaning	  that	  has	  
been	  produced	  by	  overstretching	  the	  analogy	  between	  the	  use	  of	  the	  words	  
‘meaning’	  and	  ‘speaking’,	  they	  made	  a	  speculative	  theoretical	  claim	  that	  propped	  the	  
                                                
117	  So,	  in	  Kuusela’s	  example,	  someone	  who	  says	  ‘Napoleon	  is	  a	  short	  man’	  and	  later	  clarifies	  ‘I	  meant	  
the	  man	  who	  was	  defeated	  at	  Waterloo’,	  does	  not	  have	  to	  have	  consciously	  thought	  of	  Waterloo	  and	  
Napoleon’s	  defeat	  at	  the	  time	  that	  they	  uttered	  the	  first	  sentence	  in	  order	  for	  the	  second	  sentence	  to	  
make	  sense.	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picture	  up	  in	  the	  face	  of	  contradictory	  evidence.	  In	  both	  this	  case	  and	  that	  of	  the	  
Augustinian	  picture,	  Kuusela’s	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  ‘solution’	  to	  the	  problems	  
thrown	  up	  by	  these	  pictures,	  according	  to	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  is	  to	  be	  found	  not	  in	  a	  
theory	  that	  tries	  to	  answer	  these	  problems	  by	  explaining	  what	  sorts	  of	  peculiar	  
objects	  numerals	  might	  stand	  for,	  or	  what	  sort	  of	  extraordinary	  process	  ‘meaning’	  
might	  be;	  but	  rather	  through	  a	  critical	  examination	  of	  the	  pictures	  and	  analogies	  from	  
which	  the	  articulation	  of	  these	  problems	  originally	  stemmed.	  
	  
Clarifications and Additions  
	  
Having	  outlined	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  understanding	  of	  
‘pictures’	  and	  their	  possible	  role	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  philosophical	  problems	  and	  
theories,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  present	  some	  clarifications	  and	  additions	  to	  this	  
interpretation	  that	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  answer	  the	  remaining	  questions	  I	  identified	  
earlier,	  and	  thereby	  overcome	  the	  final	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  ARO’s	  attempt	  to	  
apply	  this	  aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy.	  	  
	  
What	  Exactly	  Is	  a	  ‘Picture’?	  
	  
One	  concern	  that	  a	  critic	  might	  have	  about	  the	  above	  interpretation,	  is	  that	  although	  
Kuusela	  provides	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  that	  ‘pictures’	  can	  have	  in	  the	  genesis	  
of	  philosophical	  problems	  and	  theories,	  his	  interpretation	  still	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  
satisfactory	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  a	  ‘picture’	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  is.	  In	  his	  
characterisation,	  Kuusela	  says	  that	  a	  ‘picture’	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  “a	  conception	  or	  a	  
mode	  of	  presenting	  things	  or	  facts”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.36),	  but	  does	  not	  explain	  
further	  what	  this	  amounts	  to.	  This	  criticism	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  similar	  to	  the	  objection	  
that	  Wittgenstein	  imagines	  in	  PI	  §65	  concerning	  his	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘language-­‐game’,	  
when	  he	  writes:	  
	   	  
“For	  someone	  might	  object	  against	  me:	  ‘You	  make	  things	  easy	  for	  yourself!	  
You	  talk	  about	  all	  sorts	  of	  language-­‐games,	  but	  have	  nowhere	  said	  what	  is	  
essential	  to	  a	  language-­‐game,	  and	  so	  to	  language:	  what	  is	  common	  to	  all	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these	  activities,	  and	  makes	  them	  into	  language	  or	  parts	  of	  language.	  So	  you	  
let	  yourself	  off	  the	  very	  part	  of	  the	  investigation	  that	  once	  gave	  you	  the	  most	  
headache,	  the	  part	  about	  the	  general	  form	  of	  the	  proposition	  and	  of	  
language.’”	  
	  
In	  this	  light,	  we	  might	  want	  to	  reply	  to	  the	  criticism	  of	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  along	  
the	  same	  lines	  that	  Wittgenstein	  responds	  to	  the	  above	  criticism	  of	  his	  use	  of	  the	  
term	  ‘language-­‐game’	  in	  the	  PI.	  That	  is,	  we	  may	  respond	  that	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  
identify	  a	  particular	  phenomenon	  that	  corresponds	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
‘picture’	  in	  characterising	  the	  development	  of	  philosophical	  problems	  and	  theories,	  
our	  stance	  is	  that	  this	  term	  may	  be	  used	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  affiliated	  ways	  (a)	  which	  are	  
not	  necessarily	  referential,	  and	  (b)	  whereby	  even	  those	  uses	  that	  are	  referential	  may	  
not	  necessarily	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  phenomena.	  This	  response,	  however,	  only	  
gets	  us	  so	  far;	  since	  although	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  sidestep	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  general	  
account	  of	  what	  a	  ‘picture’	  is,	  it	  does	  not	  let	  us	  off	  the	  hook	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
requirement	  for	  providing	  further	  explanations	  concerning	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  
specific	  affiliated	  senses	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  this	  term	  as	  part	  of	  a	  critical	  
technique	  in	  the	  PI.	  We	  can	  address	  this	  concern	  by	  revisiting	  the	  PI	  and	  providing	  
more	  detailed	  explanations	  of	  some	  specific	  senses	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  
term	  ‘picture’	  to	  characterise	  philosophical	  problems	  and	  theories	  can	  be	  
understood.	  	  
	  
If	  we	  look	  at	  the	  various	  remarks	  in	  the	  PI	  where	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  
in	  contexts	  of	  critical	  examination,	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  quite	  a	  few	  cases	  where	  
Wittgenstein	  is	  using	  this	  term	  to	  mean	  something	  like	  a	  mental	  image	  of	  the	  kind	  
that	  we	  see	  while	  dreaming	  or	  exercising	  our	  imagination.118	  So,	  for	  example,	  in	  PI	  
§295	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  
	  
“‘I	  know	  …	  only	  from	  my	  own	  case’	  –	  what	  kind	  of	  proposition	  is	  this	  meant	  to	  
be?	  An	  empirical	  one?	  No.	  –	  A	  grammatical	  one?	  
	   So	  this	  is	  what	  I	  imagine:	  everyone	  says	  of	  himself	  that	  he	  knows	  what	  
pain	  is	  only	  from	  his	  own	  pain.	  –	  Not	  that	  people	  really	  say	  that,	  or	  are	  even	  
                                                
118	  I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  ‘mental	  image’	  simply	  to	  differentiate	  these	  sorts	  of	  visual	  images	  from	  those	  
that	  we	  see	  using	  our	  eyes.	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prepared	  to	  say	  it.	  But	  if	  everybody	  said	  it	  —	  it	  might	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  
exclamation.	  And	  even	  if	  it	  gives	  no	  information,	  still,	  it	  is	  a	  picture	  [Bild];	  and	  
why	  should	  we	  not	  want	  to	  call	  such	  a	  picture	  before	  our	  mind?	  Imagine	  an	  
allegorical	  painting	  instead	  of	  the	  words.	  
	   Indeed,	  when	  we	  look	  into	  ourselves	  as	  we	  do	  philosophy,	  we	  often	  
get	  to	  see	  just	  such	  a	  picture	  [Bild].	  Virtually	  a	  pictorial	  representation	  of	  our	  
grammar.	  Not	  facts;	  but,	  as	  it	  were,	  illustrated	  turns	  of	  speech.”	  
	  
A	  similar	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  is	  found	  in	  PI	  §59,	  where	  Wittgenstein	  refers	  to	  a	  
“particular	  picture”	  [bestimmtes	  Bild]	  of	  ‘primary	  elements’	  that	  “hovered	  before	  us”	  
[schwebte	  es	  uns	  …	  vor],	  and	  which	  was	  expressed	  by	  uttering	  the	  sentence	  “A	  name	  
signifies	  only	  what	  is	  an	  element	  of	  reality	  –	  what	  cannot	  be	  destroyed,	  what	  remains	  
the	  same	  in	  all	  changes.”	  Finally,	  PI	  §216	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  the	  related	  term	  
Vorstellung	  [i.e.	  imagination/	  conception]	  in	  a	  similar	  sense	  when	  he	  writes:	  	  
	  
“‘A	  thing	  is	  identical	  with	  itself.’	  –	  There	  is	  no	  finer	  example	  of	  a	  useless	  
sentence,	  which	  nevertheless	  is	  connected	  with	  a	  certain	  play	  of	  the	  
imagination	  [Vorstellung].	  It	  is	  as	  if	  in	  our	  imagination	  we	  put	  a	  thing	  into	  its	  
own	  shape	  and	  saw	  that	  it	  fitted.	  	  
We	  might	  also	  say:	  ‘Every	  thing	  fits	  into	  itself.’	  –	  Or	  again:	  ‘Every	  thing	  
fits	  into	  its	  own	  shape.’	  While	  saying	  this,	  one	  looks	  at	  a	  thing	  and	  imagines	  
that	  there	  was	  a	  space	  left	  for	  it	  and	  that	  now	  it	  fits	  into	  it	  exactly.”	  
	  
In	  these	  remarks,	  Wittgenstein	  apparently	  suggests	  that	  certain	  propositions	  can	  
induce	  us,	  quite	  literally,	  to	  visualise	  an	  imaginary	  picture	  of	  the	  phenomena	  in	  
question,	  which	  portrays	  it	  as	  being	  or	  working	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  We	  should	  
remember	  that	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  PI	  Wittgenstein	  points	  out	  that	  not	  everything	  we	  
call	  a	  ‘picture’	  is	  static	  or	  “idle	  (PI	  §291).	  Therefore	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  imaginary	  
pictures	  in	  this	  context,	  we	  should	  take	  this	  to	  include	  dynamic	  or	  animated	  
imaginary	  scenes.119	  	  
	  
The	  above	  is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  specific	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  term	  
‘picture’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  characterisations	  of	  philosophical	  
statements,	  problems	  and	  theories	  in	  the	  PI.	  As	  I	  indicated	  earlier,	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  
                                                
119	  This	  interpretation	  is	  backed	  up	  by	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  ‘play	  of	  the	  imagination’	  in	  PI	  
§216.	  	  
 131  
this	  is	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  in	  such	  contexts,	  
nor	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  individual	  examples	  of	  such	  uses	  can	  be	  
legitimately	  interpreted.	  However	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  uses/interpretations	  that	  I	  am	  going	  
to	  argue	  we	  can	  make	  use	  of	  for	  our	  purposes	  in	  overcoming	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  
the	  ARO’s	  application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy,	  and	  which	  answers	  the	  critic’s	  
objection	  regarding	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  sufficiently	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  what	  a	  ‘picture’	  
is.	  	  
	  
An	  alternative	  way	  in	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
‘picture’	  in	  such	  contexts	  is	  as	  a	  technique	  for	  representing	  certain	  patterns	  of	  bias	  
that	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  that	  someone	  speaks	  and/or	  writes	  about	  some	  subject	  
matter.	  This	  is	  an	  interpretation	  that	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  
approaches	  Augustine’s	  description	  of	  language	  learning	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  PI.	  If	  we	  
think	  back	  to	  PI	  §1b,	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  there	  that:	  “in	  Augustine’s	  words,	  it	  seems	  
to	  me,	  we	  find	  a	  particular	  picture	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  human	  language”.	  Now,	  this	  
comment	  could	  be	  understood	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  interpretation	  I	  sketched	  above,	  
as	  suggesting	  that	  when	  we	  read	  Augustine’s	  description	  of	  language-­‐use	  we	  are	  
liable	  to	  imagine	  a	  visual	  picture	  or	  scene	  of	  language	  working	  in	  the	  way	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  outlines	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  PI	  §1b.	  However,	  this	  comment	  could	  also	  be	  
understood	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  as	  summing	  up	  a	  set	  of	  tendencies	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
Augustine	  considers	  the	  phenomena	  of	  language	  that	  Wittgenstein	  reconstructs	  from	  
certain	  features	  of	  his	  description.	  	  
	  
To	  recapitulate,	  in	  PI	  §§1-­‐3	  Wittgenstein	  picks	  up	  on	  the	  following	  features	  of	  
Augustine’s	  account:	  firstly,	  that	  Augustine	  does	  not	  mention	  any	  differences	  
between	  kinds	  of	  words	  (PI	  §1c);	  secondly,	  that	  the	  way	  Augustine	  describes	  word-­‐
use	  indicates	  that	  he	  is	  concentrating	  his	  attention	  primarily	  on	  words	  of	  a	  certain	  
kind	  while	  overlooking	  others	  (PI	  §1c);	  and	  thirdly,	  that	  Augustine	  presents	  his	  
description	  of	  how	  he	  learnt	  to	  use	  words	  of	  this	  kind	  as	  though	  it	  were	  sufficient	  to	  
account	  for	  how	  he	  learnt	  to	  use	  language	  in	  general	  (PI	  §3).	  While	  these	  features	  by	  
themselves	  do	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  claim	  that	  words	  stand	  for	  objects	  that	  constitute	  
their	  meaning,	  they	  do	  indicate	  tendencies	  of	  bias	  in	  Augustine’s	  manner	  of	  thinking	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about	  language	  which	  we	  might	  expect	  from	  someone	  who	  would	  endorse	  such	  a	  
claim.	  Accordingly,	  Wittgenstein’s	  statement	  that	  “we	  find	  a	  particular	  ‘picture’	  of	  the	  
essence	  of	  language”	  in	  Augustine’s	  words	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  identification	  of	  a	  
pattern	  of	  bias	  in	  Augustine’s	  description	  that	  is	  characteristic	  of	  a	  commitment	  to	  
certain	  claims,	  but	  which	  can	  also	  be	  present	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  commitment.	  	  
	  
At	  this	  point	  we	  might	  pause	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  our	  interpretation	  and	  consider	  the	  
benefits	  of	  applying	  such	  a	  technique	  within	  IR:	  namely,	  that	  it	  would	  allow	  us	  to	  
highlight	  patterns	  of	  bias	  in	  scholars’	  work	  which	  are	  characteristic	  of	  problematic	  
commitments	  which	  these	  scholars	  may	  not	  explicitly	  endorse;	  and	  thereby	  to	  
encourage	  these	  scholars	  to	  modify	  and	  monitor	  their	  tendencies	  of	  thinking	  and	  
writing	  so	  that	  they	  minimise	  the	  risk	  of	  falling	  into	  unwelcome	  and	  misleading	  
patterns.	  
	  
Returning	  to	  the	  task	  at	  hand:	  I	  have	  now	  provided	  two	  examples	  of	  more	  detailed	  
ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  in	  
characterising	  philosophical	  problems	  and	  theories.	  What	  I	  have	  suggested	  is	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  not	  only	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  in	  various	  ways	  within	  the	  PI;	  but	  that	  
even	  in	  remarks	  where	  Wittgenstein	  is	  apparently	  using	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  to	  
characterise	  philosophical	  problems	  and	  theories,	  he	  may	  be	  using	  it	  in	  different	  or	  
multifaceted	  ways.	  Two	  of	  these	  ways	  or	  ‘facets’	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
‘picture’	  that	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  expound,	  are	  (1)	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  imaginary	  image	  or	  
scene	  of	  some	  phenomena	  that	  certain	  forms	  of	  expression	  may	  induce	  us	  to	  
envisage;	  and	  (2)	  to	  characterise	  a	  certain	  pattern	  of	  bias	  that	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  some	  phenomena	  is	  described	  or	  approached.	  These	  are	  my	  additions	  to	  
Kuusela’s	  interpretation,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  faithful	  elaborations	  of	  what	  
Kuusela	  means	  by	  defining	  a	  ‘picture’	  in	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  sense	  as	  a	  ‘conception’	  
or	  ‘mode	  of	  presentation’.	  However,	  they	  do	  allow	  us	  to	  overcome	  the	  critic’s	  
concern	  that	  the	  precise	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  when	  used	  to	  characterise	  
philosophical	  problems	  or	  theories	  remains	  elusive.	  Putting	  this	  modification	  to	  one	  
side	  for	  the	  moment,	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  consider	  and	  address	  relevant	  concerns	  with	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Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  ‘remaining	  questions’	  that	  I	  identified	  in	  
the	  last	  section.	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  Methodological	  Justification	  for	  attributing	  a	  ‘Picture’	  to	  Someone	  Else?	  
	  
One	  major	  way	  in	  which	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  is	  superior	  to	  the	  interpretation	  that	  
is	  apparently	  employed	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  
claiming	  that	  the	  ‘picture’	  outlined	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §1b	  literally	  summarises	  the	  
written	  accounts	  and	  theories	  of	  the	  various	  philosophers	  or	  other	  academics	  to	  
whom	  Wittgenstein’s	  critical	  remarks	  in	  the	  PI	  might	  be	  addressed.	  Thus,	  for	  
example,	  we	  saw	  earlier	  how	  Pin-­‐Fat	  quotes	  PI	  §1b	  as	  a	  summary	  of	  a	  range	  of	  
philosophical	  ‘views’	  of	  language,	  including	  that	  allegedly	  presented	  by	  early	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  and	  by	  Augustine	  in	  the	  Confessions;	  and	  implies	  that	  
Wittgenstein’s	  subsequent	  criticisms	  of	  this	  picture	  and	  Augustine’s	  description	  
undermine	  ‘representational’	  views	  or	  accounts	  of	  language	  in	  general	  (Pin-­‐Fat,	  2010:	  
p.10-­‐11).	  As	  I	  pointed	  out	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  this	  kind	  of	  interpretation	  is	  not	  only	  
exegetically	  problematic,	  but	  also	  leads	  to	  argumentative	  problems	  for	  the	  ARO,	  such	  
as	  the	  problem	  of	  claiming	  that	  various	  ‘positivist’	  IR	  scholars	  are	  somehow	  
‘committed’	  to	  the	  same	  (representational)	  account	  of	  language	  even	  though	  it	  is	  not	  
explicitly	  expressed	  in	  their	  work,	  and	  presenting	  specific	  counter-­‐claims	  against	  
idiosyncratic	  universal	  claims	  regarding	  words	  and	  sentences	  as	  though	  they	  were	  
effective	  refutations	  of	  any	  view	  or	  claim	  regarding	  language	  that	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  
‘representational’.	  	  
The	  main	  feature	  of	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  that	  enables	  the	  avoidance	  of	  these	  
sorts	  of	  problems	  is	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  the	  historical	  or	  developmental	  role	  that	  it	  
assigns	  to	  pictures	  in	  relation	  to	  philosophical	  accounts	  or	  theories.	  This	  means	  that	  
rather	  than	  identifying	  the	  picture	  in	  PI	  §1	  as	  summarising	  some	  common	  explicit	  
and/or	  implicit	  claims	  of	  various	  contemporary	  philosophical	  theories	  and	  accounts,	  
Kuusela	  instead	  identifies	  this	  picture	  as	  a	  possible	  source	  and	  guiding	  influence	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  such	  theories,	  which	  in	  their	  current	  versions	  may	  be	  much	  more	  
elaborate	  and	  sophisticated	  than	  the	  picture	  that	  generated	  their	  construction.	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Despite	  this	  advantage,	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  related	  methodological	  concern	  that	  a	  
critic	  might	  raise	  concerning	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation,	  which	  is	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
justification	  with	  which	  one	  can	  say	  that	  another	  person’s	  philosophical	  or	  academic	  
work	  was	  developed	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  particular	  picture	  such	  as	  that	  outlined	  
in	  PI	  §1b.	  I	  noted	  above	  that	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  avoids	  the	  problem	  of	  claiming	  
that	  the	  simplistic	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  outlined	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §1b	  is	  a	  
summary	  of	  one	  or	  more	  actual	  philosophical	  theories	  of	  language,	  by	  suggesting	  
instead	  that	  this	  picture	  may	  be	  instrumental	  in	  the	  development	  of	  such	  theories	  
and	  the	  problems	  which	  they	  are	  engineered	  to	  address.	  However,	  this	  raises	  the	  
question:	  how	  are	  we	  to	  tell	  in	  an	  actual	  case,	  whether	  the	  development	  of	  a	  given	  
philosophical	  theory	  has	  been	  influenced	  by	  such	  a	  picture?	  And	  doesn’t	  saying	  that	  
the	  development	  of	  a	  philosophical	  theory	  has	  been	  influenced	  in	  this	  way	  involve	  
making	  some	  hypothetical	  historical	  or	  psychological	  claims	  about	  its	  author’s	  way	  of	  
thinking?	  	  
	  
Recall	  that	  according	  to	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation,	  a	  picture	  can	  influence	  us	  by	  
“putting	  [us]	  on	  a	  certain	  path	  of	  thinking	  about	  [some]	  phenomena”	  which	  can	  lead	  
us	  to	  apprehend	  cases	  that	  contradict	  the	  picture	  as	  somehow	  ‘puzzling’	  (Kuusela,	  
2008:	  p.37).	  This	  implies	  that	  one	  way	  we	  can	  tell	  that	  a	  given	  philosophical	  theory	  
may	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  a	  particular	  picture	  is	  by	  the	  sorts	  of	  cases	  that	  the	  
author	  apprehends	  as	  problematic	  and	  as	  in	  need	  of	  theoretical	  explanation.	  Thus,	  
for	  example,	  imagine	  a	  philosophical	  theory	  which	  takes	  one	  of	  its	  central	  tasks	  to	  be	  
to	  explain	  how	  words	  like	  ‘five’	  and	  ‘not’	  have	  meaning.	  This	  theory	  is	  not	  itself	  
committed	  to	  the	  contention	  that	  all	  words	  refer	  to	  objects	  that	  constitute	  their	  
meaning,	  and	  so	  we	  cannot	  attribute	  this	  claim	  directly	  to	  the	  theory,	  or	  criticise	  it	  as	  
though	  it	  were	  committed	  to	  this	  claim	  (which	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  problematic	  approach	  
employed	  by	  the	  ARO).	  However,	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  make	  
an	  educated	  guess	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  theory	  tries	  to	  explain	  how	  non-­‐referential	  
words	  like	  ‘five’	  and	  ‘not’	  have	  meaning,	  that	  the	  author	  of	  the	  theory	  may	  have	  
started	  from	  a	  picture	  of	  language	  to	  which	  these	  sorts	  of	  words	  were	  exceptions.	  
Another	  way	  of	  putting	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  if	  a	  person	  were	  thinking	  open-­‐mindedly	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about	  language,	  they	  would	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  find	  the	  use	  of	  words	  like	  ‘five’	  and	  
‘not’	  any	  more	  puzzling	  than	  the	  use	  of	  words	  like	  ‘table’	  or	  ‘bread’.	  So	  when	  
someone	  does	  find	  the	  former	  sorts	  of	  cases	  puzzling	  and	  tries	  to	  create	  a	  theory	  to	  
explain	  them,	  this	  gives	  us	  grounds	  to	  believe	  that	  this	  person	  initially	  started	  
thinking	  about	  language	  in	  a	  way	  that	  did	  not	  make	  sense	  of	  such	  cases.	  	  
	  
Here	  our	  critic	  may	  reply:	  “But	  this	  is	  pure	  speculation.	  We	  cannot	  know	  for	  certain	  
how	  a	  philosopher	  or	  academic	  first	  started	  thinking	  about	  their	  subject	  matter	  prior	  
to	  formulating	  their	  account,	  unless	  they	  tell	  us.	  Also,	  if	  the	  academic	  in	  question	  is	  
still	  living,	  what	  if	  they	  were	  to	  disagree	  outright	  with	  such	  an	  assessment	  of	  their	  
work?	  What	  right	  would	  we	  have	  to	  insist,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  author’s	  denial,	  that	  
their	  theory	  was	  developed	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  particular	  picture?”	  This	  criticism	  
can	  be	  satisfactorily	  answered	  by	  an	  explanation	  of	  what	  various	  interpreters	  have	  
called	  the	  ‘therapeutic’	  aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  approach	  to	  philosophy	  in	  the	  PI.	  
This	  can	  be	  unpacked	  as	  follows.	  
	  
The	  above	  problems	  raised	  by	  the	  critic	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  arise	  if	  we	  interpret	  
Wittgenstein’s	  approach	  in	  the	  PI	  as	  one	  of	  authoritative	  contradiction,	  whereby	  
Wittgenstein	  is	  seen	  as	  analysing	  the	  work	  of	  various	  philosophers	  and	  telling	  them	  
where	  they	  went	  wrong	  in	  thinking	  about	  their	  subject	  matter.	  However,	  if	  we	  pay	  
close	  attention	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  strategies	  in	  the	  PI	  and	  what	  he	  says	  about	  his	  own	  
approach,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  spirit	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  carries	  
out	  his	  techniques	  of	  philosophical	  clarification.	  	  
	  
First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  PI	  Wittgenstein	  hardly	  ever	  addresses	  his	  
remarks	  explicitly	  towards	  the	  work	  of	  actual	  philosophers,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  
engage	  in	  dialogue	  with	  imaginary	  interlocutors	  who	  say	  things	  that	  more	  or	  less	  
resemble	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  that	  philosophers	  have	  said	  throughout	  history.	  
Exceptions	  to	  this	  are	  Wittgenstein’s	  explicit	  references	  to	  Plato	  (§46,	  §518),	  
Augustine	  (PI	  §1,	  §2,	  §3,	  §4,	  §5,	  §32,	  §89,	  §90,	  §436,	  §618),	  Frege	  (PI	  §22,	  §49,	  §71),	  
Russell	  (PI	  §46,	  §79),	  the	  Tractatus	  (PI	  §23,	  §46,	  §97,	  §114),	  Moore	  (PI	  §87,	  §98)	  and	  
William	  James	  (PI	  §299);	  however	  given	  that	  such	  remarks	  only	  constitute	  a	  fraction	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of	  the	  text,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  primary	  mode	  of	  operation	  in	  the	  PI	  is	  to	  
work	  with	  unattributed	  or	  fictional	  examples	  of	  philosophical	  problems,	  theories	  and	  
ways	  of	  thinking.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  there	  is	  the	  consideration	  that	  when	  Wittgenstein	  does	  make	  inferences	  
about	  the	  work	  of	  actual	  philosophers,	  he	  quite	  often	  qualifies	  these	  inferences	  so	  
that	  they	  are	  not	  bald	  assertions	  about	  how	  the	  relevant	  philosophers	  ‘think’	  or	  how	  
they	  arrived	  at	  certain	  philosophical	  propositions	  or	  concepts.	  For	  example,	  as	  I	  have	  
previously	  highlighted,	  when	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  an	  inference	  in	  PI	  §1	  about	  how	  
someone	  is	  thinking	  who	  describes	  language	  learning	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Augustine	  does,	  
he	  qualifies	  this	  with	  the	  expression	  “so	  I	  want	  to	  believe”	  [so	  möchte	  ich	  glauben].	  
Similarly,	  when	  Wittgenstein	  provides	  an	  account	  in	  PI	  §22	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  way	  in	  
which	  he	  thinks	  that	  Frege	  understood	  his	  concept	  of	  an	  ‘assumption’,	  he	  writes	  that	  
“Frege	  probably	  conceived	  of	  the	  ‘assumption’	  along	  these	  lines”	  (PI	  §22,	  my	  
emphasis);	  and	  in	  PI	  §71	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  the	  following	  qualified	  suggestion	  
concerning	  Frege’s	  understanding	  of	  conceptual	  boundaries:	  “Frege	  compares	  a	  
concept	  to	  a	  region,	  and	  says	  that	  a	  region	  without	  clear	  boundaries	  can’t	  be	  called	  a	  
region	  at	  all.	  This	  presumably	  means	  that	  we	  can’t	  do	  anything	  with	  it”	  (PI	  §71,	  my	  
emphasis).	  
	  
Finally,	  when	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  about	  his	  methodology	  in	  PI	  §133,	  he	  remarks:	  
	  
“The	  real	  discovery	  is	  the	  one	  that	  enables	  me	  to	  break	  off	  
philosophising	  when	  I	  want	  to.	  –	  The	  one	  that	  gives	  philosophy	  peace,	  so	  that	  
it	  is	  no	  longer	  tormented	  by	  questions	  which	  bring	  itself	  in	  question.	  –	  
Instead,	  a	  method	  is	  now	  demonstrated	  by	  examples,	  and	  the	  series	  of	  
examples	  can	  be	  broken	  off.—	  Problems	  are	  solved	  (difficulties	  eliminated),	  
not	  a	  single	  problem.	  	  
There	  is	  not	  a	  single	  philosophical	  method,	  though	  there	  are	  indeed	  
methods,	  so	  to	  speak	  different	  therapies.”	  
	  
This	  remark	  suggests	  various	  possibilities.	  One	  of	  them	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein	  sees	  his	  
work	  in	  the	  PI	  primarily	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  different	  methods	  for	  eliminating	  the	  
difficulties	  that	  we	  call	  ‘philosophical	  problems’;	  while	  another	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein	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sees	  these	  methods	  as	  being	  more	  like	  ‘therapies’	  of	  some	  kind	  than	  methods	  of	  
criticism	  or	  contradiction.	  	  
	  
These	  features	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  approach	  in	  the	  PI	  have	  important	  consequences	  for	  
how	  we	  understand	  the	  status	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  remarks,	  including	  those	  that	  
include	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  to	  characterise	  philosophical	  problems,	  theories	  
and	  ways	  of	  thinking.	  One	  such	  consequence	  is	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  methods	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  demonstrates	  in	  the	  PI	  does	  not	  depend	  upon	  the	  validity	  of	  any	  
particular	  claim	  that	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  about	  the	  work	  of	  actual	  philosophers	  
within	  the	  text,	  since	  these	  claims	  are	  simply	  part	  of	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  methods	  
whose	  usefulness	  is	  to	  be	  proven	  upon	  their	  application.	  Another	  is	  that	  the	  principal	  
aim	  of	  the	  methods	  that	  Wittgenstein	  demonstrates	  in	  the	  PI	  is	  not	  to	  state	  how	  
matters	  stand	  or	  to	  contradict	  what	  someone	  else	  has	  said,	  but	  rather	  to	  enable	  the	  
dissolution	  of	  various	  difficulties	  with	  which	  a	  person	  may	  become	  preoccupied.	  As	  
Kuusela	  puts	  it:	  	  
	  
“Clarification	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  establishing	  what	  would	  be	  the	  
correct,	  non-­‐misleading	  ways	  of	  thinking.	  Philosophy	  is	  not	  the	  correction	  of	  
mistakes	  but	  is	  more	  like	  a	  therapy.	  …	  The	  objective	  of	  such	  therapies	  is	  to	  
release	  a	  person	  from	  the	  grip	  of	  misleading	  conceptions	  she	  has	  adopted,	  
that	  is,	  from	  the	  misleading	  pictures	  that	  hold	  her	  thought	  in	  a	  cramp,	  causing	  
disquietude	  and	  not	  allowing	  her	  to	  reach	  clarity	  about	  the	  matters	  at	  hand.”	  
(Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.45)	  
	  
The	  upshot	  of	  these	  considerations	  is	  that	  (a)	  the	  primary	  justification	  for	  the	  
statements	  that	  one	  makes	  in	  the	  course	  of	  employing	  these	  methods	  is	  not	  based	  on	  
their	  veracity,	  but	  on	  how	  effective	  they	  are	  in	  dissolving	  philosophical	  problems;	  and	  
(b)	  it	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  that	  someone	  who	  seeks	  to	  apply	  these	  methods	  to	  
the	  work	  of	  contemporary	  (living)	  academics,	  should	  engage	  and	  involve	  their	  
subjects	  in	  a	  way	  that	  facilitates	  the	  latter’s	  release	  from	  their	  apparent	  difficulties.	  In	  
other	  words,	  rather	  than	  stridently	  proclaiming	  the	  incorrectness	  of	  a	  person’s	  claims	  
or	  assumptions,	  a	  less	  didactic,	  conversational	  approach	  may	  be	  needed	  in	  order	  for	  




In	  the	  context	  of	  these	  sorts	  of	  observations,	  previous	  interpreters	  –	  fortified	  by	  
supporting	  remarks	  from	  Wittgenstein’s	  nachlass	  –	  have	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  
securing	  a	  person’s	  ‘acknowledgement’	  when	  applying	  the	  methods	  demonstrated	  by	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  PI	  to	  their	  thought	  (e.g.	  as	  expressed	  in	  their	  written	  work).	  Thus	  
Gordon	  Baker,	  following	  up	  Wittgenstein’s	  comparison	  of	  his	  methods	  with	  therapies	  
in	  PI	  §133,	  writes	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  “aim	  was	  to	  bring	  each	  patient	  to	  acknowledge	  
the	  origins	  of	  her	  particular	  conceptual	  disorder,”	  and	  that	  “the	  patient’s	  own	  
acknowledgement	  of	  the	  rules	  in	  which	  she	  is	  entangled	  is	  a	  precondition	  of	  the	  
correctness	  of	  the	  diagnosis	  (BT	  410)	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  cure	  (BT	  
410)”	  (Baker,	  2004	  [1992]:	  p.68).	  Similarly,	  Hutchinson	  and	  Read	  write	  that	  the	  
clarifications	  Wittgenstein	  offers	  in	  the	  PI	  are	  “when	  read	  through	  the	  hermeneutic	  
of	  therapy,	  clarifications	  in	  the	  achievement	  sense.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  only	  serve	  as	  
clarifications	  if	  our	  interlocutor	  recognises	  them	  as	  such”	  (Hutchinson	  and	  Read,	  
2008:	  p.156-­‐7).	  This	  is	  a	  point	  with	  which	  Kuusela	  also	  concurs:	  
	  
“What	  counts	  as	  a	  confusion	  or	  a	  misunderstanding	  [according	  to	  later	  
Wittgenstein]	  is	  not	  defined	  by	  reference	  to	  a	  criterion	  established,	  so	  to	  
speak,	  from	  outside	  by	  the	  philosopher	  examining	  a	  person’s	  language	  use.	  
Rather,	  identifying	  a	  confusion	  requires	  acknowledgement	  from	  the	  speaker	  
herself.	  The	  requirement	  of	  acknowledgement	  or	  consent	  is	  emphasised	  in	  
the	  1937	  version	  of	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations:	  ‘One	  of	  our	  most	  
important	  tasks	  is	  to	  express	  all	  false	  trains	  of	  thought	  so	  characteristically	  
that	  the	  other	  says,	  ‘Yes	  that	  is	  exactly	  the	  way	  I	  meant	  it.’	  …	  Indeed	  we	  can	  
only	  convict	  someone	  else	  of	  a	  mistake	  if	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  this	  is	  really	  
the	  expression	  of	  his	  feeling.	  For	  only	  if	  he	  acknowledges	  it	  as	  such,	  is	  it	  the	  
correct	  expression.’”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.28)	  
	  
	  
The	  above	  re-­‐specification	  of	  the	  status	  of	  remarks	  made	  using	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  
concept	  of	  a	  ‘picture’	  –	  from	  didactic	  claims	  about	  the	  historical	  and	  psychological	  
provenance	  of	  a	  person’s	  way	  of	  thinking	  and	  writing	  about	  their	  subject	  matter,	  to	  
potentially	  ‘therapeutic’	  remarks	  awaiting	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  person	  
whose	  work	  they	  seek	  to	  characterise	  –	  enables	  us	  to	  overcome	  the	  critic’s	  objection	  
concerning	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  sound	  methodological	  justification	  for	  such	  ‘claims’.	  As	  we	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will	  see	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  it	  also	  requires	  us	  to	  adjust	  our	  tone	  and	  modus	  operandi	  
when	  using	  later	  Wittgenstein	  to	  criticise	  the	  work	  of	  ‘positivist’	  IR	  scholars.	  	  
 
 
3.3	   The	  Methodological	  Justification	  of	  Appeals	  to	  ‘Ordinary’	  Language	  
 
	  
A	  final	  task	  that	  I	  want	  to	  accomplish	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  methodological	  
justification	  based	  on	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  for	  appealing	  to	  facts	  or	  
features	  of	  ‘ordinary’	  language-­‐use.	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  is	  an	  important	  issue	  to	  
address	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  only	  because	  I	  identified	  one	  of	  the	  
problems	  with	  the	  ARO	  as	  being	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  justification	  for	  appeals	  to	  
‘ordinary	  language’;	  but	  also	  because	  employing	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  concept	  of	  a	  
‘picture’	  in	  identifying	  patterns	  of	  bias	  in	  another’s	  writing	  will	  inevitably	  involve	  
making	  observations	  about	  how	  they	  are	  using	  language,	  sometimes	  involving	  
comparisons	  with	  ‘ordinary’	  usage.	  Unlike	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  I	  have	  not	  
at	  any	  point	  sought	  to	  deny	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  legitimately	  make	  empirical	  
true/false	  claims,	  to	  form	  and	  test	  hypotheses,	  and	  to	  arrive	  at	  certain	  knowledge,	  
and	  therefore	  I	  do	  not	  face	  the	  significant	  potential	  problem	  of	  self-­‐contradiction	  that	  
the	  ARO	  does	  in	  appealing	  to	  observations	  of	  how	  language	  is	  ordinarily	  used	  (see	  
Section	  2.2,	  problems	  4	  and	  6).	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  still	  necessary	  for	  the	  sound	  
employment	  of	  the	  technique(s)	  I	  recommend	  to	  provide	  some	  account	  of	  what	  
‘ordinary	  language-­‐use’	  is,	  and	  the	  status	  of	  observations	  that	  are	  made	  about	  it.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  accomplish	  this	  goal,	  I	  will	  start	  by	  summarising	  Baker	  and	  Hacker’s	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  ‘everyday’	  or	  ‘ordinary’	  language-­‐use	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  
later	  philosophy	  in	  their	  Analytical	  Commentary	  on	  the	  PI,	  which	  is	  a	  popular	  
interpretation	  that	  has	  not	  only	  been	  taken	  up	  by	  various	  subsequent	  interpreters	  of	  
the	  PI,	  but	  also	  apparently	  by	  Pin-­‐Fat	  (e.g.	  2010:	  p.1	  and	  p.21).	  I	  will	  then	  consider	  
some	  problems	  with	  this	  interpretation	  raised	  by	  Kuusela	  in	  The	  Struggle	  Against	  
Dogmatism,	  before	  developing	  my	  own	  interpretation	  of	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  
Wittgenstein	  distinguishes	  between	  ‘philosophical’	  and	  ‘everyday’	  language-­‐use	  in	  
the	  PI	  that	  avoids	  these	  problems.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  appeal	  to	  Cavell’s	  interpretation	  of	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the	  status	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  remarks	  concerning	  ‘what	  we	  say’	  as	  a	  
methodological	  basis	  for	  making	  observations	  about	  how	  words	  are	  ordinarily	  used.	  
	  
Baker and Hacker’s Interpretation 
	  
In	  their	  Analytical	  Commentary	  on	  the	  PI,	  Baker	  and	  Hacker	  present	  a	  reading	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  conception	  of	  ‘everyday’	  versus	  ‘philosophical’	  language	  along	  the	  
following	  lines.	  Linguistic	  expressions	  such	  as	  words	  and	  sentences	  only	  make	  sense	  
in	  when	  they	  are	  used	  in	  specific	  ‘everyday’	  contexts	  of	  use,	  where	  there	  are	  
established	  conventions	  for	  their	  application.	  Using	  the	  terminology	  of	  the	  PI,	  these	  
everyday	  contexts	  of	  language-­‐use	  can	  be	  called	  ‘language-­‐games’,	  while	  the	  
established	  conventions	  for	  the	  application	  of	  expressions	  within	  these	  contexts	  can	  
be	  called	  ‘grammar’	  or	  ‘grammatical	  rules’.	  In	  this	  light,	  ‘philosophical	  theses’	  are	  
either	  trivial	  articulations	  of	  implicit	  grammatical	  rules	  for	  the	  use	  of	  expressions	  
(such	  as	  ‘five	  is	  a	  number’),	  or	  “nonsense”	  that	  has	  been	  generated	  by	  philosophers	  
‘misusing’	  words	  and	  other	  linguistic	  expressions	  in	  ways	  that	  go	  against	  the	  
established	  conventions.	  They	  write:	  
	  
“The	  putative	  propositions	  of	  philosophy	  (especially,	  but	  not	  only,	  of	  
metaphysics)	  are	  either	  grammatical	  trivialities	  or	  nonsense	  that	  transgresses	  
the	  grammar	  of	  the	  constituent	  expressions.”	  (Baker	  and	  Hacker,	  2005	  [1980]	  
b:	  p.256)	  
	  
According	  to	  this	  reading,	  ‘everyday’	  language,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  conventional	  ways	  
in	  which	  expressions	  are	  used	  in	  established	  contexts	  of	  language-­‐use,	  is	  ‘superior’	  to	  
‘philosophical’	  language,	  and	  serves	  as	  the	  ideal	  standard	  of	  ‘sense’	  according	  to	  
which	  philosophical	  language	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  trivial	  or	  meaningless.	  As	  Baker	  and	  
Hacker	  observe,	  “it	  is	  the	  everyday,	  ordinary	  language-­‐game,	  not	  the	  metaphysical	  
misuse	  of	  words,	  that	  wears	  the	  trousers.	  For	  it	  is	  in	  the	  language-­‐game	  where	  the	  
expression	  is	  at	  home	  that	  it	  has	  an	  established	  and	  intelligible	  sense”	  (Baker	  and	  
Hacker,	  2005	  [1980]	  b:	  p.254).	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In	  this	  light,	  Baker	  and	  Hacker	  see	  Wittgenstein’s	  main	  task	  in	  the	  PI	  as	  being	  to	  
reveal	  the	  ‘nonsensicality’	  of	  philosophical	  uses	  of	  language,	  bringing	  philosophers	  to	  
“the	  painful	  recognition	  of	  [their]	  previous	  attempts	  to	  transgress	  the	  boundaries	  of	  
sense”	  (Baker	  and	  Hacker,	  2005	  [1980]	  b:	  p.255),	  and	  thereby	  inducing	  them	  to	  
return	  to	  using	  words	  and	  expressions	  in	  ‘everyday’	  ways	  that	  are	  in	  accordance	  with	  
the	  established	  grammatical	  norms	  of	  our	  existing	  practices.	  In	  this	  way,	  
Wittgenstein’s	  remark	  that	  “What	  we	  do	  is	  to	  bring	  words	  back	  from	  their	  
metaphysical	  to	  their	  everyday	  use”	  (PI	  116)	  is	  interpreted	  by	  Baker	  and	  Hacker	  as	  
meaning	  that	  the	  methods	  in	  the	  PI	  are	  designed	  to	  “bring	  words	  back	  from	  their	  
metaphysical	  use	  to	  their	  correct	  use	  (richtige	  Verwendung)	  in	  the	  language”	  (Baker	  




In	  Struggle	  Against	  Dogmatism	  Kuusela	  takes	  issue	  with	  Baker	  and	  Hacker’s	  
interpretation,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  other	  interpreters	  such	  as	  Hintikka	  and	  Hintikka,	  and	  
Avrum	  Stroll	  who	  endorse	  similar	  readings	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ‘everyday’	  in	  
Wittgenstein’s	  later	  methodology.	  He	  sums	  up	  Baker	  and	  Hacker’s	  interpretation	  as	  
follows:	  
	  
“Baker	  and	  Hacker	  take	  everyday	  or	  ordinary	  language	  to	  constitute	  a	  ground	  
of	  intelligibility	  for	  Wittgenstein	  in	  a	  very	  particular	  sense.	  ...	  from	  their	  point	  
of	  view	  deviation	  from	  ordinary	  language	  means	  either	  speaking	  nonsense	  or	  
falling	  into	  irrelevance,	  that	  is,	  losing	  contact	  with	  what	  we	  speak	  about	  when	  
we	  employ	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘language’	  and	  ‘meaning’,	  and	  so	  on,	  that	  have	  their	  
roots	  in	  everyday	  life	  and	  language.	  To	  avoid	  this	  fall	  into	  nonsense	  or	  
irrelevancy,	  philosophers	  must	  use	  their	  expressions	  in	  accordance	  with	  
everyday	  language,	  which	  in	  this	  sense	  constitutes	  a	  standard	  for	  correct	  or	  
meaningful	  language	  use	  and	  also	  for	  the	  correctness	  of	  philosophical	  views	  
relating	  to	  everyday	  concepts.”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.275-­‐6)	  
	  
Kuusela	  objects	  to	  this	  reading	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  implies	  that	  “ordinary	  or	  
everyday	  language,	  or	  a	  certain	  description	  of	  it,	  constitutes	  for	  Wittgenstein	  a	  
standard	  of	  sense	  that	  he	  urges	  one	  to	  abide	  by”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.79,	  see	  also	  p.40).	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Against	  this	  Kuusela	  cites	  Savickey’s	  point	  that	  under	  such	  an	  interpretation	  
“Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  would	  thus	  become	  ‘a	  form	  of	  intellectual	  constraint	  or	  
censorship’”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.79;	  Savickey,	  1999:	  p.105),	  and	  argues	  that	  to	  appeal	  
to	  everyday	  language	  as	  a	  standard	  of	  sense	  “presupposes	  that	  an	  (ultimately)	  
uncontroversial	  way	  of	  identifying	  what	  counts	  as	  conformity	  with	  everyday	  language	  
is	  available”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.276).	  Kuusela	  also	  quotes	  a	  passage	  from	  an	  earlier	  
draft	  of	  the	  PI	  that	  appears	  to	  directly	  contradict	  Baker	  and	  Hacker’s	  reading,	  where	  
Wittgenstein	  writes:	  
	  
	  “Why	  are	  the	  grammatical	  problems	  so	  tough	  and	  seemingly	  ineradicable?—
Because	  they	  are	  connected	  with	  the	  oldest	  thought	  habits,	  i.e.,	  with	  the	  
oldest	  pictures	  that	  are	  engraved	  into	  our	  language	  itself.	  …	  
	  	   People	  are	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  philosophical,	  i.e.,	  grammatical	  
confusions.	  And	  to	  free	  them	  from	  these	  presupposes	  pulling	  them	  out	  from	  
the	  immensely	  manifold	  connections	  they	  are	  caught	  up	  in.	  …	  –But	  this	  
language	  came	  about	  //	  developed	  //	  as	  it	  did	  because	  people	  had—and	  
have—the	  inclination	  to	  think	  in	  this	  way.”	  (TS	  213:	  422-­‐423,	  as	  translated	  by	  
Kuusela)	  
	  
In	  the	  passage	  quoted	  by	  Kuusela,	  rather	  than	  portraying	  ordinary	  language	  as	  the	  
‘standard	  of	  sense’	  according	  to	  which	  philosophical	  ‘misuses’	  of	  words	  can	  be	  
identified	  and	  corrected,	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  that	  philosophical	  problems	  can	  arise	  
through	  engaging	  in	  habits	  of	  thought	  that	  are	  metaphorically-­‐speaking	  engraved	  
into	  the	  forms	  of	  our	  ordinary	  language.	  As	  Kuusela	  puts	  it,	  this	  shows	  that	  
“Wittgenstein	  is	  not	  committed	  to	  an	  assumption	  about	  the	  separation	  of	  everyday	  
language	  from	  philosophical	  ideas”,	  and	  that	  “far	  from	  being	  uninfluenced	  by	  
philosophically	  problematic	  tendencies	  of	  thinking,	  the	  development	  of	  everyday	  
language,	  according	  to	  him,	  is	  affected	  by	  just	  the	  kind	  of	  tendencies	  of	  thinking	  that	  
also	  lie	  at	  the	  root	  of	  philosophical	  problems”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.278).	  Kuusela	  
concludes	  that	  “Wittgenstein’s	  conception	  of	  everyday	  language	  seems	  radically	  
different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  ordinary	  language	  philosophers,	  who	  seem	  to	  have	  more	  or	  
less	  assumed	  that	  ordinary	  language	  constitutes	  a	  reliable	  ground	  for	  deciding	  
philosophical	  questions”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.278).	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  these	  problems,	  Kuusela	  proposes	  an	  alternative	  interpretation	  
according	  to	  which	  to	  “lead	  words	  back	  to	  everyday	  language	  …	  is	  …	  to	  refrain	  from	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assuming	  with	  the	  metaphysician	  that	  there	  must	  be	  some	  unified	  definition	  of	  the	  
cases	  falling	  under	  a	  concept	  and	  to	  adopt	  instead	  a	  more	  humble	  employment	  of	  
clarificatory	  concepts”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.281).	  We	  can	  think	  of	  Kuusela’s	  
interpretation	  as	  a	  ‘negative’	  understanding	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  conception	  of	  the	  
everyday;	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  instead	  of	  identifying	  ‘everyday	  language’	  as	  a	  type	  of	  
language-­‐use,	  Kuusela	  suggests	  that	  according	  to	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  the	  
‘everydayness’	  of	  everyday	  language	  simply	  consists	  in	  the	  avoidance	  of	  metaphysical	  
uses	  of	  words	  and	  expressions,	  where	  a	  ‘metaphysical	  use’	  amounts	  to	  using	  a	  
concept	  as	  though	  all	  cases	  of	  its	  application	  could	  be	  captured	  under	  one	  definition.	  
He	  suggests:	  
	  
“By	  characterising	  what	  ‘we’—the	  Wittgensteinian	  philosophers—do	  as	  
‘leading	  words	  back,’	  Wittgenstein	  is	  referring	  to	  a	  particular	  approach	  or	  to	  a	  
style	  of	  philosophy.	  But	  he	  is	  not	  committed	  to	  any	  claims	  or	  assumptions	  
about	  a	  clearly	  circumscribable	  concept	  of	  everyday	  language	  under	  which	  
philosophical	  uses	  must	  be	  subsumed	  or	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  uses	  of	  everyday	  
expressions	  are	  clearly	  definable	  and	  that	  philosophers	  have	  to	  match	  their	  
concepts	  with	  such	  uses.”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.281)	  
	  
A Different Approach  
	  
Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  is	  all	  right	  as	  far	  as	  it	  goes.	  However,	  conceiving	  of	  everyday	  
language	  purely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  avoidance	  of	  metaphysics,	  in	  the	  narrowly-­‐defined	  
sense	  of	  ‘metaphysics’	  employed	  by	  Kuusela,	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  various	  
remarks	  in	  the	  PI	  where	  Wittgenstein	  openly	  describes	  or	  refers	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
words	  and	  expressions	  are	  ‘actually	  used’	  in	  ordinary	  or	  everyday	  cases	  –	  including	  
remarks	  where	  Wittgenstein	  contrasts	  such	  uses	  with	  ‘philosophical’	  or	  
‘metaphysical’	  ones.120	  Examples	  are	  PI	  §134,	  where	  Wittgenstein	  addresses	  the	  
philosophical	  statement	  that	  the	  general	  form	  of	  a	  proposition	  is	  “this	  is	  how	  things	  
are”	  by	  asking	  “how	  is	  this	  sentence	  applied—that	  is,	  in	  our	  everyday	  language?”,	  PI	  
                                                
120	  Kuusela	  himself	  acknowledges	  that	  even	  though	  he	  thinks	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  read	  later	  
Wittgenstein	  as	  appealing	  to	  everyday	  language	  as	  an	  ideal	  standard	  of	  ‘correct’	  usage,	  the	  
examination	  and	  description	  of	  ‘normal’	  uses	  still	  has	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  clarification	  of	  philosophical	  
problems:	  “Wittgenstein	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  suggesting	  that	  one	  must	  abide	  by	  ordinary	  ways	  of	  
using	  language.	  …	  Rather,	  the	  purpose	  of	  examining	  the	  normal	  context	  of	  use	  is	  to	  clarify	  the	  
functioning	  of	  the	  word	  and	  help	  get	  rid	  of	  confusions”	  (Kuusela,	  2008:	  p.40).	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§412,	  where	  Wittgenstein	  comments	  regarding	  an	  imaginary	  philosophical	  utterance	  
that	  “I	  did	  not	  utter	  the	  sentence	  in	  the	  surroundings	  in	  which	  it	  would	  have	  had	  an	  
everyday	  and	  unparadoxical	  sense”,	  and	  a	  passage	  in	  Part	  II	  of	  the	  PI	  where	  
Wittgenstein	  writes	  that	  “the	  everyday	  language-­‐game	  [of	  what	  is	  called	  a	  ‘physical	  
object’]	  is	  to	  be	  accepted,	  and	  false	  accounts	  of	  it	  characterised	  as	  false”.121	  In	  
addition	  to	  the	  above	  exegetical	  concern,	  Kuusela’s	  interpretation	  would	  be	  of	  
limited	  use	  for	  our	  purposes	  of	  providing	  a	  methodological	  justification	  for	  making	  
observations	  concerning	  how	  language	  is	  used,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  identifying	  
problematic	  tendencies	  and	  patterns	  of	  bias	  in	  the	  work	  of	  others.	  What	  is	  needed,	  
then,	  is	  an	  interpretation	  of	  what	  Wittgenstein	  means	  by	  ‘everyday’	  or	  ‘ordinary’	  
language-­‐use	  in	  remarks	  where	  he	  describes	  such	  uses	  and	  contrasts	  them	  with	  
philosophical	  utterances,	  which	  avoids	  the	  problems	  identified	  by	  Kuusela,	  and	  can	  
be	  used	  to	  provide	  a	  sound	  explanation	  of	  the	  methodological	  status	  of	  observations	  
concerning	  ‘ordinary’	  or	  ‘everyday’	  language	  that	  we	  might	  want	  to	  use	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  clarifying	  apparently	  problematic	  forms	  of	  expression	  in	  academic	  
written	  work.	  I	  will	  now	  endeavour	  to	  provide	  such	  an	  interpretation.	  
	  
‘Everyday’	  vs.	  ‘Philosophical’	  Language	  
	  
As	  with	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘picture’,	  trying	  to	  explain	  in	  more	  detail	  
what	  Wittgenstein	  means	  by	  ‘everyday’	  or	  ‘ordinary’	  language	  in	  contexts	  of	  
philosophical	  clarification	  does	  not	  necessarily	  involve	  assuming	  that	  whenever	  
Wittgenstein	  uses	  terms	  like	  ‘everyday’,	  ‘ordinary’,	  ‘normal’	  etc.	  that	  he	  always	  
means	  the	  same	  thing.	  With	  that	  in	  mind,	  I	  will	  be	  upfront	  with	  my	  acknowledgement	  
that	  I	  am	  picking	  out	  and	  elaborating	  one	  particular	  sense	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  can	  
be	  seen	  to	  employ	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘everyday’	  or	  ‘ordinary’	  language	  in	  a	  number	  of	  
remarks	  in	  the	  PI,	  and	  a	  corresponding	  sense	  in	  which	  certain	  philosophical	  
utterances	  are	  not	  ‘ordinary’	  or	  ‘everyday’	  according	  to	  the	  sense	  employed	  in	  these	  
remarks.	  	  
	  
                                                
121	  Published	  as	  §162	  of	  ‘Philosophy	  of	  Psychology	  –	  A	  Fragment	  xi’	  in	  the	  2009	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell	  edition	  
of	  the	  PI.	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In	  PI	  §412	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  the	  following	  lengthy	  but	  worthwhile	  passage,	  in	  
which	  he	  contrasts	  a	  ‘philosophical’	  with	  an	  ‘everyday’	  use	  of	  a	  sentence:	  
	  
“The	  feeling	  of	  an	  unbridgeable	  gulf	  between	  consciousness	  and	  brain	  
process:	  how	  come	  that	  this	  plays	  no	  role	  in	  reflections	  of	  ordinary	  life?	  This	  
idea	  of	  a	  difference	  in	  kind	  is	  accompanied	  by	  slight	  giddiness	  –	  which	  occurs	  
when	  we	  are	  doing	  logical	  tricks.	  …	  When	  does	  this	  feeling	  occur	  in	  the	  
present	  case?	  It	  is	  when	  I,	  for	  example,	  turn	  my	  attention	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  
on	  to	  my	  own	  consciousness	  and,	  astonished,	  say	  to	  myself:	  “THIS	  is	  supposed	  
to	  be	  produced	  by	  a	  process	  in	  the	  brain!”	  –	  as	  it	  were	  clutching	  my	  forehead.	  
–	  But	  what	  can	  it	  mean	  to	  speak	  of	  “turning	  my	  attention	  on	  to	  my	  own	  
consciousness”?	  There	  is	  surely	  nothing	  more	  extraordinary	  than	  that	  there	  
should	  be	  any	  such	  thing!	  What	  I	  described	  with	  these	  words	  (which	  are	  not	  
used	  in	  this	  way	  in	  ordinary	  life)	  was	  an	  act	  of	  gazing.	  I	  gazed	  fixedly	  in	  front	  of	  
me	  –	  but	  not	  at	  any	  particular	  point	  or	  object.	  My	  eyes	  were	  wide	  open,	  
brows	  not	  contracted	  (as	  they	  mostly	  are	  when	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  a	  particular	  
object).	  No	  such	  interest	  preceded	  this	  gazing.	  My	  glance	  was	  vacant;	  or	  
again,	  like	  that	  of	  someone	  admiring	  the	  illumination	  of	  the	  sky	  and	  drinking	  
in	  the	  light.	  	  
Note	  that	  the	  sentence	  which	  I	  uttered	  as	  a	  paradox	  (“this	  is	  produced	  
by	  a	  brain	  process!”)	  has	  nothing	  paradoxical	  about	  it.	  I	  could	  have	  said	  it	  in	  
the	  course	  of	  an	  experiment	  whose	  purpose	  was	  to	  show	  that	  an	  effect	  of	  
light	  which	  I	  see	  is	  produced	  by	  stimulation	  of	  a	  particular	  part	  of	  the	  brain.	  –	  
But	  I	  did	  not	  utter	  the	  sentence	  in	  the	  surroundings	  in	  which	  it	  would	  have	  
had	  an	  everyday	  and	  unparadoxical	  sense.	  And	  my	  attention	  was	  not	  such	  as	  
would	  have	  been	  in	  keeping	  with	  that	  experiment.	  (If	  it	  had	  been,	  my	  gaze	  
would	  have	  been	  intent,	  not	  vacant.)”	  	  
	  
In	  this	  remark	  Wittgenstein	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  a	  ‘philosophical’	  use	  of	  a	  
sentence,	  whereby	  someone	  –	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  they	  are	  ‘turning	  their	  
attention	  onto	  their	  own	  consciousness’	  –	  gazes	  fixedly	  forward,	  without	  focusing	  on	  
a	  particular	  point	  or	  object,	  and	  says	  “THIS	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  produced	  by	  a	  process	  
in	  the	  brain!”	  In	  addition,	  Wittgenstein	  provides	  an	  explicit	  example	  of	  a	  different	  
scenario	  in	  which	  the	  same	  sentence	  would	  have	  had	  an	  “everyday	  sense”,	  which	  in	  
this	  case	  is	  an	  experiment	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  stimulating	  a	  certain	  part	  of	  the	  brain	  
produces	  a	  visual	  light	  effect.	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In	  the	  next	  remark,	  PI	  §413,	  Wittgenstein	  calls	  the	  ‘philosophical’	  context	  of	  use	  that	  
he	  imagined	  at	  the	  start	  of	  PI	  §412	  a	  “case	  of	  introspection”,	  which	  he	  likens	  to	  the	  
sort	  of	  introspection	  that	  “gave	  William	  James	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  ‘self’	  consisted	  
mainly	  of	  ‘peculiar	  motions	  in	  the	  head	  and	  between	  the	  head	  and	  the	  throat’”.	  
Wittgenstein	  suggests	  that	  this	  was	  not	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘self’	  as	  James	  thought,	  but	  
rather	  of	  “the	  state	  of	  a	  philosopher’s	  attention	  when	  he	  says	  the	  word	  ‘self’	  to	  
himself	  and	  tries	  to	  analyse	  its	  meaning”.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
Wittgenstein	  suggested	  in	  PI	  §412	  that	  someone	  who	  “turns	  their	  attention	  onto	  
their	  own	  consciousness”	  is	  not	  really	  attending	  to	  their	  own	  consciousness,	  but	  is	  
rather	  going	  into	  a	  kind	  of	  vacant	  trance.	  In	  this	  light,	  the	  next	  remark	  that	  comes	  is	  
highly	  significant:	  	  
	  
“You	  think	  that	  after	  all	  you	  must	  be	  weaving	  a	  piece	  of	  cloth:	  because	  you	  
are	  sitting	  at	  a	  loom	  –	  even	  if	  it	  is	  empty	  –	  and	  going	  through	  the	  motions	  of	  
weaving.”	  (PI	  §414)	  
	  
The	  implication	  of	  PI	  §414,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  two	  previous	  remarks,	  is	  this:	  that	  when	  
philosophers	  utter	  or	  write	  sentences	  in	  contexts	  of	  introspective	  reflection,	  they	  
might	  think	  that	  they	  are	  thereby	  stating	  observations	  about	  their	  own	  consciousness	  
or	  some	  other	  matter	  being	  introspected	  upon.	  However,	  Wittgenstein’s	  metaphor	  of	  
the	  empty	  loom	  suggests	  that	  they	  may	  only	  be	  going	  through	  the	  motions	  of	  using	  
language;	  and	  that	  the	  sentences	  philosophers	  use	  in	  such	  contexts	  are	  not	  
‘functional’	  in	  the	  way	  that	  that	  they	  would	  be	  in	  an	  ordinary	  (i.e.	  non-­‐philosophical)	  
setting.	  The	  example	  of	  a	  context	  in	  which	  such	  a	  sentence	  would	  have	  a	  functional	  
‘everyday’	  meaning	  that	  Wittgenstein	  provides,	  is	  stating	  the	  findings	  of	  an	  empirical	  
experiment.	  However	  this	  is	  presumably	  just	  one	  possible	  example	  which	  is	  
appropriate	  for	  the	  particular	  sentence	  that	  Wittgenstein	  is	  considering,	  and	  there	  
are	  other	  contexts	  of	  language-­‐use	  that	  could	  do	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  especially	  important	  observations	  to	  be	  made	  here:	  firstly,	  according	  
to	  this	  trio	  of	  remarks	  (§§412-­‐414),	  it	  is	  not	  particular	  words	  or	  sentences	  themselves	  
that	  are	  either	  ‘philosophical’	  or	  ‘everyday’;	  but	  rather	  it	  is	  the	  conditions	  under	  
which	  they	  are	  written	  or	  uttered	  that	  makes	  them	  so.	  Secondly,	  in	  these	  remarks	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Wittgenstein	  associates	  ‘everyday’	  linguistic	  meaning	  with	  situations	  in	  which	  
language	  is	  functional	  or	  productive,	  as	  opposed	  to	  contexts	  of	  ‘philosophical’	  
reflection	  or	  introspection,	  where	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  that	  uttering	  the	  same	  
words	  and	  sentences	  is	  like	  making	  motions	  on	  an	  empty	  loom.	  	  
	  
These	  two	  observations	  are	  borne	  out	  by	  various	  other	  remarks	  in	  the	  PI.	  For	  
example,	  in	  PI	  §38,	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  
	  
“Naming	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  strange	  connection	  of	  a	  word	  with	  an	  object.	  –	  And	  
such	  a	  strange	  connection	  really	  obtains,	  particularly	  when	  a	  philosopher	  tries	  
to	  fathom	  the	  relation	  between	  name	  and	  what	  is	  named	  by	  staring	  at	  an	  
object	  in	  front	  of	  him	  and	  repeating	  a	  name,	  or	  even	  the	  word	  ‘this’,	  
innumerable	  times.	  For	  philosophical	  problems	  arise	  when	  language	  goes	  on	  
holiday.	  And	  then	  we	  may	  indeed	  imagine	  naming	  to	  be	  some	  remarkable	  
mental	  act,	  as	  it	  were	  the	  baptism	  of	  an	  object.	  And	  we	  can	  also	  say	  the	  word	  
‘this’	  to	  the	  object,	  as	  it	  were	  address	  the	  object	  as	  ‘this’	  –	  a	  strange	  use	  of	  
this	  word,	  which	  perhaps	  occurs	  only	  when	  philosophising.”	  
	  
Here	  Wittgenstein	  imagines	  the	  example	  of	  a	  philosopher	  who	  is	  attempting	  to	  –	  and	  
is	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  they	  are	  –	  investigating	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  name	  
and	  what	  is	  named,	  by	  ‘observing’	  their	  own	  repeated	  action	  of	  naming	  a	  particular	  
object	  in	  private	  (a	  kind	  of	  solitary	  ‘ceremony’	  similar	  to	  that	  Wittgenstein	  imagines	  
in	  PI	  §258).122	  However,	  similarly	  with	  the	  case	  of	  ‘turning	  one’s	  attention	  to	  one’s	  
own	  consciousness’,	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  that	  what	  they	  are	  actually	  doing	  is	  simply	  
staring	  at	  an	  object	  while	  repeatedly	  uttering	  a	  word.	  The	  word	  ‘this’	  is	  being	  uttered;	  
however	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  that	  in	  this	  ‘odd’	  context	  of	  philosophical	  reflection,	  it	  
does	  not	  perform	  the	  kind	  of	  productive	  function	  that	  it	  does	  in	  other,	  non-­‐
philosophical	  contexts:	  it	  is	  “on	  holiday”.	  As	  Wittgenstein	  puts	  it	  in	  PI	  §132:	  “The	  
                                                
122	  “Let’s	  imagine	  the	  following	  case.	  I	  want	  to	  keep	  a	  diary	  about	  the	  recurrence	  of	  a	  certain	  
sensation.	  To	  this	  end	  I	  associate	  it	  with	  the	  sign	  “S”	  and	  write	  this	  sign	  in	  a	  calendar	  for	  every	  day	  on	  
which	  I	  have	  the	  sensation.	  —–	  I	  first	  want	  to	  observe	  that	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  sign	  cannot	  be	  
formulated.	  –	  But	  all	  the	  same,	  I	  can	  give	  one	  to	  myself	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ostensive	  definition!	  –	  How?	  Can	  I	  
point	  to	  the	  sensation?	  –	  Not	  in	  the	  ordinary	  sense.	  But	  I	  speak,	  or	  write	  the	  sign	  down,	  and	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  I	  concentrate	  my	  attention	  on	  the	  sensation	  –	  and	  so,	  as	  it	  were,	  point	  to	  it	  inwardly.	  –	  But	  




confusions	  which	  occupy	  us	  arise	  when	  language	  is,	  as	  it	  were,	  idling,	  not	  when	  it	  is	  
doing	  work.”	  So	  we	  could	  say	  that	  the	  philosopher	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  example	  is	  
‘using’	  the	  word	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  he	  is	  speaking	  it;	  however	  he	  is	  not	  ‘using’	  it	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  putting	  it	  to	  work.	  Wittgenstein’s	  association	  of	  ‘everyday’	  language	  with	  
work	  and	  functionality	  makes	  more	  sense	  if	  we	  recognise	  that	  the	  German	  word	  
Wittgenstein	  often	  uses	  in	  these	  contexts	  –	  alltäglich	  –	  can	  be	  used	  not	  only	  mean	  
‘ordinary’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘commonplace’,	  but	  also	  ‘workaday’.	  
	  
In	  other	  remarks,	  Wittgenstein	  adopts	  a	  different	  tactic	  to	  show	  up	  the	  idleness	  of	  
philosophical	  uses	  of	  language	  by	  imagining	  putting	  them	  to	  work	  in	  a	  functional	  
everyday	  scenario.	  For	  example,	  in	  PI	  §60	  he	  imagines	  placing	  a	  philosophically	  
‘analysed’	  sentence	  into	  an	  everyday	  context	  in	  which	  the	  relevant	  forms	  of	  
expression	  are	  ordinarily	  used.	  He	  writes:	  	  	  	  	  
	  
“Suppose	  that,	  instead	  of	  telling	  someone	  “Bring	  me	  the	  broom!”,	  you	  said	  
“Bring	  me	  the	  broomstick	  and	  the	  brush	  which	  is	  fitted	  on	  to	  it!”	  –	  Isn’t	  the	  
answer:	  “Do	  you	  want	  the	  broom?	  Why	  do	  you	  put	  it	  so	  oddly?”	  —–	  Is	  he	  
going	  to	  understand	  the	  further	  analysed	  sentence	  better?	  –	  This	  sentence,	  
one	  might	  say,	  comes	  to	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  the	  ordinary	  one,	  but	  in	  a	  more	  
roundabout	  way.”	  (PI	  §60)	  
The	  ‘analysed’	  sentence	  in	  this	  example	  might	  fit	  some	  philosopher’s	  desiderata	  of	  
clarity	  or	  fully-­‐articulated	  meaning	  that	  they	  have	  hit	  upon	  during	  a	  moment	  of	  
isolated	  philosophical	  reflection;	  however	  Wittgenstein	  points	  out	  that	  in	  the	  
everyday	  scenario	  in	  which	  the	  original	  expression	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  used,	  the	  ‘analysed’	  
version	  has	  no	  practical	  advantage	  over	  the	  original	  one	  in	  terms	  of	  enabling	  the	  
purpose	  and	  aims	  of	  the	  utterance	  –	  and	  to	  the	  contrary,	  may	  even	  impede	  its	  
effectiveness.	  
	  	  
Meanwhile	  in	  PI	  §246,	  Wittgenstein	  tries	  to	  imagine	  how	  one	  could	  use	  the	  
philosophical	  statement	  that	  ‘only	  I	  can	  know	  whether	  I	  am	  really	  in	  pain’	  to	  
accomplish	  something	  in	  ordinary	  non-­‐philosophical	  scenarios	  in	  which	  we	  use	  the	  
expressions	  ‘know’	  and	  ‘being	  in	  pain’;	  and	  in	  PI	  §296,	  Wittgenstein	  responds	  to	  an	  
interlocutor’s	  insistence	  that	  ‘there	  is	  a	  Something	  which	  accompanies	  my	  cry	  of	  pain	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on	  account	  of	  which	  I	  utter	  it’	  by	  questioning	  “Only	  to	  whom	  are	  we	  telling	  this?	  And	  
on	  what	  occasion?”	  Similarly,	  in	  PI	  §416	  Wittgenstein	  responds	  to	  the	  proposition	  
that	  human	  beings	  “are	  their	  own	  witnesses	  that	  they	  have	  consciousness”	  by	  
questioning:	  “whom	  do	  I	  really	  inform	  if	  I	  say	  ‘I	  have	  consciousness’?	  What	  is	  the	  
purpose	  of	  saying	  this	  to	  myself,	  and	  how	  can	  another	  person	  understand	  me?”	  
According	  to	  such	  remarks,	  what	  is	  distinctive	  and	  problematic	  about	  ‘philosophical’	  
uses	  of	  language	  is	  not	  that	  they	  involve	  the	  employment	  of	  words	  and	  expressions	  in	  
novel	  ways	  which	  ‘violate’	  the	  implicit	  rules	  of	  established	  practices	  of	  using	  words;	  
but	  rather	  that	  they	  do	  so	  without	  achieving	  any	  practical	  improvements	  over	  our	  
existing	  forms	  of	  language	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  various	  aims	  and	  purposes	  that	  they	  
satisfy.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  also	  another	  element	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  understanding	  of	  ‘philosophical’	  
language	  in	  the	  PI	  that	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned	  under	  the	  last	  two	  sections,	  which	  is	  
to	  do	  with	  the	  generation	  of	  ‘pictures’	  or	  ‘illusions’.	  Although	  I	  have	  suggested	  so	  far	  
in	  this	  subsection	  that	  according	  to	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  philosophical	  contexts	  of	  
language-­‐use	  are	  ones	  where	  language	  is	  uttered	  and	  written	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  in	  a	  
certain	  sense	  non-­‐functional,	  we	  saw	  earlier	  from	  remarks	  like	  PI	  §216	  and	  PI	  §295	  
that	  later	  Wittgenstein	  does	  associate	  philosophical	  language-­‐use	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  
ornamental	  or	  aesthetic	  function	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘calling	  up	  pictures’	  or	  being	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  ‘play	  of	  the	  imagination’.	  To	  refresh	  our	  memories,	  here	  are	  the	  
relevant	  extracts	  again:	  
	  
“So	  this	  is	  what	  I	  imagine:	  everyone	  says	  of	  himself	  that	  he	  knows	  what	  pain	  is	  
only	  from	  his	  own	  pain.	  –	  Not	  that	  people	  really	  say	  that,	  or	  are	  even	  
prepared	  to	  say	  it.	  But	  if	  everybody	  said	  it	  ––	  it	  might	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  
exclamation.	  And	  even	  if	  it	  gives	  no	  information,	  still,	  it	  is	  a	  picture;	  and	  why	  
should	  we	  not	  want	  to	  call	  such	  a	  picture	  before	  our	  mind?	  Imagine	  an	  
allegorical	  painting	  instead	  of	  the	  words.	  
Indeed,	  when	  we	  look	  into	  ourselves	  as	  we	  do	  philosophy,	  we	  often	  
get	  to	  see	  just	  such	  a	  picture.	  Virtually	  a	  pictorial	  representation	  of	  our	  
grammar.	  Not	  facts;	  but,	  as	  it	  were,	  illustrated	  turns	  of	  speech.”	  (PI	  §295)	  
	   	  
“’A	  thing	  is	  identical	  with	  itself.’	  –	  There	  is	  no	  finer	  example	  of	  a	  useless	  
sentence,	  which	  nevertheless	  is	  connected	  with	  a	  certain	  play	  of	  the	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imagination.	  It	  is	  as	  if	  in	  our	  imagination	  we	  put	  a	  thing	  into	  its	  own	  shape	  and	  
saw	  that	  it	  fitted.”	  (PI	  §216)	  
	  
In	  both	  of	  these	  remarks	  Wittgenstein	  comments	  on	  the	  ‘uselessness’	  of	  the	  
statements	  that	  his	  interlocutors	  have	  come	  up	  with,	  but	  also	  identifies	  their	  
potential	  for	  stimulating	  or	  facilitating	  the	  imagination.	  In	  the	  passage	  from	  PI	  §295	  
quoted	  above,	  Wittgenstein	  notes	  that	  the	  imagination	  is	  often	  stimulated	  in	  this	  way	  
when	  we	  are	  doing	  philosophy.123	  If	  we	  recall	  the	  passage	  Kuusela	  quoted	  from	  TS	  
213,	  there	  Wittgenstein	  did	  not	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  ‘philosophical’	  or	  
‘everyday’	  language	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  capacity	  to	  harbour	  ‘pictures’,	  writing	  that	  	  
“grammatical	  problems	  are	  connected	  with	  the	  oldest	  thought	  habits,	  i.e.,	  with	  the	  
oldest	  pictures	  that	  are	  engraved	  into	  our	  language	  itself”	  and	  that	  “this	  language	  
came	  about	  //	  developed	  //	  as	  it	  did	  because	  people	  had—and	  have—the	  inclination	  
to	  think	  in	  this	  way.”124	  Taking	  this	  remark	  together	  with	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  distinction	  between	  ‘philosophical’	  and	  ‘everyday’	  language	  that	  I	  
have	  developed	  so	  far,	  we	  could	  add	  to	  this	  the	  following	  detail:	  that	  although	  the	  
language	  used	  by	  philosophers	  is	  no	  different	  from	  everyday	  ‘non-­‐philosophical’	  
language	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  capacity	  for	  suggesting	  certain	  ‘pictures’,	  the	  typical	  contexts	  
in	  which	  philosophy	  as	  an	  activity	  takes	  place	  –	  i.e.	  the	  ‘surroundings’	  it	  provides	  us	  
with	  –	  are	  such	  that	  people	  who	  are	  engaged	  in	  philosophising	  become	  especially	  
susceptible	  to	  the	  ‘pictures’,	  analogies	  and	  so	  on	  that	  are	  manifest	  in	  the	  apparent	  
forms	  of	  the	  everyday	  language	  that	  they	  are	  inclined	  to	  use.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  what	  
later	  Wittgenstein	  is	  alluding	  to	  in	  remarks	  like	  PI	  §11	  when	  he	  emphasises	  the	  
diversity	  of	  functions	  that	  words	  can	  perform,	  before	  asserting:	  “of	  course,	  what	  
confuses	  us	  is	  the	  uniform	  appearance	  of	  words	  when	  we	  hear	  them	  in	  speech,	  or	  
                                                
123	  One	  could	  say	  that	  the	  stimulation	  of	  the	  imagination	  by	  language	  that	  is	  used	  in	  a	  philosophical	  
context	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘function’	  or	  purpose,	  similar	  to	  the	  function	  of	  language	  when	  used	  in	  poems,	  for	  
example.	  However,	  the	  issue	  here	  is	  whether	  this	  function	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  function	  that	  the	  speaker	  
is	  aiming	  for,	  or	  is	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  they	  are	  achieving,	  when	  they	  engage	  in	  philosophical	  
reflection.	  For	  example,	  if	  someone	  thinks	  that	  by	  saying	  ‘everything	  is	  identical	  with	  itself’	  in	  a	  
context	  of	  philosophical	  reflection	  they	  are	  stating	  a	  truth	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  identity,	  and	  what	  they	  
are	  actually	  doing	  is	  using	  a	  sentence	  to	  conjure	  up	  an	  imaginary	  animation	  of	  an	  object	  being	  fitted	  
into	  its	  own	  space,	  then	  even	  though	  stimulating	  the	  imagine	  is	  a	  legitimate	  function	  of	  language	  in	  
certain	  contexts,	  the	  mismatch	  in	  this	  context	  between	  aim	  and	  achievement	  would	  give	  grounds	  for	  
classing	  this	  particular	  use	  as	  ‘nonfunctional’.	  
124	  TS	  213:	  422-­‐423,	  as	  translated	  by	  Kuusela.	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see	  them	  written	  or	  in	  print.	  For	  their	  use	  is	  not	  that	  obvious.	  Especially	  when	  we	  are	  
doing	  philosophy!”	  
	  
It	  is	  in	  view	  of	  the	  misleading	  ‘pictures’	  and	  other	  impressions	  that	  can	  be	  conjured	  
up	  by	  our	  language,	  combined	  with	  the	  propensity	  for	  philosophical	  contexts	  to	  
encourage	  us	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  apparent	  forms	  of	  utterances	  rather	  than	  their	  
functional	  employment,	  that	  Wittgenstein	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  recommend	  close	  
observation	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  various	  words	  and	  expressions	  as	  a	  remedy	  for	  
dissolving	  philosophical	  problems.	  For	  example,	  when	  he	  writes	  in	  PI	  §4:	  “It	  disperses	  
the	  fog	  if	  we	  study	  the	  phenomena	  of	  language	  in	  primitive	  kinds	  of	  use	  in	  which	  one	  
can	  clearly	  survey	  the	  purpose	  and	  functioning	  of	  words”;	  and	  in	  PI	  §132:	  “We	  want	  
to	  establish	  an	  order	  in	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  use	  of	  language:	  an	  order	  for	  a	  
particular	  purpose,	  one	  out	  of	  many	  possible	  orders,	  not	  the	  order.	  For	  this	  purpose	  
we	  shall	  again	  and	  again	  emphasise	  distinctions	  which	  our	  ordinary	  forms	  of	  language	  
easily	  make	  us	  overlook.”	  
	  
How	  this	  Interpretation	  Overcomes	  Kuusela’s	  Objection	  
	  
The	  interpretation	  I	  have	  developed	  so	  far	  in	  this	  subsection	  overcomes	  the	  two	  main	  
problems	  posed	  by	  Kuusela	  for	  Baker	  and	  Hacker’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  distinction	  
between	  ‘philosophical’	  and	  ‘everyday’	  language	  as	  follows.	  Firstly,	  according	  to	  my	  
interpretation,	  the	  words	  and	  expressions	  used	  by	  philosophers	  are	  not	  in	  principle	  
different	  from	  ‘everyday’	  language;	  as	  Wittgenstein	  observes	  in	  PI	  §120	  and	  PI	  §134,	  
philosophers	  “frame”	  their	  questions	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  everyday,	  and	  get	  their	  
words	  and	  sentences	  from	  our	  existing	  practices	  of	  language-­‐use.	  Rather	  it	  is	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  these	  words	  and	  expressions	  are	  uttered	  or	  written	  within	  a	  
philosophical	  context	  that	  differentiates	  them	  from	  ‘everyday’	  uses.	  In	  short:	  in	  
‘everyday’	  use,	  words	  and	  expressions	  are	  employed	  in	  ways	  that	  satisfy	  certain	  aims	  
and	  functions,	  whereas	  in	  ‘philosophical’	  contexts	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  use	  and	  
modify	  language	  in	  superfluous	  or	  counterproductive	  ways	  while	  being	  under	  the	  
impression	  that	  one	  is	  thereby	  fulfilling	  a	  different	  aim	  or	  purpose	  (such	  as,	  perhaps,	  
investigating	  some	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  related	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  relevant	  word	  or	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expression	  in	  established	  non-­‐philosophical	  contexts).	  This	  means	  that	  my	  
interpretation	  is	  resistant	  to	  Kuusela’s	  objection	  that	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  make	  a	  
principled	  distinction	  in	  the	  PI	  or	  other	  related	  texts	  between	  ‘philosophical’	  and	  
‘everyday’	  language.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  according	  to	  my	  interpretation,	  philosophical	  uses	  of	  language	  are	  not	  to	  
be	  compared	  with	  ‘everyday’	  ones	  in	  terms	  of	  correctness,	  but	  rather	  in	  terms	  of	  
their	  functionality	  (or	  lack	  thereof).	  What	  is	  problematic	  about	  philosophical	  uses	  of	  
language	  examined	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  relevant	  remarks	  is	  not	  that	  they	  employ	  
words	  and	  sentences	  in	  ways	  that	  violate	  norms	  of	  what	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  say	  within	  
established	  contexts	  of	  language-­‐use;	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  interlocutor	  in	  these	  
examples	  is	  using	  language	  in	  an	  idling,	  ‘ornamental’	  way	  while	  being	  under	  the	  
impression	  that	  they	  are	  making	  highly	  informative	  pronouncements	  about	  the	  
matters	  under	  discussion.	  Hence	  the	  language-­‐use	  of	  the	  philosophical	  interlocutor	  in	  
Wittgenstein’s	  examples	  does	  not	  live	  up	  to	  their	  own	  aims	  and	  purposes	  in	  using	  
language	  in	  the	  relevant,	  often	  idiosyncratic,	  ways.	  	  	  	  
	  
Another	  purpose	  that	  is	  served	  by	  offering	  descriptions	  of	  ‘everyday’	  (non-­‐
philosophical)	  language-­‐use	  to	  the	  philosopher	  which	  I	  have	  mentioned,	  is	  the	  task	  
referred	  to	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  remarks	  like	  PI	  §132,	  of	  emphasising	  distinctions	  
between	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  word	  is	  used	  in	  order	  to	  fend	  off	  over-­‐simplified	  
‘pictures’	  of	  a	  concept	  that	  may	  be	  suggested	  to	  philosophers	  by	  certain	  similarities	  
or	  analogies	  between	  the	  apparent	  forms	  of	  certain	  expressions.	  Again,	  this	  
technique	  would	  not	  fall	  foul	  of	  Kuusela’s	  objection	  to	  conceiving	  of	  everyday	  
language	  as	  the	  ‘standard’	  of	  correct	  use,	  since	  the	  aim	  –	  as	  Wittgenstein	  says	  –	  is	  not	  
to	  establish	  “the	  order”	  in	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  use	  of	  language;	  but	  rather	  to	  
establish	  an	  order	  which	  repeatedly	  ‘emphasises’	  “distinctions	  that	  our	  ordinary	  
forms	  of	  language	  easily	  make	  us	  overlook”	  (PI	  §132).	  Here	  the	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  be	  
‘correct’,	  but	  to	  provide	  whatever	  representations	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  language-­‐use	  
will	  be	  most	  effective	  in	  counteracting	  the	  assimilating	  tendencies	  encouraged	  by	  the	  
forms	  of	  certain	  words	  and	  expressions.	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The	  Methodological	  Status	  of	  ‘Ordinary’	  Language	  Observations	  
	  
In	  the	  last	  subsection	  I	  developed	  an	  interpretation	  of	  a	  relevant	  distinction	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  draws	  in	  the	  PI	  between	  ‘philosophical’	  and	  ‘everyday’	  uses	  of	  language,	  
which	  overcomes	  the	  problem	  posed	  by	  Kuusela	  for	  Baker	  and	  Hacker’s	  
interpretation,	  while	  allowing	  us	  to	  flesh	  out	  a	  concept	  of	  ‘ordinary’	  or	  ‘everyday’	  
language-­‐use	  more	  satisfactorily	  than	  Kuusela’s	  alternative	  reading.	  Now	  it	  is	  time	  to	  
provide	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  status	  of	  those	  observations	  about	  ‘ordinary’/	  
‘everyday’	  language-­‐use,	  that	  according	  to	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  are	  meant	  to	  help	  
those	  whose	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  speaking	  about	  some	  subject	  matter	  may	  have	  
been	  unduly	  influenced	  by	  the	  ‘pictures’	  and	  other	  impressions	  that	  are	  readily	  
encouraged	  by	  the	  apparent	  forms	  of	  our	  language,	  to	  which	  those	  who	  engage	  in	  
the	  sort	  of	  reflection	  characteristic	  of	  philosophising	  are	  especially	  susceptible.	  	  	  
	  
At	  first	  blush,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  treat	  Wittgenstein’s	  various	  observations	  in	  the	  PI	  
regarding	  how	  language	  functions	  as	  third-­‐person	  empirical	  claims	  about	  what	  
people	  in	  a	  given	  population	  of	  language-­‐speakers	  typically	  say	  under	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  
circumstances.	  There	  are,	  however,	  various	  indications	  in	  the	  PI	  that	  this	  is	  not	  how	  
Wittgenstein	  intends	  his	  observations	  to	  be	  understood.	  For	  one	  thing,	  Wittgenstein	  
does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  arrived	  at	  his	  observations	  by	  carrying	  out	  a	  systematic	  
sociological	  study	  of	  language-­‐use	  (or	  at	  least,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  for	  Wittgenstein’s	  
having	  engaged	  in	  such	  a	  study).	  For	  another	  thing,	  Wittgenstein	  frequently	  
characterises	  his	  descriptions	  of	  language-­‐use	  as	  “reminding”	  us	  of	  things	  we	  already	  
know,	  or	  with	  which	  we	  are	  already	  familiar,	  about	  “our	  language”	  (e.g.	  PI	  §89,	  §127,	  
§140,	  §253).	  Such	  remarks	  suggest	  that	  the	  ‘descriptions’	  Wittgenstein	  provides	  are	  
intended	  to	  characterise	  certain	  aspects	  of	  our	  existing	  linguistic	  know-­‐how	  in	  such	  a	  
way	  as	  to	  bring	  them	  into	  a	  contrast	  with	  our	  use	  of	  language	  in	  ‘philosophical’	  
contexts,	  where	  we	  may	  have	  started	  to	  employ	  the	  relevant	  words	  and	  expressions	  
in	  ways	  that	  are	  characteristic	  of	  certain	  misleading	  ‘pictures’	  of	  their	  use.	  In	  this	  
case,	  we	  might	  ask:	  what	  is	  the	  status	  of	  our	  personal	  ‘speaker’s’	  knowledge	  of	  how	  
our	  language	  is	  used,	  and	  with	  what	  authority	  can	  we	  appeal	  to	  this	  knowledge	  as	  a	  
record	  of	  actual	  usage	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  clarification	  of	  philosophical	  disquiets?	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In	  The	  Claim	  of	  Reason	  Stanley	  Cavell	  provides	  a	  compelling	  discussion	  of	  this	  very	  
topic	  which	  we	  can	  make	  use	  of.	  He	  begins	  by	  noting	  that	  “the	  criteria	  Wittgenstein	  
appeals	  to	  –	  those	  which	  are,	  for	  him,	  the	  data	  of	  philosophy	  –	  are	  always	  ‘ours’,	  the	  
‘group’	  which	  forms	  his	  ‘authority’	  is	  always,	  apparently,	  the	  human	  group	  as	  such,	  
the	  human	  being	  generally.	  When	  I	  voice	  [the	  criteria]	  I	  do	  so,	  or	  take	  myself	  to	  do	  so,	  
as	  a	  member	  of	  that	  group,	  a	  representative	  human”	  (Cavell,	  1979:	  p.18).	  Cavell	  then	  
raises	  two	  questions	  regarding	  this	  procedure:	  	  
	  
(1) “How	  can	  I,	  what	  gives	  me	  the	  right	  to,	  speak	  for	  the	  group	  of	  which	  I	  am	  
a	  member?	  How	  have	  I	  gained	  that	  remarkable	  privilege?	  What	  
confidence	  am	  I	  to	  place	  in	  a	  generalisation	  from	  what	  I	  say	  to	  what	  
everybody	  says?;	  the	  sample	  is	  irresponsibly,	  preposterously	  small”.	  
	  
(2) “Since	  I	  do	  not	  think	  the	  claim	  to	  speak	  for	  ‘us’	  is	  preposterous,	  I	  do	  not	  
think	  it	  is	  a	  generalisation.	  But	  what	  else	  is	  it?”	  (Ibid.)	  
	  
Cavell	  answers	  his	  own	  questions	  by	  suggesting	  that	  “For	  all	  Wittgenstein’s	  claims	  
about	  what	  we	  say,	  he	  is	  always	  at	  the	  same	  time	  aware	  that	  others	  might	  not	  agree,	  
that	  a	  given	  person	  or	  group	  (a	  ‘tribe’)	  might	  not	  share	  our	  criteria”	  (Ibid.).	  Thus:	  
	  
“When	  Wittgenstein	  …	  ‘says	  what	  we	  say’,	  what	  he	  produces	  is	  not	  a	  
generalisation	  …	  but	  a	  (supposed)	  instance	  of	  what	  we	  say.	  We	  may	  think	  of	  it	  
as	  a	  sample.	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  sample	  by	  the	  words	  ‘We	  say	  …’	  is	  an	  
invitation	  for	  you	  to	  see	  whether	  you	  have	  such	  a	  sample,	  or	  can	  accept	  mine	  
as	  a	  sound	  one.	  One	  sample	  does	  not	  refute	  or	  disconfirm	  another;	  if	  two	  are	  
in	  disagreement	  they	  vie	  with	  one	  another	  for	  the	  same	  confirmation.	  The	  
only	  source	  of	  confirmation	  here	  is	  ourselves.	  And	  each	  of	  us	  is	  fully	  
authoritative	  in	  this	  struggle.”	  (Cavell,	  1979;	  p.19)	  
	  
So	  according	  to	  Cavell,	  Wittgenstein’s	  ‘descriptions’	  of	  ‘what	  we	  say’	  are	  intended	  as	  
samples,	  based	  on	  Wittgenstein’s	  personal	  know-­‐how	  as	  a	  language-­‐speaker,	  which	  
we	  –	  as	  members	  of	  the	  same	  or	  a	  similar	  language-­‐speaking	  community	  –	  can	  
consider	  in	  light	  of	  our	  own	  experiences	  of	  using	  our	  language,	  and	  decide	  whether	  
or	  not	  we	  agree	  that	  it	  is	  a	  sample	  of	  a	  typical	  usage	  of	  the	  relevant	  word/expression.	  
This	  means	  that	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  descriptions	  of	  language-­‐use	  hold	  no	  greater	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authority	  than	  that	  with	  any	  individual	  participants	  in	  the	  linguistic	  practices	  of	  their	  
community.	  	  
	  
This	  should	  not	  however	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  ‘weak’	  ground	  for	  making	  observations	  
about	  how	  words	  are	  used,	  since	  it	  is	  the	  ground	  and	  authority	  upon	  which	  all	  of	  us	  
are	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  using	  language	  effectively	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  do,	  and	  in	  
successfully	  understanding	  one	  another	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  do.	  The	  fact	  –	  which	  
Wittgenstein	  reminds	  us	  of	  in	  PI	  §241-­‐242	  –	  that	  human	  beings	  tend	  to	  coincide	  to	  a	  
greater	  or	  lesser	  extent	  in	  their	  practices	  of	  using	  language,	  provides	  some	  
confidence	  that	  a	  competent	  individual	  speakers’	  observations	  about	  how	  particular	  
words	  and	  sentences	  are	  typically	  used	  will	  have	  a	  good	  chance	  of	  commanding	  a	  
reasonable	  degree	  of	  assent	  among	  fellow	  speakers,	  provided	  that	  they	  have	  
carefully	  considered	  the	  uses	  with	  which	  they	  are	  familiar.	  This	  will	  of	  course	  not	  be	  
the	  case	  with	  regard	  to	  words	  whose	  application	  is	  ‘essentially	  contested’	  in	  the	  
sense	  explained	  earlier;	  however,	  that	  simply	  means	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  command	  the	  
assent	  of	  our	  readers	  or	  critical	  subjects,	  we	  would	  be	  wise	  to	  stick	  to	  observations	  of	  
the	  use	  of	  words	  whose	  application	  is	  not	  so	  controversial.	  This	  overcomes	  Kuusela’s	  
objection	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  appealing	  to	  ‘everyday’	  language	  assumes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
universal	  and	  uncontroversial	  way	  of	  determining	  “what	  counts	  as	  conformity	  with	  













Chapter	  4	  	   Replacing	  the	  Anti-­‐Representationalist	  Objection	  
	  
In	  the	  last	  chapter	  I	  revisited	  some	  of	  the	  remarks	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  PI	  which	  I	  had	  
identified	  as	  the	  probable	  inspiration	  for	  the	  ARO’s	  contention	  that	  later	  
Wittgenstein	  decisively	  criticised	  a	  representational	  view	  of	  language	  that	  was	  
allegedly	  endorsed	  by	  numerous	  philosophers	  throughout	  history.	  I	  carried	  out	  a	  
close	  textual	  reading	  of	  these	  remarks	  (PI	  §§1-­‐5)	  and	  highlighted	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  
resisted	  an	  interpretation	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  that	  employed	  by	  the	  ARO,	  before	  
spelling	  out	  some	  preliminary	  implications	  for	  the	  potential	  to	  overcome	  certain	  
problems	  faced	  by	  the	  ARO.	  I	  investigated	  in	  more	  detail	  how	  we	  can	  understand	  
Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  as	  part	  of	  a	  ‘therapeutic’	  technique	  of	  
criticism	  employed	  in	  remarks	  like	  PI	  §§1-­‐5.	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  used	  an	  existing	  
interpretation	  of	  this	  aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  methodology	  provided	  by	  
Kuusela,	  which	  I	  subsequently	  added	  to	  and	  clarified	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  an	  
interpretation	  which	  overcomes	  most	  of	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  ARO	  as	  well	  as	  
other	  potential	  criticisms.	  Finally,	  I	  developed	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
distinction	  between	  ‘philosophical’	  and	  ‘everyday’	  language-­‐use,	  and	  used	  Cavell’s	  
reading	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  observations	  concerning	  ‘what	  we	  say’	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  
providing	  a	  methodological	  justification	  for	  making	  observations	  concerning	  how	  
language	  is	  ordinarily	  used.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  am	  now	  going	  to	  provide	  some	  detailed	  suggestions	  for	  an	  
alternative	  critical	  approach	  based	  on	  the	  interpretation	  presented	  in	  the	  last	  
chapter,	  and	  demonstrate	  how	  one	  might	  apply	  the	  kind	  of	  critical	  technique	  
employed	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  remarks	  like	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  to	  the	  work	  of	  ‘positivist’	  IR	  
scholars	  such	  as	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt.	  I	  will	  start	  in	  4.1	  by	  outlining	  my	  
recommendations	  for	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  criticising	  ‘positivist’	  scholars	  of	  IR	  
which	  can	  take	  the	  place	  of	  the	  ARO	  and	  overcome	  the	  various	  problems	  identified	  
with	  the	  latter	  line	  of	  argument.	  In	  4.2	  I	  will	  reflect	  on	  these	  recommendations,	  and	  
address	  some	  potential	  concerns	  that	  might	  arise	  regarding	  them.	  In	  4.3	  I	  will	  
demonstrate	  how	  putting	  these	  recommendations	  into	  practice	  might	  work	  out,	  by	  
carrying	  out	  an	  analysis	  of	  ‘biased’	  tendencies	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  writings	  of	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Waltz	  and	  Wendt	  using	  the	  kind	  of	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  approach	  I	  have	  
recommended.	  In	  4.4	  I	  will	  compare	  and	  contrast	  my	  approach	  with	  an	  alternative	  
possible	  way	  of	  using	  remarks	  like	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  to	  criticise	  ‘positivist’	  IR	  scholars	  such	  as	  
Wendt	  based	  on	  Nigel	  Pleasants’	  criticisms	  of	  Bhaskar’s	  version	  of	  ‘realism’.	  Finally,	  in	  
4.5,	  I	  will	  suggest	  how	  the	  critical	  approach	  I	  have	  developed	  may	  have	  relevance	  for	  
more	  recent	  and	  future	  work	  carried	  out	  in	  IR	  by	  contemporary	  ‘neo-­‐realist’	  scholars.	  
	  
4.1	   Recommendations	  
	  
Suggestion 1.  From ‘Anti-Representationalist’ to Anti-Bias 
 
 
The	  first	  suggestion	  I	  am	  going	  to	  make	  is	  that	  those	  wishing	  to	  use	  remarks	  such	  as	  
PI	  §§1-­‐5	  to	  criticise	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  should	  orient	  themselves	  away	  from	  
a	  specifically	  ‘anti-­‐representationalist’	  (i.e.	  anti-­‐	  ‘mirror	  view’	  or	  ‘picture	  view’)	  line	  of	  
objection,	  to	  one	  which	  targets	  biased	  tendencies	  of	  thought;	  and	  furthermore	  that	  
these	  tendencies	  should	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  specific	  forms	  in	  which	  they	  are	  
manifest	  in	  the	  work	  of	  particular	  IR	  scholars,	  rather	  than	  as	  general	  tendencies	  that	  
are	  vaguely	  insinuated	  as	  being	  present	  in	  the	  works	  of	  various	  academics	  
throughout	  history.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  it	  is	  a	  distortion	  to	  interpret	  
Wittgenstein’s	  strategy	  in	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  as	  being	  to	  summarise	  and	  criticise	  a	  particular	  
representational	  ‘view’,	  ‘theory’	  or	  ‘account’	  of	  language,	  and	  that	  a	  better	  
characterisation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  approach	  in	  these	  and	  other	  similar	  remarks	  would	  
be	  to	  say	  that	  he	  is	  demonstrating	  a	  ‘therapeutic’	  method	  for	  dissolving	  philosophical	  
problems,	  whereby	  one	  identifies	  a	  certain	  pattern	  of	  bias	  in	  what	  someone	  else	  has	  
written	  or	  said,	  and	  presents	  this	  pattern	  to	  the	  author	  as	  stemming	  from,	  or	  
constituting,	  a	  ‘particular	  picture’	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  subject	  matter	  (the	  term	  
‘picture’	  in	  this	  context	  being	  understood	  in	  one	  of	  the	  two	  ways	  which	  I	  outlined	  in	  
3.2	  –	  or	  in	  an	  alternative	  manner	  for	  which	  an	  appropriate	  methodological	  
justification	  has	  been	  provided).	  
	  
 158  
Rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  undermine	  approaches	  to	  IR	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  alleged	  
commitment	  to	  a	  particular	  view,	  account	  or	  theory	  of	  language,	  a	  revised	  
application	  of	  this	  aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  IR	  should	  therefore	  
direct	  its	  critical	  attention	  towards	  the	  kinds	  of	  imaginary	  models	  and/or	  biased	  
tendencies	  of	  thought	  that	  later	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  motivate	  or	  stimulate	  the	  
formation	  of	  such	  accounts,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  active	  in	  the	  work	  of	  IR	  scholars	  
as	  well	  as	  philosophers.	  This	  would	  not	  only	  involve	  a	  more	  textually	  faithful	  
interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  remarks	  in	  the	  PI,	  but	  would	  also	  overcome	  the	  
problems	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  face	  in	  trying	  to	  make	  out	  that	  the	  
various	  philosophers	  and	  ‘positivist’	  scholars	  of	  IR	  that	  they	  criticise	  are	  somehow	  
committed	  to	  the	  same	  underlying	  set	  of	  claims	  concerning	  how	  language	  functions.	  
	  
Suggestion 2.  From ‘In Principle’ Objections to Specific Critical 
Observations 
	  
My	  second	  suggestion	  is	  that	  rather	  than	  criticising	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  in	  
principle,	  scholars	  like	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  should	  seek	  instead	  to	  critically	  
identify	  specific	  tendencies	  or	  patterns	  of	  bias	  manifest	  in	  the	  work	  of	  particular	  IR	  
scholars,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  those	  that	  adopt	  a	  ‘positivist’	  approach.	  This	  would	  remove	  
the	  temptation	  to	  over-­‐inflate	  the	  application	  of	  quite	  specific	  critical	  observations	  as	  
though	  they	  applied	  in	  principle	  to	  all	  approaches	  that	  can	  be	  re-­‐described	  so	  as	  to	  fit	  
a	  certain	  classification	  of	  what	  these	  scholars	  regard	  as	  ‘positivist’,	  and	  thus	  avoid	  the	  
problem	  of	  making	  out	  that	  the	  relevant	  criticisms	  are	  more	  generally	  applicable	  than	  
they	  are.	  	  
	  
Suggestion 3.  Broaden the Scope of Criticism 
	  
So	  far	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  scholars	  such	  as	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  who	  wish	  
to	  use	  remarks	  such	  as	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  to	  ground	  criticisms	  of	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  in	  IR	  
should	  move	  from	  (a)	  being	  against	  a	  particular	  ‘representational’	  view	  of	  language	  
to	  being	  critical	  of	  certain	  biases	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  IR	  scholars	  think	  and	  write	  about	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their	  subject	  matter,	  and	  (b)	  being	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  in	  principle,	  to	  
critically	  examining	  specific	  tendencies	  of	  bias	  in	  the	  work	  of	  individual	  ‘positivist’	  IR	  
scholars.	  This	  being	  the	  case,	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  avoiding	  hypocrisy,	  these	  scholars	  
should	  also	  be	  open	  to	  detecting	  and	  highlighting	  tendencies	  of	  bias	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
non-­‐‘positivist’	  IR	  scholars	  as	  well	  as	  ‘positivist’	  ones,	  despite	  the	  main	  focus	  being	  on	  
those	  that	  adopt	  a	  ‘positivist’	  approach.	  This	  should	  include	  critical	  self-­‐examination	  
and	  acknowledgement	  of	  any	  tendencies	  of	  bias	  in	  one’s	  own	  statements	  and	  ways	  
of	  thinking,	  as	  well	  as	  on-­‐going	  attempts	  to	  overcome	  these.	  	  
	  
Suggestion 4.  Qualify Critical Observations and Invite 
Acknowledgement 
	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  there	  are	  roughly	  two	  factors	  that	  enable	  the	  method	  
of	  criticism	  demonstrated	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §§1-­‐2	  to	  avoid	  the	  problem	  of	  not	  
having	  sufficient	  methodological	  justification	  for	  making	  claims	  about	  the	  
development	  of	  other	  people’s	  work.	  These	  factors	  are	  (a)	  that	  the	  inferences	  
Wittgenstein	  makes	  about	  what	  someone	  else	  has	  written	  are	  often	  qualified	  with	  
expressions	  such	  as	  ‘it	  seems	  to	  me’	  and	  ‘so	  I	  believe’;	  and	  (b)	  that	  characterisations	  
of	  the	  origin	  or	  form	  of	  what	  someone	  has	  written	  are	  to	  be	  offered	  in	  a	  ‘therapeutic’	  
spirit,	  whereby	  these	  characterisations	  are	  justified	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  (i)	  accepted	  by	  
the	  person	  whose	  work	  is	  under	  scrutiny	  and	  are	  (ii)	  successful	  in	  allowing	  them	  to	  
overcome	  the	  relevant	  tendencies.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  my	  fourth	  recommendation	  is	  
that	  those	  who	  want	  to	  apply	  this	  aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  method	  within	  IR	  should	  
take	  care	  when	  making	  more	  speculative	  or	  novel	  statements	  about	  other	  IR	  
scholars’	  work	  (such	  as	  that	  we	  find	  a	  particular	  ‘picture’	  in	  their	  words),	  to	  qualify	  
what	  they	  say	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Wittgenstein	  often	  does	  in	  the	  PI;	  and	  to	  present	  their	  
characterisations	  in	  an	  open-­‐minded	  manner	  for	  the	  consideration	  of	  those	  whose	  
work	  they	  are	  examining,	  so	  as	  to	  encourage	  dialogue,	  assent,	  and	  genuine	  





4.2	   Reflections	  on	  the	  Recommendations	  
	  
Before	  moving	  on	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  import	  of	  the	  
recommendations	  just	  made,	  and	  address	  a	  potential	  concern	  regarding	  the	  
consistency	  of	  my	  approach	  so	  far.	  
A	  Replacement	  –	  rather	  than	  Modification	  –	  of	  the	  ARO	  
 
In	  the	  above	  recommendations	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  IR	  scholars	  who	  previously	  
sought	  to	  employ	  the	  ARO	  as	  an	  objection	  to	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  should	  alter	  
their	  approach	  so	  that	  it	  is:	  
	  
(1) Not	  specifically	  targeted	  against	  a	  ‘representational’	  view,	  theory	  or	  
account	  of	  language	  and	  approaches	  which	  allegedly	  assume	  this	  view;	  
(2) Not	  a	  principled	  universal	  objection	  to	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR;	  
and	  
(3) Not	  a	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense.	  
	  
As	  I	  have	  previously	  stated,	  what	  these	  recommendations	  effectively	  amount	  to	  is	  a	  
proposal	  for	  the	  replacement	  of	  the	  ARO	  with	  a	  different	  strategy	  for	  criticising	  
‘positivist’	  and	  other	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  based	  on	  a	  re-­‐interpretation	  of	  remarks	  such	  
as	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  by	  which	  the	  ARO	  was	  originally	  inspired.	  This	  is	  necessary	  largely	  because	  
the	  criticisms	  I	  made	  of	  the	  ARO	  in	  Chapter	  2	  identified	  fundamental	  problems	  with	  
the	  characteristic	  features	  that	  make	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  what	  it	  is	  	  –	  namely,	  its	  
‘anti-­‐representational’	  focus,	  its	  principled	  objection	  to	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  
and	  its	  use	  of	  counter-­‐claims	  and	  counter-­‐examples	  to	  refute	  the	  ‘view’	  of	  language	  
to	  which	  these	  approaches	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  committed.	  	  
	  
The	  Consistency	  of	  My	  Approach	  
	  
A	  potential	  concern	  that	  might	  arise	  at	  this	  point	  in	  the	  thesis	  is	  that	  my	  own	  critical	  
approach	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  in	  Chapter	  2	  apparently	  does	  
not	  live	  up	  to	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  recommendations	  that	  I	  have	  made	  so	  far	  in	  this	  
 161  
chapter.	  This	  is	  true;	  however	  I	  can	  offer	  the	  following	  reasons	  in	  defence	  of	  my	  
approach.	  Firstly,	  in	  the	  earlier	  parts	  of	  the	  thesis	  I	  do	  not	  purport	  to	  be	  applying	  
Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  directly,	  until	  I	  come	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  approach	  I	  
have	  recommended	  in	  4.3.	  Prior	  to	  that	  point,	  I	  see	  myself	  as	  having	  used	  
conventional	  methods	  of	  academic	  analysis	  and	  textual	  interpretation	  to	  identify	  
problems	  with	  a	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  these	  scholars	  use	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  
philosophy	  to	  support,	  and	  to	  explain	  an	  alternative	  way	  in	  which	  the	  relevant	  
aspects	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  PI	  might	  more	  fruitfully	  and	  legitimately	  be	  applied.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  I	  have	  tried	  my	  best	  not	  to	  make	  speculative	  claims	  about	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐
Fat	  and	  Fierke’s	  ways	  of	  thinking,	  and	  have	  attempted	  to	  stay	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  
what	  they	  write	  and	  direct	  implications	  thereof.	  In	  addition,	  I	  have	  not	  claimed	  that	  
the	  approach	  I	  recommended	  in	  the	  last	  section	  is	  the	  only	  legitimate	  way	  to	  criticise	  
the	  work	  of	  IR	  scholars;125	  rather,	  I	  have	  presented	  the	  suggested	  approach	  as	  a	  
legitimate	  way	  of	  applying	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  
IR	  that	  overcomes	  or	  avoids	  certain	  problems	  encountered	  by	  the	  ARO.	  This	  leaves	  
room	  for	  alternative	  critical	  approaches,	  including	  those	  employed	  in	  the	  earlier	  
stages	  of	  this	  thesis,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  do	  not	  fall	  into	  the	  problems	  I	  have	  identified	  
with	  the	  ARO	  or	  other	  significant	  difficulties.	  Finally,	  as	  a	  practical	  matter,	  I	  judged	  
that	  the	  thesis	  will	  be	  more	  readily	  understood	  and	  received	  by	  my	  intended	  
audience	  if	  I	  were	  to	  introduce	  a	  novel	  method	  of	  criticism	  using	  conventional	  
academic	  techniques,	  rather	  than	  if	  I	  had	  attempted	  to	  introduce	  this	  method	  on	  its	  
own	  terms	  by	  employing	  it	  myself	  from	  the	  start.	  
	  
4.3	   How	  the	  Recommendations	  can	  be	  Implemented	  
 
	  
Having	  outlined	  my	  recommendations	  and	  addressed	  potential	  concerns,	  I	  will	  now	  
attempt	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  sorts	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  can	  be	  implemented	  by	  
carrying	  out	  analyses	  of	  patterns	  of	  bias	  that	  are	  visible	  Waltz’s	  Theory	  of	  
                                                
125	  Indeed,	  nor	  have	  I	  claimed	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  legitimate	  way	  in	  which	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  IR.	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International	  Politics	  and	  Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics.	  The	  
techniques	  that	  I	  will	  employ,	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  I	  present	  my	  analyses,	  will	  be	  
based	  on	  the	  interpretations	  of	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  
which	  I	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  3;	  although	  my	  demonstration	  will	  at	  times	  be	  
interspersed	  with	  observations	  about	  my	  own	  approach	  that	  are	  intended	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  those	  readers	  who	  would	  like	  to	  follow	  or	  develop	  it	  in	  their	  own	  work.	  	  
 
Patterns of Bias in Waltz and Wendt 
 
Waltz	  on	  Scientific	  ‘Laws’,	  Theoretical	  ‘Representation’	  and	  ‘Structures’	  
 
 
Waltz	  begins	  his	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics	  by	  seeking	  to	  define	  the	  key	  terms	  
‘theory’	  and	  ‘law’	  in	  a	  way	  that	  meets	  “philosophy-­‐of-­‐science	  standards”	  (Waltz,	  
1979:	  p.2).	  Starting	  with	  the	  term	  ‘law’,	  Waltz	  appeals	  to	  a	  “widely	  accepted”	  
definition	  according	  to	  which	  “laws	  establish	  relations	  between	  variables,	  variables	  
being	  concepts	  that	  can	  take	  different	  values”	  (ibid.).	  According	  to	  this	  definition,	  a	  
statement	  of	  a	  law	  has	  the	  form	  “if	  a,	  then	  b,	  where	  a	  stands	  for	  one	  or	  more	  
independent	  variables	  and	  b	  stands	  for	  a	  dependent	  variable”	  (ibid.).	  Waltz	  states	  
that	  “if	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  and	  b	  is	  invariant,	  the	  law	  is	  absolute”;	  while	  “if	  the	  
relation	  is	  highly	  constant”	  the	  law	  would	  be	  probabilistic	  and	  would	  read	  “if	  a,	  then	  
b	  with	  probability	  x”	  (ibid.).	  Waltz	  contends	  that	  “in	  the	  natural	  sciences	  even	  
probabilistic	  laws	  contain	  a	  strong	  imputation	  of	  necessity”,	  and	  that	  by	  extension	  
statements	  of	  probabilistic	  correlations	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘social	  sciences’	  can	  be	  
treated	  as	  “law-­‐like	  statements”,	  whereby	  “the	  word	  like	  implies	  a	  lesser	  sense	  of	  
necessity”	  (ibid.).	  
	  
Pausing	  at	  this	  point,	  we	  can	  make	  the	  following	  observations:	  
	  
-­‐ Waltz	  approaches	  the	  questions	  of	  what	  a	  ‘theory’	  is,	  and	  what	  a	  ‘law’	  is,	  
by	  considering	  how	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  previously	  defined	  these	  
concepts.	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-­‐ Waltz	  does	  not	  mention	  or	  discuss	  any	  particular	  examples	  of	  laws	  that	  
are	  operative	  in	  the	  ‘natural	  sciences’.	  
-­‐ Waltz	  couches	  the	  distinction	  between	  invariant	  correlations	  and	  highly	  
constant	  probabilistic	  correlations	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  relative	  strength	  of	  
‘necessity’,	  with	  invariant	  correlations	  being	  ‘absolute,’	  and	  highly	  
constant	  probabilistic	  laws	  holding	  with	  a	  ‘strong’	  but	  comparatively	  
‘lesser’	  imputation	  of	  necessity.	  
	  	  
For	  now,	  let	  us	  pick	  up	  on	  this	  last	  point.	  In	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  –	  at	  least,	  
among	  the	  philosophers	  of	  science	  whom	  Waltz	  references	  –	  the	  term	  ‘necessity’	  is	  
applied	  to	  invariant	  correlations	  in	  which	  a	  variable	  a	  is	  always	  accompanied	  by	  
another	  variable	  b,	  to	  assert	  that	  a	  cannot	  occur	  without	  b	  also	  occurring	  and	  that	  
there	  is	  therefore	  a	  ‘necessary’	  relation	  between	  the	  two	  variables	  (e.g.	  Boltzmann,	  
1901:	  p.78;	  Harris,	  2002	  [1970]:	  p.52).	  While	  this	  is	  already	  a	  philosophical	  usage	  of	  
the	  word	  ‘necessity’	  that	  Waltz	  is	  drawing	  upon,	  it	  is	  clearly	  related	  to	  everyday	  non-­‐
philosophical	  contexts	  in	  which	  the	  word	  ‘necessary’	  is	  used	  to	  mean	  ‘must’.	  In	  this	  
light,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  one	  can,	  in	  this	  established	  sense	  of	  ‘necessary’,	  say	  that	  a	  
highly	  constant	  probabilistic	  correlation	  carries	  a	  ‘lesser’	  imputation	  of	  necessity,	  
since	  any	  correlation	  that	  obtains	  with	  a	  probability	  of	  less	  than	  100%	  cannot	  be	  a	  
‘necessary’	  correlation	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense.	  That	  is:	  if	  a	  is	  not	  accompanied	  by	  b	  in	  
every	  instance,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  a	  cannot	  occur	  without	  b	  occurring;	  hence	  
a	  is	  not	  a	  ‘necessary’	  condition	  for	  b	  in	  any	  probabilistic	  correlation,	  no	  matter	  how	  
high	  the	  proportion	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  holds.126	  
	  
Am	  I	  saying,	  then,	  that	  it	  is	  forbidden	  or	  impossible	  to	  use	  the	  word	  ‘necessity’	  as	  a	  
relative	  term	  to	  compare	  invariant	  correlations	  with	  probabilistic	  correlations?	  The	  
short	  answer	  to	  this	  is	  ‘no’.	  What	  I	  am	  saying	  is	  that	  probabilistic	  correlations	  cannot	  
be	  said	  to	  be	  ‘necessary’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  invariant	  correlations	  have	  been	  called	  
‘necessary	  relations’	  by	  the	  philosophers	  of	  science;	  and	  so	  by	  attributing	  “strong”	  
                                                
126	  Another	  way	  to	  put	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  ‘necessity’,	  as	  this	  word	  has	  commonly	  been	  applied	  to	  
invariant	  correlations	  by	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  is	  a	  binary	  term,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  either	  a	  must	  be	  
accompanied	  by	  b,	  or	  it	  need	  not;	  and	  so	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  and	  b	  is	  either	  necessary	  or	  it	  is	  not.	  
However,	  Waltz	  tries	  to	  treat	  the	  term	  ‘necessity’	  as	  though	  it	  designated	  a	  spectrum,	  with	  the	  
‘absolute’	  correlations	  at	  the	  top	  and	  ‘probabilistic’	  correlations	  lower	  down.	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and	  “lesser”	  imputations	  of	  necessity	  to	  probabilistic	  correlations,	  Waltz	  is	  either	  
making	  self-­‐contradictory	  statements	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  non-­‐necessary	  correlations	  
are	  still	  somehow	  necessary,	  or	  he	  is	  applying	  the	  term	  ‘necessity’	  to	  such	  cases	  in	  a	  
new	  sense,	  to	  mean	  something	  other	  than	  that	  ‘if	  a	  occurs,	  b	  must	  also	  occur’.	  Let	  us	  
therefore	  take	  a	  moment	  to	  consider	  in	  which	  novel	  sense	  Waltz	  could	  be	  using	  the	  
term	  ‘necessity’	  with	  regard	  to	  highly	  constant	  probabilistic	  correlations,	  which	  
departs	  from	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  this	  term	  is	  applied	  to	  invariant	  correlations	  by	  
philosophers	  of	  science,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  everyday	  uses	  of	  ‘necessary’	  to	  mean	  ‘must’.	  
	  
As	  we	  saw	  above,	  Waltz	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  call	  statements	  of	  probabilistic	  
correlations	  in	  the	  ‘social	  sciences’	  “law-­‐like	  statements”,	  whereby	  “the	  word	  like	  
implies	  a	  lesser	  sense	  of	  necessity”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.2).	  Immediately	  afterwards,	  Waltz	  
qualifies	  that	  such	  a	  statement	  “would	  not	  be	  at	  all	  like	  a	  law	  unless	  it	  had	  so	  often	  
and	  so	  reliably	  been	  found	  in	  the	  past	  that	  the	  expectation	  of	  its	  holding	  in	  the	  future	  
with	  comparable	  probability	  is	  high”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.2-­‐3).	  According	  to	  this	  
qualification,	  in	  order	  for	  a	  statement	  of	  a	  probabilistic	  correlation	  to	  be	  legitimately	  
termed	  ‘law-­‐like’	  –	  and	  thereby	  be	  said	  to	  hold	  with	  a	  ‘lesser	  sense	  of	  necessity’	  in	  
Waltz’s	  sense	  –	  the	  correlation	  has	  to	  be	  found	  to	  obtain	  reliably	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  
probability.	  From	  this	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  in	  Waltz’s	  terminology,	  to	  say	  that	  a	  
probabilistic	  correlation	  has	  a	  certain	  strength	  of	  ‘necessity’	  is	  equivalent	  to	  saying	  
that	  it	  obtains	  with	  a	  certain	  frequency	  and	  reliability	  –	  i.e.	  a	  probability	  –	  that	  falls	  
within	  an	  upper	  range.	  Presumably,	  the	  correlations	  with	  the	  ‘strongest’	  imputations	  
of	  necessity	  would	  be	  those	  that	  obtained	  with	  the	  highest	  probability;	  while	  the	  
‘less’	  necessary	  correlations	  would	  be	  those	  that	  obtain	  with	  lower	  probabilities	  that	  
are	  nevertheless	  above	  a	  threshold	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  highly	  probable	  according	  to	  
Waltz.	  In	  this	  light,	  we	  can	  make	  the	  following	  observations:	  
	  
(a) To	  say	  –	  in	  Waltz’s	  new	  terminology	  –	  that	  highly	  constant	  
probabilistic	  correlations	  obtain	  ‘with	  a	  lesser	  sense	  of	  necessity’	  than	  
invariant	  correlations,	  is	  just	  a	  roundabout	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  these	  
correlations	  obtain	  with	  a	  probability	  of	  less	  than	  100%	  that	  falls	  
within	  an	  upper	  range,	  and	  does	  not	  add	  any	  extra	  information	  about	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the	  nature	  of	  probabilistic	  correlations	  or	  the	  confidence	  with	  which	  
they	  can	  be	  stated.	  
	  
(b)	   Given	  the	  established	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘necessary	  relation’	  in	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  to	  characterise	  relationships	  between	  variables	  
whereby	  if	  a	  occurs	  then	  b	  must	  occur,	  Waltz’s	  novel	  use	  of	  the	  word	  
‘necessity’	  as	  a	  relative	  term	  to	  compare	  invariant	  and	  probabilistic	  
correlations	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  respective	  probabilities,	  is	  liable	  to	  give	  
the	  misleading	  impression	  that	  probabilistic	  correlations	  are	  more	  
similar	  in	  to	  invariant	  correlations	  than	  they	  are	  –	  perhaps	  to	  the	  tune	  
of	  making	  probabilistic	  correlations	  appear	  more	  certain	  and	  reliable.	  
	  
At	  this	  point,	  one	  might	  ask:	  if	  the	  expression	  ‘a	  lesser	  sense	  of	  necessity’	  when	  
applied	  to	  probabilistic	  correlations	  is	  just	  a	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  these	  correlations	  
obtain	  with	  a	  probability	  that	  falls	  within	  an	  upper	  range,	  and	  does	  not	  add	  any	  new	  
information	  about	  them,	  then	  why	  does	  Waltz	  use	  this	  expression	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  
given	  that	  it	  is	  an	  awkward	  turn	  of	  phrase	  that	  is	  liable	  to	  mislead?	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  
a	  legitimate	  reason	  for	  Waltz’s	  employment	  of	  this	  expression,	  I	  think	  we	  have	  
grounds	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  bias	  in	  Waltz’s	  description	  towards	  the	  sorts	  of	  
invariant	  correlations	  that	  he	  calls	  ‘absolute	  laws’.	  This	  bias	  is	  manifest	  in	  Waltz’s	  use	  
of	  the	  word	  ‘necessity’	  as	  a	  relative	  term	  to	  characterise	  the	  probability	  values	  with	  
which	  non-­‐universal	  correlations	  obtain,	  which	  serves	  no	  practical	  explanatory	  
purpose	  and	  furthermore	  misleadingly	  implies	  that	  probabilistic	  correlations	  are	  just	  
weaker	  versions	  of	  correlations	  that	  are	  ‘necessary’	  in	  the	  conventional	  sense	  of	  
being	  absolutely	  invariant.	  	  
	  
Having	  identified	  this	  bias	  in	  Waltz’s	  description,	  there	  are	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  
could	  proceed	  using	  the	  modified	  ‘Wittgenstein-­‐inspired’	  method	  of	  criticism	  I	  
outlined	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  passage	  from	  Waltz	  is	  not	  an	  
ideal	  example	  to	  practise	  on,	  since	  Waltz	  is	  no	  longer	  alive,	  meaning	  that	  we	  cannot	  
offer	  representations	  of	  his	  work	  for	  his	  consideration	  and	  acknowledgement.	  
Nevertheless,	  we	  can	  still	  imagine	  how	  we	  would	  offer	  such	  representations	  to	  Waltz	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if	  he	  were	  still	  with	  us;	  and	  we	  can	  also	  address	  ourselves	  to	  contemporary	  IR	  
scholars	  who	  would	  endorse	  Waltz’s	  description	  of	  laws	  in	  A	  Theory	  of	  International	  
Politics.	  
	  
One	  way	  in	  which	  could	  proceed	  is	  by	  saying	  –	  analogously	  with	  Wittgenstein’s	  
approach	  in	  PI	  §1	  –	  that	  we	  seem	  to	  find	  in	  Waltz’s	  description	  a	  ‘particular	  picture’	  
of	  a	  scientific	  law,	  according	  to	  which	  scientific	  laws	  are	  essentially	  statements	  of	  
necessary	  relations	  between	  variables.	  To	  this	  we	  could	  add	  the	  suggestion	  that	  it	  is	  
possibly	  because	  Waltz	  is	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  such	  a	  ‘picture’	  that	  he	  is	  led	  to	  
characterise	  the	  probability	  of	  highly	  constant	  (but	  not	  invariant)	  correlations	  using	  
the	  expressions	  ‘strong	  imputation	  of	  necessity’	  and	  ‘lesser	  sense	  of	  necessity’;	  
because	  although	  these	  expressions	  mean	  nothing	  more	  in	  this	  context	  than	  that	  the	  
relevant	  correlations	  obtain	  with	  relatively	  higher	  or	  lower	  probabilities	  that	  fall	  
within	  a	  certain	  range,	  using	  the	  word	  ‘necessity’	  to	  describe	  these	  probabilities	  
allows	  Waltz	  to	  appear	  to	  attribute	  a	  characteristic	  property	  of	  absolute	  laws	  to	  
probabilistic	  correlations,	  and	  to	  thereby	  present	  probabilistic	  correlations	  as	  though	  
they	  were	  just	  versions	  of	  invariant	  correlations.	  	  
	  
Now,	  this	  is	  a	  characterisation	  of	  Waltz’s	  account	  that	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  assert	  
definitively	  as	  being	  an	  accurate	  historical	  representation	  of	  what	  Waltz’s	  was	  
thinking,	  or	  how	  he	  came	  to	  describe	  probabilistic	  correlations	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘necessity’.	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  a	  characterisation	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  neatly	  sum	  up	  the	  apparent	  
bias	  in	  Waltz’s	  description,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  false	  impressions	  that	  readers	  might	  get	  
from	  Waltz’s	  misleading	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘necessity’,	  which	  we	  could	  invite	  Waltz	  and	  
other	  like-­‐minded	  IR	  scholars	  to	  consider	  with	  a	  view	  to	  acknowledgement.	  If	  these	  
scholars	  could	  be	  brought	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  relevant	  ‘picture’	  of	  a	  law	  (i.e.	  the	  
picture	  of	  a	  law	  as	  an	  absolute	  correlation)	  as	  being	  at	  the	  root	  of	  their	  temptation	  to	  
characterise	  probabilistic	  correlations	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘necessity’,	  then	  they	  may	  
subsequently	  be	  persuaded	  to	  relinquish	  this	  picture,	  which	  would	  manifest	  itself	  in	  a	  
modification	  in	  these	  scholars’	  phraseology,	  so	  that	  instead	  of	  using	  obfuscating	  
expressions	  such	  as	  ‘strong	  imputation	  of	  necessity’	  and	  ‘lesser	  sense	  of	  necessity’	  to	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characterise	  probabilistic	  correlations,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  describe	  these	  correlations	  
more	  straightforwardly	  on	  their	  own	  terms	  (i.e.	  in	  terms	  of	  relative	  probabilities).	  	  
	  
A	  related	  set	  of	  problems	  concerning	  Waltz’s	  use	  of	  terminology	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  
the	  following	  passage	  –	  cited	  critically	  by	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  –	  where	  
Waltz	  gives	  his	  account	  of	  what	  a	  theory	  is:	  
	  
	   “If	  a	  theory	  is	  not	  an	  edifice	  of	  truth	  and	  not	  a	  reproduction	  of	  reality,	  
then	  what	  is	  it?	  A	  theory	  is	  a	  picture,	  mentally	  formed,	  of	  a	  bounded	  realm	  or	  
domain	  of	  activity.	  A	  theory	  is	  a	  depiction	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  a	  domain	  and	  
of	  the	  connections	  among	  its	  parts	  (cf.	  Boltzmann	  1905).	  The	  infinite	  materials	  
of	  any	  realm	  can	  be	  organized	  in	  endlessly	  different	  ways.	  A	  theory	  indicates	  
that	  some	  factors	  are	  more	  important	  than	  others	  and	  specifies	  relations	  
among	  them.	  In	  reality,	  everything	  is	  related	  to	  everything	  else,	  and	  one	  
domain	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  others.	  Theory	  isolates	  one	  realm	  from	  all	  
others	  in	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  it	  intellectually.”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.9)	  
	  
Recall	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  criticised	  this	  passage	  for	  its	  
representational	  account	  of	  theory,	  and	  its	  supposed	  tacit	  commitment	  to	  the	  RVL.	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  this	  anti-­‐representationalist	  line	  of	  criticism	  did	  not	  
hold	  water.	  However,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  were	  on	  the	  
right	  track	  insofar	  as	  this	  passage	  is	  indeed	  problematic;	  only	  not	  for	  the	  reasons	  that	  
these	  scholars	  gave.	  I	  will	  now	  attempt	  to	  explain	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  arise	  
due	  to	  Waltz’s	  use	  of	  terminology	  in	  this	  passage,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  developed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  line,	  “a	  theory	  is	  not	  an	  edifice	  of	  truth”,	  is	  apparently	  a	  restatement	  of	  
Waltz’s	  previous	  contention	  that	  a	  theory	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  set	  of	  laws	  or	  established	  
hypotheses;	  for	  example,	  when	  Waltz	  writes	  that	  “rather	  than	  being	  mere	  collections	  
of	  laws,	  theories	  are	  statements	  that	  explain	  them”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.5),	  and	  that	  
“hypotheses	  about	  the	  association	  of	  this	  with	  that,	  no	  matter	  how	  well	  confirmed,	  
do	  not	  give	  birth	  to	  theories.	  Associations	  never	  contain	  or	  conclusively	  suggest	  their	  
own	  explanation”	  (See	  Waltz,	  1979:	  p.8).	  As	  such,	  this	  is	  a	  reasonable	  assertion	  that	  
could	  be	  argued	  for	  with	  reference	  to	  various	  examples	  of	  what	  are	  regarded	  as	  
‘theories’	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  natural	  sciences.	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However,	  Waltz’s	  next	  assertion	  that	  a	  theory	  is	  “not	  a	  reproduction	  of	  reality”	  is	  not	  
so	  straightforward	  –	  especially	  given	  that	  Waltz	  immediately	  afterwards	  states	  that	  a	  
theory	  is	  a	  “picture”	  of	  a	  domain.	  Since	  in	  many	  cases	  what	  we	  call	  a	  ‘picture’	  can	  
also	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  ‘reproduction’	  of	  something,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  Waltz’s	  basis	  is	  
for	  distinguishing	  between	  ‘pictures’	  and	  ‘reproductions’,	  and	  rejecting	  the	  claim	  that	  
a	  theory	  is	  a	  ‘reproduction’	  of	  reality	  while	  allowing	  his	  own	  claim	  that	  a	  theory	  is	  a	  
‘picture’	  of	  some	  domain.	  Waltz	  does	  not	  say	  much	  more	  about	  what	  it	  means	  for	  a	  
theory	  to	  be	  a	  ‘picture’	  according	  to	  him,	  except	  that	  it	  is	  “mentally-­‐formed”	  and	  that	  
it	  is	  a	  “depiction	  of	  the	  organisation	  of	  a	  domain	  and	  of	  the	  connections	  among	  its	  
parts”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.9).	  What	  the	  difficulty	  here	  boils	  down	  to	  is	  that	  Waltz	  does	  
not	  specify	  what	  regarding	  theory	  as	  a	  ‘reproduction’	  of	  reality,	  and	  regarding	  a	  
theory	  as	  a	  ‘picture’	  of	  reality,	  would	  amount	  to,	  such	  that	  one	  can	  see	  how	  the	  latter	  
conception	  is	  relevantly	  different	  from	  the	  former	  so	  as	  to	  be	  superior	  to	  it.	  This	  
means	  that,	  as	  the	  passage	  stands,	  we	  cannot	  properly	  evaluate	  these	  claims	  of	  
Waltz’s	  without	  speculating	  further	  about	  what	  Waltz	  means	  by	  his	  application	  of	  the	  
terms	  ‘reproduction’	  and	  ‘picture’	  in	  this	  context.	  	  
	  
The	  situation	  here	  could	  be	  aptly	  summed	  up	  with	  reference	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  
remark	  in	  PI	  §13:	  
	  
“If	  we	  say,	  ‘Every	  word	  in	  the	  language	  signifies	  something’,	  we	  have	  so	  far	  
said	  nothing	  whatever;	  unless	  we	  explain	  exactly	  what	  distinction	  we	  wish	  to	  
make.	  (It	  might	  be,	  of	  course,	  that	  we	  wanted	  to	  distinguish	  words	  of	  [the	  
primitive	  language	  imagined	  in	  §8]	  from	  words	  ‘without	  meaning’	  such	  as	  
occur	  in	  Lewis	  Carroll’s	  poems,	  or	  words	  like	  ‘Tra-­‐la-­‐la’	  in	  a	  song.)”	  	  
	  
The	  crux	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  point	  in	  this	  remark	  is	  that	  terms	  like	  ‘signify’,	  ‘meaning’,	  
‘nonsense’	  and	  so	  on	  do	  not	  just	  have	  one	  meaning,	  but	  can	  be	  used	  in	  multiple	  
different	  senses,	  some	  of	  which	  may	  diverge	  from	  or	  even	  contradict	  each	  other.	  As	  a	  
result,	  words	  that	  can	  be	  said	  not	  to	  ‘signify’	  in	  one	  sense,	  e.g.	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  
made	  up,	  could	  at	  the	  same	  time	  justifiably	  be	  said	  to	  ‘signify’	  in	  another	  sense,	  e.g.	  
by	  virtue	  of	  performing	  an	  entertaining	  or	  aesthetic	  role.	  The	  upshot	  of	  this	  is	  that	  if	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one	  is	  going	  to	  make	  a	  claim	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  ‘all	  words	  signify	  something’,	  or	  to	  
attempt	  to	  establish	  a	  distinction	  between	  words	  that	  ‘signify’	  and	  words	  that	  do	  not,	  
it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  specify	  in	  which	  sense	  one	  is	  using	  the	  word	  ‘signify’;	  because	  
otherwise	  not	  only	  is	  it	  unclear	  what	  is	  being	  asserted,	  but	  also	  one’s	  claim	  or	  
distinction	  will	  be	  constantly	  open	  to	  contradiction	  from	  people	  employing	  the	  term	  
‘signify’	  in	  an	  alternative	  but	  equally	  valid	  sense.	  A	  similar	  issue	  arises	  with	  Waltz’s	  
vague	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘reproduction’	  and	  ‘picture’.	  
	  
Reading	  the	  passage	  from	  Waltz	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  her	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
Tractatus	  and	  the	  RVL,	  Fierke	  interprets	  Waltz’s	  contrast	  between	  ‘reproduction’	  and	  
‘picture’	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  “isomorphic	  correspondence”	  (which	  
Waltz	  allegedly	  rejects),	  versus	  the	  idea	  that	  theories	  correspond	  to	  an	  essential	  
underlying	  order	  or	  ‘logic’	  of	  reality	  (Fierke,	  2002:	  p.336).	  ‘Reproduction’	  and	  
‘depiction’	  under	  Fierke’s	  interpretation	  thus	  refer	  to	  distinct	  forms	  of	  
correspondence	  –	  ‘reproduction’	  being	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  correspondence,	  and	  ‘picturing’	  
being	  ‘essential’	  correspondence	  –	  as	  rival	  ways	  in	  which	  theories	  can	  be	  thought	  to	  
relate	  to	  reality.	  However,	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  Waltz’s	  own	  writing	  to	  confirm	  this	  
interpretation	  of	  his	  distinction	  between	  ‘reproduction’	  and	  ‘picturing’,	  and	  even	  
some	  passages	  to	  contradict	  it,	  for	  example	  when	  Waltz	  writes	  that	  “we	  can	  never	  
say	  with	  assurance	  that	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  inductively	  arrived	  at	  corresponds	  to	  
something	  objectively	  real”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.5).	  What	  Waltz	  does	  mean	  more	  
specifically	  by	  calling	  a	  theory	  a	  ‘picture’	  thus	  necessitates	  further	  investigation	  if	  we	  
are	  to	  critically	  evaluate	  his	  claims	  in	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  way	  than	  simply	  declaring	  them	  
vague.	  
	  
When	  Waltz	  writes	  that	  a	  theory	  is	  a	  mentally-­‐formed	  ‘picture’	  of	  the	  organisation	  of	  
a	  domain,	  he	  cites	  a	  collection	  of	  essays	  by	  Ludwig	  Boltzmann,	  thereby	  indicating	  that	  
he	  takes	  himself	  to	  be	  at	  least	  in	  partial	  agreement	  with	  Boltzmann	  on	  this	  point.127	  If	  
we	  look	  at	  the	  essays	  of	  Boltzmann’s	  that	  Waltz	  cites,	  we	  find	  a	  number	  of	  relevant	  
passages	  that	  with	  caution	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  indicative	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  Waltz	  
                                                
127	  We	  should	  note	  that	  this	  is	  a	  conjecture	  that	  it	  is	  left	  to	  the	  reader	  to	  make,	  and	  that	  Waltz	  himself	  
does	  not	  spell	  out	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  Boltzmann’s	  work	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  his	  own	  account.	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means	  when	  he	  says	  that	  a	  theory	  is	  a	  ‘picture’	  in	  contrast	  to	  a	  ‘reproduction’.	  One	  
such	  quote	  is	  found	  in	  Boltzmann’s	  1901	  essay	  ‘On	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  Methods	  
of	  Theoretical	  Physics	  in	  Recent	  Times’:	  
	  
“Hertz	  makes	  physicists	  properly	  aware	  of	  something	  philosophers	  had	  no	  
doubt	  long	  since	  stated,	  namely	  that	  no	  theory	  can	  be	  objective,	  actually	  
coinciding	  with	  nature,	  but	  rather	  that	  each	  theory	  is	  only	  a	  mental	  picture	  
[Bild]	  of	  phenomena,	  related	  to	  them	  as	  sign	  is	  to	  designatum.	  …	  From	  this	  it	  
follows	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  our	  task	  to	  find	  an	  absolutely	  correct	  theory	  but	  
rather	  a	  picture	  that	  is	  as	  simple	  as	  possible	  and	  that	  represents	  phenomena	  
as	  accurately	  as	  possible.”	  (Boltzmann,	  1974	  [1901]:	  p.90-­‐91)	  
	  
Here	  Boltzmann	  makes	  a	  contrast	  between	  thinking	  of	  theories	  as	  objective	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  ‘coinciding’	  with	  nature	  –	  which	  he	  rejects	  –	  and	  thinking	  of	  them	  as	  
simplified	  ‘mental	  pictures’	  which	  represent	  the	  phenomena	  to	  which	  they	  relate	  as	  
best	  they	  can.	  This	  could	  be	  the	  distinction	  that	  Waltz	  is	  trying	  to	  make	  when	  he	  
writes	  that	  a	  theory	  is	  not	  a	  ‘reproduction’	  of	  reality	  but	  rather	  a	  “picture,	  mentally	  
formed”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.9).128	  Elsewhere	  in	  the	  same	  essay,	  Boltzmann	  provides	  a	  
specific	  example	  of	  a	  scientific	  theory	  that	  is	  intended	  as,	  and	  functions	  as,	  a	  kind	  of	  
‘picture’	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  he	  is	  using	  this	  word:	  
	   	  
“Whereas	  it	  was	  perhaps	  less	  the	  creators	  of	  the	  old	  classical	  physics	  than	  its	  
later	  representatives	  that	  pretended	  by	  means	  of	  it	  to	  have	  recognised	  the	  
true	  nature	  of	  things,	  Maxwell	  wished	  his	  theory	  [of	  electromagnetism]	  to	  be	  
regarded	  as	  a	  mere	  picture	  of	  nature,	  a	  mechanical	  analogy	  as	  he	  puts	  it,	  
which	  at	  the	  present	  moment	  allows	  one	  to	  give	  the	  most	  uniform	  and	  
comprehensive	  account	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  phenomena.”	  (Boltzmann,	  1905:	  
p.83)	  
	  
                                                
128	  To	  be	  fair	  to	  Waltz,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  even	  in	  Boltzmann	  one	  finds	  some	  of	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  
vagueness	  and	  conflation	  of	  meanings	  that	  obstructs	  understanding	  and	  evaluation	  of	  Waltz’s	  claims	  
concerning	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  theory	  does	  and	  does	  not	  represent	  reality.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  
passage	  quoted	  above	  it	  is	  not	  fully	  clarified	  what	  ‘coinciding	  with	  nature’	  would	  mean,	  and	  there	  is	  
also	  an	  obscure	  shift	  from	  talking	  about	  theories	  as	  depicting	  or	  modelling	  nature	  (as	  suggested	  by	  the	  
German	  Bild),	  to	  characterising	  the	  relationship	  between	  theories	  and	  nature	  as	  akin	  to	  that	  between	  
a	  “sign”	  and	  “designatum”,	  which	  implies	  representation	  of	  a	  different	  kind,	  such	  as	  naming,	  
substitution,	  or	  symbolism.	  While	  these	  different	  forms	  of	  representation	  can	  of	  course	  have	  various	  
manifestations,	  some	  of	  which	  –	  depending	  on	  the	  particular	  case	  in	  question	  –	  can	  occur	  alongside	  
depiction,	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  equivalent	  to,	  or	  accompaniments	  of,	  depiction	  in	  the	  various	  
senses	  of	  this	  word.	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Here	  we	  have	  another	  clue	  as	  to	  what	  Boltzmann	  means,	  more	  specifically,	  when	  he	  
refers	  to	  theories	  as	  ‘pictures’	  of	  nature,	  provided	  by	  Boltzmann’s	  reference	  to	  
Maxwell’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “mechanical	  analogy”	  to	  characterise	  his	  theory	  of	  
electromagnetism.	  In	  two	  important	  papers,	  ‘On	  Faraday’s	  Lines	  of	  Force’	  and	  ‘On	  
Physical	  Lines	  of	  Force’,	  Maxwell	  explains	  this	  characterisation	  in	  detail:	  
	  
“By	  a	  physical	  analogy	  I	  mean	  that	  partial	  similarity	  between	  the	  laws	  of	  one	  
science	  and	  those	  of	  another	  which	  makes	  each	  of	  them	  illustrate	  the	  other.	  
…	  The	  changes	  of	  direction	  which	  light	  undergoes	  in	  passing	  from	  one	  
medium	  to	  another,	  are	  identical	  with	  the	  deviations	  of	  the	  path	  of	  a	  particle	  
moving	  through	  a	  narrow	  space	  in	  which	  intense	  forces	  act.	  This	  analogy,	  
which	  extends	  only	  to	  the	  direction,	  and	  not	  to	  the	  velocity	  of	  motion,	  was	  
long	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  true	  explanation	  of	  the	  refraction	  of	  light;	  and	  we	  still	  
find	  it	  useful	  in	  the	  solution	  of	  certain	  problems,	  in	  which	  we	  employ	  it	  
without	  danger,	  as	  an	  artificial	  method.	  The	  other	  analogy,	  between	  light	  and	  
the	  vibrations	  of	  an	  elastic	  medium,	  extends	  much	  farther,	  but,	  though	  its	  
importance	  and	  fruitfulness	  cannot	  be	  over-­‐estimated,	  we	  must	  recollect	  that	  
it	  is	  founded	  only	  on	  a	  resemblance	  in	  form	  between	  the	  laws	  of	  light	  and	  
those	  of	  vibrations.”	  (Maxwell,	  2013	  [1855]:	  p.157)	  
	  
“In	  the	  Cambridge	  and	  Dublin	  Mathematical	  Journal	  for	  January	  1847,	  
Professor	  William	  Thomson	  has	  given	  a	  ‘Mechanical	  Representation	  of	  
Electric,	  Magnetic,	  and	  Galvanic	  Forces,’	  by	  means	  of	  the	  displacements	  of	  the	  
particles	  of	  an	  elastic	  solid	  in	  a	  state	  of	  strain.	  In	  this	  representation	  …	  the	  
absolute	  displacement	  of	  any	  particle,	  considered	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  
particle	  in	  its	  immediate	  neighbourhood,	  will	  correspond	  in	  magnitude	  and	  
direction	  to	  the	  quantity	  of	  electric	  current	  passing	  through	  the	  corresponding	  
point	  of	  the	  magneto-­‐electric	  field.	  The	  author	  of	  this	  method	  of	  
representation	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  observed	  forces	  
by	  the	  effects	  due	  to	  these	  strains	  in	  the	  elastic	  solid,	  but	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  
mathematical	  analogies	  of	  the	  two	  problems	  to	  assist	  the	  imagination	  in	  the	  
study	  of	  both.”	  (Maxwell,	  2013	  [1862]	  p.453)	  
	  
Here	  at	  last	  we	  have	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  what	  it	  might	  mean,	  in	  a	  particular	  
case,	  for	  a	  theory	  to	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  ‘picture’	  of	  reality	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  
Boltzmann	  suggests,	  and	  which	  Waltz	  cites	  when	  making	  his	  own	  claim	  to	  this	  effect	  
in	  his	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics.	  In	  the	  above	  passages,	  Maxwell	  refers	  to	  his	  
theory	  of	  electromagnetism	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  light	  that	  preceded	  it	  as	  being	  based	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on	  two	  different	  ‘analogies’:	  the	  first	  being	  an	  analogy	  between	  the	  refraction	  of	  light	  
and	  the	  directional	  movement	  of	  particles	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  and	  the	  second	  
being	  an	  analogy	  between	  light	  and	  the	  vibrations	  of	  an	  elastic	  medium	  (Maxwell	  
himself	  experimented	  on	  blocks	  of	  fish	  gelatine	  and	  films	  of	  gutta	  percha	  (see	  
Maxwell,	  2013	  [1850]:	  p.55)).	  According	  to	  Maxwell	  neither	  of	  these	  ‘analogies’	  is	  
strictly	  true,	  in	  that	  light	  is	  not	  a	  particle	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense,	  and	  neither	  is	  it	  a	  
vibration	  in	  an	  elastic	  solid.	  Nevertheless,	  representing	  light	  as	  though	  it	  were	  a	  
particle	  enables	  predictions	  to	  be	  made	  concerning	  the	  direction	  and	  angle	  of	  its	  
refraction;	  while	  representing	  light	  as	  a	  vibration	  in	  an	  elastic	  medium	  enables	  many	  
problems	  to	  be	  solved	  and	  predictions	  to	  be	  made	  concerning	  not	  only	  the	  behaviour	  
of	  light,	  but	  also	  other	  phenomena	  concerning	  magnetism	  and	  electricity.	  Maxwell	  
suggests	  that	  the	  success	  of	  these	  analogies	  depends	  on	  certain	  formal	  similarities	  
that	  happen	  to	  obtain	  between	  the	  typical	  behaviour	  of	  light,	  particles,	  and	  vibrations	  
under	  certain	  conditions;	  however	  he	  is	  careful	  to	  note	  that	  the	  similarity	  is	  partial	  
and	  may	  only	  apply	  to	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  phenomena	  in	  question	  (for	  example,	  to	  
direction	  and	  not	  to	  speed).	  It	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  Maxwell	  conceives	  of	  this	  
formal	  similarity	  as	  a	  mathematical	  one,	  which	  is	  accordingly	  to	  be	  expressed	  in	  
mathematical	  terms	  (such	  as	  Maxwell’s	  own	  famous	  ‘field	  equations’).	  
	  
Now	  that	  we	  have	  more	  of	  a	  handle	  on	  what	  it	  means	  to	  claim	  in	  Boltzmann’s	  sense	  
that	  theories	  ‘depict’	  a	  domain,	  we	  can	  consider	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  passage	  on	  p.9	  of	  
Waltz’s	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  and	  its	  proposed	  relevance	  for	  IR,	  in	  this	  light.	  
In	  the	  passage	  in	  question,	  as	  well	  as	  stating	  that	  a	  theory	  is	  a	  ‘picture’	  of	  reality,	  
Waltz	  claims	  more	  specifically	  that	  a	  theory	  is	  “a	  depiction	  of	  the	  organisation	  of	  a	  
domain	  and	  of	  the	  connections	  among	  its	  parts,”	  and	  that	  “a	  theory	  indicates	  that	  
some	  factors	  are	  more	  important	  than	  others	  and	  specifies	  the	  relations	  among	  
them”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.9).	  Using	  the	  example	  of	  Maxwell’s	  theory	  of	  
electromagnetism	  discussed	  above,	  we	  can	  ask:	  what,	  in	  this	  specific	  case,	  would	  
count	  as	  the	  ‘parts’,	  ‘connections’	  and	  ‘organisation’	  of	  the	  domain?	  If	  we	  take	  the	  
‘domain’	  in	  this	  case	  to	  be	  the	  particular	  collection	  of	  phenomena	  to	  do	  with	  light,	  
magnetism,	  and	  electricity	  with	  which	  Maxwell’s	  theory	  deals,	  then	  perhaps	  the	  
‘parts’	  might	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  particles	  of	  the	  imaginary	  elastic	  medium	  by	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analogy	  with	  whose	  vibrations	  the	  relevant	  phenomena	  are	  mathematically	  
modelled.	  However,	  then	  again,	  one	  might	  equally	  say	  that	  the	  ‘parts’	  in	  this	  case	  are	  
the	  individual	  instances	  of	  the	  photic,	  electrical	  or	  magnetic	  phenomena	  that	  the	  
theory	  purports	  to	  explain	  via	  analogy.	  Here	  we	  encounter	  a	  troublesome	  issue	  in	  
seeking	  to	  understand	  how	  Waltz’s	  account	  of	  ‘theoretical	  depiction’	  might	  apply	  to	  
Maxwell’s	  theory	  of	  electromagnetism;	  in	  that	  although	  it	  might	  be	  possible	  –	  using	  
Waltz’s	  terminology	  –	  to	  characterise	  the	  relationship	  between	  Maxwell’s	  theory	  and	  
the	  theorised	  phenomena	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  	  ‘depiction	  of	  the	  organisation	  among	  parts	  
of	  a	  domain’,	  there	  is	  not	  an	  unambiguous	  candidate	  for	  what	  would	  count	  as	  the	  
‘parts’	  of	  the	  domain	  in	  this	  case.	  
	  
Likewise,	  there	  are	  various	  possibilities	  for	  what	  one	  might	  term	  the	  ‘connections’	  in	  
this	  scenario.	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  identify	  the	  ‘parts’	  of	  the	  domain	  as	  the	  
individual	  photic,	  electrical,	  or	  magnetic	  phenomena	  that	  the	  theory	  purports	  to	  
explain,	  then	  one	  might	  identify	  the	  ‘connections’	  as	  the	  hypothesised	  regular	  ways	  
in	  which	  changes	  in	  the	  behaviour	  of	  one	  of	  these	  phenomena,	  such	  as	  the	  direction	  
of	  the	  light,	  affects	  changes	  in	  the	  behaviour	  of	  other	  phenomena,	  such	  as	  electrical	  
charge.	  However,	  one	  might	  just	  as	  well	  identify	  as	  ‘connections’	  the	  formal	  
similarities	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  mathematically	  between	  the	  electromagnetic/	  photic	  
phenomena	  that	  the	  theory	  purports	  to	  explain,	  and	  the	  individual	  phenomena	  with	  
which	  these	  are	  analogised	  (i.e.	  various	  phenomena	  relating	  to	  vibrations	  in	  an	  elastic	  
medium).	  Finally,	  the	  term	  ‘organisation’	  might	  be	  an	  impressionistic	  way	  of	  
summing	  up	  the	  ‘connections’	  between	  the	  ‘parts’	  of	  the	  domain	  (whatever	  these	  are	  
considered	  to	  be);	  or	  it	  could	  be	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  overall	  formal	  similarity	  between	  
the	  phenomena	  under	  explanation	  and	  the	  phenomena	  with	  which	  they	  are	  
analogised,	  which	  is	  expressed	  abstractly	  in	  mathematical	  terms	  such	  as	  in	  Maxwell’s	  
field	  equations.	  
	  
That	  there	  are	  such	  various	  possibilities	  left	  open	  for	  what	  Waltz’s	  terms	  ‘parts’,	  
‘connections’	  and	  ‘organisation’	  might	  mean	  when	  applied	  to	  a	  particular	  theory,	  
such	  as	  Maxwell’s	  theory	  of	  electromagnetism,	  illustrates	  how	  –	  despite	  significant	  
efforts	  to	  unpack	  Waltz’s	  account	  of	  theoretical	  ‘depiction’	  –	  the	  details	  of	  this	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account	  remain	  elusive	  and	  therefore	  not	  amenable	  to	  assessment.	  As	  with	  the	  initial	  
difficulties	  encountered	  with	  Waltz’s	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘reproduction’	  and	  ‘depiction’,	  
this	  elusiveness	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  Waltz’s	  failure	  to	  specify	  a	  particular	  sense	  in	  which	  
he	  is	  using	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘part’,	  ‘connection’,	  and	  ‘organisation’	  in	  relation	  to	  theories	  
and	  their	  domains.	  Again,	  this	  difficulty	  can	  be	  aptly	  characterised	  using	  one	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  remarks	  in	  the	  PI:	  
	  
“But	  what	  are	  the	  simple	  constituent	  parts	  of	  which	  reality	  is	  composed?	  –	  
What	  are	  the	  simple	  constituent	  parts	  of	  a	  chair?	  –	  The	  pieces	  of	  wood	  from	  
which	  it	  is	  assembled?	  Or	  the	  molecules,	  or	  the	  atoms?	  –	  ‘Simple’	  means:	  not	  
composite.	  And	  here	  the	  point	  is:	  in	  what	  sense	  ‘composite’?	  It	  makes	  no	  
sense	  at	  all	  to	  speak	  absolutely	  of	  the	  ‘simple	  parts	  of	  a	  chair’.	  
	   Again:	  Does	  my	  visual	  image	  of	  this	  tree,	  of	  this	  chair,	  consist	  of	  parts?	  
And	  what	  are	  its	  simple	  constituent	  parts?	  Multi-­‐colouredness	  is	  one	  kind	  of	  
compositeness;	  another	  is,	  for	  example,	  that	  of	  an	  open	  curve	  composed	  of	  
straight	  bits.	  And	  a	  continuous	  curve	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  composed	  of	  an	  
ascending	  and	  a	  descending	  segment.	  
	   If	  I	  tell	  someone	  without	  any	  further	  explanation,	  ‘What	  I	  see	  before	  
me	  is	  not	  composite’,	  he	  will	  legitimately	  ask,	  ‘What	  do	  you	  mean	  by	  
‘composite’?	  For	  there	  are	  all	  sorts	  of	  things	  it	  may	  mean!’	  –	  The	  question	  ‘Is	  
what	  you	  see	  composite?’	  makes	  good	  sense	  if	  it	  is	  already	  established	  what	  
kind	  of	  compositeness	  –	  that	  is,	  which	  particular	  use	  of	  the	  word	  –	  is	  in	  
question.	  If	  it	  had	  been	  laid	  down	  that	  the	  visual	  image	  of	  a	  tree	  was	  to	  be	  
called	  ‘composite’	  if	  one	  saw	  not	  just	  a	  trunk,	  but	  also	  branches,	  then	  the	  
question	  ‘Is	  the	  visual	  image	  of	  this	  tree	  simple	  or	  composite?’	  and	  the	  
question	  ‘What	  are	  its	  simple	  constituent	  parts?’	  would	  have	  a	  clear	  sense	  –	  a	  
clear	  use.	  …	  
To	  the	  philosophical	  question	  ‘Is	  the	  visual	  image	  of	  this	  tree	  
composite,	  and	  what	  are	  its	  constituent	  parts?’	  The	  correct	  answer	  is:	  ‘That	  
depends	  on	  what	  you	  understand	  by	  ‘composite’.’	  (And	  that,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  
an	  answer	  to,	  but	  a	  rejection	  of,	  the	  question.)”	  (PI	  §47)	  
	  
In	  this	  remark	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  that	  claims	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  ‘X	  is	  composed	  of	  
constituent	  parts’	  or	  ‘X	  is	  not	  composite’	  do	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  and	  unambiguous	  
meaning	  until	  it	  has	  been	  established	  in	  which	  particular	  sense	  the	  terms	  ‘composite’	  
and	  ‘simple’	  are	  being	  used;	  since	  there	  are	  various	  things	  that	  these	  terms	  could	  
mean	  in	  a	  given	  case,	  and	  without	  further	  guidance	  we	  would	  not	  know	  which,	  if	  any,	  
of	  the	  options	  that	  occur	  to	  us	  are	  intended.	  In	  contexts	  where	  such	  terms	  are	  not	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ordinarily	  used,	  or	  are	  being	  used	  in	  an	  unusual	  way,	  this	  would	  mean	  establishing	  
(‘laying	  down’)	  and	  clearly	  explaining	  the	  new	  usage.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  Waltz’s	  
references	  to	  the	  ‘organisation’,	  ‘connections’	  and	  ‘parts’	  of	  a	  theorised	  domain,	  and	  
also	  of	  his	  use	  of	  other	  similar	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘factors’	  and	  ‘relations’	  when	  making	  
general	  claims	  about	  theories	  and	  how	  they	  work	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.9).	  The	  problem	  
here	  is	  not	  –	  as	  Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  suggested	  –	  that	  Waltz	  has	  mistakenly	  
characterised	  the	  nature	  of	  theories	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  their	  subject	  matter,	  but	  
rather	  that	  Waltz	  has	  provided	  a	  characterisation	  using	  novel	  terminology	  whose	  use	  
he	  has	  not	  adequately	  clarified.	  The	  appropriate	  response	  to	  Waltz’s	  account	  is	  thus	  
not	  to	  contradict	  it,	  but	  rather	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  either	  agreed	  or	  
contradicted	  with	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  clarification.	  
	  
The	  kind	  of	  terminological	  ambiguities	  identified	  so	  far	  in	  Waltz’s	  initial	  account	  of	  
how	  theories	  function	  persist	  into	  his	  subsequent	  discussion	  of	  which	  types	  of	  
theories	  and	  methods	  are	  appropriate	  for	  studying	  IR.	  In	  Chapter	  4	  of	  Theory	  of	  
International	  Politics,	  he	  writes:	  	  
	  
“From	  Chapter	  1	  we	  know	  how	  theories	  are	  constructed.	  To	  construct	  a	  
theory	  we	  have	  to	  abstract	  from	  reality,	  that	  is,	  to	  leave	  aside	  most	  of	  what	  
we	  see	  and	  experience.	  Students	  of	  international	  politics	  have	  tried	  to	  get	  
closer	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  international	  practice	  and	  to	  increase	  the	  empirical	  
content	  of	  their	  studies.	  Natural	  science,	  in	  contrast,	  has	  advanced	  over	  the	  
millennia	  by	  moving	  away	  from	  everyday	  reality	  and	  by	  fulfilling	  Conant’s	  
previously	  mentioned	  aspiration	  to	  lower	  ‘the	  degree	  of	  the	  empiricism	  
involved	  in	  solving	  problems.’	  Natural	  scientists	  look	  for	  simplicities:	  
elemental	  units	  and	  elegant	  theories	  about	  them.	  Students	  of	  international	  
politics	  complicate	  their	  studies	  and	  claim	  to	  locate	  more	  and	  more	  variables.	  
The	  subject	  matters	  of	  the	  social	  and	  natural	  sciences	  are	  profoundly	  
different.	  The	  difference	  does	  not	  obliterate	  certain	  possibilities	  and	  
necessities.	  No	  matter	  what	  the	  subject,	  we	  have	  to	  bound	  the	  domain	  of	  our	  
concern,	  to	  organise	  it,	  to	  simplify	  the	  materials	  we	  deal	  with,	  to	  concentrate	  
on	  central	  tendencies,	  and	  to	  single	  out	  the	  strongest	  propelling	  forces.”	  
(Waltz,	  1979:	  p.69)	  
	  
In	  this	  paragraph,	  despite	  acknowledging	  “profound	  differences”	  between	  the	  
subject	  matter	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘natural’	  and	  ‘social’	  sciences,	  Waltz	  insists	  on	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providing	  a	  uniform	  characterisation	  of	  how	  theories	  are	  created	  using	  the	  concepts	  
of	  ‘bounding’,	  ‘organising’,	  ‘simplifying’,	  ‘materials’,	  ‘tendencies’	  and	  ‘forces’.	  In	  
addition	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  insufficient	  terminological	  clarification	  discussed	  above,	  
this	  account	  falls	  foul	  of	  the	  consideration	  that	  even	  if	  Waltz	  were	  to	  clarify	  specific	  
senses	  in	  which	  he	  is	  using	  these	  terms,	  it	  would	  be	  unlikely	  for	  the	  same	  specific	  
sense	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  all	  of	  the	  various	  subject	  matters	  and	  theories	  that	  his	  
account	  purports	  to	  summarise.	  For	  example,	  the	  term	  ‘force’	  as	  it	  is	  used	  in	  physics	  
–	  to	  mean	  something	  that	  changes	  the	  motion	  of	  an	  object	  with	  mass	  –	  will	  not	  be	  
directly	  applicable	  to	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  international	  politics,	  though	  it	  may	  be	  
used	  in	  a	  metaphorical	  or	  partially	  analogical	  sense	  (and,	  even	  then,	  such	  analogies	  
should	  be	  treated	  with	  extreme	  caution).	  Similarly,	  what	  ‘simplification’	  amounts	  to	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  different	  theories	  and	  subject	  matters,	  even	  within	  the	  ‘natural	  
sciences’,	  is	  likely	  to	  vary.	  What	  ‘simplification’	  involves	  in	  the	  case	  of	  evolutionary	  
theory,	  may	  be	  quite	  different	  from	  what	  it	  involves	  in	  the	  case	  of	  astrophysics,	  for	  
example.	  Waltz’s	  account	  could	  thus	  be	  said	  to	  trade	  on	  an	  illusion	  that	  something	  
general	  or	  common	  is	  being	  stated	  about	  theory-­‐creation	  –	  we	  might	  call	  this	  illusion	  
a	  ‘picture’	  of	  theorising	  –	  which	  is	  generated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  multifunctional	  
terminology	  without	  committing	  to	  a	  particular	  one	  of	  the	  different	  senses	  in	  which	  
these	  terms	  would	  apply	  to	  an	  actual	  case.	  In	  this	  respect,	  Waltz	  follows	  the	  earlier	  
musings	  of	  James	  B.	  Conant,	  whose	  book	  Modern	  Science	  and	  Modern	  Man	  (1952)	  he	  
quotes	  in	  the	  above	  passage.	  The	  relevant	  paragraph	  from	  which	  the	  quote	  is	  taken	  
reads	  as	  follows:	  
	  
“The	  parallel	  [between	  the	  biological	  sciences	  and]	  the	  social	  sciences,	  I	  
suggest,	  is	  worth	  considering.	  All	  the	  sciences	  concerned	  with	  human	  beings	  
that	  range	  from	  the	  abstractions	  of	  economics	  through	  sociology	  to	  
anthropology	  and	  psychology	  are,	  in	  part,	  efforts	  to	  lower	  the	  degree	  of	  
empiricism	  in	  certain	  areas;	  in	  part	  they	  are	  efforts	  to	  organize	  and	  
systematize	  empirical	  procedures.	  Whether	  or	  not	  in	  each	  of	  the	  divisions	  or	  
subdivisions	  a	  Pasteur	  has	  yet	  arisen	  is	  not	  for	  me	  to	  say.	  But	  if	  he	  has,	  his	  
contribution	  has	  been	  the	  introduction	  of	  some	  new	  broad	  concepts,	  some	  
working	  hypotheses	  on	  a	  grand	  scale	  that	  have	  been	  fruitful	  of	  further	  
investigations.	  It	  would	  seem	  important	  to	  distinguish,	  if	  possible,	  the	  
advances	  connected	  with	  such	  broad	  working	  hypotheses,	  which	  are	  the	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essence	  of	  a	  science,	  and	  the	  continued	  efforts	  to	  improve	  human	  society	  by	  
empirical	  procedures.”	  (Conant,	  James	  B.,	  1952:	  p.76)	  
	  
In	  all	  probability	  we	  have	  here	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  textual	  sources	  from	  which	  Waltz	  
adopts	  the	  vague	  use	  of	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘organisation’,	  ‘abstraction’,	  and	  so	  on,	  as	  
concepts	  that	  can	  provide	  an	  apparently	  uniform	  account	  of	  science	  and	  scientific	  
progress	  which	  appears	  capable	  of	  encompassing	  disciplines	  such	  as	  economics	  and	  
IR	  alongside	  ‘natural’	  sciences	  such	  as	  biology	  and	  physics.	  It	  is	  understandable	  how	  
the	  above	  account	  –	  coming	  as	  it	  does	  from	  an	  eminent	  chemist	  –	  might	  easily	  be	  
taken	  up	  by	  a	  scholar	  such	  as	  Waltz	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  James	  B.	  Conant’s	  scientific	  
credentials	  and	  authority.	  One	  might	  be	  inclined	  to	  think:	  if	  we	  are	  to	  trust	  anyone’s	  
judgement	  about	  what	  science	  is	  and	  how	  it	  progresses,	  then	  certainly	  we	  should	  
trust	  the	  word	  of	  a	  practising	  chemist	  who	  uses	  scientific	  theories	  and	  methods	  on	  a	  
daily	  basis.	  However,	  when	  reading	  such	  ‘philosophical’	  accounts	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  
cautious	  not	  to	  place	  too	  much	  store	  in	  the	  author’s	  authority	  as	  a	  scientist,	  
especially	  when	  the	  generality	  of	  the	  statements	  involved	  reaches	  far	  beyond	  the	  
author’s	  area	  of	  specialism.	  	  
	  
Wittgenstein	  writes	  in	  one	  of	  his	  notebooks	  that	  “the	  popular	  scientific	  writings	  of	  
our	  scientists	  are	  not	  the	  expression	  of	  hard	  work	  but	  of	  resting	  on	  laurels”	  
(Wittgenstein,	  1998:	  p.48e,	  MS	  125	  21r:	  1942).	  	  What	  Wittgenstein	  seems	  to	  be	  
suggesting	  here	  is	  that	  we	  should	  recognise	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  ‘scientific’	  
writings	  of	  scientists,	  as	  expressions	  of	  detailed	  scientific	  work	  undertaken	  by	  the	  
author,129	  and	  scientists’	  more	  ‘popular’	  musings	  about	  what	  they	  do,	  which	  borrow	  
glory	  from	  –	  or	  ‘rest	  on	  the	  laurels’	  of	  –	  the	  hard	  work	  that	  underwrites	  their	  
scientific	  credentials.	  While	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  popular	  writings	  
of	  scientists	  should	  be	  rejected	  as	  illegitimate,	  it	  does	  caution	  against	  accepting	  such	  
writings	  at	  face	  value	  purely	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  author’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  scientist.	  
In	  support	  of	  this	  caution	  we	  should	  consider	  that	  even	  when	  a	  scientist	  is	  intimately	  
acquainted	  with	  the	  specific	  procedures	  and	  so	  on	  employed	  in	  their	  area	  of	  
                                                
129	  This	  work	  could,	  for	  example,	  take	  the	  form	  of	  systematic	  experiments	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  results,	  
as	  published	  in	  scientific	  journals,	  though	  there	  are	  of	  course	  other	  forms	  of	  scientific	  ‘work’	  that	  could	  
count	  as	  well.	  
 178  
research,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  they	  will	  be	  proficient	  at	  providing	  a	  
general	  description	  of	  these	  procedures	  en	  masse	  –	  let	  alone	  a	  description	  of	  these	  
procedures	  that	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  particularities	  of	  other	  subjects	  such	  as	  sociology,	  
anthropology,	  psychology,	  economics	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics,	  Wittgenstein	  warns	  that	  
mathematicians	  are	  wont	  to	  “go	  astray”	  when	  they	  try	  to	  “talk	  about	  calculi	  in	  
general”	  because	  “they	  forget	  the	  particular	  stipulations	  that	  are	  the	  foundations	  of	  
each	  particular	  calculus”,	  and	  that	  “the	  philosopher	  only	  marks	  what	  the	  
mathematician	  casually	  throws	  off	  about	  his	  activities”	  (Wittgenstein,	  1974	  [1933]:	  
p.369).	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  quite	  conceivable	  that	  scientists’	  more	  general	  reflections	  about	  
science	  may	  be	  ‘casually	  thrown	  off’	  with	  insufficient	  efforts	  made	  to	  preserve	  the	  
specific	  details	  –	  especially	  divergences	  –	  of	  the	  individual	  methods,	  theories	  and	  so	  
on	  with	  which	  the	  scientist	  operates	  expertly	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis.	  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  
to	  say	  that	  the	  reflections	  of	  scientists	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  or	  contest	  
observations	  concerning	  scientific	  practice	  and	  language-­‐use;	  rather	  that	  when	  
appealing	  to	  scientists	  in	  this	  way,	  we	  should	  focus	  on	  those	  reflections	  that	  are	  
grounded	  in	  specific	  examples	  related	  to	  the	  author’s	  area	  of	  expertise	  (such	  as	  
Maxwell’s	  observations	  concerning	  the	  theories	  of	  light	  and	  electromagnetism,	  
discussed	  previously),	  and	  not	  accord	  undue	  authority	  to	  scientists’	  vaguer	  
statements	  about	  science	  especially	  where	  these	  appear	  to	  erase	  important	  details	  
and	  distinctions.	  	  
	  
Returning	  now	  to	  Waltz:	  despite	  providing	  a	  uniform	  account	  of	  how	  theories	  in	  the	  
so-­‐called	  natural	  and	  social	  sciences	  function,	  Waltz	  recommends	  that	  the	  domain	  of	  
international	  politics	  is	  more	  suited	  to	  “a	  systemic”	  approach	  than	  “the	  analytic	  
method	  of	  classical	  physics”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.12).	  The	  ‘systemic’	  theory	  of	  
international	  politics	  that	  Waltz	  goes	  on	  to	  develop	  is	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  the	  concept	  
of	  ‘structure’,	  which	  he	  develops	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Kaplan	  and	  other	  past	  political	  




“Within	  a	  given	  system,	  different	  ‘causes’	  may	  produce	  the	  same	  effect;	  in	  
different	  systems,	  the	  same	  ‘causes’	  may	  have	  different	  consequences.	  The	  
effect	  of	  an	  organisation,	  in	  short,	  may	  predominate	  over	  the	  attributes	  and	  
interactions	  of	  the	  elements	  within	  it.	  Short	  of	  predominating,	  a	  system’s	  
structure	  acts	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  system’s	  units.	  It	  disposes	  them	  to	  
behave	  in	  certain	  ways	  and	  not	  in	  others,	  and	  because	  it	  does	  so	  the	  system	  is	  
maintained.”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.58)	  
	  
Waltz	  argues	  that	  “the	  repeated	  failure	  of	  attempts	  to	  explain	  international	  
outcomes	  analytically—that	  is,	  through	  examination	  of	  interacting	  units—strongly	  
signals	  the	  need	  for	  a	  systems	  approach.	  If	  the	  same	  effects	  follow	  from	  different	  
causes,	  then	  constraints	  must	  be	  operating	  on	  the	  independent	  variables	  in	  ways	  that	  
affect	  outcomes”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.68-­‐9).	  To	  construct	  a	  ‘systems	  theory’	  of	  
international	  politics,	  according	  to	  Waltz,	  thus	  “requires	  conceiving	  of	  an	  
international	  system’s	  structure	  and	  showing	  how	  it	  works	  its	  effects”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  
p.69).	  	  
	  
Unlike	  some	  of	  the	  other	  concepts	  examined	  so	  far,	  Waltz	  provides	  a	  fairly	  
comprehensive	  explanation	  of	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  he	  is	  using	  the	  term	  ‘structure’	  in	  
relation	  to	  theories	  of	  international	  politics:	  
	  
“I	  use	  the	  word	  ‘structure’	  only	  in	  its	  second	  sense.	  …	  In	  the	  second	  sense	  
structure	  designates	  a	  set	  of	  constraining	  conditions.	  Such	  a	  structure	  acts	  as	  
a	  selector,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  seen,	  examined,	  and	  observed	  at	  work.	  …	  Freely	  
formed	  economic	  markets	  and	  international-­‐political	  structures	  are	  selectors,	  
but	  they	  are	  not	  agents.	  Because	  structures	  select	  by	  rewarding	  some	  
behaviours	  and	  punishing	  others,	  outcomes	  cannot	  be	  inferred	  from	  
intentions	  and	  behaviours.	  …	  Structures	  are	  causes,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  causes	  in	  
the	  sense	  meant	  by	  saying	  that	  A	  causes	  X	  and	  B	  causes	  Y.	  …	  Because	  A	  and	  B	  
are	  different,	  they	  produce	  different	  effects.	  In	  contrast,	  structures	  limit	  and	  
mould	  agents	  and	  agencies	  and	  point	  them	  in	  ways	  that	  tend	  toward	  a	  
common	  quality	  of	  outcomes	  even	  though	  the	  efforts	  and	  aims	  of	  agents	  and	  
agencies	  vary.	  …	  In	  itself	  a	  structure	  does	  not	  directly	  lead	  to	  one	  outcome	  
rather	  than	  another.	  Structure	  affects	  behaviour	  within	  the	  system,	  but	  does	  
so	  indirectly.	  The	  effects	  are	  produced	  in	  two	  ways:	  through	  socialisation	  of	  
the	  actors	  and	  through	  competition	  among	  them.”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.73-­‐4)	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Waltz	  proceeds	  in	  Chapter	  5	  to	  explain	  further	  what	  he	  understands	  by	  the	  
‘structure’	  of	  the	  international	  political	  system,	  by	  way	  of	  contrast	  with	  the	  
‘structure’	  of	  domestic	  politics.	  He	  writes:	  	  
	  
“The	  parts	  of	  domestic	  political	  systems	  stand	  in	  relations	  of	  super-­‐	  and	  
subordination.	  Some	  are	  entitled	  to	  command;	  others	  are	  required	  to	  obey.	  
Domestic	  systems	  are	  centralised	  and	  hierarchic.	  The	  parts	  of	  international-­‐
political	  systems	  stand	  in	  relations	  of	  coordination.	  Formally,	  each	  is	  the	  equal	  
of	  all	  the	  others.	  None	  is	  entitled	  to	  command;	  none	  is	  required	  to	  obey.	  
International	  systems	  are	  decentralised	  and	  anarchic.	  The	  ordering	  principles	  
of	  the	  two	  structures	  are	  distinctly	  different,	  indeed,	  contrary	  to	  each	  other.”	  
(Waltz,	  1979:	  p.88)	  
	  
Effectively,	  then,	  what	  Waltz	  calls	  the	  anarchic	  ‘structure’	  of	  international	  politics	  is	  
the	  alleged	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  institutionally	  established	  hierarchy	  among	  individual	  
nation	  states,	  so	  that	  in	  principle	  all	  states	  are	  on	  an	  equal	  footing	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  
they	  are	  authorised	  to	  act.	  According	  to	  Waltz	  this	  ‘structure’	  serves	  as	  a	  constraining	  
condition	  on	  the	  interactions	  of	  states	  by	  favourably	  affecting	  the	  outcome	  of	  certain	  
actions	  and	  negatively	  affecting	  others,	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  
things	  that	  are	  called	  ‘structures’	  in	  other	  related	  disciplines	  such	  as	  economics,	  
political	  theory	  and	  anthropology.	  Bracketing	  for	  now	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Waltz	  
is	  right	  that	  states	  are	  on	  a	  ‘formally	  equal	  footing’	  and	  that	  this	  constrains	  their	  
interactions	  in	  significant	  ways,	  we	  might	  ask	  what	  the	  academic	  advantage	  is	  of	  
using	  the	  term	  ‘structure’	  to	  refer	  to	  this	  alleged	  in-­‐principle	  equality,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
simply	  calling	  it	  a	  ‘constraining	  condition’	  and	  leaving	  it	  at	  that.	  After	  all,	  as	  Waltz	  
acknowledges,	  the	  formal	  equality	  of	  nation	  states	  is	  not	  a	  ‘structure’	  in	  the	  same	  
sense	  as	  a	  domestic	  political	  ‘structure’,	  which	  according	  to	  him	  is	  largely	  constituted	  
by	  the	  established	  organisational	  hierarchy	  of	  official	  governmental	  roles	  with	  
specific	  authorised	  powers	  and	  responsibilities	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.81).	  	  
	  
It	  is	  hard	  to	  escape	  the	  conclusion	  that,	  against	  Waltz’s	  intentions,	  the	  main	  function	  
of	  his	  novel	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘structure’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  politics	  is	  a	  
rhetorical	  rather	  than	  a	  theoretical	  one,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  rhetorical	  function	  of	  such	  
terms	  that	  enables	  Waltz	  to	  characterise	  the	  operation	  of	  his	  theory	  in	  terms	  that	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make	  it	  appear	  to	  fit	  an	  established	  template	  of	  enquiry	  that	  had	  already	  gained	  
mainstream	  acceptance	  in	  other	  disciplines	  such	  as	  economics.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  Waltz’s	  
application	  of	  the	  term	  ‘structure’	  to	  international	  politics	  which	  crucially	  enables	  
him	  to	  maintain	  that	  his	  theory	  falls	  under	  the	  uniform	  account	  of	  theory-­‐creation	  he	  
developed	  using	  Boltzmann’s	  philosophy	  of	  physics,	  according	  to	  which	  all	  theories	  –	  
regardless	  of	  their	  subject	  matter	  –	  depict	  the	  ‘organisation’	  of	  a	  domain	  and	  the	  
connections	  among	  its	  parts.	  If	  Waltz	  were	  to	  characterise	  the	  principle	  of	  
international	  anarchy	  as	  a	  ‘constraining	  condition’	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  ‘structure’,	  then	  it	  
would	  become	  much	  harder	  for	  Waltz	  to	  make	  out	  that	  his	  theory	  of	  international	  
politics	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  enterprise	  as	  theories	  in	  the	  so-­‐
called	  natural	  sciences.	  This	  observation	  supports	  the	  suggestion	  that	  Waltz’s	  use	  of	  
the	  term	  ‘structure’	  in	  relation	  to	  international	  politics	  serves	  a	  primarily	  rhetorical	  
purpose	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  useful	  theoretical	  function,	  and	  thereby	  fuels	  a	  misleading	  
‘picture’	  of	  how	  theories	  generally,	  and	  –	  more	  specifically	  –	  theories	  in	  IR,	  work.	  
	  
At	  this	  point	  someone	  might	  raise	  the	  consideration	  that	  perhaps	  Waltz	  consciously	  
intended	  his	  account	  of	  theory	  and	  use	  of	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘structure’,	  ‘law’	  etc.	  to	  
perform	  a	  rhetorical	  function,	  and	  as	  such,	  criticisms	  of	  the	  precision,	  
appropriateness	  and/or	  academic	  usefulness	  of	  his	  terminology	  do	  not	  have	  much	  
bite.	  There	  are	  two	  responses	  to	  this.	  Firstly,	  Waltz	  explicitly	  sets	  himself	  high	  
standards	  of	  terminological	  clarity	  and	  criticises	  other	  academics	  for	  their	  unclear	  or	  
misleading	  use	  of	  key	  terms.	  For	  example,	  on	  the	  first	  page	  of	  his	  Theory	  of	  
International	  Politics	  Waltz	  laments	  the	  way	  in	  which	  “students	  of	  international	  
politics	  use	  the	  term	  ‘theory’	  freely,	  often	  to	  cover	  any	  work	  that	  departs	  from	  mere	  
description”,	  and	  asserts	  that	  “the	  aims	  I	  intend	  to	  pursue	  require	  that	  definitions	  of	  
the	  key	  terms	  theory	  and	  law	  be	  carefully	  chosen”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.1).	  Later	  on	  Waltz	  
identifies	  “the	  first	  big	  difficulty”	  as	  being	  to	  state	  “theories	  with	  enough	  precision	  
and	  plausibility	  to	  make	  testing	  worthwhile”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.14),	  and	  criticises	  
previous	  IR	  scholars	  for	  their	  unclear	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘polarity’:	  
	  
“‘Polarity,’	  moreover,	  is	  variously	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  countries	  or	  of	  blocs.	  
‘Poles’	  are	  counted	  sometimes	  according	  to	  the	  physical	  capabilities	  of	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nations	  or	  of	  alliances,	  sometimes	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  pattern	  of	  national	  
interrelations,	  and	  sometimes	  by	  awarding	  or	  denying	  top	  status	  to	  those	  who	  
get	  or	  fail	  to	  get	  their	  ways.	  Unless	  the	  confused,	  vague,	  and	  fluctuating	  
definitions	  of	  variables	  are	  remedied,	  no	  tests	  of	  anything	  can	  properly	  be	  
conducted.”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.15)	  
	  
Waltz’s	  point	  in	  this	  passage	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  evaluate	  the	  plausibility	  of	  a	  
theoretical	  claim	  that	  has	  not	  been	  expressed	  with	  enough	  clarity	  for	  us	  to	  
understand	  what	  it	  is	  that	  is	  being	  claimed.	  Ironically,	  this	  is	  the	  very	  problem	  that	  
readers	  of	  Waltz’s	  Theory	  come	  up	  against	  with	  regard	  to	  Waltz’s	  general	  claims	  
regarding	  how	  theories	  work	  (as	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  section).	  Concerning	  his	  
definition	  of	  ‘structure’,	  Waltz	  writes	  that	  “the	  problem	  is	  to	  develop	  theoretically	  
useful	  concepts	  to	  replace	  the	  vague	  and	  varying	  systemic	  notions	  that	  are	  
customarily	  employed—notions	  such	  as	  environment,	  situation,	  context,	  and	  milieu.	  
Structure	  is	  a	  useful	  concept	  if	  it	  gives	  clear	  and	  fixed	  meaning	  to	  such	  vague	  and	  
varying	  terms”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.80).130	  
	  
A	  specific	  IR	  theorist	  who	  Waltz	  strongly	  criticises	  on	  terminological	  grounds	  is	  
Kaplan.	  Although	  Waltz	  is	  inspired	  by	  Kaplan’s	  systemic	  approach,	  he	  writes	  that	  
“Kaplan	  has	  failed	  to	  develop	  the	  concepts	  that	  would	  permit	  him	  to	  bend	  the	  
recalcitrant	  materials	  of	  international	  politics	  to	  fit	  the	  precise	  and	  demanding	  
framework	  of	  a	  systems	  approach”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.53).	  An	  example	  of	  this,	  according	  
to	  Waltz,	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  “Kaplan	  merges,	  or	  confuses,	  international	  systems	  with	  
their	  environment”,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  “the	  reader	  has	  to	  puzzle	  through	  an	  answer	  
for	  himself”	  as	  to	  where	  the	  international	  system	  ends	  and	  its	  environment	  begins	  
(Waltz,	  1979:	  p.53).	  Later,	  Waltz	  writes	  the	  following	  with	  regard	  to	  Kaplan’s	  account	  
of	  the	  dynamic	  between	  subsystems	  within	  the	  international	  system:	  
	  
                                                
130	  Another	  concept	  whose	  prior	  inadequate	  application	  Waltz	  highlights	  within	  the	  study	  of	  politics	  is	  
that	  of	  ‘power’:	  “We	  are	  misled	  by	  the	  pragmatically	  formed	  and	  technologically	  influenced	  American	  
definition	  of	  power	  –	  a	  definition	  that	  equates	  power	  with	  control.	  …	  That	  definition	  may	  serve	  for	  
some	  purposes,	  but	  it	  ill	  fits	  the	  requirements	  of	  politics.	  To	  define	  ‘power’	  as	  ‘cause’	  confuses	  process	  
with	  outcome.	  To	  identify	  power	  with	  control	  is	  to	  assert	  that	  only	  power	  is	  needed	  to	  get	  one’s	  way.”	  
(Waltz,	  1979:	  p.191)	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“Here,	  as	  so	  often,	  Kaplan’s	  language	  is	  loose	  and	  imprecise	  to	  the	  point	  of	  
misleading	  the	  reader.	  On	  one	  and	  the	  same	  page,	  he	  writes	  of	  subsystems	  
sharing	  dominance	  and	  of	  essential	  subsystems	  entering	  ‘into	  an	  equilibrium	  
somewhat	  like	  that	  of	  the	  oligopolistic	  market’	  (1964,	  p.17).	  The	  mind	  boggles	  
at	  the	  thought	  of	  subsystems	  being	  dominant,	  let	  alone	  sharing	  dominance.	  
What	  could	  subsystems’	  dominance	  be	  other	  than	  the	  negation	  of	  a	  systems	  
approach?	  An	  oligopolistic	  market,	  moreover,	  is	  not	  one	  in	  which	  firms	  
dominate	  the	  market	  but	  rather	  one	  in	  which,	  contrary	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  
dominance,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  firms	  affect	  the	  market	  and	  are	  in	  turn	  
affected	  by	  it	  is	  indeterminate.”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.54)	  
	  
Finally,	  Waltz	  provides	  a	  damning	  criticism	  of	  Kaplan’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘feedback’:	  
	  
“By	  [Wiener’s]	  definition,	  feedback	  operates	  only	  within	  an	  organisation;	  that	  
is,	  the	  notion	  of	  feedback	  has	  no	  precise,	  distinct,	  technical	  meaning	  outside	  
of	  a	  hierarchic	  order.	  …	  Kaplan’s,	  and	  everybody’s,	  favourite	  example	  of	  a	  
thermostat	  regulating	  a	  furnace	  so	  as	  to	  keep	  the	  temperature	  within	  a	  
narrow	  range	  is	  consistent	  with	  Wiener’s	  definition	  and	  with	  what	  it	  entails	  –	  
a	  controller	  and	  a	  controlled	  instrument	  producing	  a	  given	  result.	  But	  in	  
international	  relations,	  what	  corresponds	  to	  such	  notions?	  Nothing!	  Kaplan	  
simply	  uses	  the	  word	  without	  worrying	  about	  its	  formal	  appropriateness.	  …	  
His	  work	  is	  more	  an	  approach	  and	  a	  taxonomy	  than	  a	  theory.	  But	  the	  
approach	  is	  full	  of	  puzzles	  that,	  because	  of	  contradictions	  and	  conceptual	  
inadequacies,	  the	  reader	  cannot	  solve.”	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  p.57)	  
	  
Passages	  such	  as	  the	  above	  demonstrate	  that	  Waltz	  views	  the	  vague,	  empty,	  
inconsistent	  or	  inappropriate	  application	  of	  concepts	  within	  IR	  as	  serious	  flaws,	  and	  
consequently	  it	  would	  be	  the	  height	  of	  hypocrisy	  if	  Waltz	  were	  himself	  to	  be	  
intentionally	  taking	  advantage	  of	  such	  features	  of	  language-­‐use	  in	  order	  to	  
accomplish	  a	  deliberate	  rhetorical	  aim,	  such	  as	  inflating	  the	  apparent	  significance	  and	  
scientific	  credentials	  of	  his	  own	  theoretical	  account.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  response	  that	  can	  be	  made	  to	  the	  suggestion	  that	  Waltz	  may	  be	  
purposefully	  using	  certain	  terminology	  in	  a	  vague,	  non-­‐committal	  manner	  to	  
accomplish	  a	  rhetorical	  aim,	  is	  that	  even	  if	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  it	  would	  not	  make	  the	  
features	  of	  Waltz’s	  language-­‐use	  criticised	  so	  far	  in	  this	  chapter	  any	  less	  problematic	  
in	  terms	  of	  the	  misleading	  impressions	  that	  they	  convey	  to	  the	  reader.	  It	  does	  not	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follow	  that	  simply	  because	  an	  author’s	  aim	  is	  to	  produce	  a	  misleading	  impression	  of	  
their	  own	  work,	  that	  criticisms	  of	  the	  means	  by	  which	  they	  produce	  this	  impression	  
have	  no	  bite.	  In	  any	  case,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  established,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  
Waltz	  is	  deliberately	  misleading	  his	  reader,	  and	  so	  this	  is	  not	  the	  situation	  that	  we	  are	  
faced	  with	  here.	  
	  
In	  conclusion:	  Waltz’s	  novel	  uses	  of	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘law’,	  ‘picture’,	  ‘structure’,	  
‘organisation’,	  ‘parts’,	  ‘connections’	  and	  so	  on,	  do	  not	  succeed	  in	  performing	  the	  
academic	  function	  that	  Waltz	  apparently	  intends	  them	  to	  fulfil;	  namely,	  to	  provide	  a	  
general	  account	  of	  the	  relation	  of	  theories	  to	  their	  subject	  matter	  that	  can	  
encompass	  IR	  alongside	  theories	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘natural	  sciences’,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  
provide	  a	  basis	  for	  developing	  a	  more	  ‘scientific’	  theory	  of	  IR.	  Instead,	  the	  role	  that	  
these	  terms	  succeed	  in	  playing	  in	  Waltz’s	  account	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  or	  
aesthetic	  one,	  which	  gives	  the	  impression	  that	  various	  epistemic	  techniques	  and	  
procedures	  employed	  in	  IR	  are	  more	  similar	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  procedures	  employed	  by	  
natural	  scientists	  than	  they	  are.	  In	  this	  light	  one	  could	  put	  it	  to	  Waltz	  that	  his	  
extensions	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘law’,	  ‘picture’,	  ‘structure’	  and	  so	  on	  are	  biased	  towards	  
maintaining	  a	  certain	  impression	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  ‘science’;	  that	  these	  biased	  tendencies	  of	  
language-­‐use	  are	  characteristic	  of	  a	  certain	  ‘picture’	  of	  what	  science	  is	  and	  what	  IR	  
should	  strive	  to	  become,	  and	  that	  Waltz’s	  own	  commitment	  to	  such	  a	  ‘picture’	  may	  
be	  what	  has	  led	  him	  to	  develop	  and	  employ	  his	  terminology	  in	  this	  way.	  Of	  course,	  
this	  latter	  characterisation	  is	  something	  that	  would	  have	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  by	  
Waltz	  and	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  acknowledgement.	  
Nevertheless,	  what	  we	  can	  say	  is	  that	  regardless	  of	  Waltz’s	  own	  motivations,	  his	  
terminological	  extensions	  do	  not	  bear	  out	  the	  impression	  of	  science	  and	  IR	  that	  they	  
appear	  to	  articulate.	  
	  
Having	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  recommendations	  outlined	  in	  the	  last	  Chapter	  might	  
be	  implemented	  with	  regard	  to	  particular	  biases	  that	  are	  present	  in	  Waltz’s	  Theory	  of	  




Wendt	  on	  Unobservable	  Entities	  and	  ‘Inner	  Structures’	  
	  
In	  his	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  Wendt	  seeks	  to	  articulate	  a	  version	  of	  
‘scientific	  realism’	  that	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  theorising	  about	  IR.	  A	  central	  
topic	  that	  Wendt	  addresses	  in	  this	  context	  is	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  relevant	  ‘social’	  
phenomena,	  such	  as	  ‘states’,	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  sorts	  of	  phenomena	  studied	  by	  
the	  natural	  sciences.131	  Wendt	  acknowledges	  some	  important	  differences	  between	  
what	  he	  calls	  ‘social	  kinds’	  and	  ‘natural	  kinds’,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  that	  unlike	  ‘natural	  
kinds’,	  ‘social	  kinds’	  are	  constituted	  to	  a	  significant	  degree	  by	  people’s	  ideas	  and	  
practices	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.71).	  Nevertheless,	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  many	  ‘social	  kinds’	  
are	  still	  constituted	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  objective	  ‘mind-­‐independent’	  factors	  that	  are	  
causally	  effective,	  and	  which	  ‘resist’	  denials	  or	  misrepresentations	  of	  their	  existence.	  
Therefore,	  Wendt	  claims	  that	  is	  possible	  to	  develop	  theories	  of	  IR	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  
the	  sorts	  of	  theories	  produced	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  	  
	  
Wendt’s	  argument	  relies	  heavily	  upon	  certain	  alleged	  similarities	  between	  ‘social’	  
and	  ‘natural’	  phenomena.132	  One	  such	  similarity	  alleged	  by	  Wendt,	  is	  that	  the	  
                                                
131	  Wendt	  has	  very	  recently	  published	  another	  book	  entitled	  Quantum	  Mind	  and	  Social	  Science:	  
Unifying	  Physical	  and	  Social	  Ontology	  (2015),	  in	  which	  he	  argues	  that	  human	  beings	  and	  their	  actions	  
can	  be	  understood	  as	  ‘quantum	  phenomena’.	  The	  arguments	  that	  Wendt	  puts	  forward	  in	  support	  of	  
this	  proposal	  are	  numerous	  and	  complex,	  and	  for	  this	  among	  other	  reasons	  I	  will	  not	  attempt	  to	  
grapple	  with	  this	  latest	  contribution	  in	  detail	  here.	  Another	  reason	  is	  that,	  as	  Wendt	  himself	  observes,	  
Quantum	  Mind	  is	  predominantly	  a	  work	  of	  philosophy,	  which	  does	  not	  directly	  address	  IR	  (“unlike	  my	  
first	  book,	  which	  was	  half	  philosophy	  and	  half	  IR,	  this	  one	  is	  all	  philosophy”	  (Wendt,	  2015:	  p.2)).	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  book’s	  main	  thesis	  that	  “human	  beings	  are	  walking	  wave	  
functions”	  (Wendt,	  2015:	  p.3	  &	  p.37)	  is	  extremely	  dubious,	  as	  is	  Wendt’s	  insistence	  that	  he	  intends	  
this	  “not	  as	  an	  analogy	  or	  metaphor,	  but	  as	  a	  realist	  claim	  about	  what	  people	  really	  are”	  (Wendt,	  2015:	  
p.3).	  A	  good	  indication	  of	  the	  dubiousness	  of	  this	  central	  claim	  is	  found	  in	  the	  physicist	  Philip	  
Moriarty’s	  2016	  blog	  post	  on	  Wendt’s	  book,	  where	  Moriarty	  observes	  that	  if	  human	  beings	  were	  
literally	  ‘wave	  functions’	  then	  “we	  would	  diffract	  when	  we	  walk	  through	  doorways”	  and	  “would	  be	  
able	  to	  tunnel	  through	  walls	  without	  expending	  any	  energy”	  (Moriarty,	  2016).	  Of	  course	  one	  could	  
argue	  that	  the	  dubiousness	  of	  this	  one	  outlandish	  claim	  made	  in	  the	  introduction	  –	  although	  it	  is	  
presented	  as	  the	  book’s	  central	  thesis	  –	  does	  not	  automatically	  render	  the	  rest	  of	  Wendt’s	  more	  
complex	  arguments	  invalid;	  and	  that	  it	  is	  still	  necessary	  to	  carefully	  unpick	  and	  examine	  these	  
arguments	  before	  a	  proper	  verdict	  on	  Wendt’s	  contribution	  can	  be	  reached.	  While	  in	  my	  opinion	  
Wendt’s	  project	  is	  still	  misconceived,	  I	  agree	  that	  it	  requires	  a	  thorough	  and	  carefully	  reasoned	  
explanation	  as	  to	  why	  it	  should	  be	  rejected	  which	  adequately	  takes	  into	  account	  all	  of	  the	  arguments	  
made	  in	  the	  book.	  This	  constitutes	  the	  third	  main	  reason	  why	  I	  will	  not	  attempt	  a	  proper	  evaluation	  of	  
Wendt’s	  book	  here,	  since	  doing	  so	  would	  require	  a	  much	  longer	  discussion	  than	  can	  be	  
accommodated	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
132	  An	  alternative	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  criticism	  of	  this	  aspect	  of	  Wendt’s	  approach	  could	  be	  made	  
using	  Peter	  Winch’s	  The	  Idea	  of	  a	  Social	  Science	  (1958)	  and	  subsequent	  developments	  of	  Winch’s	  
arguments	  by	  philosophers	  and	  sociologists.	  However,	  to	  properly	  exposit	  and	  evaluate	  the	  
 186  
epistemic	  status	  of	  social/political	  entities	  such	  as	  ‘the	  state’	  is	  equivalent	  to	  that	  of	  
unobservable	  entities	  such	  as	  ‘electrons’	  that	  are	  hypothesised	  in	  the	  natural	  
sciences.	  He	  writes:	  
	  
“Is	  it	  reasonable	  to	  infer	  the	  existence	  of	  electrons	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  certain	  
observable	  effects,	  given	  that	  electron	  theory	  is	  our	  best	  satisfactory	  
explanation	  for	  those	  effects	  yet	  might	  turn	  out	  later	  to	  be	  wrong?	  Is	  it	  
reasonable	  to	  infer	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  state	  from	  the	  activities	  of	  people	  
calling	  themselves	  customs	  officials,	  soldiers,	  and	  diplomats,	  given	  that	  state	  
theory	  is	  our	  best	  satisfactory	  explanation	  of	  these	  activities	  yet	  might	  turn	  
out	  to	  be	  wrong?	  Philosophers	  call	  such	  reasoning	  ‘inference	  to	  the	  best	  
explanation,’	  (IBE)	  and	  much	  of	  the	  debate	  about	  realism	  turns	  on	  attitudes	  
toward	  it.	  Realists	  argue	  that	  IBE	  is	  warranted,	  pointing	  out	  that	  even	  though	  
as	  a	  form	  of	  induction	  it	  lacks	  the	  certainty	  we	  gain	  through	  deduction,	  it	  is	  at	  
the	  heart	  of	  scientific	  method	  and	  is	  used	  routinely	  in	  everyday	  life.”	  (Wendt,	  
1999:	  p.	  62-­‐3)	  
	  	  
Another	  similarity	  alleged	  by	  Wendt	  is	  that	  both	  ‘social’	  and	  ‘natural	  kinds’	  are	  to	  
some	  degree	  “self-­‐organising”,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  possess	  an	  “internal	  structure”	  
that	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  makes	  them	  what	  they	  are.	  He	  writes:	  
	  
“What	  scientific	  realists	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  behaviour	  of	  things	  is	  influenced	  by	  
self-­‐organizing,	  mind-­‐independent	  structures	  that	  constitute	  those	  things	  with	  
certain	  intrinsic	  powers	  and	  dispositions.	  Discovery	  those	  structures	  is	  what	  
science	  is	  all	  about,	  which	  is	  itself	  essentialist	  in	  this	  weak	  sense.	  Implicit	  in	  
this	  attitude	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  things	  have	  internal	  structures,	  which	  is	  
debatable	  if	  they	  are	  unobservable,	  and	  perhaps	  doubly	  so	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
social	  kinds.	  My	  point	  is	  that	  whether	  an	  object	  has	  an	  internal,	  self-­‐
organizing	  structure	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  empirical	  question,	  not	  ruled	  out	  
a	  priori	  by	  epistemological	  scepticism.	  …	  Few	  today	  would	  doubt	  that	  dogs,	  
water,	  and	  even	  atoms	  have	  essential	  properties.	  More	  would	  doubt	  that	  
states	  and	  state	  systems	  do,	  but	  I	  want	  the	  reader	  to	  be	  open	  to	  the	  
possibility.”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.64)	  
	  
I	  will	  now	  examine	  these	  two	  alleged	  similarities	  more	  closely.	  	  
	  
                                                                                                                                        
applicability	  of	  Winch’s	  arguments	  to	  Wendt	  and	  other	  IR	  scholars	  would	  require	  a	  whole	  PhD	  in	  itself,	  
and	  would	  take	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  discussion	  in	  quite	  another	  direction	  away	  from	  the	  central	  aims	  of	  
this	  thesis.	  Therefore,	  having	  indicated	  it	  as	  a	  potentially	  fruitful	  parallel	  avenue,	  I	  will	  not	  here	  
address	  the	  relevance	  of	  Winch	  for	  criticising	  scholars	  such	  as	  Wendt.	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In	  the	  context	  of	  experimental	  physics	  –	  which,	  according	  to	  remarks	  like	  PI	  §412	  
would	  count	  as	  an	  ‘everyday’	  context	  –	  an	  electron	  is	  called	  ‘unobservable’	  not	  
simply	  because	  it	  is	  a	  hypothesised	  entity,	  but	  because	  if	  it	  does	  exist	  it	  is	  so	  small	  
that	  we	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  perceive	  it	  by	  unaided	  human	  vision,	  touch,	  smell	  etc.	  In	  
this	  way,	  the	  term	  ‘unobservable’	  when	  applied	  to	  electrons	  means	  ‘too	  small	  to	  
perceive	  using	  our	  bodily	  senses’.	  Now:	  could	  the	  same	  be	  said	  about	  ‘the	  state’?	  
Would	  one	  want	  to	  say	  that	  the	  state	  is	  ‘unobservable’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  
perceived	  by	  our	  bodily	  senses	  because	  it	  is	  too	  small?	  I	  suspect	  –	  and	  hope	  –	  that	  
Wendt	  would	  join	  me	  in	  replying	  to	  this	  question	  in	  the	  negative.	  This	  would	  amount	  
to	  an	  acknowledgement	  that	  the	  term	  ‘unobservable’	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  
meaning	  when	  Wendt	  applies	  it	  to	  ‘the	  state’	  as	  it	  has	  when	  it	  is	  applied	  to	  a	  concept	  
like	  ‘electron’.	  	  
	  
What	  else	  could	  the	  adjective	  ‘unobservable’	  mean	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  
‘the	  state’,	  if	  not	  that	  it	  is	  too	  small	  to	  be	  perceived?	  This	  is	  a	  question	  to	  which	  
Wendt	  does	  not	  give	  an	  answer.	  The	  upshot	  of	  this	  is	  that	  Wendt	  is	  urging	  us	  in	  the	  
name	  of	  ‘reasonableness’	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  inference	  that	  ‘the	  state	  exists	  as	  an	  
unobservable	  entity’	  as	  a	  “best	  possible	  explanation”	  (Wendt	  1999:	  p.52),	  without	  
clarifying	  what	  it	  would	  mean	  for	  something	  to	  be	  ‘unobservable’	  in	  the	  new	  sense.	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  clarification	  Wendt’s	  inference	  is	  empty,	  and	  therefore	  we	  
cannot	  either	  endorse	  or	  reject	  it.	  If	  the	  term	  ‘unobservable’	  does	  not	  mean	  the	  same	  
when	  applied	  to	  ‘the	  state’	  as	  it	  does	  when	  applied	  to	  electrons	  (i.e.	  that	  the	  relevant	  
item	  is	  unobservable	  because	  it	  is	  too	  small	  to	  be	  perceived),	  then	  this	  also	  means	  
that	  ‘unobservability’	  cannot	  be	  cited	  as	  a	  shared	  feature	  of	  ‘electrons’	  and	  ‘the	  
state’	  which	  would	  justify	  treating	  states	  as	  similar	  to	  electrons	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
academic	  study.	  Hence	  Wendt’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘unobservable’	  to	  characterise	  both	  
‘electrons’	  and	  ‘the	  state’	  is	  misleading	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  Waltz’s	  application	  of	  the	  
term	  ‘necessity’	  to	  both	  invariant	  and	  probabilistic	  correlations,	  in	  that	  it	  gives	  the	  
impression	  of	  a	  common	  attribute	  where	  there	  is	  not	  one.	  
	  
Let	  us	  turn	  now	  to	  Wendt’s	  second	  alleged	  similarity,	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  both	  natural	  
and	  social	  kinds	  have	  ‘internal	  structures’	  that	  can	  be	  ‘discovered’	  by	  science.	  Recall	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that	  according	  to	  Wendt,	  an	  ‘internal	  structure’	  is	  a	  “self-­‐organising,	  mind-­‐
independent”	  structure	  that	  “constitutes	  [something]	  with	  certain	  intrinsic	  powers	  
and	  dispositions”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.64).	  In	  the	  third	  chapter	  of	  his	  book,	  Wendt	  
provides	  the	  following	  list	  of	  examples	  of	  how	  ‘internal	  structures’	  constitute	  natural	  
and	  social	  kinds:	  	  
	  
“Water	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  atomic	  structure	  H2O;	  human	  beings	  are	  
constituted	  by	  their	  genetic	  structures;	  doctors	  are	  constituted	  (in	  part)	  by	  
the	  self-­‐understandings	  that	  define	  the	  social	  kind	  known	  as	  ‘doctor’;	  states	  
are	  constituted	  (in	  part)	  by	  organisational	  structures	  that	  give	  them	  a	  
territorial	  monopoly	  on	  organised	  violence.”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.83)	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  somewhat	  variegated	  list,	  which	  deserves	  some	  unpicking.	  As	  a	  substance,	  
water	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  ‘constituted’	  by	  the	  atomic	  structure	  H2O	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  a	  
sample	  of	  pure	  water	  consists	  entirely	  of	  hydrogen	  and	  oxygen	  atoms	  arranged	  in	  
H2O	  molecular	  configurations.	  However,	  the	  human	  body	  does	  not	  consist	  entirely	  of	  
‘genetic’	  structures	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  water	  consists	  of	  H2O	  –	  e.g.	  a	  human	  body	  is	  
not	  a	  body	  of	  DNA	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  a	  body	  of	  water	  is	  a	  body	  of	  H2O	  –	  and	  so	  even	  if	  
we	  assume	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  a	  human	  being	  is	  equivalent	  to	  a	  human	  
body,	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  says	  that	  the	  human	  body	  is	  constituted	  by	  ‘genetic	  
structures’	  will	  be	  different	  from	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  says	  that	  water	  is	  
constituted	  by	  H2O.	  Presumably	  what	  Wendt	  means	  when	  he	  says	  that	  the	  human	  
body	  is	  constituted	  by	  ‘genetic	  structures’,	  is	  that	  the	  DNA	  within	  human	  cells	  plays	  a	  
crucial	  role	  in	  various	  biochemical	  processes	  involved	  in	  the	  creation,	  development	  
and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  human	  body,	  and	  that	  as	  a	  result	  certain	  characteristic	  
features	  of	  bodily	  appearance	  and	  function	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  with	  reference	  to	  
the	  properties	  of	  the	  DNA.	  Thus,	  ‘constitution’	  in	  this	  context	  means	  something	  much	  
more	  complex	  than	  in	  it	  does	  in	  the	  case	  of	  water	  being	  ‘constituted’	  by	  H2O.	  
	  
Now	  we	  come	  to	  the	  trickier	  case:	  “doctors	  are	  constituted	  (in	  part)	  by	  the	  self-­‐
understandings	  that	  define	  a	  social	  kind	  known	  as	  ‘doctor’”.	  Wendt’s	  placement	  of	  
this	  statement	  in	  a	  sequence	  where	  it	  comes	  straight	  after	  statements	  to	  the	  effect	  
that	  ‘water	  is	  constituted	  by	  H2O’	  and	  ‘human	  beings	  are	  constituted	  by	  genetic	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structures’,	  implies	  that	  this	  is	  just	  another	  example	  of	  how	  things	  in	  general	  are	  
constituted	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent	  by	  ‘mind-­‐independent’	  structures	  that	  make	  
them	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  they	  are.	  However,	  let’s	  stop	  at	  this	  point	  and	  consider:	  Are	  
doctors	  constituted	  by	  self-­‐understandings	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  that	  water	  is	  
constituted	  by	  H2O?	  Well,	  put	  it	  this	  way:	  is	  ‘self-­‐understanding’	  a	  type	  of	  molecule	  of	  
which	  a	  substance	  could	  be	  composed?	  The	  obvious	  answer	  to	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  no.	  
Likewise	  we	  could	  ask:	  are	  doctors	  constituted	  by	  self-­‐understandings	  in	  the	  same	  
sense	  that	  human	  bodies	  are	  constituted	  by	  genetic	  structures?	  Again,	  given	  that	  a	  
‘self-­‐understanding’	  is	  not	  a	  bit	  of	  genetic	  material	  such	  as	  a	  nucleotide	  or	  strand	  of	  
DNA	  that	  could	  be	  a	  part	  of	  a	  biochemical	  process,	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  would	  seem	  to	  
be	  no.	  In	  what	  sense,	  then,	  does	  Wendt	  think	  that	  a	  doctor	  is	  ‘constituted’	  by	  the	  
self-­‐understandings	  that	  define	  a	  social	  kind	  known	  as	  ‘doctor’?	  	  
	  
Elsewhere,	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  “the	  existence	  of	  social	  kinds	  depends	  on	  the	  
interlocking	  beliefs,	  concepts,	  or	  theories	  held	  by	  actors”;	  that	  social	  kinds	  are	  
“categories”	  invented	  by	  people	  which	  “create	  or	  ‘make	  up’	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  person	  
and	  its	  associated	  social	  possibilities”;	  and	  that	  “before	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  shared	  
ideas	  that	  constitute	  them	  (if	  not	  the	  actual	  words	  themselves),	  these	  social	  kinds	  did	  
not	  exist”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.70-­‐71).	  Wendt	  states	  that	  this	  “is	  true	  of	  witches,	  doctors,	  
and	  states”	  (Ibid.).	  In	  light	  of	  such	  passages,	  it	  seems	  that	  when	  Wendt	  says	  that	  
doctors	  are	  partially	  constituted	  by	  self-­‐understandings,	  he	  means	  that	  the	  ability	  of	  
people	  to	  become	  ‘doctors’,	  and	  to	  perform	  the	  various	  actions	  associated	  with	  being	  
a	  doctor,	  depends	  upon	  their	  community’s	  collective	  acceptance	  and	  recognition	  of	  
‘doctorhood’	  as	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  social	  role	  –	  and	  that	  without	  the	  prior	  
establishment	  of	  the	  idea	  and	  practices	  of	  ‘doctorhood’	  within	  a	  community,	  
individuals	  would	  be	  constrained	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  become	  doctors	  and	  to	  do	  the	  
sorts	  of	  things	  that	  doctors	  do.	  	  
	  
Now,	  the	  above	  is	  a	  situation	  that	  could	  be	  summed	  up	  –	  using	  a	  new	  extended	  use	  
of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘constitution’	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  doctors	  being	  ‘constituted’	  by	  shared	  
ideas	  and	  understandings.	  However,	  the	  social	  situation	  which	  would	  be	  summed	  up	  
by	  this	  expression	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘doctorhood’	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	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situation	  concerning	  the	  molecular	  composition	  of	  water	  that	  is	  summed	  by	  the	  
expression	  ‘water	  is	  constituted	  by	  H2O’;	  which	  is	  –	  as	  I	  have	  explained	  –	  in	  its	  turn	  
quite	  different	  from	  the	  situation	  that	  is	  summed	  by	  the	  expression	  ‘human	  beings	  
are	  constituted	  by	  genetic	  structures’.	  In	  addition,	  if	  ‘doctorhood’	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  an	  
example	  of	  a	  social	  kind	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  an	  ‘internal	  structure’,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  
clear	  in	  this	  case	  what	  the	  ‘internal	  structure’	  would	  be.	  In	  the	  example	  of	  H2O	  
constituting	  water,	  the	  ‘internal	  structure’	  is	  the	  molecular	  structure	  of	  H2O;	  and	  in	  
the	  example	  of	  genetic	  structures	  constituting	  human	  beings,	  the	  ‘internal	  structure’	  
is	  presumably	  the	  molecular	  structure	  of	  genetic	  material	  such	  as	  DNA,	  RNA	  and	  so	  
on.	  So	  what	  on	  earth	  could	  the	  ‘internal	  structure’	  of	  the	  social	  kind	  ‘doctor’	  be?	  	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  1,	  Wendt	  mentions	  “patterns	  of	  friendship	  or	  enmity”	  and	  “institutions”	  as	  
the	  “kinds	  of	  ideational	  attributes	  or	  relationships	  that	  might	  constitute	  a	  social	  
structure”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.16);	  while	  elsewhere	  he	  picks	  out	  the	  “ideational	  aspect	  
of	  social	  structure”	  and	  describes	  this	  as	  “a	  distribution	  of	  knowledge”	  shared	  among	  
individuals,	  citing	  Hutchins’	  concept	  of	  “socially	  distributed	  cognition”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  
p.140;	  Hutchins,	  1991).	  However,	  again:	  patterns	  of	  friendship	  and	  enmity,	  
institutional	  organisations,	  distributions	  of	  knowledge	  or	  ideas,	  and	  so	  on,	  are	  
substantially	  different	  from	  molecular	  structures	  such	  as	  H2O	  and	  DNA.	  Indeed,	  one	  
might	  say	  that	  a	  ‘social	  structure’	  conceived	  in	  Wendt’s	  sense	  is	  as	  different	  from	  a	  
molecular	  structure	  as	  an	  emotional	  bond	  is	  from	  a	  covalent	  bond.	  Accordingly,	  
whereas	  one	  can	  say	  that	  H2O	  and	  DNA	  are	  ‘internal’	  structures	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  
are	  contained	  ‘within’	  a	  substance	  or	  organic	  body	  (such	  as	  a	  cell),	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  
how	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  Wendt	  identifies	  as	  ‘social	  structures’	  can	  count	  as	  being	  
“internal”	  in	  a	  relevantly	  similar	  sense.	  
	  
Finally	  we	  can	  consider	  the	  most	  significant	  example	  in	  Wendt’s	  list,	  which	  is	  that	  
“states	  are	  constituted	  (in	  part)	  by	  organisational	  structures	  that	  give	  them	  a	  
territorial	  monopoly	  on	  organised	  violence”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.83).	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  
Wendt	  gives	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  what	  he	  means	  by	  ‘organisational	  structures’	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  state.	  There	  Wendt	  identifies	  five	  ‘essential’	  features	  that	  “all	  states	  in	  
all	  times	  and	  places	  have	  in	  common,”	  which	  include	  having	  “an	  organisation	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claiming	  a	  monopoly	  on	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  organised	  violence”,	  and	  having	  “an	  
organisation	  with	  sovereignty”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.202).	  Wendt	  qualifies	  that	  by	  
‘organised	  violence’	  in	  this	  context,	  he	  means	  “the	  coordinated	  use	  of	  deadly	  force”,	  
and	  observes	  that	  modern	  states	  typically	  “divide	  up	  their	  coercive	  potential	  into	  two	  
organisations,	  a	  police	  force	  for	  internal	  security	  and	  an	  army	  for	  external”	  (Wendt,	  
1999:	  p.204).	  At	  that	  point	  there	  may	  be	  various	  complex	  distinctions	  made,	  for	  
example	  between	  “local,	  provincial,	  and	  national	  police;	  army,	  navy,	  air	  force”	  etc.	  
However,	  Wendt	  proposes	  that	  what	  gives	  these	  organisations	  a	  “monopoly”	  on	  the	  
legitimate	  use	  of	  organised	  violence	  is	  not	  that	  they	  have	  a	  single,	  centralised	  
‘leader’,	  but	  rather	  that	  they	  are	  (a)	  “non-­‐rivals	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  do	  not	  settle	  
their	  disputes	  …	  by	  force”,	  and	  (b)	  “unified	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  each	  perceives	  a	  threat	  
to	  others	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  itself,	  so	  that	  all	  defend	  against	  it	  together”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  
p.205).	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  question	  of	  ‘sovereignty’,	  Wendt	  makes	  a	  distinction	  
between	  “internal	  sovereignty”	  whereby	  “the	  state	  is	  the	  supreme	  locus	  of	  political	  
authority	  in	  society”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.206),	  and	  “external	  sovereignty”	  which	  
“denot[es]	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  external	  authority	  higher	  than	  the	  state”	  (Wendt,	  
1999:	  p.208).	  
	  
From	  the	  above	  we	  can	  see	  that	  when	  Wendt	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘organisational	  structures’	  
of	  a	  state,	  he	  is	  talking	  about	  things	  like	  coordinated	  security	  forces	  –	  such	  as	  army	  
and	  police	  agencies	  –	  and	  about	  the	  right	  and	  ability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  exercise	  political	  
authority	  both	  over	  its	  population	  and	  in	  interactions	  with	  other	  states’	  
representatives.	  Again,	  Wendt	  is	  perfectly	  welcome	  to	  characterise	  these	  typical	  
features	  of	  modern	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘constitution’	  of	  states	  by	  their	  
‘organisational	  structures’.	  However,	  if	  what	  this	  means	  is	  that	  having	  a	  coordinated	  
security	  force	  and	  exercising	  sovereignty	  are	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  ‘statehood’,	  
then	  it	  is,	  again,	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  water	  can	  be	  said	  to	  
be	  constituted	  by	  H2O,	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  human	  body	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  
constituted	  by	  genetic	  ‘structures’,	  and	  even	  from	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  Wendt	  suggests	  




As	  with	  Waltz’s	  application	  of	  the	  term	  ‘structure’	  to	  characterise	  the	  constraining	  
conditions	  under	  which	  nation	  states	  operate,	  Wendt’s	  account	  of	  natural	  and	  social	  
kinds	  as	  both	  being	  to	  some	  extent	  ‘constituted	  by	  their	  internal	  structures’	  is	  not	  
problematic	  in	  a	  straightforward	  sense.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  it	  is	  incorrect	  to	  use	  the	  
expression	  ‘constituted	  by	  an	  internal	  structure’	  to	  characterise	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  
‘doctorhood’	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  defined	  and	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  shared	  ideas	  and	  
practices	  of	  a	  community,	  even	  though	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  these	  shared	  ideas	  and	  
practices	  can	  be	  called	  an	  ‘internal	  structure’	  may	  need	  further	  explanation.	  Likewise,	  
it	  is	  not	  incorrect	  to	  refer	  to	  states’	  security	  forces	  and	  political	  sovereignty	  as	  an	  
‘internal	  structure’	  by	  which	  states	  are	  ‘constituted’.	  However,	  what	  is	  problematic	  is	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  Wendt	  groups	  these	  examples	  together	  with	  the	  examples	  of	  H2O	  
‘constituting’	  water	  and	  genetic	  molecules	  ‘constituting’	  the	  human	  body,	  and	  
presents	  these	  diverse	  cases	  as	  though	  they	  were	  instances	  of	  a	  general	  overarching	  
sense	  in	  which	  things	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  ‘constituted	  by	  their	  internal	  structures’.	  It	  is	  
to	  just	  such	  a	  misconceived	  general	  sense	  of	  ‘structure’	  that	  Wendt	  appeals	  when	  he	  
attributes	  to	  scientific	  realism	  the	  idea	  that	  “science	  is	  successful	  because	  it	  gradually	  
brings	  our	  theoretical	  understanding	  into	  conformity	  with	  the	  deep	  structure	  of	  the	  
world	  out	  there”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.65),	  and	  argues	  that	  “in	  sum,	  the	  ontology	  of	  social	  
life	  is	  consistent	  with	  scientific	  realism”	  because	  “social	  kinds	  are	  materially	  
grounded,	  self-­‐organising	  phenomena	  with	  intrinsic	  powers	  and	  dispositions	  that	  
exist	  independently	  of	  the	  minds	  and/or	  discourse	  of	  those	  who	  would	  know	  them”	  
(Wendt,	  1999:	  p.75-­‐6).	  	  
	  
Although,	  as	  I	  have	  allowed,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  apply	  the	  word	  ‘structure’	  to	  the	  various	  
examples	  that	  Wendt	  lists	  –	  i.e.	  to	  H2O,	  DNA,	  shared/distributed	  ideas,	  organised	  
security	  forces	  and	  the	  capability	  or	  right	  to	  exercise	  political	  sovereignty	  –	  the	  word	  
‘structure’	  has	  a	  more	  or	  less	  different	  sense	  when	  applied	  to	  each	  of	  these	  cases,	  as	  
would	  the	  expression	  ‘constituted	  by	  its	  internal	  structure’;	  and	  hence	  it	  would	  be	  
misleading	  to	  subsequently	  refer	  to	  these	  cases	  as	  though	  they	  were	  instantiations	  of	  
a	  common	  underlying	  ‘structure	  of	  reality’	  to	  which	  scientific	  theories	  can	  and	  should	  
conform.	  Here	  one	  can	  say	  that	  Wendt’s	  summing	  up	  of	  these	  various	  cases	  in	  similar	  
terms	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  minimising	  or	  papering	  over	  significant	  differences	  between	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them,	  which	  Wendt	  himself	  would	  acknowledge	  if	  he	  were	  to	  methodically	  consider	  
in	  each	  case	  what	  his	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘constitution’	  and	  ‘internal	  structure’	  could	  
mean.	  
	  
Again,	  we	  can	  illuminate	  the	  situation	  further	  using	  the	  following	  remark	  from	  
Wittgenstein’s	  PI:	  
	   	  
“Imagine	  someone’s	  saying:	  ‘All	  tools	  serve	  to	  modify	  something.	  Thus	  the	  
hammer	  modifies	  the	  position	  of	  the	  nail,	  the	  saw	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  board,	  and	  
so	  on.’	  —And	  what	  is	  modified	  by	  the	  rule,	  the	  glue-­‐pot,	  the	  nails? —‘Our	  
knowledge	  of	  a	  thing’s	  length,	  the	  temperature	  of	  the	  glue,	  and	  the	  solidity	  of	  
the	  box.’	  ——Would	  anything	  be	  gained	  by	  this	  assimilation	  of	  expressions?”	  
(PI	  §14)	  
	  
In	  this	  remark,	  Wittgenstein	  imagines	  someone	  who	  makes	  a	  general	  claim	  that	  “All	  
tools	  serve	  to	  modify	  something”,	  and	  as	  justification	  for	  this	  claim	  cites	  two	  
examples	  of	  tools	  whose	  operation	  can	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘modification’.	  To	  
describe	  these	  tools’	  functions	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘modification’	  is	  not	  too	  much	  of	  a	  
departure	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  word	  ‘modification’	  is	  ordinarily	  used,	  although	  
what	  ‘modification’	  amounts	  to	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  hammer	  is	  different	  from	  what	  it	  
amounts	  to	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  saw.	  However,	  where	  the	  problem	  with	  this	  strategy	  
becomes	  most	  apparent	  is	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  next	  three	  examples	  of	  the	  
rule,	  the	  glue-­‐pot	  and	  the	  nails.	  One	  could	  describe	  measuring	  the	  length	  of	  
something	  as	  a	  ‘modification	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  a	  thing’s	  length’,	  keeping	  glue	  in	  a	  
pot	  as	  a	  ‘modification	  of	  the	  temperature	  of	  the	  glue’,	  and	  nailing	  a	  box	  together	  as	  a	  
‘modification	  of	  the	  box’s	  solidity’;	  however	  this	  would	  involve	  extending	  the	  
employment	  of	  the	  word	  ‘modification’	  beyond	  its	  usual	  application	  in	  order	  to	  re-­‐
describe	  the	  examples	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  fit	  the	  general	  statement	  that	  ‘all	  tools	  
serve	  to	  modify	  something’.	  Such	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  word	  
‘modification’	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  wrong;	  however	  Wittgenstein	  questions	  what	  
is	  gained	  by	  this	  “assimilation	  of	  expressions”,	  since	  hammering	  a	  nail	  into	  a	  board	  
remains	  just	  as	  different	  from	  pouring	  glue	  into	  a	  pot	  even	  after	  we	  have	  
characterised	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘modification’.	  If	  ‘modification’	  is	  just	  a	  more	  vague	  
way	  of	  describing	  what	  happens	  in	  each	  case	  than	  ‘pouring’,	  ‘hammering’,	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‘measuring’,	  etc.,	  which	  does	  not	  have	  any	  benefit	  over	  these	  forms	  of	  expression	  
other	  than	  to	  enable	  the	  generalisation	  ‘All	  tools	  serve	  to	  modify	  something’,	  then	  
there	  is	  no	  compelling	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  accept	  this	  new	  mode	  of	  describing	  the	  
operation	  of	  tools.	  	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  above	  we	  could	  suggest	  that	  Wendt	  is	  a	  bit	  like	  the	  person	  imagined	  by	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  PI	  §14,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  is	  apparently	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  by	  
describing	  various	  cases	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘natural’	  and	  ‘social	  kinds’	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
‘constitution	  by	  internal	  structures’,	  he	  is	  somehow	  articulating	  some	  common	  
feature	  that	  all	  these	  cases	  share	  to	  some	  degree.	  However,	  in	  parallel	  with	  
Wittgenstein’s	  example,	  we	  could	  say	  that	  what	  he	  has	  accomplished	  is	  simply	  an	  
‘assimilation	  of	  expressions’	  for	  describing	  these	  cases,	  by	  way	  of	  a	  novel	  extension	  
of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  words	  ‘constitution’	  and	  ‘structure’	  beyond	  their	  usual	  
employment.	  In	  view	  of	  this	  we	  could	  question	  what	  this	  assimilation	  of	  expressions	  
achieves,	  and	  propose	  to	  Wendt	  that	  he	  is	  perhaps	  caught	  up	  in	  a	  misunderstanding	  
of	  the	  implications	  of	  his	  own	  use	  of	  language,	  which	  –	  if	  he	  were	  aware	  of	  it	  –	  would	  
lead	  him	  to	  abandon	  this	  terminological	  extension.	  	  
	  
As	  I	  have	  suggested,	  we	  could	  present	  to	  Wendt	  our	  observations	  concerning	  the	  
diversity	  between	  the	  examples	  he	  describes	  as	  being	  ‘constituted	  by	  their	  internal	  
structures’,	  together	  with	  the	  reminder	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  apply	  to	  describe	  various	  
cases	  using	  a	  common	  expression	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  that	  they	  have	  
something	  in	  common,	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  Wendt	  the	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  whether	  
he	  is	  labouring	  under	  a	  misapprehension	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  his	  ‘assimilation	  of	  
expressions’	  amounts	  to	  an	  identification	  of	  a	  general	  phenomenon	  of	  ‘structure’	  or	  
‘structural	  constitution’.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  such	  a	  misapprehension	  certainly	  appears	  
to	  be	  expressed	  by	  the	  general	  claims	  that	  Wendt	  makes	  about	  ‘social’	  and	  ‘natural	  
kinds’	  and	  about	  their	  ability	  to	  be	  studied	  from	  a	  perspective	  of	  scientific	  realism.	  	  
	  
Alternatively,	  we	  could	  also	  characterise	  this	  misapprehension	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  held	  
captive	  by	  a	  ‘picture’	  in	  one	  of	  the	  two	  senses	  I	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  For	  example,	  
we	  could	  suggest	  that	  certain	  analogies	  between	  the	  different	  cases	  that	  Wendt	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groups	  together	  can	  induce	  us	  to	  imagine	  something	  that	  is	  like	  a	  material	  structure	  
only	  somehow	  immaterial	  that	  guides	  the	  actions	  and	  interactions	  of	  people	  involved	  
in	  international	  politics;	  and	  put	  it	  to	  Wendt	  that	  he	  has	  perhaps	  visualised	  such	  an	  
imaginary	  model,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  what	  leads	  him	  to	  continue	  to	  describe	  diverse	  
social	  and	  political	  phenomena	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘structure’	  and	  ‘constitution	  by	  internal	  
structures’.	  Or,	  we	  could	  characterise	  Wendt’s	  mode	  of	  description	  in	  terms	  of	  
captivity	  to	  a	  particular	  picture	  of	  ‘structure’	  as	  the	  underlying	  essence	  of	  reality,	  
where	  this	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  way	  of	  highlighting	  that	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  
why	  someone	  who	  is	  not	  committed	  to	  an	  explicit	  claim	  to	  this	  effect	  should	  go	  to	  
such	  efforts	  to	  characterise	  hugely	  diverse	  cases	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  being	  ‘constituted	  
by	  internal	  structures’.	  Which	  of	  these	  is	  the	  better	  strategy	  would	  have	  to	  be	  
decided	  based	  on	  which	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  transformative	  effect	  upon	  Wendt	  
and	  his	  supporters,	  in	  terms	  of	  persuading	  them	  to	  relinquish	  the	  misleading	  forms	  of	  
expression	  they	  are	  wont	  to	  adopt	  involving	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘structure’	  and	  
‘constitution’.	  
	  
4.3	   An	  Alternative	  Wittgensteinian	  Approach	  to	  Criticising	  Wendt	  
	  
So	  far	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  used	  the	  interpretation	  of	  selected	  remarks	  from	  later	  
Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  developed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  to	  conduct	  an	  in-­‐depth	  
critical	  analysis	  of	  Waltz’s	  and	  Wendt’s	  extended	  use	  of	  terminology,	  noting	  the	  role	  
that	  the	  latter	  plays	  in	  generating	  and	  maintaining	  a	  misleading	  impression	  of	  the	  
significance	  and	  general	  applicability	  of	  the	  accounts	  that	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt	  provide	  
of	  theories	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  their	  subject	  matter.	  This,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  only	  
way	  in	  which	  the	  remarks	  from	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  that	  inspired	  the	  ARO	  
could	  potentially	  be	  used	  to	  criticise	  scholars	  such	  as	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt,	  and	  hence	  I	  
will	  now	  take	  some	  time	  to	  explore	  one	  of	  these	  alternate	  possible	  applications	  with	  
regard	  to	  Wendt’s	  account	  of	  ‘scientific	  realism’,	  and	  to	  consider	  how	  it	  compares	  
with	  the	  approach	  I	  have	  developed.	  
	  
Wendt’s	  version	  of	  ‘scientific	  realism’	  in	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics	  relies	  
heavily	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Roy	  Bhaskar	  (see,	  e.g.,	  p.50,	  fn.	  9;	  p.69;	  p.143),	  and	  as	  a	  result,	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it	  is	  potentially	  vulnerable	  to	  criticisms	  of	  Bhaskar’s	  so-­‐called	  ‘critical	  social	  theory’.	  
An	  influential	  criticism	  of	  Bhaskar	  which	  makes	  use	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  critical	  
application	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  in	  the	  PI	  (the	  starting	  point	  for	  both	  the	  ARO	  and	  my	  
own	  strategy	  of	  critical	  analysis),	  is	  found	  in	  Nigel	  Pleasants’	  1999	  book	  Wittgenstein	  
and	  the	  Idea	  of	  a	  Critical	  Social	  Theory.	  The	  criticisms	  that	  Pleasants	  makes	  in	  this	  
book	  could	  therefore	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  an	  alternative	  way	  in	  which	  the	  relevant	  
passages	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  could	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  critically	  upon	  
Wendt’s	  approach	  to	  IR.	  In	  this	  sub-­‐section	  I	  will	  briefly	  sketch	  out	  some	  of	  the	  
possible	  criticisms	  that	  could	  be	  made	  of	  Wendt	  on	  this	  basis,	  and	  contrast	  and	  
compare	  Pleasants’	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  approach	  with	  that	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  so	  
far	  in	  this	  chapter.133	  
	  
In	  Wittgenstein	  and	  the	  Idea	  of	  a	  Critical	  Social	  Theory,	  Pleasants	  aims	  to	  show	  how	  
“Wittgenstein’s	  critique	  of	  traditional	  theory	  can	  be	  extended	  a	  fortiori	  to	  critical	  
social	  theory”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.10).	  Pleasants	  focuses	  his	  criticisms	  on	  the	  work	  of	  
Giddens,	  Bhaskar	  and	  Habermas,	  although	  he	  suggests	  that	  they	  may	  apply	  more	  
widely.	  The	  main	  aspects	  of	  Bhaskar	  that	  Pleasants	  targets	  are	  the	  former’s	  so-­‐called	  
‘transcendental	  realism’	  and	  ‘transformational	  model	  of	  social	  activity’,	  which	  are	  
also	  key	  aspects	  on	  which	  Wendt	  draws	  in	  his	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics.	  
Pleasants	  explains	  that	  his	  principal	  strategy	  in	  criticising	  Bhaskar	  et	  al	  is	  “to	  tackle	  …	  
the	  theoretical	  ‘pictures’	  which	  captivate	  critical	  social	  theorists”,	  and	  that	  he	  aims	  to	  
do	  this	  “in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  ‘deconstructions’	  of	  the	  pictures	  which	  
dominate	  traditional	  philosophical	  thought”	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
A	  principal	  line	  of	  criticism	  that	  Pleasants	  uses	  Wittgenstein’s	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘picture’	  to	  
pursue	  is	  that	  Bhaskar’s	  ‘transformational	  model	  of	  social	  activity’	  is	  committed	  to	  a	  
flawed	  ‘picture’	  of	  individual	  agency	  as	  inherently	  (rather	  than	  electively)	  free.	  This	  is	  
a	  commitment	  that	  Pleasants	  suggests	  Bhaskar	  shares	  with	  Giddens	  and	  Hayek,	  and	  
he	  explains	  it	  as	  follows:	  
                                                
133	  The	  justification	  for	  concentrating	  on	  a	  possible	  extrapolation	  of	  Pleasants’	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  
criticisms	  of	  Bhaskar,	  as	  opposed	  to	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  criticisms	  of	  Wendt	  that	  already	  exist	  (such	  
as	  Smith,	  1999),	  is	  that	  Pleasants	  draws	  specifically	  on	  the	  remarks	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  
concerning	  ‘pictures’	  that	  the	  ARO	  was	  inspired	  by,	  and	  whose	  reinterpretation	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  
the	  replacement	  critical	  approach	  that	  I	  have	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis.	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“For	  Giddens	  and	  Hayek	  …	  individuals	  exercise	  their	  freedom	  ‘routinely’	  
without	  necessarily	  being	  consciously	  aware	  that	  they	  are	  doing	  so.	  This	  
conception	  of	  freedom	  differs	  from	  more	  traditional,	  rationalist	  ‘subject-­‐
centred’	  views,	  where	  freedom	  is	  identified	  with	  consciously	  reasoned	  choice	  
and	  intentioned	  action.	  The	  crucial	  difference	  is	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  tacit	  
knowledge	  grounds	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  in	  individuals’	  powers	  of	  agency,	  
not	  their	  conscious	  choices.	  Agency	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  the	  ontologically	  basic	  
condition	  of	  individual	  action:	  ‘agency	  refers	  not	  to	  the	  intentions	  people	  
have	  in	  doing	  things	  but	  to	  their	  capability	  of	  doing	  those	  things	  in	  the	  first	  
place’	  (Giddens	  1984:9).	  A	  corollary	  of	  this	  conception	  of	  agency	  …	  is	  that	  ‘at	  
any	  point	  in	  time,	  “the	  agent	  could	  have	  acted	  otherwise”‘	  (Giddens	  1979:56).	  
…	  This	  proposition	  expresses	  the	  (intuitively	  compelling)	  conviction	  that	  
individuals	  possess	  ‘free	  will’,	  and	  do	  not	  live	  in	  a	  deterministic	  (social	  and	  
natural)	  universe.”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.99-­‐100)	  
	  
Pleasants	  asserts	  that	  this	  ‘picture’	  of	  agency	  is	  fundamental	  to	  Bhaskar’s	  and	  
Giddens’	  ontologies	  of	  individual	  and	  social	  life,	  where	  it	  is	  presented	  by	  these	  
theorists	  as	  “a	  necessary	  precondition	  for	  the	  very	  existence	  and	  continuance	  of	  
‘social	  structures’”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.100).	  	  
	  
One	  problem	  that	  Pleasants	  identifies	  with	  this	  “ontological	  picture”	  is	  that	  no	  
attempt	  is	  made	  to	  justify	  the	  assumption	  –	  central	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  undetermined	  
agency	  –	  that	  ‘an	  agent	  could	  always	  have	  acted	  otherwise	  than	  they	  did’,	  which	  is	  
simply	  presented	  by	  Bhaskar	  and	  Giddens	  as	  “an	  obvious	  and	  indisputable	  fact	  of	  
personhood”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.114).	  Pleasants	  uses	  Wittgenstein’s	  criticisms	  of	  G.E.	  
Moore’s	  ‘commonsense	  realism’	  to	  argue	  that	  Bhaskar	  makes	  the	  same	  mistake	  as	  
Moore	  in	  trying	  to	  use	  everyday	  truisms	  to	  ‘prove’	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  philosophical	  thesis.	  
Pleasants	  argues:	  “like	  Wittgenstein,	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  Bhaskar	  might	  be	  wrong	  
about	  his	  (and	  our)	  [everyday	  experience	  of	  our]	  ability	  to	  ‘act	  otherwise’”;	  however,	  
following	  Wittgenstein’s	  response	  to	  Moore’s	  example	  of	  ‘here	  is	  a	  hand’,	  Pleasants	  
argues	  that	  this	  ‘experience’	  does	  not	  constitute	  knowledge	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  would	  be	  
required	  to	  support	  a	  thesis	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  agency	  is	  inherently	  ‘undetermined’	  
(Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.114).	  He	  writes:	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“According	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  such	  subjective	  certainties	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  
as	  knowledge	  claims	  in	  the	  philosophical	  sense,	  ‘where	  “I	  know”	  is	  meant	  to	  
mean:	  I	  can’t	  be	  wrong’	  (Wittgenstein	  1975:	  §8).	  Apart	  from	  the	  difficulty	  of	  
providing	  a	  meaningful	  context	  for	  the	  claims	  …,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  way	  in	  
which	  they	  could	  be	  either	  verified	  or	  falsified.	  …	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  
simply	  negate	  the	  realist’s	  proposition	  that	  ‘physical	  objects	  exist’	  (or	  that	  
‘agency	  is	  real’	  …);	  he	  does	  not	  say	  that	  these	  ‘things’	  do	  not	  exist	  or	  are	  not	  
real.	  Rather,	  he	  argues	  that	  both	  the	  realist	  and	  the	  sceptic	  misuse	  the	  verb	  
‘to	  know’.”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.115)	  
	  
Another	  problem	  identified	  by	  Pleasants	  with	  the	  ‘picture’	  of	  agency	  to	  which	  
Bhaskar,	  Giddens	  and	  Habermas	  adhere,	  is	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  “inherent	  
counterfactual”	  that	  individuals	  could	  always	  have	  acted	  otherwise	  (ibid.),	  and	  the	  
“Enlightenment	  faith	  in	  the	  possibility	  and	  desirability	  of	  objectively	  valid	  scientific	  
knowledge”	  about	  ‘social’	  affairs	  that	  these	  critical	  social	  theorists	  apparently	  all	  
share	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.6).	  In	  Bhaskar’s	  case,	  Pleasants	  observes	  that	  he	  “insists	  
that	  human	  agency	  is	  ‘real’	  –	  that	  is,	  agency	  really	  is	  as	  it	  commonsensically	  seems	  to	  
be:	  ‘free’	  and	  ‘undetermined’.	  …	  However,	  he	  also	  (1989a:	  100)	  maintains	  that	  
‘everything	  happens	  in	  accordance	  with	  physical	  laws.	  Thus	  Bhaskar	  advocates	  both	  
indeterminism	  and	  compatibilism—an	  unlikely	  combination”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  
p.105).	  
	  
According	  to	  Pleasants,	  Bhaskar’s	  general	  ontology	  of	  ‘transcendental	  realism’	  
attempts	  to	  resolve	  this	  apparent	  tension	  by	  establishing	  that	  “causality	  exists	  and	  
acts	  at	  a	  ‘deep’	  level	  of	  reality—which	  transcends	  the	  possibility	  of	  direct	  sensory	  
experience”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.106).	  It	  is	  meant	  to	  achieve	  this	  by	  showing	  “firstly,	  
that	  ‘the	  world	  is	  stratified	  and	  differentiated’	  (ibid.:	  5),	  and	  secondly,	  that	  certain	  
powers,	  mechanisms	  and	  structures	  must	  exist	  as	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  
‘manifest	  phenomena’	  of	  experience”	  (ibid.).	  These	  tenets	  of	  transcendental	  realism	  
are	  manifest	  in	  Bhaskar’s	  ‘transformative	  model	  of	  social	  action’	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  his	  
“causal	  theory	  of	  mind,”	  which	  purports	  to	  reconcile	  “physicalism	  and	  
hermeneuticism”	  with	  respect	  to	  psychological	  and	  social	  phenomena	  (Pleasants,	  
1999:	  p.106-­‐7).	  Thus	  “against	  physicalism,	  Bhaskar	  upholds	  the	  ‘reality’	  of	  reasons,	  
meanings	  and	  concepts	  (the	  preoccupation	  of	  hermeneuticism);	  and	  against	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hermeneuticism	  he	  insists	  that	  reasons,	  etc.	  causally	  generate	  individual	  agency….	  
But	  the	  universe	  is,	  in	  Bhaskar’s	  terminology,	  inherently	  ‘open’	  –that	  is,	  
undetermined.	  Hence	  human	  action—along	  with	  every	  other	  kind	  of	  event—is	  caused	  
but	  not	  ‘determined’”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.106-­‐7).	  
	  
Pleasants	  criticises	  Bhaskar’s	  attempted	  resolution	  of	  indeterminism	  and	  
compatibilism	  with	  respect	  to	  psychological	  and	  social	  phenomena	  by	  appealing	  to	  
later	  “Wittgenstein’s	  critique	  of	  the	  ‘name-­‐object’	  picture	  of	  language”	  (Pleasants,	  
1999:	  p.108).	  According	  to	  Pleasants,	  Bhaskar’s	  identification	  of	  ‘reasons’	  as	  ‘causes’	  
involves	  mistakenly	  treating	  reasons	  as	  ‘quasi-­‐objects’	  “bestowed	  with	  causal	  
powers”	  (ibid.).	  Pleasants	  suggests	  that	  this	  “rests	  on	  a	  beguiling	  linguistic	  confusion”	  
identified	  by	  Wittgenstein,	  whereby	  “when	  theorists	  see	  that	  ‘a	  substantive	  is	  not	  
used	  as	  what	  in	  general	  we	  should	  call	  the	  name	  of	  an	  object’,	  an	  obvious	  move	  is	  to	  
make	  the	  substantive	  into	  ‘the	  name	  of	  an	  aethereal	  object’”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.108;	  
Blue	  Book:	  47).	  Drawing	  on	  Wittgenstein’s	  Blue	  Book,	  Pleasants	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  
problematic	  to	  treat	  ‘reasons’	  as	  causally-­‐effective	  quasi-­‐objects,	  because	  while	  
“actions	  can	  always	  be	  made	  out	  to	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  some	  reason	  or	  reasons,	  it	  
is	  quite	  a	  different	  matter	  to	  contend	  that	  some	  particular	  reason	  or	  reasons	  was	  
actually	  implicated	  in	  the	  genesis	  of	  an	  act”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.108).	  Paraphrasing	  
Wittgenstein,	  Pleasants	  suggests	  that	  when	  we	  ‘make	  out’	  that	  an	  action	  was	  in	  
accordance	  with	  some	  reason,	  we	  are	  providing	  a	  post-­‐hoc,	  hypothetical	  
rationalisation	  of	  the	  activity	  in	  question.	  This	  kind	  of	  rationalisation	  is	  quite	  different	  
from	  ‘identifying	  the	  cause’	  of	  some	  action,	  not	  least	  because	  “what	  looks	  like	  the	  
‘real	  reason’	  for	  an	  act	  from	  one	  point	  of	  view	  …	  may	  well	  look	  quite	  different	  from	  
another	  perspective”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.109).134	  In	  this	  light,	  Pleasants	  suggests	  
“Bhaskar’s	  assertion	  that	  ‘intentional	  human	  behaviour…	  is	  always	  caused	  by	  
reasons’	  is	  just	  a	  rationalist	  myth	  created	  by	  his	  own	  symbolism”	  (ibid.).	  
	  
                                                
134	  According	  to	  Pleasants,	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  acts	  are	  never	  motivated	  by	  reasons;	  but	  
rather	  that	  rationalising	  an	  action	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘reasons’	  is	  not	  generally	  equivalent	  to	  identifying	  the	  
cause	  of	  an	  action,	  and	  that	  the	  instances	  in	  which	  such	  rationalisations	  do	  amount	  to	  causal	  
explanations	  of	  actions	  are	  few	  and	  far	  between	  (ibid.).	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Another	  way	  in	  which	  Pleasants	  claims	  that	  Bhaskar’s	  ‘picture’	  of	  individual	  agency	  is	  
“incoherent”	  is	  that	  it	  “is	  unable	  to	  show	  how	  individuals	  ‘could	  have	  acted	  
otherwise’,	  and	  that	  ‘agency	  is	  real’”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.109).	  As	  an	  example,	  
Pleasants	  quotes	  a	  passage	  from	  Bhaskar’s	  The	  Possibility	  of	  Naturalism,	  where	  
Bhaskar	  tries	  to	  explain	  how	  social	  and	  psychological	  phenomena	  can	  be	  
indeterminate	  while	  still	  being	  able	  to	  be	  brought	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  a	  naturalistic	  
model	  of	  causation:	  
	   	  
“It	  is	  an	  error	  of	  the	  greatest	  magnitude	  to	  suppose	  that	  what	  is	  going	  to	  
happen	  in	  the	  future	  is	  (epistemically)	  determined	  before	  it	  is	  (ontologically)	  
caused.	  For,	  when	  it	  is	  caused	  it	  will	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  action	  of	  bodies,	  
preformed,	  complex	  and	  structured,	  possessing	  powers	  irreducible	  to	  their	  
exercise,	  endowed	  with	  various	  degrees	  of	  self	  regulation	  (and	  
transformation),	  in	  thorough-­‐going	  interaction	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  subject	  
to	  a	  flow	  of	  contingencies	  that	  can	  never	  be	  predicted	  with	  certainty.”	  
(Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.109;	  Bhaskar,	  1989:	  p.87)	  
	  
Pleasants’	  verdict	  is	  that	  “despite	  its	  foreboding	  language,	  this	  passage	  says	  no	  more	  
than	  that	  physical,	  social,	  and	  psychological	  phenomena	  are	  extremely	  complex”,	  and	  
hence	  it	  does	  not	  succeed	  in	  explaining	  how	  social	  and	  psychological	  phenomena	  can	  
be	  both	  inherently	  ‘indeterminate’	  and	  yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  universally	  ‘caused’	  
(Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.109).	  	  
	  
This	  is	  part	  of	  a	  further	  problem	  that	  Pleasants’	  identifies	  concerning	  the	  distinction	  
that	  Bhaskar	  makes	  between	  the	  ‘transitive’	  realm	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  
‘instransitive’	  realm	  of	  ontology.	  	  According	  to	  this	  distinction,	  the	  ‘transitive’	  realm	  
of	  knowledge	  is	  relativistic,	  fallible,	  variable	  and	  contingent;	  while	  the	  ‘intransitive’	  
realm	  of	  ontology	  is	  “strictly	  non-­‐relativistic”,	  and	  “consists	  of	  objects,	  powers,	  
mechanisms,	  structures	  and	  relations	  which	  operate	  and	  endure”	  regardless	  of	  the	  
state	  of	  our	  knowledge	  about	  them	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.110).	  This	  distinction	  is	  what	  
allows	  Bhaskar	  to	  claim	  in	  the	  passage	  quoted	  above	  that	  phenomena	  are	  
‘ontologically’	  caused	  and	  yet	  ‘epistemically’	  undetermined.	  Yet	  Pleasants	  observes	  
that	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  this	  claim	  is	  reliant	  on	  the	  specialist	  way	  in	  which	  Bhaskar	  
uses	  the	  word	  ‘determined’.	  	  When	  Bhaskar	  asserts	  that	  events	  are	  not	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epistemologically	  ‘determined’,	  he	  apparently	  uses	  this	  word	  to	  mean	  “predictability	  
of	  outcomes”.	  However,	  Pleasants	  points	  out	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  
word	  ‘determined’	  has	  traditionally	  been	  used	  in	  the	  philosophical	  debates	  
concerning	  free	  will	  on	  which	  Bhaskar	  draws,	  where	  it	  has	  more	  typically	  been	  used	  
to	  mean	  that	  every	  event	  is	  universally	  (and	  ontologically)	  caused.	  In	  other	  words,	  
Bhaskar’s	  novel	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘determined’	  allows	  him	  to	  appear	  to	  make	  the	  
paradoxical	  claim	  that	  phenomena	  are	  both	  caused	  and	  yet	  in	  a	  sense	  uncaused;	  
however,	  when	  you	  unpack	  his	  terminology,	  his	  claim	  simply	  amounts	  to	  saying	  that	  
phenomena	  are	  causally	  determined	  but	  epistemically	  unpredictable.	  As	  Pleasants	  
comments,	  this	  is	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  Hume’s	  ‘compatibilist’	  view	  of	  causality	  
which	  Bhaskar	  rejects,	  and	  which	  his	  version	  of	  transcendental	  realism	  is	  meant	  to	  
replace	  (Bhaskar,	  1989:	  p.16-­‐18).	  	  	  
	  
Likewise,	  Pleasants	  finds	  issues	  with	  Bhaskar’s	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘emergence’	  and	  
‘irreducibility’.	  Bhaskar	  claims	  that	  ‘mind’	  is	  an	  ‘emergent	  power’	  which	  is	  
‘irreducible’	  to	  physical	  matter,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  nothing	  
more	  than	  “physical	  properties	  of	  the	  human	  organism”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.110-­‐111).	  
In	  the	  course	  of	  setting	  out	  this	  claim,	  Bhaskar	  contends	  that	  psychological	  
phenomena	  such	  as	  agency,	  intentionality,	  belief,	  desire	  etc.	  are	  ontologically	  distinct	  
from	  the	  physical	  matter	  out	  of	  which	  they	  emerge,	  though	  they	  are	  “causally	  
generated”	  by	  it	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.111).	  However,	  Pleasants	  argues	  that	  “Bhaskar’s	  
‘ontologisation’	  of	  the	  concept	  ‘emergence’	  is	  riven	  with	  perplexities	  that	  are	  just	  as	  
puzzling	  as	  those	  produced	  by	  the	  ontological	  pictures	  that	  he	  rejects”	  (ibid.).	  For	  
example,	  Pleasants	  asks,	  “what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  certain	  phenomena	  ‘cannot	  
be	  reduced	  to’	  the	  phenomena	  from	  which	  they	  emerge”,	  in	  an	  ontological	  as	  
opposed	  to	  an	  epistemological	  sense	  (ibid.)?	  In	  addition,	  Pleasants	  questions:	  if	  
mental	  powers	  are	  ‘causally	  generated’	  by	  physical	  matter,	  “how,	  then,	  is	  freedom	  
and	  agency	  preserved	  if	  we	  have	  to	  accept	  that	  ‘ontological’	  emergence	  is	  just	  a	  
totally	  non-­‐explicable,	  ‘irreducible’	  fact?”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.111).	  Pleasants	  
identifies	  a	  parallel	  issue	  with	  Bhaskar’s	  account	  of	  ‘social	  structures’	  as	  ‘emerging	  
from’	  but	  remaining	  ‘irreducible	  to’	  people	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.112),	  according	  to	  
which	  there	  is	  “an	  ontological	  hiatus	  between	  society	  and	  people”	  (Bhaskar,	  1989:	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p.33).	  Effectively,	  Pleasants	  proposes,	  this	  amounts	  to	  the	  endorsement	  of	  a	  
contradictory	  claim	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  “social	  structure	  both	  has	  a	  sui	  generis	  real,	  
separate	  existence	  from	  people”	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  “does	  not	  exist	  independently	  
of	  people”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.112-­‐3).	  	  
	  
The	  above	  criticisms	  are	  the	  main	  ways	  in	  which	  Pleasants	  uses	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  
philosophy	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  ‘pictures’	  of	  agency,	  mentality	  and	  social	  phenomena	  
that	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Bhaskar’s	  version	  of	  critical	  realism.	  Some	  of	  the	  same	  or	  
similar	  aspects	  of	  Bhaskar’s	  work	  that	  Pleasants	  finds	  problematic	  are	  also	  found	  in	  
Wendt’s	  Social	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  and	  hence	  there	  is	  scope	  for	  adapting	  
Pleasants’	  critique	  to	  apply	  to	  Wendt.	  So,	  for	  example,	  Wendt	  apparently	  shares	  
Bhaskar’s	  difficulty	  of	  maintaining	  that	  social	  structures	  are	  ‘irreducible’	  to	  people,	  
while	  also	  claiming	  that	  social	  structures	  ‘emerge	  from’	  people’s	  interactions.	  He	  
writes:	  
	  
“In	  sum,	  concrete	  individuals	  play	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  state	  action,	  
instantiating	  and	  carrying	  it	  forward	  in	  time,	  but	  state	  action	  is	  no	  more	  
reducible	  to	  those	  individuals	  than	  their	  action	  is	  reducible	  to	  neurons	  in	  the	  
brain.	  Both	  kinds	  of	  agency	  exist	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  structured	  relationships	  
among	  their	  elements	  [i.e.	  individual	  neurones	  or	  people],	  but	  the	  effect	  of	  
those	  structures	  is	  to	  constitute	  irreducible	  capacities	  for	  intentionality.	  These	  
capacities	  are	  real,	  not	  fictions.”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.221)135	  
	  
Similarly,	  Wendt	  struggles	  to	  reconcile	  his	  commitment	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  social	  
phenomena	  are	  constituted	  by	  people’s	  actions	  and	  dialogues,	  with	  the	  ‘realist’	  tenet	  
that	  social	  and	  natural	  phenomena	  are	  both	  subject	  to	  causality:	  
	  
“Elements	  from	  the	  description	  and	  relational	  theory	  need	  to	  be	  incorporated	  
when	  dealing	  with	  social	  kinds.	  However,	  in	  the	  realist	  view	  social	  life	  is	  
continuous	  with	  nature,	  and	  as	  such	  science	  must	  be	  anchored	  to	  the	  world	  
via	  the	  mechanisms	  described	  by	  the	  causal	  theory.”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.58)	  
	  
                                                
135	  Like	  Bhaskar,	  Wendt	  characterises	  the	  emergence	  and	  irreducibility	  of	  social	  structures	  in	  terms	  of	  
ontology,	  writing	  that	  “the	  state	  is	  ontologically	  emergent”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.221).	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Thus,	  like	  Bhaskar,	  Wendt	  could	  be	  said	  to	  subscribe	  to	  an	  ontology	  according	  to	  
which	  social	  phenomena	  both	  do	  and	  do	  not	  have	  an	  independent	  existence	  from	  the	  
(causal)	  natural	  realm.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Wendt	  insists	  that	  social	  kinds	  are	  
ontologically	  ‘irreducible’	  to	  natural	  kinds;	  however,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  argues	  
that	  “material	  forces”	  play	  a	  role	  “in	  constituting	  social	  kinds”,	  and	  that	  were	  it	  not	  
for	  the	  fact	  that	  social	  kinds	  are	  “materially	  grounded”	  in	  certain	  genetic	  or	  intrinsic	  
material	  properties,	  “there	  would	  be	  no	  social	  kinds	  at	  all”	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.72).	  
Wendt’s	  solution	  for	  how	  the	  alleged	  dependence	  of	  social	  phenomena	  on	  the	  
‘material’	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  their	  “irreducible	  emergent	  properties”	  (Wendt,	  
1999:	  p.143)	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  natural	  kinds	  serve	  to	  constrain	  social	  kinds	  to	  varying	  
extents	  without	  fully	  ‘determining’	  them	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.72).	  Nevertheless,	  Wendt	  
concludes:	  “in	  the	  last	  analysis	  a	  theory	  of	  social	  kinds	  must	  refer	  to	  natural	  kinds,	  
including	  human	  bodies	  and	  their	  physical	  behaviour,	  which	  are	  amenable	  to	  a	  causal	  
theory	  of	  reference”	  (ibid.).	  Like	  Bhaskar,	  Wendt	  refers	  to	  the	  causal	  naturalistic	  
‘underpinnings’	  out	  of	  which	  social	  phenomena	  emerge	  as	  the	  “deep	  structure”	  of	  
reality	  (Wendt,	  1999:	  p.49).	  
	  
Based	  on	  Wendt’s	  apparent	  absorption	  of	  some	  of	  the	  tensions	  in	  Bhaskar’s	  
philosophy,	  it	  seems	  that	  Pleasants’	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  criticisms	  of	  Bhaskar’s	  
flawed	  ‘pictures’	  of	  agency	  and	  ontology	  could	  without	  much	  difficulty	  be	  extended	  
to	  apply	  to	  the	  above	  features	  of	  Wendt’s	  account.	  Such	  an	  approach	  could	  be	  a	  
potentially	  valid	  alternative	  or	  supplement	  to	  the	  critical	  application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
later	  philosophy	  to	  IR	  that	  I	  have	  developed	  in	  this	  and	  the	  last	  chapter.	  However,	  
there	  are	  some	  relevant	  differences	  between	  Pleasants’	  critical	  approach	  and	  my	  
own	  which	  would	  impact	  upon	  the	  methodological	  status	  and	  justifications	  of	  the	  
criticisms	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  would	  be	  used	  to	  make	  in	  each	  case.	  	  
	  
Firstly,	  Pleasants	  does	  not	  explicitly	  acknowledge	  the	  possibility	  of	  various	  
applications	  and	  indexes	  of	  the	  word	  ‘picture’	  as	  it	  is	  used	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  PI,	  but	  
instead	  provides	  one	  singular	  definition	  of	  what	  a	  ‘picture’	  is	  according	  to	  later	  
Wittgenstein	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.304).	  This	  means	  that	  unlike	  the	  application	  I	  have	  
developed,	  Pleasants’	  application	  could	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  criticism	  that	  he	  does	  not	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allow	  for	  variety	  among	  Wittgenstein’s	  uses	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  in	  the	  PI,	  or	  for	  
alternative	  interpretations	  of	  these	  uses,	  and	  that	  by	  oversimplifying	  the	  
employment	  of	  this	  term	  to	  a	  single	  sense	  he	  has	  disguised	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  this	  
aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  a	  range	  of	  strategies	  for	  
criticising	  academic	  work.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  Pleasants’	  definition	  of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘picture’	  differs	  
somewhat	  from	  the	  two	  main	  senses	  of	  the	  term	  that	  I	  identified	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  
as	  being	  at	  play	  in	  the	  PI.	  He	  writes:	  
	  
	  “A	  philosophical	  picture,	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  sense,	  is	  a	  theoretical	  
representation	  which	  has	  lost	  its	  representational	  status	  and	  has	  been	  reified	  
into	  a	  peculiarly	  compelling	  portrayal	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  some	  phenomenon.	  
Such	  pictures	  are	  really	  only	  metaphors,	  analogies,	  models	  and	  
representations,	  but	  they	  are	  experienced	  as	  knowledge	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  
reality-­‐in-­‐itself…	   	  
Many	  of	  the	  ‘pictures’	  which	  occupy	  Wittgenstein’s	  attention	  are	  not	  
really	  pictures	  in	  the	  usual	  sense—they	  are	  reified	  representations	  of	  states	  of	  
affairs	  which	  cannot	  really	  be	  pictured	  at	  all.	  Or,	  rather,	  what	  can	  be	  pictured	  
is	  just	  an	  aspect,	  or	  part	  of	  the	  whole	  phenomenon,	  which	  somehow	  seems	  to	  
stand	  for	  such	  complex	  phenomena	  as	  ‘language’,	  ‘mind’,	  ‘self’,	  etc.”	  
(Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.3-­‐4)	  
	  
According	  to	  Pleasants’	  definition,	  a	  ‘picture’	  is	  a	  “compelling	  portrayal	  of	  the	  
essence	  of	  some	  phenomenon”	  which	  is	  “experienced	  as	  knowledge	  of	  the	  essence	  
of	  reality-­‐in-­‐itself”,	  but	  which	  is	  actually	  only	  a	  metaphor,	  analogy,	  model	  or	  
representation	  (Ibid.).	  Pleasants	  suggests	  that	  typically	  the	  phenomena	  that	  are	  
apparently	  portrayed	  by	  such	  ‘pictures’	  either	  cannot	  be	  visualised	  at	  all,	  or	  only	  
visualised	  in	  part	  due	  to	  their	  size	  or	  complexity.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  a	  ‘picture’	  of	  a	  
part	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  is	  passed	  off	  as	  a	  portrayal	  of	  the	  ‘essence’	  of	  the	  whole.	  	  	  
	  
Pleasants’	  definition,	  as	  summarised	  above,	  partially	  overlaps	  with	  the	  first	  sense	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  in	  the	  PI	  that	  I	  unpacked	  in	  3.2,	  which	  was	  
based	  on	  remarks	  where	  Wittgenstein	  apparently	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  to	  mean	  an	  
imaginary	  image,	  model	  or	  scene	  that	  we	  are	  induced	  to	  envisage	  by	  certain	  forms	  of	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expression.	  Where	  Pleasants’	  definition	  differs	  from	  mine,	  however,	  is	  that	  my	  
interpretation	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  clarification	  of	  the	  methodological	  justification	  for	  
attributing	  a	  ‘picture’	  in	  this	  sense	  to	  other	  scholars;	  as	  well	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  an	  
alternative	  complimentary	  sense	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein’s	  critical	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
‘picture’	  in	  the	  PI	  can	  be	  understood	  –	  i.e.	  as	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  pattern	  of	  bias	  
that	  is	  apparent	  within	  a	  text.	  This	  in	  turn	  means	  that	  Pleasants’	  critical	  application	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  term	  ‘picture’	  is	  restricted	  to	  making	  speculative	  claims	  to	  the	  effect	  
that	  certain	  philosophers	  or	  theorists	  are	  committed	  to	  particular	  ‘models’	  or	  
‘portrayals’	  of	  phenomena.	  	  
	  
Examples	  of	  such	  claims	  are	  when	  Pleasants	  refers	  to	  “the	  pictures	  which	  dominate	  
traditional	  philosophical	  thought”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.10),	  when	  he	  identifies	  the	  
‘picture’	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  language	  in	  PI	  §1	  as	  a	  picture	  which	  “has	  exercised	  
enormous	  influence	  on	  philosophers,	  from	  Plato	  to	  Wittgenstein	  himself	  in	  his	  early	  
work”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.3),	  and	  when	  he	  refers	  to	  this	  picture	  as	  one	  that	  “is	  deeply	  
embedded	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  philosophers”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.17).	  In	  contrast	  to	  
Wittgenstein’s	  own	  carefully	  qualified	  judgements,	  such	  claims	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  
problematic	  due	  to	  their	  uncompromising	  generality	  and	  lack	  of	  methodological	  
justification.	  As	  with	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  the	  boldness	  and	  overgeneralisation	  of	  
Pleasants’	  claims	  regarding	  others’	  commitments	  to	  certain	  ‘pictures’	  is	  apparently	  
connected	  with	  his	  black-­‐and-­‐white	  interpretation	  of	  PI	  §1.	  Rather	  than	  
acknowledging	  the	  subtle	  but	  important	  distinctions	  marked	  by	  Wittgenstein	  
between	  the	  ‘description’,	  ‘picture’	  and	  ‘idea’	  introduced	  in	  PI	  §1,	  Pleasants	  glosses	  
the	  remark	  as	  providing	  “an	  account	  of	  ‘a	  particular	  picture	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  human	  
language’”	  (Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.3),	  and	  summarises	  this	  ‘picture’	  by	  an	  edited	  quote	  
that	  artificially	  conflates	  Wittgenstein’s	  separate	  descriptions	  of	  the	  ‘picture’	  and	  
‘idea’	  in	  PI	  §1:	  
	  	  
“This	  picture	  …	  provides	  a	  generalised,	  universal	  model	  of	  the	  essential	  
function	  of	  language:	  ‘individual	  words	  in	  language	  name	  objects—sentences	  
are	  combinations	  of	  such	  names…	  Every	  word	  has	  a	  meaning.	  This	  meaning	  is	  
correlated	  with	  the	  word.	  It	  is	  the	  object	  for	  which	  the	  word	  stands.’”	  
(Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.16)	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Pleasants	  subsequently	  refers	  back	  to	  this	  as	  the	  “‘name-­‐object’	  picture	  of	  language”	  
(Pleasants,	  1999:	  p.16),	  and	  goes	  on	  to	  sum	  up	  Wittgenstein’s	  supposed	  “objections”	  
to	  this	  picture.	  In	  addition,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Wittgenstein	  himself	  does	  not	  
attribute	  the	  ‘picture’	  he	  describes	  in	  PI	  §1	  to	  any	  actual	  philosophers,	  Pleasants	  
claims	  that	  this	  particular	  picture	  has	  influenced	  multiple	  philosophers	  throughout	  
history	  from	  Plato	  onwards	  (Ibid.).	  	  
	  
From	  the	  above,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  Pleasants’	  application	  involves	  an	  interpretation	  
of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  that	  is	  very	  much	  like	  that	  employed	  by	  Kratochwil,	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  who	  use	  it	  to	  mount	  an	  anti-­‐representationalist	  objection	  to	  
‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR.	  However,	  Pleasants’	  application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  
philosophy	  is	  also	  relevantly	  different	  from	  the	  ARO,	  in	  that	  Pleasants	  does	  not	  use	  
his	  interpretation	  of	  PI	  §1	  to	  directly	  attribute	  the	  “‘name-­‐object’	  picture	  of	  
language"	  to	  Bhaskar	  with	  a	  view	  to	  arguing	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  allegedly	  committed	  to	  
this	  problematic	  ‘picture’	  of	  language	  (although	  he	  does	  argue	  that	  Bhaskar	  is	  
committed	  to	  other	  problematic	  ‘pictures’).	  In	  other	  words,	  despite	  certain	  
similarities	  between	  the	  interpretations	  of	  PI	  §1	  employed	  by	  Pleasants	  and	  the	  ARO,	  
Pleasants’	  application	  of	  his	  interpretation	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  the	  ARO	  in	  that	  
Pleasants	  does	  not	  use	  his	  interpretation	  to	  mount	  an	  anti-­‐representationalist	  
objection.	  This	  means	  that	  although	  Pleasants’	  interpretation	  of	  PI	  §1	  is	  somewhat	  
problematic,	  the	  problems	  with	  this	  interpretation	  do	  not	  impact	  the	  validity	  of	  
Pleasants’	  criticisms	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  do	  with	  the	  ARO.	  	  
	  
To	  summarise:	  Pleasants’	  critical	  application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  
Bhaskar	  could,	  with	  certain	  modifications,	  be	  extended	  to	  provide	  an	  alternative	  
route	  for	  using	  remarks	  such	  as	  PI	  §§1-­‐5	  to	  criticise	  Wendt.	  However,	  some	  
important	  modifications	  and	  additions	  to	  Pleasants’	  application	  would	  first	  be	  
necessary,	  such	  as	  providing	  a	  methodological	  justification	  for	  attributing	  ‘pictures’	  to	  
others,	  and	  toning	  down	  claims	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  certain	  philosophers	  or	  other	  
scholars	  are	  committed	  to	  specific	  ‘pictures’	  of	  phenomena.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  my	  
application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis,	  these	  are	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issues	  that	  have	  had	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  overcome.	  While	  Pleasants’	  interpretation	  
of	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  is	  problematic	  for	  some	  of	  the	  same	  
reasons	  that	  I	  identified	  earlier	  with	  the	  interpretation	  employed	  by	  the	  ARO,	  the	  
objections	  that	  Pleasants	  uses	  this	  interpretation	  to	  make	  are	  not	  necessarily	  
vulnerable	  to	  the	  same	  criticisms	  as	  those	  I	  made	  of	  the	  ARO;	  although	  Pleasants’	  
critical	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘picture’	  does	  need	  some	  further	  clarification.	  The	  application	  
that	  I	  have	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis	  could	  be	  of	  help	  to	  Pleasants	  in	  this	  regard,	  since	  
Pleasants’	  comments	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  Bhaskar	  is	  committed	  to	  a	  certain	  ‘picture’	  of	  
individual	  action,	  and	  so	  on,	  could	  be	  qualified	  and	  rephrased	  so	  as	  to	  be	  
understandable	  in	  terms	  of	  either	  or	  both	  of	  the	  two	  senses	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  
the	  word	  ‘picture’	  that	  I	  outlined	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  In	  this	  way,	  Pleasants’	  critical	  
application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  Bhaskar	  amounts	  to	  a	  promising	  
basis	  for	  a	  potentially	  complimentary	  line	  of	  objection	  to	  IR	  scholars	  such	  as	  Wendt,	  
for	  which	  support	  could	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  novel	  aspects	  of	  the	  interpretation	  and	  
application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  
	  
4.4	   Potential	  Relevance	  for	  Recent	  and	  Future	  Work	  in	  IR	  	  
	  
	  
Having	  demonstrated	  the	  applicability	  of	  my	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  strategy	  of	  
therapeutic	  criticism	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt,	  and	  having	  compared	  this	  
strategy	  with	  a	  potential	  alternative	  one	  based	  on	  Pleasants’	  Wittgensteinian	  
objections	  to	  Bhaskarian	  ‘critical	  realism’,	  I	  will	  complete	  this	  chapter	  by	  briefly	  
considering	  the	  potential	  relevance	  of	  my	  approach	  for	  more	  recent	  and	  future	  work	  
in	  IR,	  specifically	  by	  contemporary	  ‘neo-­‐realist’	  scholars	  who	  have	  been	  inspired	  by	  
Waltz.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  subsection	  is	  not	  to	  provide	  a	  full	  account	  of	  the	  criticisms	  
that	  can	  be	  made	  of	  these	  works,	  but	  rather	  to	  indicate	  by	  way	  of	  a	  specific	  example	  
how	  the	  sorts	  of	  critical	  analyses	  that	  I	  have	  so	  far	  provided	  of	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt	  
might	  be	  extended	  and	  brought	  to	  bear	  upon	  more	  recent	  contributions.	  
	  
The	  reader	  may	  note	  that	  Waltz’s	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics	  is	  now	  thirty-­‐seven	  
years	  old,	  and	  on	  this	  basis	  may	  wonder	  whether	  and	  how	  the	  critical	  observations	  of	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Waltz’s	  Theory	  provided	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  of	  relevance	  to	  current	  scholarship.	  An	  
initial	  response	  to	  this	  concern	  is	  that	  despite	  its	  age,	  Waltz’s	  Theory	  is	  obviously	  still	  
considered	  to	  be	  relevant	  within	  IR,	  as	  is	  attested	  to	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  scholars	  such	  as	  
Kratochwil,	  Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke	  still	  address	  themselves	  to	  it.	  However,	  in	  addition	  to	  
its	  role	  as	  the	  emblem	  of	  a	  historical	  tradition	  in	  opposition	  to	  which	  various	  
contemporary	  IR	  scholars	  define	  their	  approach,	  Waltz’s	  Theory	  also	  exerts	  a	  more	  
substantial	  influence	  upon	  current	  debates	  and	  contributions	  through	  the	  inspiration	  
it	  continues	  to	  provide	  for	  contemporary	  ‘neo-­‐realists’	  hoping	  to	  carry	  forward	  
Waltz’s	  dream	  of	  a	  ‘scientific’	  theory	  of	  IR.	  A	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  latter	  is	  Adrian	  
Hyde-­‐Price	  (see	  Hyde-­‐Price,	  2007;	  2008;	  2012;	  2016),	  a	  self-­‐confessed	  follower	  of	  
Waltz	  who,	  in	  his	  most	  recent	  essay,	  seeks	  to	  use	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  Waltz’s	  
structural	  theory	  of	  IR	  to	  provide	  a	  ‘neo-­‐realist’	  analysis	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  NATO	  
since	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2016:	  p.41).	  I	  will	  use	  this	  essay	  as	  an	  example	  to	  
suggest	  how	  my	  Wittgensteinian	  analysis	  of	  Waltz	  might	  be	  applicable	  to	  such	  
contributions	  by	  contemporary	  ‘neo-­‐realist’	  scholars.	  
 
In	  his	  2016	  essay	  Hyde-­‐Price	  hails	  Waltz	  as	  an	  intellectual	  hero	  of	  IR,	  writing:	  
	  
“Kenneth	  Waltz’s	  great	  achievement	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  parsimonious	  and	  
deductive	  theory	  that	  established	  neo-­‐realism	  as	  a	  distinctive	  research	  
paradigm	  able	  to	  generate	  cumulative	  knowledge.	  ‘The	  contribution	  of	  the	  
realist	  paradigm	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  scientific	  study	  of	  international	  
relations’,	  John	  Vasquez	  (1998:	  39)	  has	  written,	  
	  
has	  been,	  first,	  to	  point	  out	  that	  science	  must	  be	  empirical	  and	  
theoretical,	  not	  normative	  and	  narrowly	  historical,	  and	  second,	  to	  
provide	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  world	  (i.e.	  a	  paradigm)	  which	  has	  permitted	  
the	  field	  to	  develop	  a	  common	  research	  agenda	  and	  to	  follow	  it	  
systematically	  and	  somewhat	  cumulatively.”	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2016:	  p.54-­‐
5)	  
	  
More	  specifically,	  Hyde-­‐Price	  spells	  out	  the	  Waltzian	  underpinnings	  of	  his	  approach	  
as	  follows:	  	  
“Neo-­‐realism	  focuses	  on	  the	  structural	  pressures	  that	  ‘shape	  and	  
shove’	  the	  behaviour	  of	  states	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  Neo-­‐
realism	  is	  also	  an	  explicitly	  parsimonious	  theory	  that	  seeks	  to	  provide	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elegant	  theoretical	  explanations	  to	  the	  ‘big	  questions’	  of	  international	  
politics,	  such	  as	  the	  causes	  of	  war	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  peace.”	  (Hyde-­‐
Price,	  2016:	  p.44)	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  his	  specific	  topic	  of	  interest,	  Hyde-­‐Price	  identifies	  two	  main	  ‘structural	  
pressures’	  as	  having	  shaped	  the	  development	  of	  the	  NATO	  alliance:	  “the	  continuing	  
primacy	  of	  American	  power	  …	  and	  the	  process	  of	  ‘continental	  drift’	  which	  has	  
characterised	  transatlantic	  relations	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  East-­‐West	  conflict”	  (2016:	  
p.41).	  Hyde-­‐Price	  subsequently	  proceeds	  to	  give	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  NATO	  has	  developed	  since	  the	  Cold	  War	  with	  reference	  to	  these	  two	  ‘key	  
trends’.	  	  
	  
From	  the	  passages	  quoted	  above,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  Hyde-­‐Price	  shares	  Waltz’s	  premise	  
that	  one	  can	  provide	  a	  general	  account	  of	  how	  ‘theories’	  work	  regardless	  of	  subject	  
matter,	  and	  that	  such	  an	  account	  reveals	  certain	  characteristic	  features	  of	  successful	  
theories	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  create	  a	  ‘scientific’	  theory	  of	  IR.	  Features	  of	  Waltz’s	  
theory	  that	  Hyde-­‐Price	  identifies	  as	  ‘scientific’	  are	  its	  elegance,	  parsimony,	  
empiricism,	  objectivity	  and	  attempt	  to	  go	  “beyond	  mere	  description”	  to	  get	  at	  more	  
general	  “underlying”	  factors	  impacting	  the	  course	  of	  events	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2016:	  p.44,	  
54	  &	  55).	  In	  addition,	  Hyde-­‐Price	  adopts	  Waltz’s	  extended	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘structure’	  
to	  refer	  to	  the	  various	  constraints	  on	  states’	  behaviour	  and	  interactions	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  
2016:	  p.44).	  With	  respect	  to	  these	  inherited	  commitments,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  
same	  critical	  observations	  I	  made	  earlier	  concerning	  Waltz’s	  generalisations	  about	  
how	  ‘theories’	  work,	  and	  his	  extended	  application	  of	  the	  term	  ‘structure’,	  are	  also	  
directly	  applicable	  to	  Hyde-­‐Price;	  namely,	  that	  the	  vague	  and	  flexible	  application	  of	  
terminology	  such	  as	  ‘explanation’,	  ‘parsimony’,	  ‘structure’	  etc.	  in	  these	  contexts	  does	  
not	  constitute	  the	  identification	  of	  genuine	  commonalities	  between	  theories	  in	  the	  
so-­‐called	  ‘natural	  sciences’	  and	  Waltz’s	  theory	  of	  IR,	  but	  rather	  achieves	  a	  rhetorical	  
effect	  of	  producing	  the	  impression	  that	  such	  commonalities	  obtain	  where	  they	  may	  
not.	  Since	  Hyde-­‐Price,	  like	  Waltz,	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  intentionally	  striving	  to	  
achieve	  such	  a	  rhetorical	  effect,	  one	  may	  suggest	  –	  as	  with	  Waltz	  –	  that	  Hyde-­‐Price	  
has	  inadvertently	  found	  himself	  expressing	  his	  aims	  and	  approach	  in	  terms	  that	  
incline	  to	  a	  general	  ‘picture’	  of	  theorising	  and	  of	  IR	  which	  he	  would	  perhaps	  not	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endorse,	  were	  he	  first	  to	  examine	  in	  detail	  the	  diverse	  senses	  that	  these	  terms	  would	  
have	  in	  specific	  cases	  falling	  under	  his	  account.	  	  
	  
At	  this	  juncture	  one	  may	  ask	  how	  such	  critical	  observations	  affect	  the	  substance	  of	  
Hyde-­‐Price’s	  research	  into	  NATO’s	  expansion	  since	  the	  Cold	  War.	  To	  answer	  this	  
question:	  regardless	  of	  any	  rhetorical	  illusions	  generated	  by	  his	  meta-­‐theoretical	  
remarks,	  what	  Hyde-­‐Price	  actually	  writes	  about	  NATO	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  its	  manner	  
of	  development	  is	  a	  well-­‐researched	  and	  historically	  informed	  piece	  of	  political	  
analysis.	  As	  such,	  Hyde-­‐Price’s	  explanation	  is	  not	  automatically	  rendered	  invalid	  by	  
problems	  associated	  with	  the	  terms	  that	  he	  uses	  to	  characterise	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  
explanation	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  other	  ‘theoretical’	  endeavours.	  That	  said,	  these	  
problems	  do	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  perceived	  status	  and	  authority	  of	  Hyde-­‐Price’s	  
account,	  in	  that	  once	  these	  problems	  have	  been	  acknowledged,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  
possible	  for	  Hyde-­‐Price	  to	  claim	  superiority	  for	  his	  explanation	  as	  being	  more	  
‘scientific’	  than	  others	  on	  the	  back	  of	  his	  or	  Waltz’s	  meta-­‐theoretical	  account	  of	  neo-­‐
realism.	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  Hyde-­‐Price’s	  explanation	  gains	  no	  genuine	  scholarly	  advantage	  over	  
other	  explanations	  of	  NATO’s	  development	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  described	  as	  
‘scientific’,	  nor	  by	  its	  employment	  of	  terminologies	  that	  can	  also	  be	  employed	  in	  
more	  or	  less	  varying	  senses	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘natural	  sciences’.	  Correspondingly,	  Hyde-­‐
Price’s	  analysis	  does	  not	  stand	  to	  lose	  anything	  except	  a	  superficial	  impression	  of	  
ascendancy	  if	  the	  meta-­‐theoretical	  remarks	  that	  frame	  it	  were	  to	  be	  omitted,	  and	  if	  
its	  explanatory	  statements	  referencing	  the	  ‘structural	  pressures’	  of	  international	  
politics	  were	  re-­‐cast	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  specific	  political	  trends	  and	  events	  which	  are	  
glossed	  by	  this	  phrase,	  such	  as	  growing	  American	  dominance	  and	  the	  loosening	  of	  
transatlantic	  security	  arrangements	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2016:	  p.52).	  Rather,	  the	  academic	  
value	  of	  Hyde-­‐Price’s	  explanation	  would	  continue	  to	  rest	  on	  its	  intrinsic	  merits;	  on	  
factors	  such	  as	  the	  range	  and	  reliability	  of	  historical	  sources	  cited,	  the	  plausibility	  of	  
the	  motives	  and	  views	  ascribed	  to	  relevant	  actors,	  and	  so	  on.136	  In	  this	  light,	  a	  
                                                
136	  For	  example,	  the	  prevalent	  view	  of	  NATO’s	  purpose	  that	  Hyde-­‐Price	  attributes	  to	  its	  members	  in	  
the	  years	  immediately	  following	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2016:	  p.49).	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primary	  benefit	  of	  applying	  the	  Wittgenstein-­‐inspired	  technique	  of	  critical	  analysis	  
developed	  in	  this	  chapter	  to	  the	  work	  of	  current	  IR	  scholars	  such	  as	  Hyde-­‐Price	  can	  
be	  seen	  to	  consist	  in	  dissipating	  the	  rhetorical	  ‘fog’	  created	  by	  the	  meta-­‐theoretical	  
statements	  infiltrating	  the	  politico-­‐historical	  explanations	  that	  these	  scholars	  provide,	  
so	  that	  the	  academic	  content	  of	  their	  contributions	  can	  be	  more	  clearly	  evaluated	  

































Chapter	  5	   Conclusion	  
	  
The	  main	  achievement	  of	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  has	  been	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  novel	  and	  
sophisticated	  way	  of	  using	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  to	  critically	  examine	  so-­‐
called	  ‘positivist’	  and	  other	  approaches	  to	  IR,	  which	  takes	  its	  lead	  from	  the	  remarks	  of	  
later	  Wittgenstein’s	  that	  inspired	  the	  ARO	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Kratochwil,	  
Pin-­‐Fat	  and	  Fierke,	  while	  overcoming	  the	  problems	  identified	  with	  this	  line	  of	  
objection.	  The	  approach	  I	  have	  recommended	  to	  replace	  the	  ARO	  is	  different	  from	  
this	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  many	  respects.	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  not	  ‘against’	  any	  particular	  view	  or	  
theory	  of	  language;	  rather,	  it	  targets	  problematic	  patterns	  in	  the	  way	  that	  particular	  
IR	  scholars	  are	  inclined	  to	  think	  and	  write	  about	  their	  subject	  matter.137	  Secondly,	  it	  
does	  not	  involve	  making	  authoritative	  contradictions	  or	  counterclaims	  against	  
academic	  theses;	  rather	  it	  involves	  making	  critical	  observations	  about	  the	  language-­‐
use	  of	  particular	  scholars,	  which	  are	  designed	  to	  be	  ‘therapeutic’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
they	  are	  addressed	  to	  these	  scholars	  for	  their	  assent	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  bringing	  them	  
round	  to	  a	  realisation	  about	  the	  aims	  and	  functioning	  of	  their	  own	  uses	  of	  
language.138	  Thirdly,	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  making	  universal	  claims	  about	  the	  ‘nature’	  of	  
language	  –	  for	  example,	  that	  it	  is	  ‘socially	  constructed,’	  or	  that	  it	  determines	  how	  and	  
what	  we	  perceive	  –	  although	  it	  does	  involve	  making	  some	  modal	  suggestions	  about	  
the	  sorts	  of	  effects	  language	  can	  have	  on	  us	  in	  certain	  situations,	  for	  example,	  by	  
suggesting	  that	  it	  can	  sometimes	  stimulate	  our	  imagination,	  or	  conjure	  certain	  
‘pictures’	  before	  our	  minds.139	  Finally,	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  denying	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  
ordinary	  or	  routine	  practices	  of	  language-­‐use	  in	  which	  people	  can	  successfully	  form	  
and	  test	  hypotheses,	  can	  make	  empirical	  or	  factual	  claims,	  can	  be	  certain	  of	  
something,	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  instead	  involves	  trying	  to	  clarify	  situations	  in	  which	  IR	  
scholars	  might	  be	  using	  these	  and	  similar	  terms	  in	  contexts	  where	  they	  are	  not	  
                                                
137	  This	  avoids	  the	  difficulty	  of	  having	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  coherent	  conception	  of	  a	  general	  ‘view’	  of	  the	  
kind	  that	  could	  be	  held	  implicitly	  by	  various	  philosophers	  and	  other	  scholars	  throughout	  history,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  risk	  of	  committing	  to	  a	  potentially	  ‘essentialist’	  claim	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  all	  ‘positivist’	  
scholars	  share	  some	  specific	  commitments	  or	  assumptions	  in	  common	  (see	  2.2:	  	  Problem	  2).	  	  
138	  This	  ‘therapeutic’	  aspect	  of	  the	  approach	  avoids	  the	  problem	  of	  unfairly	  committing	  IR	  scholars	  to	  
‘implicit’	  assumptions	  and	  claims	  that	  they	  do	  not	  overtly	  endorse.	  
139	  However,	  these	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  a	  ‘therapeutic’	  vocabulary	  which	  is	  used	  for	  freeing	  
scholars	  from	  patterns	  of	  speech	  that	  they	  would	  rather	  not	  be	  caught	  up	  in,	  which	  is	  –	  as	  mentioned	  
above	  –	  justified	  by	  its	  effectiveness.	  
 213  
successful	  in	  performing	  a	  function	  (or	  at	  least,	  not	  the	  function	  which	  they	  are	  
purportedly	  intended	  to	  fulfil).140	  
	  
Above	  all,	  the	  approach	  I	  have	  recommended	  is	  crucially	  different	  from	  the	  ARO	  in	  
that	  it	  is	  not	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  in	  principle.	  For	  after	  all,	  how	  could	  
we	  possibly	  say,	  in	  advance	  of	  every	  future	  effort,	  that	  one	  cannot	  produce	  a	  theory	  
in	  IR	  that	  makes	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  ‘objective’	  and	  ‘subjective’;	  which	  
focuses	  on	  ‘data’	  and	  ‘data	  analysis’;	  which	  involves	  searching	  for	  general	  laws	  to	  
explain	  specific	  events,	  and	  so	  on?	  For	  one	  thing,	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘objective’,	  
‘subjective’,	  ‘data’,	  ‘analysis’	  and	  so	  on	  do	  not	  themselves	  have	  fixed	  or	  singular	  
meanings,	  and	  so	  it	  is	  entirely	  possible	  that	  further	  definitions	  and	  usages	  will	  
emerge	  over	  time	  which	  may	  be	  legitimately	  employed	  within	  IR.	  For	  another,	  as	  we	  
can	  learn	  from	  the	  example	  of	  Wendt’s	  appeal	  to	  Durkheim’s	  conception	  of	  the	  
‘objectivity’	  of	  social	  facts	  (see	  2.2,	  under	  Problem	  7),	  it	  is	  always	  possible	  for	  scholars	  
and	  theorists	  to	  redefine	  their	  terminology	  and	  complexify	  their	  accounts	  in	  such	  a	  
way	  that	  it	  avoids	  any	  specific	  objections	  we	  might	  make.	  That	  is	  why	  it	  is	  important	  
to	  clarify	  the	  tendencies	  and	  motives	  that	  fuel	  the	  development	  and	  elaboration	  of	  
the	  relevant	  accounts	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  which	  is	  a	  primary	  reason	  that	  later	  
Wittgenstein	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  PI	  to	  begin	  by	  turning	  his	  attention	  to	  
the	  ways	  of	  describing	  and	  thinking	  about	  language	  that	  he	  imagines	  precede	  the	  
formation	  of	  philosophical	  accounts	  and	  theories	  of	  meaning	  (see	  Chapter	  3,	  3.1).	  
	  
While	  the	  approach	  I	  have	  recommended	  is	  not	  against	  ‘positivist’	  approaches	  to	  IR	  
in	  principle,	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  criticise	  (or	  critically	  examine)	  existing	  ‘positivist’	  
approaches	  in	  various	  ways	  that	  could	  result	  in	  their	  being	  abandoned	  or	  reframed.	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt,	  in	  seeking	  to	  endow	  their	  recommended	  
approach	  to	  IR	  with	  ‘scientific’	  credentials,	  extend	  the	  application	  of	  terms	  that	  have	  
typically	  been	  applied	  in	  contexts	  relating	  to	  ‘natural	  sciences’	  such	  as	  physics	  and	  
biology,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  phenomena	  that	  might	  be	  studied	  
in	  IR.	  Thus	  Waltz	  extends	  the	  application	  of	  the	  term	  ‘necessary	  law’	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  
                                                
140	  Thus	  it	  avoids	  the	  ARO’s	  problems	  of	  making	  unsupported	  and	  self-­‐contradictory	  universal	  claims,	  
having	  an	  inconsistent	  stance	  towards	  everyday	  linguistic	  practices,	  and	  committing	  to	  problematic	  
strong	  forms	  of	  linguistic	  relativism	  (see	  2.2:	  Problem	  5,	  6	  and	  7).	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applied	  to	  probabilistic	  correlations,	  and	  ‘structure’	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  
constraints	  under	  which	  nation	  states	  operate,	  while	  Wendt	  extends	  the	  application	  
of	  the	  expression	  ‘constitution	  by	  internal	  structure’	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  
‘states’.	  As	  I	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  these	  terminological	  extensions	  are	  not	  straight-­‐
forwardly	  wrong	  or	  incorrect,	  though	  they	  are	  liable	  to	  create	  misleading	  impressions	  
about	  the	  new	  cases	  to	  which	  the	  words	  are	  applied	  based	  on	  their	  previous	  
applications,	  and	  also	  more	  readily	  enable	  over-­‐simplifications	  and	  over-­‐
generalisations	  to	  be	  made	  concerning	  the	  variety	  of	  cases	  that	  now	  fall	  within	  the	  
modified	  scope	  of	  the	  relevant	  terms.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  key	  question	  that	  we	  should	  ask	  scholars	  who	  extend	  their	  terminology	  
in	  such	  a	  manner	  is	  this:	  what	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  extending	  the	  use	  of	  terms	  like	  
‘necessary	  law’	  and	  ‘structure’	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  subject	  
matter	  one	  might	  encounter	  in	  IR?	  This	  is	  a	  question	  that	  IR	  scholars	  who	  seek	  to	  
extend	  terms	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt	  do	  should	  seriously	  put	  to	  themselves	  
and	  try	  to	  answer	  honestly.	  If	  the	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  extending	  the	  
application	  of	  such	  terms	  to	  encompass	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  IR	  is	  to	  enable	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  ‘scientific’	  theory	  of	  IR	  which	  is	  as	  successful	  as	  the	  sorts	  of	  
theories	  that	  we	  use	  in	  biology	  and	  physics,	  then	  this	  is	  unfortunately	  not	  a	  purpose	  
that	  is	  going	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  re-­‐describing	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  IR	  using	  new	  
terminology.	  As	  I	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Waltz’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘necessary	  law’,	  
while	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  coin	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  ‘necessary’	  that	  allows	  this	  term	  to	  be	  
applied	  to	  probabilistic	  correlations,	  this	  does	  not	  make	  those	  correlations	  any	  more	  
certain	  or	  more	  similar	  to	  universal	  correlations	  than	  they	  already	  are.	  Similarly,	  
while	  it	  is	  possible	  as	  Wendt	  does	  to	  extend	  the	  use	  of	  the	  expression	  ‘internal	  
structure’	  so	  that	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  coordinated	  security	  forces	  of	  a	  state,	  this	  does	  not	  
make	  those	  security	  forces	  any	  more	  like	  H2O	  or	  DNA	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  properties,	  
effects	  and	  manner	  of	  functioning,	  and	  so	  on.	  
	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  a	  point	  I	  have	  already	  tangentially	  touched	  upon	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  
with	  regard	  to	  Hyde-­‐Price,	  which	  John	  Gunnell	  makes	  very	  well	  (though	  from	  a	  
different	  perspective)	  in	  his	  2011	  article	  entitled	  ‘Social	  Scientific	  Inquiry	  and	  Meta-­‐
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Theoretical	  Fantasy:	  The	  Case	  of	  International	  Relations’.	  In	  this	  article,	  Gunnell	  
criticises	  the	  way	  in	  which	  IR	  scholars	  frequently	  appeal	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  
to	  provide	  a	  ‘meta-­‐theoretical’	  foundation	  for	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations,	  on	  
the	  grounds	  that	  such	  appeals	  betray	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  scientific	  practice.	  He	  writes:	  
	  
“One	  of	  the	  basic	  problems	  in	  all	  of	  this	  literature	  has	  been	  a	  neglect	  of	  the	  
issue	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  enterprise	  has	  been	  represented	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  in	  its	  contemporary	  form.	  More	  specifically,	  there	  
has	  been	  a	  lack	  of	  attention	  to	  the	  relationship	  of	  this	  field	  to	  scientific	  
practices	  and	  particularly	  to	  social	  science.	  Little	  is	  gained	  in	  social	  science	  by	  
importing	  and	  becoming	  mortgaged	  to	  philosophical	  debates,	  such	  as	  that	  
between	  realism	  and	  anti-­‐realism.	  What	  is	  important	  is	  less	  making	  a	  choice	  
between	  realism	  and	  conventionalism	  as	  theories	  of	  theory	  than	  recognising	  




According	  to	  Gunnell,	  the	  problem	  with	  appealing	  to	  philosophies	  of	  science	  to	  
provide	  a	  foundation	  for	  studying	  IR	  is	  that	  philosophies	  of	  science	  do	  not	  relate	  to	  
actual	  scientific	  practices	  as	  their	  foundation,	  but	  rather	  as	  “transient,	  philosophical	  
reconstructions”	  (Gunnell,	  2011:	  p.1466).	  In	  other	  words,	  philosophies	  of	  science	  are	  
descriptive	  summaries	  of	  how	  scientific	  theories	  and	  practices	  work,	  and	  have	  no	  
power	  to	  render	  the	  practices	  they	  describe	  successful,	  no	  matter	  how	  they	  
represent	  them.141	  In	  this	  light,	  if	  it	  is	  indeed	  Waltz’s	  and	  Wendt’s	  purpose	  in	  
extending	  the	  uses	  of	  expressions	  such	  as	  ‘necessary	  law’,	  ‘structure’	  and	  
‘constitution	  by	  internal	  structure’	  to	  provide	  a	  meta-­‐theoretical	  foundation	  for	  IR	  
that	  will	  enable	  the	  development	  of	  one	  or	  more	  successful	  ‘theories’,	  then	  they	  are	  
going	  to	  be	  disappointed.	  This	  realisation	  –	  if	  it	  is	  enabled	  alongside	  the	  more	  specific	  
considerations	  I	  raised	  earlier	  in	  Chapter	  4	  –	  should	  provide	  an	  even	  stronger	  impetus	  
for	  scholars	  like	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt	  to	  abandon	  their	  novel	  terminologies,	  which	  
although	  permitted,	  are	  both	  misleading	  and	  useless	  for	  the	  purpose	  for	  which	  they	  
were	  coined.	  
                                                
141	  This	  is	  related	  to	  my	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  remark	  that	  “the	  popular	  scientific	  writings	  
of	  our	  scientists	  are	  not	  the	  expression	  of	  hard	  work	  but	  of	  resting	  on	  laurels”	  (Wittgenstein,	  1998:	  
p.48e,	  MS	  125	  21r:	  1942).	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We	  should	  not	  be	  too	  complacent	  in	  making	  this	  observation	  however,	  since	  
‘positivist’	  scholars	  of	  IR	  do	  not	  have	  a	  monopoly	  on	  creating	  such	  useless	  and	  
misleading	  extensions	  of	  vocabulary.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  where	  we	  –	  if	  we	  are	  
‘constructivists’,	  or	  ‘constructivist’	  sympathisers	  (which	  I	  must	  confess	  to	  having	  
been)	  –	  come	  to	  the	  broadening	  out	  and	  self-­‐critical	  parts	  of	  the	  approach	  that	  I	  
recommended	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  For	  if	  we	  criticise	  scholars	  like	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt	  for	  their	  
counterproductive	  extensions	  of	  terms	  like	  ‘necessary	  law’	  and	  ‘internal	  structure’,	  
then	  we	  have	  to	  also	  admit	  that	  it	  is	  in	  an	  apparently	  parallel	  way	  that	  the	  application	  
of	  the	  term	  ‘construction’	  is	  extended	  by	  many	  scholars	  of	  IR	  who	  are	  against	  a	  
‘positivist’	  approach,	  and	  used	  to	  characterise	  various	  social	  and	  linguistic	  
phenomena	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  exempt	  them	  from	  a	  ‘scientific’	  approach.	  	  
	  
So,	  for	  example,	  Nicholas	  Onuf	  –	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  ‘constructivism’	  in	  IR	  and	  one	  
of	  its	  foremost	  contemporary	  advocates	  –	  expresses	  the	  “fundamental	  proposition”	  
of	  constructivism	  as	  follows:	  
	  
“Human	  beings	  are	  social	  beings,	  and	  we	  would	  not	  be	  human	  but	  for	  our	  
social	  relations.	  In	  other	  words,	  social	  relations	  make	  or	  construct	  people—
ourselves—into	  the	  kind	  of	  beings	  that	  we	  are.	  Conversely,	  we	  make	  the	  
world	  what	  it	  is,	  from	  the	  raw	  materials	  that	  nature	  provides,	  by	  doing	  what	  
we	  do	  with	  each	  other	  and	  saying	  what	  we	  say	  to	  each	  other.	  Indeed,	  saying	  is	  
doing:	  talking	  is	  undoubtedly	  the	  most	  important	  way	  that	  we	  go	  about	  
making	  the	  world	  what	  it	  is.”	  (Onuf,	  2013	  [1998]:	  p.3)	  
	  
In	  this	  passage,	  Onuf	  uses	  ordinary	  words	  and	  expressions	  in	  grossly	  extended	  novel	  
applications	  to	  express	  a	  generalisation	  about	  –	  apparently	  –	  everything	  in	  the	  world,	  
and	  how	  we	  as	  humans	  relate	  to	  it	  all.	  The	  application	  of	  the	  term	  ‘raw	  material’,	  
which	  is	  commonly	  used	  to	  distinguish	  things	  like	  crude	  oil,	  timber,	  iron	  ore	  and	  so	  on	  
from	  the	  various	  material	  products	  that	  we	  make	  from	  these	  (i.e.	  petrol,	  furniture,	  
pokers	  etc.),	  is	  extended	  to	  some	  indefinite	  totality;	  while	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘making’	  
and	  ‘constructing’	  are	  widened	  to	  include	  speaking.	  Similarly	  to	  Waltz’s	  and	  Wendt’s	  
extended	  use	  of	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘structure’,	  although	  though	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  extend	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘raw	  materials’,	  ‘make’	  and	  ‘construct’	  to	  apply	  to	  everything	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in	  the	  world,	  these	  words	  would	  not	  have	  the	  same	  sense	  when	  applied	  to	  all	  of	  the	  
various	  cases	  that	  Onuf	  uses	  them	  to	  encompass.	  Therefore,	  although	  Onuf	  presents	  
the	  passage	  above	  as	  expressing	  a	  general	  ‘proposition’	  which	  says	  something	  
significant	  about	  our	  relation	  as	  humans	  to	  everything,	  due	  to	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  
senses	  with	  which	  this	  proposition	  would	  apply	  to	  individual	  cases	  under	  
examination,	  the	  passage	  does	  not	  successfully	  achieve	  what	  Onuf	  apparently	  wants	  
it	  to.	  Similar	  examples	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  passages	  I	  quoted	  from	  Fierke	  and	  
Kratochwil	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  1.5,	  under	  Criticism	  3.	  
	  
The	  most	  important	  lesson	  to	  be	  learned	  from	  this,	  and	  from	  the	  thesis	  as	  a	  whole,	  
then,	  is	  as	  follows:	  that	  regardless	  of	  whether	  we	  are	  ‘positivist’,	  or	  ‘constructivist’,	  or	  
whether	  we	  endorse	  no	  general	  position	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  study	  of	  IR;	  when	  we	  are	  
using	  language	  to	  write	  about	  international	  politics	  or	  the	  study	  of	  IR,	  as	  with	  
contexts	  of	  philosophical	  reflection,	  we	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  developing	  novel	  patterns	  of	  
expression	  which	  seem	  to	  function	  in	  a	  way	  that	  we	  want	  –	  to	  achieve	  something	  
extra-­‐ordinary	  that	  these	  expressions	  in	  their	  existing	  employments	  could	  not	  –	  but	  
which	  are	  actually	  disguised	  ‘ornamental’	  employments	  that	  not	  only	  fail	  to	  achieve	  
our	  desired	  purpose,	  but	  serve	  to	  further	  obscure	  the	  topic	  under	  consideration.	  
Therefore,	  we	  must	  always	  be	  on	  our	  guard	  to	  spot	  such	  patterns	  and	  take	  













Directions	  for	  Further	  Research	  
	  
What	  I	  have	  accomplished	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  set	  out,	  and	  demonstrate,	  a	  way	  in	  
which	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy	  can	  be	  used	  to	  critically	  examine	  the	  meta-­‐
theoretical	  descriptions	  that	  appear	  to	  justify	  ‘positivist’	  and	  other	  approaches	  in	  IR,	  
which	  overcome	  the	  problems	  I	  identified	  with	  the	  ARO	  as	  a	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  
some	  IR	  scholars	  have	  previously	  used	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  make.	  However,	  
this	  is	  just	  a	  fragment	  of	  several	  much	  larger	  projects	  that	  can	  be	  undertaken	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  application	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  to	  IR.	  One	  of	  these	  larger	  
projects,	  mentioned	  earlier,	  is	  a	  general	  appraisal	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  various	  
ways	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  has	  already	  been	  applied	  within	  IR,	  since	  my	  
evaluation	  in	  Chapter	  2	  only	  focuses	  on	  one	  line	  of	  objection	  that	  Wittgenstein	  has	  
been	  used	  to	  make	  within	  the	  discipline.	  Another	  is	  to	  investigate	  more	  
comprehensively	  what	  the	  implications	  of	  various	  aspects	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  
philosophy	  are	  for	  IR,	  since	  I	  focused	  mainly	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  remarks	  such	  as	  PI	  
§§1-­‐5	  which	  inspired	  the	  ARO.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  the	  huge	  task,	  continuing	  from	  the	  
analysis	  of	  Waltz	  and	  Wendt	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  of	  critically	  clarifying	  the	  various	  
misleading	  patterns	  and	  forms	  of	  expression	  that	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
current	  and	  future	  IR	  scholars.	  This	  is	  a	  task	  that	  I	  hope	  my	  thesis	  will	  enable	  others	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